Enclave Politics and Party System (Non)-Nationalization

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Literature on party system nationalization focuses on the process by which national parties form at the expense of local parties, as part of a long-term historical process of modernization. But this process has not eliminated ethnic or identity-based parties. This paper examines the means by which ethnic parties resist these processes. Do such parties emerge from the local level, based on cleavages? Or, to what extent does their success rely on their ability to obtain resources in the form of patronage and support from the center? The discussion is placed In the context of general party system literature (Sartori, Lipset and Rokkan), and literature on party system nationalization in Europe (Caramani 2004, Chibber and Kollman 2004). These party system frameworks provide a context to consider how ethnic parties at the local level reflect regional-local party dynamics. A focus on city council politics provides a corrective to studies focusing on party contestation at other levels of government, the focus of most prior studies. It is only at the city level that one can truly examine grassroots driving factors. Must even local ethnic enclave parties rely on local-central interactions to succeed? Or, under what conditions might they be truly independent from the center? I examine local council elections in Hungarian enclave cities in Slovakia to illustrate these dynamics. Unlike many other local council elections in the region that use proportional representation, Slovakia conducts local council elections using a majoritarian, district-based first past the post electoral system. Because the dynamics discussed in Chibber and Kollman take place with this type of electoral system, this alignment allows for an in-depth consideration of their posited nationalization dynamics.

I am grateful to Frank Thames of Texas Tech University, for pointing me in the direction of the party system nationalization literature to better understand these empirics.

Long-term processes of state-formation, and nation-building have all been related to the development of political parties. How parties formed out of these processes has been the focus of work on the nationalization of party systems: in particular the work of Daniele Caramani (*The Nationalization of Politics*, 2004), and Pradeep Chibber and Ken Kollman (*The Formation of National Party Systems*, 2004). The logic behind nationalization is this. As part of modernizing processes, voters begin to perceive economic interests as prior to more culturally-based interests, producing an emergent focus on left-right economic cleavages in party politics. This cleavage can emerge in a homogenous fashion across the whole of a state (Caramani 2004). Moreover, candidates for office develop incentives to work within a party structure, rather than focusing on being more independent operators at the local level (Chibber and Kollman 2004). Much of the literature on party systems has started to take the nationalization process as a given.

But for those of us working on ethnic parties and ethnic politics, this assumption is a problematic one. Not only do ethnic parties remain strong, but we also see new ethnic parties and identity parties forming all the time, as challengers to older ethnic parties (Stroschein 2011 and others), or as entirely new entities. If we open up the state to examine demographic regions where state ethnic minorities are the local majority, or enclaves, we see even more of a contrast. Enclave regions are often dominated by ethnic parties that are not necessarily aligned with central party politics, depicting a situation of varied integration within central state structures (see also Boone 2003). This paper emerges from a larger project examining city council party politics over time in ethnic enclave cities: in Hungarian-majority cities in Romania, Serbia and Slovakia, and in Albanian-majority cities in North Macedonia. This paper will sketch some of the empirical material from the Hungarian enclaves in Slovakia, as their majoritarian system of elections matches up with the system emphasized in some of the literature. The focus of the paper is a consideration of the ways in which we might understand local ethnic party politics in enclaves as pockets of resistance to party system nationalization, and how these dynamics might work instead.

Party System Nationalization Processes, as Seen in Caramani and Chibber and Kollman (both 2004)

The literature on party system nationalization describes it as the process by which national parties form at the expense of local parties in a long-term historical process. There is an assumption that local politics, fraught with clientalism and local political personalities, will fall away in this process (Caramani p. 2, Chibber and Kollman Chapter 4). The perceived mechanism by which this change happens is through the perceived transfer of local interests to modernized economic interests, reflecting a right-left economic spectrum that is homogenous across the state, and indeed across other states – a process of the "nationalization or homogenization of politics" (Caramani,

especially p. 5). He sees this happening as "independent and local powerful political personalities were replaced by candidates controlled by national parties, and no longer represented local interests but rather national ideologies and issues," p. 294 – similar to Chibber and Kollman's discussion of a change in incentives that produces candidates more willing to work with national parties than to focus on local interests.

