The Christian Nation of the Illiberal State in Hungary

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The issue of religion is particularly relevant in Eastern Europe as at regime change many hoped for a return of the pre-communist status quo on the exercise of religion and the role of the church in public life. In Hungary, state neutrality and guarantee of freedom of religion has become the norm, despite the primacy of the traditional churches over 'newer' congregations. Post-regime Hungary is largely secular, most people have no strong ties to religion and churches are on the margins of Hungarian social life. This however does not mean that politics has not penetrated the churches – both the majority Catholic Church and the protestant churches support different political parties. At the same time, nationalism has a long tradition in Hungary, a country having lost two-third of its territory and people after WWI. The financial crisis, the challenge of the mass influx of people into the country and diminished trust in the European project have had enormous impact on everyday politics that provide solid ground for more and more exclusionary nationalism that often resorts to religious references. This paper highlights how illiberal actors use religion to support their nationalist identity politics. Using systematic content analysis of the official speeches of Prime Minister Viktor Orban from 2010 to 2018, I examine the creation of this new discourse of Hungarian populist nationalism, where national identity is interwoven with loyalty to Christianity. This discourse is not only populist in being anti-establishment or anti-Europe but also increasingly ethnocentric being anti-migrants and uses religious references in defining itself as anti-Muslim. In Orban's illiberal democracy, identity of the nation rests on the discursive processes of 'othering' that stands for a contestation of cultural diversity and liberal equality for the sake of saving the nation: migrants and refugees stand for culturally deviant people and liberal rationalism of EU institutions or progressive gender rights are threatening the nativist conception of society. It is this illiberal refusal of equality and diversity that calls on Christian religion as a sign of Hungarianness. This echoes the anti-liberal turn in 1918 that brought church and state into closer union both symbolic and financial terms, yet references to Christianity are not evoked in a religious sense but rather religion is hijacked as a civilizational marker to distinguish and unite against Islam, and also to re-create a more nativist/cultural version of Europe in contrast to the liberal EU.

Hungary has become infamous in recent years, leading the wave of anti-democratic and anti-European developments both in Central and Eastern Europe and the larger European Union. The dismantling of democratic institutions took place in a spectacularly fast fashion in a country that used to be a forerunner of post-communist democratization and had the most institutionalized party system in Eastern Europe (Enyedi 2016a). This paper investigates this radical, populist and nationalist shift in recent years[1] that culminates in Prime Minister Viktor Orbán's ambition to build an "illiberal democracy" (see Tóth 2014) – a term used with pride by Orbán, though originally introduced to political science with pejorative connotation (Zacharia 1996). Using systematic content analysis of the speeches of Orbán from 2010 to 2018, the paper examines the creation of this new discourse of Hungarian populist nationalism that is not only right-wing populist in being anti-establishment, anti-elite or anti-Europe (Brubaker 2017) but also increasingly ethnocentric in being anti-migrant, and uses Christian religion in defining itself as anti-Muslim in a largely secular country, where only about 16% of people attend the Church on a weekly basis and no major party is religious.[2]

The radical right populist politics of the Orbán government that focus on identity fears seem to have been fueled by both the financial crisis and the migration crisis (although Hungary is not a destination but rather a transit or a source country for migration). Ever since 2010, the Hungarian government has been a forerunner not only in blaming foreign capital and Brussels for its financial troubles but was among the first to erect barbed wire fences on the borders to protect the country (and Europe) from mainly Muslim refugees. This identity-based politics re-conceptualizes national identity in more exclusivist forms, both in tangible and intangible terms: rebuilding the once invisible borders and also reconstructing the definition of the political community in more cultural/ethnic and religious terms.

The paper proceeds with a section that examines how discursive processes of "othering" are important for both nationalism and right-wing populism to rally the support of the people. This is followed by a brief background to Hungarian politics to contextualize the discourse of the prime minister that is examined in the following pages. The next section examines Orbán's speeches during his second government (Fidesz was also in power 1998-2002), arguing that the period 2010-14 has been dominated by the discourse of economic crisis, evoking Christian morals to enable Hungary's righteous fight against bankruptcy. The following section reviews the discourse of Orbán's third government, 2014-18, when instead of a normalization of the discourse, we see how the discourse shifts suddenly to the topic of fighting migration, portrayed as a cultural, religious and civilizational existential threat. This in turn results in more radical right-wing populist and xenophobic nationalist discursive strategies that are rooted in a belief in the supremacy of Christian religion. A brief concluding section outlines how the ambiguous use of religion in the discourse helps portray the nation as sacred and absolute, while identification with the nation becomes to resemble religious credence.

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[1] See e.g. Hungary's 'Illiberalism' should not go unchallenged. In Washington Post, August 16, 2014; Orbán wants to build 'illiberal state'. In: EUObserver, July 28, 2014; Orbán the Unstoppable. In: The Economist, September 27, 2014.

[2] At the same time, there is a Christian Democratic People's Party (KDNP) but it is insignificant. Neverthless, Fidesz – governing together with KDNP – has been preferred by Christian churches since the 2000s, and Prime Minister Orbán has on numerous occasions identified himself as a Christian believer (Calvinist). (Adam and Bozoki 2016b).

Discursive "othering" – constructing "us" vs. "them"

Using processes of "othering" in discursive practices to define both "us" and "them," the meaning of collective identity is formed not only by its content such as constitutive norms or cognitive features but also its relational feature, denoting that the creation of the in-group identity will produce competitive behavior with out-groups. The content of collective identity is then the outcome of social contestation both within the group and between the groups (Abdelal and Herrera 2001). How "us" vs. "them" are defined and conceptualized is crucial because "othering" serves to justify the legitimacy of political action and consequently conditions the identity formation for both "us" and "them" (Jensen 2011). If the "other" is portrayed as posing threats to society/national interest (e.g. socioeconomic, cultural, religious or criminal threat), this will result in clear blame attribution to those allegedly responsible for this problem (Meeusen and Jacobs 2017). Blame attribution is key to justify exclusionist policies, extreme measures or denial of rights that are all at the center of illiberal politics that challenge liberal equality for the sake of protecting national identity. Following this logic, the denial of recognition for minorities is coupled with radicalized inclusionary and exclusionary criteria that oppose liberal and pluralistic democracy (Kreko and Mayer 2015, 185).

In this sense, identity rests on the discursive processes of "othering" that defines both the good people (nation) and its enemies. At the same time, categories of "the people" or "elites" and "others" can be constructed with such a great flexibility that some call these terms empty vessels (Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013, 151), filled in different ways, by different actors. Religion can play an important role in the discursive construction of "us," who belong to the community, as well as who are the "others," who do not belong, and whether the "others" are portrayed as endangering the "self." Orbán's populist drift to illiberal authoritarianism uses the legitimization of a traditionalist/neoconservative ideology, which emphasizes nationalism, religion, and traditional family values (Bugaric and Kuhelj 2018). This way, Orbán's right-wing populism and illiberalism can be understood as a contestation of diversity and liberal equality for the sake of the nation: liberal rationalism of EU institutions or progressive gender rights are portrayed as threatening the nativist conception of society and traditional forms of life. Similarly, migrants and refugees stand for culturally deviant people, of a threatening religion that must be opposed to save Hungary and Christian Europe.

Orbán has been accused of being a political radical, a right-wing populist, and a nationalist (Adam and Bozoki 2016b) and we can expect these radical, populist, and/or nationalist themes and frames interact in the processes of discursive "othering" that are responsible for Hungary's illiberal shift. Let me briefly address each of these frames to clearly define what they stand for and how these frames and themes intermingle with references to religion in Orbán's right-wing populist nationalism.

While Ignazi (2003) claimed the radical right was by definition anti-democratic, others see it rather as an expression of a particular version of democracy, "the core element of which is a myth of a homogenous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism, which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism" (Minkenberg 2013). Others have identified the radical as standing for nativism and authoritarianism in ideology (Mudde 2007). Similarly, identifying populism has produced a large variety of definitions: some call it an ideology (Mudde 2004), others see as a specific organization type (Taggart 2004) or a specific rhetoric employed by

politicians (Betz 2002), or a political style (Moffitt and Tormey 2014). The most common definition formulated by Mudde (2004, 543) identifies populism as a "thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' and 'the corrupt elite', and which argues that politics should be an expression of the *volonté general* of the people." In turn, right-wing populism "pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous 'others' who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice" (Albertazzi and McDonnell 2008, 11; Mudde and Kaltwasser 2013).

Populists portray society in Manichean terms as divided into a good "us" and a bad (even evil) "them" and base their appeal on the claim that a homogenous "good" people is threatened by the actions, from above, by elites and, from below, by a variety of "others," thus pitting the population against both national out-groups and (global) elites (Marzouki et. al. 2016). While populism on the left is rather transnational than national ("people" are seen as global under-dog), right-wing populism often (if not always) combines "the revolutionary impulse of populism" with nationalism (Jenne 2018, 546). Nationalism, an ideology that values membership in the nation (an imagined community) above all other groups (Anderson 1991) and claims that national and political borders should coincide (Gellner 1983), at its core is about "othering" since issues of inclusion and exclusion are central to identity formation of the nation. In this sense, "othering" is the way "we" is defined that excludes "them," the particularity of the community being marked by language, tradition or cultural and religious attributes – be that real or imagined – that are shared among the members of the community (Wodak 2007a and 2007b; Yuval-Davis, 1997). Exclusionary national identities function as a system of domination favoring the in-group (Wimmer 2004), translating in the "self" being positively, the "other" negatively portrayed.

Right-wing populists often combine ethnicity with religion in defining community boundaries because religious expressions or symbols are often present in people's sense of belonging, thus religion can easily become a marker to distinguish between the good "us" and the bad "them" (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 182). Religious symbols, ideals or feelings of belonging are purposefully selected to legitimize claims to political authority through these unique and authentic relationships with "the people." Yet, most analysts agree that while churches speak of faith, right-wing populists are interested in identity – their understanding of Christian identity promotes a romanticized ideal of the national community in some golden age, uncorrupted by elites or "others." This reference to "good" Christian identity also renders non-Christian religions (mainly Islam) incompatible with the community, thus posing a threat to the purity and integrity of the native community (Marzouki et. al. 2016).

Methods and data

Focusing on political discourse is warranted because all policies develop and are (re)produced in a constant struggle between competing notions of identity, values, issues, and society overall (Dryzek, 2005). Moreover, political discourses are never independent of the context, they are both influenced and influence the context, the social and political structures and practices, and at the same time they reflect a particular representation of this context (Weiss & Wodak, 2005; Wodak, 1997). Political actors and their political discourses interact in public debates and public spaces and (together with other actors) shape common understandings in a process that can be characterized as intersubjective construction of meaning (Christiansen et al.,

1999) that helps people make sense of their social and cultural life. Political discourse is in this sense the discursive construction of reality (Lazar 2005), i.e. a means to provide meaningful understandings of the world to the community. What is especially significant is that political discourse is both about ideational aspects and material characteristics (Lazar, 2000), where ideational interpretations are more important than empirical facts, often distorting reality to support specific political goals.

Quantitative content analysis and qualitative frame analysis help us see how the public debate is set in terms of agendas and frames that focus public interest on particular subjects in particular ways. Keyword searches are employed to establish the salience of different issues, and help identify the main frames of these issues in the discourse. What matters is how "the people" or the nation is defined or framed vis-à-vis "others," what are the criteria used in these definitions – cultural, ethnic, or religious. Frames are capable of shifting people´s attitudes by making aspects of a certain issue more salient through different modes of presentation (McCombs 2004). It is these frames that construct reality and give meaning to particular events, facts or issues for the general public, shaping identities, values, as well as the perceptions of the others because "both the selection of objects for attention and the selection of frames for thinking about these objects are powerful agenda-setting roles" (McCombs and Shaw 1993, 62). In today's politics, we often see these conceptions of the people interact with the repertoire of populist political discourse and imagery (Moffitt 2016, Brubaker 2017); its traditional themes and frames such as reference to crisis, breakdown or threat; an appeal to the homogeneous people; they speak in the name of the nation or the people, or as one of the people; and the discourse is often anti-European, anti-establishment, or anti-elite; or bad manners that have entered public talk (Moffitt and Tormey 2014).

The absolute power Orbán enjoys over his party, Fidesz, makes him the primary author/creator of current Hungarian public political discourse – he has an ultimate say in any policy matter. This paper looks at Orbán's speeches delivered during his second and third government and treats the two periods comparatively to see if staying in power induced any substantial change – after all, being in power means populists become the 'new elite' and one can expect some consolidation of their discourse. All speeches are available on the government website in English and Hungarian – I use the English texts for the purposes of this analysis.[3] One important note is that while for the 2010-14 government cycle there are a total of 142 speeches, for 2014-18 there are 423 speeches and interviews (for the past few years, Orbán has regular extensive interviews on national radio, where he comments on all type of issues). While the texts contain all types of speeches/statements – from public talks to press statements to opening remarks to interviews, I treat all texts the same for the purposes of analysis. The speeches are numbered chronologically, starting from the 2010 election victory speech of Orbán.