For those scholars working on ethnic party politics, this perceived assumption is problematic, as the continued existence of ethnic parties demonstrate there are holdouts against this perceived process. The process we might understand is more similar to that outlined by Lipset and Rokkan 19xx, in which the emergence of parties is linked to social cleavages, and there is no real reason that those cleavages might simply disappear. Where the nationalization literature does consider regionalist parties, they are described as "territorially fragmented electoral behaviour," almost as a kind of anomaly (Caramani, p. 112). There is, however, an acknowledgement in both of these works that nationalization processes are not successful to the same degree across different countries. Caramani's ambitious project outlines a typology that can categorize different countries along the lines of these differences, using criteria of 1) the degree to which statewide parties obtain support in regions, and 2) the degree to which regionalist parties have support The resulting categories as outlined on pp. 150-53, are:

- nationalised party systems - homogenous support for all parties, no regional parties
- segmented party systems - mainly one distinct solid region with party
- territorialised party systems – main parties heterogeneously distributed due to cleavages of cultural nature, but no regionalist parties
- regionalised party systems – main parties are unevenly distributed due to cultural cleavages, and also regional identities produce regionalist parties

Following this typology, he discusses processes that could produce a stronger emphasis on territories or regions, the opposite process of nationalization (pp. 166-68). One might consider, for example, how party system volatility might lead to these reverse processes, a fact to keep in mind for the party context in Europe in the last few years. The overall process in Caramani is thus outlined as one of progress toward a homogenous left-right economic dimension that produces national party politics. However, this progress might be "'distorted' by the intersection with particularly strong cultural and territorial identities," p. 274.

Caramani's ambitious historical project focuses on European democracies generally, and it is not hard to see how the dominance of proportional representation (PR) systems across these democracies might aid in the process of party system nationalization. Voters focusing on the same ballot across the country would of course have a tendency to think nationally. Chibber and Kollman

decide to take on democracies with majoritarian electoral systems with single member districts, to examine how nationalization might occur even under such a fragmented system that would seem to encourage a territorial focus. They compare party system nationalization processes across the United States, Canada, Great Britain, and India, to examine both how national parties emerged and the dynamics of regional parties. Their central claim is that it is the federal structure of a country that influences the party system, rather than social cleavages or laws and constitutions (p. 3).

For them, nationalization comes from a "party aggregation" process, in which parties "aggregate their votes across districts to create regional or national parties that can influence policy or run the government," p. 19. In order for candidates to be involved in this process, there must be "incentives for candidates and elected officials to link voters in disparate geographic locations under common party labels," (p. 18), and they find that incentive to be how authority is distributed across government levels. It is for this reason that they focus on the federal structure of states, as driving the forms of these candidate incentives. If strong power or authority lies at the center, that is where candidates will focus. As does Caramani, there is a base assumption that the central government will become more prominent for voters over time, producing national party politics: "Voters are more likely to support national political parties as the national government becomes more important in their lives," p. 222. But within enclaves, this type of transfer of loyalty to the center might never take place, due to their specific demographics. If more local governments are more important to those voters, this local focus will encourage more regional parties. There are some similarities between this posited mechanism and work by Migdal (19xx) and Boone (2003) which examines variation in regional incorporation into the central state.

From the perspective of examining enclaves, we might observe that regional distance from the center and a concentration of local authority might not simply be a product of formal federal institutions. Due to their particular "reversed" demographics, ethnic enclaves nearly always exhibit an inherent distance from central state structures. This distance may come with a local concentration of authority (see also Gibson 2005 on subnational authoritarianism). But this distancing might take place informally due to the social structure and demographics, even in the absence of formal federal structures. Within enclaves, city councils serve as a useful locus to examine the concentration and distribution of this kind of authority. The essential aspect is that "what matters are voters' perceptions of which level of government make decisions that are salient to voters," p. 103. That level of government could like within the ethnic enclave and within a city.

In Slovakia, ethnic Hungarians are concentrated along the southern border of the country. The cities examined in this project from that region have tended to show strong support for the Hungarian Coalition Party (MK) as well as for independent candidates. Starting in 2011, a new

challenger party ran as a bi-ethnic party in these cities, a party called Most-Híd (which means "bridge" in both Hungarian and Slovak). This new party emerged partly from the single-member district voting system for local councils, which in a true Downsian median voter fashion encouraged support for candidates from either ethnicity. In addition, it is through the emergence of Most-Híd that we can trace how a party might emerge with a focus on one city council context and then make linkages to expand across other city council contexts, building support incrementally. There is thus an important insight in the Chibber and Kollman outline of how party aggregation processes work. They give high importance to organizational ability and coordination:): "Candidates and voters have to coordinate on party labels across districts, and failure to coordinate among like- minded candidates and voters means that those who successfully coordinate can win," p. 66. But these steps and techniques of linkage and aggregation need not only produce party system nationalization; they can also produce regional from very local parties – and Most-Híd is in fact now part of the central government in Slovakia.