The deconstruction of the secular accommodative Hungarian state since 2010

The 2010 illiberal turn of Hungarian politics, emphasizing nationalism and religion, is puzzling for several reasons. First, Hungary has traditionally been a model case for accommodating cultural diversity through minority protection and group specific rights, a

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[3] Although it seems the English translation is toned down, the Hungarian version can use more radical expressions. See http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches

conscious liberal policy to serve as model for neighboring countries, hosts of co-ethnic Hungarians as result of Hungary's history, the country having lost to its neighbors two-thirds of its territory and a third of its people after WWI (Bárdi 2013). Second, guarantee of religious freedom and state neutrality has become the norm after regime change (though direct state funding was replaced by a voluntary church tax only in 1998). There are no direct links between the church and the state like in Poland or Romania, although a loophole allowed for "differential treatment of the churches, taking into account social and historical reality" (Enyedi 2003, 161), which resulted in the primacy of the traditional churches over "newer" congregations. The churches also adopted self-imposed restrictions on political participation for the clergy[4] and post-regime Hungary is largely secular, with few people practicing their religion, though the majority of people is Catholic. This does not mean that politics has not penetrated the churches (Enyedi 2003, 165). Traditionally, church-bound organizations have been important in maintaining and mobilizing the constituencies of the different political parties (Greskovits 2015, 30-1). The majority Catholic Church has been a supporter of the right, while the smaller Calvinist Church lent support to the far right and the new Congregation of Faith supported the liberals (until they disappeared) but there is no dominant church to exert direct policy influence and most people have no strong ties to religion.

Orbán's Fidesz that was founded as a political party of young liberal democrats was strongly anti-clerical at the time of regime change. Religion was not a significant part of the party's identity politics even in the 2000s, after the party took a conservative turn. While this ideological turn resulted in an openly positive stance towards the traditional churches, religion has remained unimportant for the party strategy (Halmai 2018, 226), although Orbán himself regularly participated in festive Catholic processions (Adam and Bozoki 2016a, 133). Nevertheless, Fidesz uses religious symbols in an eclectic way in which references to Christianity are often mentioned together with the pre-Christian pagan traditions corresponding to the idea of two "Hungarys": the Western Christian, and the Eastern pagan, tribal one (Halmai 2018, 226; Adam and Bozoki 2016a, 137). As the following pages will argue, all this is to serve the romantic myth of a homogenous nation in a golden age, making religion instrumental for the party strategy as well as Orbán's right-wing populist nationalism.

In contrast with the past, many institutional arrangements and policies of post-2010 Hungary contradict the idea of state neutrality: the Fidesz-adopted new Hungarian constitution defines Christianity as a force that preserved "nationhood" and the 2012 Church Act allows government to pick and choose among churches to officially recognize (Enyedi 2016b, 16-17). The new constitution divides the political community into "us" and "them" – those who do not belong to Christianity or to the ethnic nation, or refuse to vow fidelity to the will of the majority see their rights infringed (Majtényi et al 2019). This new political setup also opposes previous multiculturalism and points to an intentional de-emphasis of the traditional accommodative characteristics of Hungarian policy (Halmai 2018). The new constitution defines Hungarian self-determination based on ethnic, cultural, linguistic and religious aspects, vis-à-vis the understanding of national membership, which can be chosen or renounced individually (Brubaker 1994). In these terms, belonging cannot be interpreted only as membership in a

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[4] E.g. Catholic clergy are entirely forbidden to hold political office and Lutherans must suspend their clerical duties if they hold political office (Enyedi 2003).

political community (state) but as membership in a cultural community – the nation, a bond symbolizing the individual's belonging that is a generational link, ensuring historical transcendence and continuity for the future of the nation.

It is important to note that while post-regime Hungarian minority accommodation policy has been inclusive and liberal, this is not to suggest that Hungarian society has ever been in favor of multiculturalism. Public opinion polls have shown that chauvinism and xenophobia among ordinary Hungarians has a long tradition (e.g. Simonovits and Bernát 2016, 41), similarly to other countries of the region. Anti-Semitism, anti-Roma attitudes or dislike of foreigners have been common for large segments of Hungarian society, often lending support for Hungarian radical right parties.[5] These all suggest that the foundations upon which Orbán built his illiberal politics have been long present (Kreko and Mayer 2015, 201), as both Hungarian societal attitudes and party preferences provide solid ground for radical identity politics. The following pages show how Orbán has built on these foundations using a discourse of societal fears, combining right-wing populist strategies, nationalist claims and religious references to rally support for illiberal politics.

2010-14: Christian morals to fight economic crisis

A quick overview of the speeches of the second Orbán government (2010-14) clearly shows that the main theme has been the 2008 financial/economic crisis that hit Hungary particularly hard. The crisis keyword appears almost 400 times, being the sole most important topic for Orbán, other issues figuring much less prominently (see Appendix). The public discourse has a clear economic focus, the most often used references are Hungarian economy, markets and the need to protect Hungary and Hungarians. Despite posing as a savior of Hungarians, ethno-cultural references are largely missing from the discourse, Orbán barely mentions Hungarian ethnicity, culture and tradition. Similarly, there is no talk about religion or churches except for the speeches addressed to specific church authorities, although references to Christianity abound. All speeches focus solely on Hungary and the Hungarians; foreigners, aliens, migration or immigration as terms are barely mentioned at all. In contrast, the EU and other European countries are mentioned as often as Hungary and this is not by chance: according to Orbán, Hungary often has to combat the EU and Western countries in its quest to overcome its crisis. Portraying the EU as siding with foreign capital, the EU thus becomes identified with the "other," a traitor, using double standards against Hungary, part of Europe: "We accept the common moral standards of European cultural nations, but we will not accept double standards" (Speech 9).

Economic identity with Christian morality

All of the above suggests Hungarian identity is important for Orbán's discourse solely in economic terms and the financial crisis is a threat for this economic "self." In this economic identity based politics, the "others" are also conceived in financial terms: banks and bankers (106 mentions) and multinationals (30 mentions) stand for "multinational capital" positioned against

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[5] The first such party, MIÉP, the Hungarian Truth and Life Party, passed the 5% parliamentary threshold with its pan-Hungarian agenda, open racism and anti-Semitism (Minkenberg 2013). Jobbik (the name in Hungarian implies both 'better' and 'more to the right') became popular on an agenda of "gypsy crime" (Karacsony and Rona 2011) and the founding of a paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard Movement (Biro Nagy et al 2013).

Hungarian economy. This specific portrayal of the hostility between multinationals and Hungarians also leads to blame attribution – foreign capital together with the European Union and Western countries are to be blamed, together with the former Socialist governments, for the financial difficulties. In turn, Hungary is to stand on its own to fight this challenge by relying on its people and its resources. Hungary's new constitution (called Fundamental Law) is portrayed as one of the means of this solitary fight (143 mentions), a source of trust (96 mentions) and unity (36 mentions). Emphasizing the values of patriotism, religion, and traditional family, the constitution becomes a religious sanctuary: "the main body of the Fundamental Law is like a church nave, off which the cardinal Acts open like side aisles. The National Avowal itself is not a mere ornament or appendage at the beginning of the text, but is an integral part of it: it is the gateway through which we enter the building that is the constitution" (Speech 241).

This religious metaphor also signals that religion is the only exception for the non-presence of cultural markers of Hungarian identity. Orbán refers more often to Christianity and Christian cultural roots (175 mentions) than any other aspect of identity – even language that Orbán often refers to as the best means to express the peculiarity of Hungarianness. Nevertheless, no talk about religion as faith is present in the discourse, except for the cooperation between the state and the church that is evoked by Orbán, claiming a good relationship between state and church is and has been necessary for success: "the Hungarian nation was strong and proud at times when there was a good relationship between the state and the church" (Speech 71). He subscribes this way to the tradition of the historical churches in Hungary to have good relations with political parties on both left and right (Greskovits 2015), the different churches providing legitimacy for different parties on both sides of the ideological sphere (Enyedi 2003).

Although Hungary is a largely secular country and Fidesz is not a particularly religious party, religion or religious faith is portrayed as a source of legitimacy or morality when Orbán talks about the political and institutional changes envisioned or enacted, such as the adoption of the new constitution, which in this sense has divine justification: "Our sin, which we of course assume proudly, is that in the 21st century we have dared to include in our constitution the fact that faith, the church, the nation and the family belong not to our past but to our future" (Speech 15). Religion or Christianity is thus portrayed as a source of moral values, traditional norms and directives, which are much needed for Hungary's renewal to fend the crisis off. Orbán claims the financial crisis is due to a moral crisis, caused in turn by the diminishing role of Christianity in Europe, blamed on Brussels: "when constructing Europe we began to be ashamed of our Christian roots and to neglect them along with our moral and cultural traditions" (Speech 33). The entire capitalist system is not only portrayed as unjust but the credit system (that led to the crisis) is considered immoral, too: "the loans which our countries are suffering from no longer have any relation to any kind of moral principle" (Speech 15). This way, Hungary with its "Christian moral principles" not only has a "strong moral identity" (Speech 38) but a duty to fight immoral multinational capital and its supporters.

Yet again, while the importance of religious foundation is recognized especially for value and morality based politics, what matters more for Orbán is Christian culture and identity, with its values and norms, as "important things – work, credit, family, nation – have become dissolved from the moral foundations that Christianity provided to us" (Speech 15). Once again, Christianity ceases to be a system of faith but becomes a source of values and norms, a traditional lifeform.

Following this logic, the Fidesz government has not only enshrined 'the family' as a marriage between a man and woman into the constitution but it also clearly defines the role of women in its vision for Hungary and the ideal Hungarian family – they should stay at home to produce enough children to form a strong, Hungarian nation (Lugosi 2018, 226). This identitarian Christianism is also underlined by the fact that no reference to faith can be found in the discourse, in fact no reference to other religions is ever made (Islam is mentioned only in reference to Arab countries, Muslims never mentioned). This lack of interest in religion per se is explained by Orbán himself, noting that Hungary is "a religiously neutral country" (Speech 15), since although more than 95% of the Hungarian population belongs to a denomination, only 16% go to church on a weekly basis. As such, Orbán's discourse hijacks Christian religion as an identity marker, portrayed as a set of values, standards and behavior, part of the nativist family model. Christianity becomes a part of national identity, a source of moral power, something to protect against secular pressure (common in Europe and the EU) and Orbán becomes a "prophet of the patria" (Pirro 2014, 606): "One of the reasons why we elaborated a constitution of this kind was that we felt we must face up against those European political and intellectual trends and forces which aim to push back and undermine Christian culture, Christian civilization and Christian values" (Speech 15).

Populist discursive elements

When it comes to other discursive strategies, Orbán's discourse relies heavily on the perception of crisis (398 mentions), breakdown, and threat (29 times) or lack of security (48 times). The threats are presented in economic terms, the conflict-line between the "self" and "others" is based on financial interest: "the serious economic crisis that threatened to push Hungary into bankruptcy" (Speech 36), and those threatening Hungary are the multinationals, banks, and the EU bureaucrats – all of whom Orbán is ready to fight: "we do not wince with respect to anybody; not from the raised voices of multinational companies, nor from the threats of the bankers, nor from the negative forecasts of financial circles, nor from the raised fingers of Brussels bureaucrats" (Speech 100). These are all common themes for right-wing populist discourse in general, and Orbán relies on these populist elements focusing on fear in order to justify decisive and immediate action to protect against these threats that call for "the total renewal of our homeland, Hungary; total renewal and as a result, radical reorganization within every dimension: intellectual, moral, spiritual, economic and social" (Speech 15).

Orbán employs other populist discursive strategies as well, such as the constant appeal to the Hungarian people that is present throughout his speeches. This is best seen in the frequency of his reference to "us" and "our", by far the most often occurring keywords for the speeches. Orbán not only speaks as one of the people but he identifies with the "true people:" "Because I am familiar with our kind, I also know that Hungarians dislike 'spoon-fed talk'" (Speech 26) and he speaks in the name of or for the nation, expressing popular will and claiming ultimate legitimacy as the "national voice:" "What is good for the Hungarians? What is good for the Hungarian nation? What is good for the Hungarian people? And it is to this that we can tailor the economic model that we would like to operate" (Speech 14).

As other right-wing populists, Orbán's discourse often makes anti-elite and anti-establishment claims. As noted, the past elite (former socialist-liberal governments) are not only immoral but to be blamed for present day economic difficulties since they betrayed the people:

"The moral crisis may also be recognized in the case of those leaders who, professing a philosophy of 'let us eat and drink, for tomorrow we die'" (Speech 15). This anti-elite or anti-establishment attitude also grants Orbán the possibility to distance himself from his predecessors as well as the establishment and claim that he is not part of the political elite, he rather speaks in the name of the people, his government expressing the will of the people – unlike previous governments: "We felt that we had been cheated, that the Hungarian people were being cheated, and through them the Hungarian Government, and then we said, let's start using a different tone of voice" (Speech 129).