Due to the focus on incentives in Chibber and Kollman, their framework works well to understand both when aggregation might result in nationalization, and when there might be limits to this process. It will be difficult to aggregate "when voters' preferences are mostly locally based and candidates do not have to coordinate with politicians in other districts" p. 73. Enclaves will usually be places where local preferences will dominate and these incentives will be low. The process of aggregation depends especially on the notion that "local notables" will be incorporated into national parties as party "professionals" – essentially, party hacks, p. 83. They describe how local notables might be enticed away from their local interests to become party professionals through a mechanism of patronage, as the larger party might have more spoils to distribute (p. 84). At the same time, we might also consider how patronage might work within an ethnic group to preserve those local incentives. The literature does demonstrate that more thinking should go into the role of independent candidates in local elections, as they might be independent for a variety of reasons and not for the same reasons. Independents are simply expressing a desire not to be saddled with a party label, which could mean they might remain open to engaging in different types of patronage (see p. 161).

Dynamics of Local Politics in a State Context: A Focus on Ethnic Enclaves

If party system nationalization cannot be assumed, where is it resisted, and what are the mechanisms of this resistance? This paper forms part of a broader project on local politics in ethnic enclaves, and how this local politics plays an on ongoing feedback role with state control. The broader project involves an examination of local council seat ratios, in Albanian-majority cities in

North Macedonia (with assistance of a translator) and in Hungarian-majority cities in Romania, Serbia, and Slovakia, for which I did not need translation assistance.

What is striking about this collective evidence is its variability. Even cities with very similar ethnic demographics within the same country can display very different council party ratios, allowing for the constraints of enclaves – for example, Slovak nationalist parties would be unlikely majorities in a Hungarian enclave city. Part of this variability is driven by local factors inherent to each city. The broader project considers the relation between each city and the state government center, using party politics as an indicator of potential distance from the center. The resulting analysis in the broader project is a typology of city relationships to the center. The typology was developed before I knew about the literature on party system nationalization, but some of the ideas align well, which is reassuring as the effort has been to try to explain some of the same processes.

There are two factors that set the criteria for the typology. The first factor is *reflectivity*, or the degree to which local dominant parties reflect parties active at the central level versus parties that only exist in a particular city or a few cities – parties only visible at the local level. Large numbers of independent candidates might also fall into this category of local particularism. The second factor is *durability*, which indicates how long the same parties are dominant at the local level. In the field, people frequently talked of cities as having individual political personalities: "Oh, that is an x party town," for example. The degree to which one party appears to control a city over time is reflected in this variable.

Taken together, reflexivity and durability produce a means to assess the level of projection of the central state in enclave cities, as depicted in Figure 1 below.

Figure 1. City council politics, durability, and the state

	Parties track central / state politics	**Parties reflect local interests**
Durability – high	Central projection high	Central projection low
Durability – low	Central involvement contested	

Where dominant party durability is high, it is quite easy to categorize a city's relationship to the central state government. Dominant parties that track local interests display low levels of state

projection into a city. Dominant parties that track state central politics, even if the party is in opposition, are linked into central politics to a higher degree.

Of course these parties are even more closely linked if they are in coalition with government rather than in opposition. But the operative feature is the tracking with central state politics, rather than a focus on local politics alone. State projection is relatively high even if those central governments are voted out and the locally-dominant parties track with state oppositions. Alternatively, some cities appear to have very local systems, as occasionally a local elite can gain very strong control – similar to Gibson's (2005) description of subnational authoriatarianism, though perhaps in more benign form. A third category, perhaps the most interesting, is where state involvement at the local level is contested. In fact, the degree of local-central interactions desired in the enclave might feed into local political debates and influence local political dynamics. Endogeneity is thus a part of this political story, but one we can incorporate into the analysis rather than avoid (Stroschein 2012).

Focusing on Local Politics

Local and city politics has been woefully under-studied in Political Science. There has been some examination of the role of public administration in comparative decentralization (Stoker 2006). There has also been some careful consideration of local political dynamics in divided cities, such as between Hindus and Muslims in India (Varshney 2002, Wilkinson 2006). Closer to this project, there has been some work on local politics in divided cities in Eastern Europe (Bochsler 2012, Bochsler and Szöcsik 2013; Stroschein 2007, 2011, 2012). But overall, city politics is rarely studied in a comparative fashion.