All these suggest a right-wing populist re-conceptualization of the (true) people, of the nation – that at the same time shows that this nation is not any longer the community of all people but it is more selective – supporters of the EU or liberal values, critics of Christian values or traditional lifeforms do not belong to this group anymore. Yet, in contrast to the abundance of right-wing populist themes, nationalist frames seem to be absent from Orbán's discourse, despite to constant appeal to the Hungarian nation. There is no talk of citizenship, though this should be one of the most important markers of Hungarianness. Similarly, talk of the Hungarian diaspora, a favorite subject of Hungarian identity politics, is also largely missing. This might be explained by the adoption of a preferential citizenship law already in 2010, which Orbán portrays as a political tool to reunite the Hungarian nation, irrespective of the borders: "those who live in the Carpathian Basin and expatriates who live further afield, must be regarded as full members of the Hungarian nation" (Speech 96). Last but not least, unification of the nation is presented as part of Hungary's struggle for sovereignty but again the ethnically reunited nation should serve the purposes of economic sovereignty: "We fought for our own Constitution, for the reunification of our nation and for our economic and financial autonomy." (Speech 92).

In sum, Orbán's political discourse in 2010-14 is centered on the economic crisis, the sole major theme for his second government. All issues are presented through the populist lenses of an economic fight between Hungarian interest and foreign capital and international institutions. Orbán's discourse is abound in populist frames, blaming elites and the establishment for economic troubles, while speaking as one of the people, for the people. Yet, his discourse has little to say about Hungarian identity in non-economic terms. Only language is mentioned as marker of ethnicity. In the same way, Orbán does not talk about religious faith but Christianity as a cultural/identity marker. This way Hungary is equated with traditional Christian values, ensuring it falls within the boundaries of traditional European norms on a civilizational level. The same Christian roots and support for traditional values give Hungary a strong moral identity and legitimacy in its economic fight. Despite missing nationalist themes, Orbán discourse exposes all the major elements of right-wing populism to appeal to people's support for his fight for national sovereignty and the "Hungarian way" (meaning unorthodox economic policy) against multinationals (and partly the former political elite), the neoliberal market and the EU and its institutions. The discourse is anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-European, no critics of this approach can be considered part of the "true people" – nothing less than a prime example of economic grievance based populism.

2015-18: The fight of the ethnic religious nation against Muslim migrants
Turning to the 2014-18 period, the time of the third Orbán government, the very first thing one must notice is a major turn in Orbán's political discourse that results in yet another

reconfiguration of Hungarian identity-based politics. While issues of migration, refugees, asylum seekers or immigration have been absolutely ignored in the previous cycle, now these issues become the main topic – 180 of the 422 speeches speak to some extent about these. Moreover, this change of topic is relatively abrupt, only 4 speeches have migration as a topic in the second half of 2014 (and these focus on Hungarians working abroad and a general pro-natalist policy preference over migration) but in 2015, the discourse breaks away from the topic of the financial crisis and the vast majority of speeches (46) are mainly about the European refugee crisis. It is noteworthy that Orbán delivers his very first speech against migration already in February 2015, well in advance of the summer of the same year, when more 350,000 refugees pass through the country on their way to Western Europe. Moreover, migration remains the main topic even in 2018, long after the border-fence has been built to stop anybody from entering the country.

Migration as nemesis of the nation

What is even more significant is that Orbán's discourse also changes substantially in other terms. First, he has opposed neoliberal capitalism. Now, he claims that liberal multiculturalism is a dead end and it must be rejected since migration brings "people, many of whom are unwilling to accept European culture, or who come here with the intent of destroying European culture" (Orbán's State of the Nation Address, 27 February 2015, Budapest). The primacy of the anti-migration topic is preserved throughout the observed time period, although Hungary has built a fence already in 2015 that keeps all refugees out of Hungary. Yet, the danger of migration does not disappear, instead Orbán's discourse only radicalizes further over the years to the extent that he is willing to break taboos – yet another populist discursive strategy (Moffitt and Tormey 2014), claiming that although it is forbidden to talk about it openly "immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries" (Orbán's 15 March 2016 National Day speech, Budapest). The same major shift in the political discourse can be seen from the frequency results of the keywords used in the analysis of texts. While mentions of 'crisis' remain at the same level for 2014-18 as they were for 2010-14, mentions of terms such as migration, refugees, or asylum skyrocket. No other search term shows such extraordinary change for the two time periods analyzed, which again only underlines that migration is the sole key topic for Orbán. As noted previously, these terms were missing entirely in the previous discourse yet these dominate Orbán's discourse even in 2018, long after the refugee crisis.

A more nuanced understanding of the change in the topic emerges if we consider the visible imbalance between the different terms Orbán uses in his discourse: the terms migrants, immigrant, migration are used five times more often than refugee or asylum seeker (see Appendix). This is not by chance but is rather a clear indication of Orbán's views on the topic – he does not consider these people refugees but rather migrants, who come to Europe mainly for economic reasons: "Even those claiming to be refugees are in fact economic migrants, setting out in the hope of a better life in Europe" (Speech 244). This way the "other" is not portrayed as a 'person in need' but rather as one seeking economic benefit, which in turn means no obligation for Hungary or the Hungarians to help or show charity, except maybe for attempts to enable a better life for these people at home, as argued by Orbán: "Our political and moral starting-point is that help must be taken where there is trouble, rather than bringing the trouble here" (Speech 493).

More importantly, in this new discourse, the "other" is re-conceptualized: since the salience of economic issues diminished, international capital and supporters of neoliberalism are much less referred to but rather the "other" is now portrayed either into the image of "the migrant" or the EU and the common European refugee system that would impose refugee quotas on Hungary. Domestic organizations that help migrants are also defined enemies. Part of this re-configured process of "othering" is the fact that mentions of the EU and European countries, portrayed as supporters of migration, more than quadruple compared to the levels that we observed in the speeches of the first cycle for the EU being partner-in-crime to multinational capital. Supporters are to be blamed for bringing migration to Hungary: "We must not be given orders from Brussels on whom we should live together with, and Brussels must not have the power to forcibly resettle here people whom we do not want to live together with" (Speech 193). Similarly to what we have seen for the speeches of the first cycle, there is an abundance of negative references to the EU and liberal Western countries, moreover, there is a significant increase in the frequency of these negative references, suggesting (if possible) even more blame for the EU for Hungary's troubles.