In his 1981 book City Trenches, Ira Katznelson opened up space for a focus on city politics. Katznelson was troubled by the fact that analysts tended to focus on class and workplace as determinants of politics, when instead he observed stronger political involvement with one's place of residence (Katznelson 1981: 19). One of the key insights of Katznelson's study is that local social configurations are each unique, and thus produce unique conflicts and outcomes. An examination of these local variations becomes valuable for understanding the nature of politics (p. 19). The unique nature of each city social structure was certainly evident in the fieldwork for this project, as it was in previous work on governance in ethnically mixed cities (Stroschein 2007: 176-77; Stroschein 2012). With an acknowledgement of these variations, one aim of this project is to find lines of similarity between the different cities, using the categorization of the typology. Katznelson also settles on a space of "dispositions," between the strong determination of institutional structure and the

propensity for local variation and agency. These parameters allow for a focus on what is focus allows for an understanding of what is "probable and improbable" in different types of settings (p. 206). This project focuses on classing similar cities by categories denoting their relationship to the center, but allowing the potential that cities might switch between categories over time.

In Stathis Kalyvas' fine-grained examination of civil wars, he notes that local politics have their own local drivers, as local actors might appropriate state-level political divisions for their own local ends (2006: 371-75). Local cleavages can even be powerful enough to subvert and evade influences from the central level, a feature he notes has been missed in many observations of political conflict. The impoverished nature of the discussion of local politics is also a feature of comparative political systems, as noted by Sidel (2014: 161-64). Notable exceptions include Boone's work on Africa (1990, 2003, 2011). There has also been a turn to examine tendencies toward subnational authoritarianism – in Latin America by Gibson (2005) and others (Gervasoni 2010, Behrend 2011), and in the Philippines by Sidel (2014). The former Soviet space also proves a fruitful place for the examination of subnational authoritarianism (Hale 1999, 2003; McMann 2006; Sharafutdinova and Steinbuks 2017).

As outlined by Gibson (2005), subnational authoritarianism can emerge in local pockets within democracies. As in US politics in the American South during the last century (104), local elites can come to power through local elections in decentralised democracies, and then subsequently isolate their region from the rest of the state. If conflict remains local, it can increase that local elite's power because opponents can be easily quashed. For this reason, a key means for these elites to maintain power is the mechanism of "boundary control," or the maintenance of effective distance between their region and the remainder of the state (104-109). Another part of this control includes control over interactions with the center (111-12).

Gibson's ideas are particularly relevant for enclaves, which are often already rather separate from the central state, due to ethnic and linguistic differences as well as potential local control by an ethnic party. Parties that are connected to parties at the central level may have an advantage in access to resources and information from the center. But many enclave cities are governed by local parties of an ethnic character, a feature that can increase their potential isolation from the center. While there are different ways these dynamics might manifest as examined in the following pages, a useful indicator of some subnational authoritarianism is the durability of local regimes, shown as an absence of turnover in local elections (Sidel 2014: 171). The cities in this project exhibit considerable variance in local regime durability and turnover levels, making them a useful organizing principle for the typology of local-central interactions.

The local party structure is also a useful indication of the level of potential connection to the central government. If an enclave city has a party system that differs greatly from that at the center, we can envision a high level of local independence for that city in relation to the central government. Conversely, a local party system that is similar to that at the center would reflect a strong likelihood of resource, communication, and power links with the center. An indication of these dynamics can be found in Boone's work on state topography and development in Africa (2003). She emphasises that state development takes an uneven character, such that some regions will have stronger links to the state center. In her discussion, the state center approaches different regions with different strategies, based on the resource levels and potential bargaining power of the elites in these local regions. The strategies might include A) a sharing of power, B) a destruction of local authorities, or C) even abandonment of regions to their own devices (p. 8). Her discussion also raises the point that state building and development is not a one-off event, but rather a process that involves through continued interactions between center and regions – emphasizing the endogenous nature of these ongoing interactions.

In Boone's account, access to material resources plays a strong role in these center-local interactions. These economic aspects are also observed by McMann (2006) in her study of Russia and Kyrgyzstan. The confluence of economics and politics is discussed further below. Resources play a key role in local power configurations, especially where there is local regime durability. But where there is volatility across time in these local party systems, there are also other factors at work. In Henry Hale's work on Russia, he has noted the importance of elite capacity and organization to use opportunities to mobilise support (1999, 2003). Resource considerations can play an important role in an initial understanding of structural constraints, but there is also much room for elite agency in shifting support between parties. Tracing the party system shifts over time via local councils is a useful means to document regime durability or shifts by city.