The image of crisis, threats and dangers – often exploited by populist politicians – remains at the core of discourse, although there is no real threat of fluxes of people since Orbán built the fence on the southern borders. This also demonstrates that "political crises are, by definition, constructed, and populists can have an important role in the framing-process" (Enyedi 2015, 243). It is through Orbán's discursive strategy that threats have become central to the understanding of the Hungarian "self" as illustrated by references to the need of protection, security or threats that have increased more than seven times in the post-2015 speeches compared to the first period. While in the first period Orbán was preoccupied with protecting the interest and security of Hungary that were conceived mainly in financial terms, since 2015 he talks about threats that are multiple but are all related to migration and the alien "other" understood in a cultural, religious or civilizational sense: "This change facing Europe – or which, in my opinion, is threatening Europe – can also have an effect at deeper, civilizational layers. The identity of civilization in Europe could change." (Speech 251).

Another major change in Orbán's discourse can be noticed when it comes to reference to Hungary and the Hungarians, or the use of terms "us" and "our" that all suggest an increased ethnocentrism of the discourse. First of all, the number of these references has tripled as compared to the first cycle and while up to 2015, Orbán referred to the Hungarian nation and Hungarians in general terms and also used the term "people of Hungary," now his discourse includes more references to culture and ethnic traditions and barely talks about "people of Hungary." As such, the image of the "self" has been redefined as well, there is no more abstract citizen but Hungarian identity has become more interwoven with language, culture and tradition, a unique civilization built on ethnic particularism: "Being a Hungarian is a mission, a task, a job of work: to maintain, strengthen and carry forward a great, lonely, thousand-year-old civilization, built on the Hungarian language and on the foundations of the Hungarian mentality, and surrounded by dissimilar nations" (Speech 398).

Surrounded by the threatening "others," protection of Hungary's borders and boundaries becomes paramount for survival of this ethnic particularism. This stands for an essentialist/primordialist understanding of national identity, in name of which all other cultures or identities are to be excluded: "We commit to promoting and safeguarding our heritage, our

unique language, Hungarian culture … the Hungarian government is not in a position to support mass movements of population" (Speech 335). Moreover, it is Orbán and his government alone who has the legitimacy to decide who can belong to the nation conceived on particularistic ethnic and cultural terms: "only those who have permission from our elected parliament, government or some other official state body can enter the territory of Hungary, can settle here and live here with us; and we can say that we shall not obey anybody else's word and shall not accept orders from anyone else who states that we must admit this person or that person" (Speech 356).

Identitarian Christianity vs. religious faith

The reconfiguration of Orbán's talk is also signaled by other changes in his discursive strategies. One such difference is reference to religion: while in the first cycle, Christianity was a topic that was never really used in religious terms but rather as a cultural or civilizational marker or a source of moral standing and legitimacy – exactly in line with right-wing populists understanding of identitarian Christianity (Roy 2016a), in the post-2015 speeches, Christianity is not only three times more often referred to but it is often used as a reference to religious faith. This way, faith also becomes a marker of belonging – notwithstanding that Hungary is not a religious country – because the process of "othering" is often made contrasting Christian religion with Islam and Muslims. Through this portrayal, Orbán links religion to the definition of "us," the Christians vs. the "other," the Muslim immigrant. Moreover, Islam or Muslims are portrayed not only as foreign or alien but also threatening to both Hungarians and Europe as a whole: "this mass population movement also coincides with an offensive by a major world religion: Islam's latest global offensive" (Speech 481). It is noteworthy that the head of the Catholic Church is ready to join this discourse, renouncing the norms of support for the weak, claiming that "The Church would become a smuggler if it accepted refugees" (Majtényi et al 2019, 8).

While fearing the spread of Islam would suggest a clear preference for "our religion," Christianity, over other religions (mainly Islam), one must note that originally Orbán makes repeated statements in early 2015 that his discourse is not against other religions but its value neutral. Yet, these statements are misleading and Orbán's false value neutrality is well illustrated when he says that "we look upon the Islamic cultural communities living in Hungary as a valuable asset, and we do not wish to put them in awkward situations even at a verbal level; but we insist on Hungary's current ethnic-cultural composition, and we do not want to recognize anyone's right to force us to change that" (Speech 262). Orbán also claims "Christianity came into being as a world religion earlier than Islam … [and] lifted people out of barbarism" (Speech 534). This way he declares Hungarian national identity or culture, which he identifies with Christianity, to be above all others, particularly non-European cultures. All this signals is that Orbán's discourse is not only exclusionist in nationalist terms but clearly anti-Islam or anti-Muslim: "to be clear and unequivocal, I can say that in Hungary Islamization is subject to a constitutional ban" (Speech 335).

In this reconfigured discourse, ethnicity, culture, and religion become intermingled and function as barriers to belonging for those who do not fit these criteria. The discourse rejects multiculturalism and religious diversity – non-Hungarians have no right of inclusion, non-European cultures, civilizations or non-Christian religions are to be excluded from the political community:

> Multiculturalism means the co-existence of people with different background civilizations – for example Islam, the Asian religions and Christianity side by side. We shall make every effort to save Hungary from this. We welcome investors, artists and scientists arriving from non-Christian countries, but we do not want to co-exist with those cultures in terms of large masses of their people (Speech 253).

In a similar way, anti-Islam attitudes are also justified by Orbán's belief in a Christian Europe, which is not only religiously but culturally superior but different from the cultures and religions of migrants to the extent that no reconciliation seems possible. Moreover, newcomers provide an existential threat to the "self" and its core values, the sheer arrival of outsiders would dilute the Christianity of the continent:

> Let us not forget, however, that those arriving have been raised in another religion, and represent a radically different culture. Most of them are not Christians, but Muslims. This is an important question, because Europe and European identity is rooted in Christianity. Is it not worrying in itself that European Christianity is now barely able to keep Europe Christian? If we lose sight of this, the idea of Europe could become a minority interest in its own continent (Speech 260).

This way, Orbán redraws the cultural and religious borderlines of both Hungary and Europe and portrays himself not only the protector of Hungary but a savior of Christian Europe – all at the expense of Muslim migrants: "The only way out for those who want to preserve Europe as a Christian culture is not to allow more and more Muslims into Europe" (Speech 263). Portraying himself as a crusader of Christianity, Orbán is ready to even challenge the secular division of state and church when he talks about the need to "protect our own people, the Christians" (Speech 220) because Christianity is a persecuted religion (mainly in the Islamic world) – a topic previously unheard in Hungarian public talk. In a clear attempt to bring religion back into public policies, Orbán's government has set up a department within the Ministry for Human Capacities (responsible for education and church issues) being the first and only government in the world to do so.

Since Christian religion is not only superior to all other religions but needs to be saved from the "others," Orbán evokes religion to legitimate exclusionist understandings of Hungarian and European identity. This way, migrants are discursively conceptualized as aliens that are not only culturally and religiously different but threatening: "Let masses of people from different religious backgrounds – who have been raised with different morals and different traditions, and who have no idea about Europe – come and teach us a lesson" (Speech 405). The same image of the threat coming from migrants is revealed also by the descriptive statistics of the keywords: while in the first cycle there was little talk about crime and terrorism, the terms terrorism and terrorist organization are mentioned more than 330 times in the second period. Moreover, these risk of terrorism is to be blamed on migrants, who should have not been allowed into Europe: "we must tackle openly and plainly is that there is a clear correlation between the illegal immigrants who are flooding into Europe and the spread of terrorism" (Speech 259).

Although the above analysis shows that religion has (re)entered public discourse in Hungary, an admittedly secular country, the primary reference to Christianity is still in cultural or identity terms. Orbán claims it is Hungary's "historic and moral duty to protect" (Speech 267)

Europe and Christianity but as he himself notes, what needs to be protected is "Christianity, which here is not a question of religion, but a cultural framework" (Speech 523). This cultural framework of Christianity not only stands at the basis of Hungarian identity and morality but it is raised a step higher, it is the foundation of European civilization that no Muslim should be allowed to trespass into: "If we allow a competition to evolve between two civilizations here, in Europe, we Christians will lose. … We can only keep the continent as it is by not letting everyone in, and not allowing a competition of this kind to start" (Speech 264).

This shows Orbán employs in his post-2015 discourse an uneasy mix of Christianity understood as faith and Christianity seen as identity. This blurring of Christianity as religion and cultural civilization is best noticeable when Orbán fears freedom of religion, the fight against anti-Semitism, or gender equality from the spread of other religions in Europe: "in the immigrant countries the European values of freedom of religion, the fight against anti-Semitism and equality between the sexes are all equally under threat." (Speech 480). Yet again, this threat is not only religious but rather existential as with the loss of Christianity, fundamental values that are all rooted in Christianity could be threatened therefore "we must stand up for our conventional European values: for families, for national communities, for church communities, for the conventional forms of child-rearing, and for the traditional family model" (Speech 441).

This way, Orbán conveys a contradiction in terms: Christianity is seen not only a provider of all kinds of cultural and traditional values that are at the core of national identity but it is open and assures gender equality; freedom of religion as well as the fight against anti-Semitism unlike "barbaric" Islam. Thus, Christian religion must be an open – or even liberal – religion; and it matters little for Orbán that liberal values or norms associated with religion are contradicting convictions of true believers: gender equality or gay rights vs. traditional family and child-rearing forms. Identitarian Christianity thus comes to contradict religious faith as it demands secularizing religion or liberalizing those religious values that the Churches are trying to defend: permissiveness to differences in status between men and women, the sanctity of marriage or the "pro-life" versus "pro-choice" preference (Roy 2016a, 3). This is why Christianity as identity is in fact void of any spiritual content and becomes the synonym of self-identity in Orbán's discourse. In turn, abandoning Christianity means giving up national identity and Orbán is in favor of re-Christianizing Europe and saving the sovereign nation state from the secular EU: "In Europe some countries decided to forsake Christianity, and to forsake their own national identity. They want to enter a post-Christian and post-national era" (Speech 515).

Populist discursive strategies

What remains constant for the post 2015 speeches is Orbán's continuous use of the same right-wing populist political strategies in his speeches that were outlined already for the first cycle. Orbán often speaks in the name of the nation, using the "we" or posturing as one of the people: "In the past few years we have achieved far more than we might think. Today once more, deep down a strong Hungarian nation is being forged" (Speech 238). All policies and politics are portrayed to serve the nation not only in the domestic arena but Orbán is ready "to confirm that the basis of our foreign policy doctrine is the Hungarian national interest" (Speech 236). In the same way, Orbán's anti-European discourse has only strengthened during 2014-2018. Europe and more specifically the EU, continues to be a threatening "other" for his understanding of Hungarian identity, based on exclusionist cultural/civilizational norms and traditionalist values

rooted in religion that he sees challenged by the rational liberalism and secularism of the EU. Opposed to the EU, national sovereignty becomes absolute and definitions of the "self" increase in importance since they divide between those that can have a say and those that do not: "We alone, Hungarians who live here and who claim this country as our own, can decide on this … we must reject all EU and Brussels attempts and designs which seek to take from us and assign to someone else the right to decide" (Speech 294). Anti-Europeaness of the discourse exacerbates to the point that Orbán's opposition becomes irrational, any legal proceedings of the EU against Hungarian policy, irrespective of the policy field that the challenge takes place, is considered automatically invalid since "the procedures which have been instituted against Hungary … in a variety of legal forms can be seen as a kind of revenge for the fact that we have dared to confront Brussels' immigration policy" (Speech 294).

As a right-wing populist, Orbán's discourse also remains anti-elite, and he is not only against the European elite that he portrays as unintelligent because "it is sitting in a closed, ideological shell, which means it has hardly any connection to reality" (Speech 299) but also the previous ruling elite in Hungary that he continues to attacks for betraying the people's will: "you cannot run the life of a country by the elite closing its eyes and ears to a fundamentally important issue and ploughing ahead regardless of what the people are saying" (Speech 356). This anti-eliteness is only strengthened by his talk as one of the ordinary people, part of the common citizenry, a member of the community calling for unity: "we shall either be successful together or not at all. Either we all advance together, or we all sink into the mud" (Speech 238). In this populist claim, political leadership can only be legitimate if it speaks in the name of "the people," in the service of national interest. In turn, national interest is perceived as ultimate goal, above all others as it corresponds to the will of the "true people." Only Orbán himself can claim to represent this will because "The prevailing political leadership has today attempted to ensure that people's personal work and interests, which must be acknowledged, are closely linked to the life of the community and the nation, and that this relationship is preserved and reinforced" (Speech 219).

Conclusions and discussion

The analysis shows that Orbán's public discourse has been using right-wing populist elements ever since he took office in 2010, since the entire discourse centers on creating and maintaining the image of existential crises Hungary must face. The only change we see is that while in 2010-14 the discourse centered on the financial crisis, the post-2015 discourse is exclusively toned to the migration crisis. These alleged existential threats are then used by Orbán to justify sweeping powers and extraordinary measures such as reusing the IMF/EU bailout plans, building fences on Hungary's borders to prevent entry of migrants or the total rejection of European quota systems of refugees, as well as the total transformation of both state institutions and national identity narratives to build illiberal democracy. The two central themes of the speeches also establish the nature of the discourse for each period under study: in 2010-14 we see a standard right-wing populist discourse of economic insecurity, or simply put economic nationalism; the post-2015 discourse is what I call populist nationalism, a discourse of national identity in crisis due to the migration pressure as well as the EU's attempt to re-settle migrants.

It is the processes of discursive "othering" that are at the center of the narrative, constantly redefining both the "self" and the "other," and the reconstruction of the boundaries

of the community not only create a Manichean world but also show how Orbán's discourse is illiberal and fundamentally attacks rational liberal democracy and respect for diversity, embodied by minority rights, secularism and freedom of religion, democratic institutions, or pluralism. While the discourse of economic nationalism sees the world solely in economic terms, populist nationalism sees the rights of the nation stand above any particularistic interest: multinationals, supranational institutions or even individuals. The discourse of populist nationalism thus stands for a discourse of xenophobic nationalism, rooted in the supremacy of Christian religion that is combined with right-wing populist political strategies to provide legitimacy and inspire support for Orbán's illiberal democracy.

It is this illiberal refusal of equality and diversity that brings (back) into public discourse references to religion in otherwise secular Hungarian society. There is a dual purpose for Christian identity in Orbán discourse: on the one hand, religion is used to support a nostalgia for a golden past of the homogeneous community and its traditional life-forms and values, and on the other, it is employed to render Islam an intrinsically foreign religion (DeHanas and Shterin 2018), alien to Europe. This right-wing populist use of religion makes Orbán's discourse revolve around two notions: the restoration of traditional culture and religion that is accompanied by the idea of an essential righteous battle to be waged against "others" (Marzouki et. al. 2016) that are culturally or religiously different (migrants) or reject traditionalism (liberals, Brussels bureaucrats).

Although Orbán portrays Christian religion simultaneously being superior to all other religions and the true path to salvation (Abdel-Fadil 2018, 113), his speeches reveal that Orbán seems to fit much better into the club of right-wing populist politicians that are "Christian largely to the extent that they reject Islam" (Roy 2016b, 186). Moreover, although repeatedly claiming to be a religious person, casting Islam as a civilizational threat, Orbán shares with right-wing populists a kind of "civilizationism" (Brubaker 2017) that ironically demands from Christian civilizations very liberal views – that Orbán himself opposes – on issues such as gender and sexuality to distinguish themselves from allegedly barbaric Islamic cultures (DeHanas and Shterin 2018, 178). Portrayed this way, both Islam and Christianity cease to be religions and loose their core values as systems of faith: Islam becomes a political ideology aimed to conquer and suppress European societies, while Christianity becomes a cultural/civilizational factor, not a value system. In this sense, Orbán hijacks religion to express belonging rather than believing, casting Christian faith as an identity marker that replaces "the core value of 'love thy neighbour' with 'hate thy neighbour'" (Abdel-Fadil 2018, 112).

This ambivalence towards religion is present throughout Orbán's anti-migration discourse, a mixture of Eastern and Western use of religion in right-wing populist discourse (Brubaker 2017): on the one hand, Orbán wants to save the soul of "Christian Europe" (similarly to his Eastern counterpart, Jarosław Kaczynski to defend Poland's status as a "bulwark of Christianity")(Cremer 2018), on the other, he sees Christianity not as a religion but a source of moral strength and legitimacy that justifies all efforts to prevent "others" from watering down the uniqueness of the "self," very much in line with Western right-wing populist politicians' use of religion only as identity without faith. Notwithstanding this, Orbán's preference is for a traditional, religious, ethnic community and rejects Western nationalism shifts to civilizationism, driven by the notion of a civilizational threat from Islam that "internalizes liberalism, secularism, philosemitism, gender equality, gay rights, and free speech" (Brubaker 2017, 1208) because

Orbán opposes liberalism, claiming it subordinates national interest to "foreign models of multiculturalism, Roma rights, LGBT rights, and refugee protection" (ibid).

This ambiguity in the role of religion in Orbán's discourse can only be resolved by looking at what values his discourse promotes (Roy 2016a, 9). These are right-wing populist values: the defense of national identity as opposed to equality between citizens and the protection of Christian identity vs. the separation of church and state. These are illiberal claims against liberal and democratic norms that must be opposed to enable the "true people" and their demands. We have seen that Orbán sees the Hungarian people through the lenses of right-wing populism, in absolute terms as morally "pure," "noble" (Mudde 2004) and "virtuous" (Marzouki and McDonnell 2016). Yet, DeHanas and Shterin (2018, 182) are right in claiming "'sacred' is a better term than those such as 'noble' or 'moralistic' for capturing the moral seriousness that can animate populist followers to act in defense of their values (sometimes with violence) for the cause of 'the people.'" In Orbán's illiberal democracy, it is "the people," the ethnic nation that becomes sacred and absolute, and it is identification with the nation that resembles religious credence. Through its allegiance to the sacred people, Orban's radical right-wing populist nationalism becomes a surrogate religion (Adam and Bozoki 2016a, 142) that grants divine justification and moral legitimation to his illiberal rule.

Appendix

Sample keywords/phrases	2010-2014	2014-2018
Crisis	398	416
Debt crisis /sovereign debt	5	24
Financial crisis	10	47
Economic crisis	73	39
Eurozone crisis	1	1
European crisis	17	0
Hungarian economy	160	121
Banks	96	60
Multinationals	30	23
Banker	10	8
Stand on its own	5	12
Socialist	37	111
Market	137	268
Migration	13	1616
Refugee	3	266
Asylum	0	105
Migration/refugee crisis	0	87
Immigration	2	767
Islam	4	55
Muslim	0	86
Christianity	175	529
Religion	34	100
Terrorism	10	335
Islamic State	0	13
Hungarians	427	1390
Hungarian nation	50	122
People of Hungary	74	27
Sovereignty	15	149
National identity	5	42
Citizenship	5	24
Hungarian citizen	7	50
Alien	1	18
Hungarian culture/trad.	3	69
Hungarian identity	0	3
Hungarian family	39	60
Protection of national interest	2	21
EU	71	567
European Union	319	1320
European countries	40	188
Protect	134	909
Security	48	462

	2010-2014	2014-2018
Threat	29	288
Breakdown	0	2
Elite	13	127
Hungarians in	4	55
National unity	3	16
Unity	36	327
Diaspora	4	47
Hungarian Standing Conference	1	12
Hungarian Diaspora Council	0	6
Ethnic	3	54
Language	73	79
Constitution	118	467
Fundamental Law	25	65
Our lives	38	94
foreigners	9	65
Disintegration	15	26
Against Hungary	10	38
Trust	96	116
Faith	60	126
God	61	163
Pray	9	13
Soli Deo Gloria	9	9
us	648	3043
our	1870	6359
Soros	0	308
George Soros	0	163
Civil	3	70
NGO	3	71
Border	90	1281
Boundary	0	42
Gate	14	53
Fence	0	219
Speeches numbered	*1-142*	*143-565*

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