Parties, Ethnic Parties, and Electoral Systems at the Local Level

In Comparative Politics, parties are understood to serve the function of aggregating interests in the polity (Almond 1960). In this function, they institutionalize and represent identity and interest cleavages that are already present in society (Lipset and Rokkan 1967, Sartori 1976). Parties thus are the connection between popular preferences and government responsiveness in democracies (Stokes 1999). We can understand parties as the way that democracies hold together, as they are intended to give voice to a diverse array of groups in politics.

Much of the theoretical literature on party systems has tended to focus on structures at the statewide level. Statewide studies often focus on means of comparison such as the effective number of parties (Sartori 1976) or diagrams of party ideological configurations in relation to each other (Sartori 1976, Kitschelt 1992). Such techniques to compare party systems can also be used in city politics, although few studies have employed them in local politics.   There is a gulf between theoretical work on politics and work on the ground by party leaders and campaign strategists – for those conducting political campaigns, local politics are often a central focus for analysis and campaign targeting. It is thus somewhat surprising that there has been little comparative work focusing on local council and mayoral politics, with the notable exceptions in the section above.

Local political systems may display some differences from statewide or even regional systems. First, there is a higher likelihood that voters will have a personal knowledge of the candidates for whom they are (or are not) voting (Dawson 2012, p. 8). This fact has negative implications for the generalizable nature of such voting, as the content of the party program may not be the primary motivator for support. For this reason, independent candidates may be more likely to be successful at the local level than at the state level. While the presence of such individuals may be frustrating for researchers trying to identify general patterns, it remains useful information for understanding the actual dynamics of such politics in action. The presence of several independent candidates may indicate a less institutionalized party system, unhappiness with the available parties, or the presence of strong local elites and even patronage networks (Fumagalli 2007, Stroschein 2007). Strategic voting may exist with regard to such patronage networks (Chandra 2004) even the local level, though strategic voting for ethnic parties is likely to depend on the local ethnic demographics.

What happens with parties in ethnic enclaves? If parties serve to channel interests, then ethnic parties will emerge where ethnic identities are strongly codified and linked to political claims. Donald Horowitz worried that ethnic parties could polarize a system, via a mechanism of "outbidding" (1985). In outbidding, rival elites try to appeal to a closed ethnic group of potential voters by becoming "more" ethnic than each other. With this mechanism, we see party system fragmentation similar to Giovanni Sartiori's dynamics of "polarized pluralism" (1976). In these dynamics, democracies can collapse as voters move to ideological extremes and leave the moderate center empty – similar to the collapse of the fragmented party system of Weimar Germany. Horowitz finds the prospect of fragmentation to be so dangerous that he proposes that ethnic parties should be banned, and his 1985 book contains ample evidence of the political damage that they have wrought in African and Asian settings. Interestingly, the ethnic party dynamics that have unfolded in Eastern Europe since the onset of democracy in 1989 do not all take this form. Indeed, a

strand of the literature on ethnic parties considers the potential role of ethnic parties in establishing stable party systems (Mozaffar, Scarritt and Galaich 2003, Ishiyama 2003, Chandra 2005, Birnir 2007, Birnir and Van Cott 2007).

Moreover, outbidding is one potential and occasional outcome in ethnic party politics, but it is not the dominant mechanism. The research presented here and in the larger project indicates that there is not one clear vector for ethnic party fragmentation. More extreme parties might emerge, but also more moderate or even bi-ethnic parties (such as the infamous Most-Híd in Slovakia) might also emerge. Further study of party fragmentation is needed to examine the implications of different patterns of party fragmentation within an ethnic group, thus the focus here on ethnic enclaves.

Local Elections, Electoral Systems, and Fragmentation Patterns

Albanians in Macedonia have had a long history of being fragmented into two parties – including sometimes violent competition between Albanian groups in local elections. But following inter-ethnic violence and state restructuring in 2001, a new party called the DUI emerged, and the field of Albanian politics in Macedonia changed substantially. Some common dynamics can be observed across cities in the broader project. Seat configurations on local councils in enclaves can feature relatively equal splits between the dominant ethnic group – as in the case in splits between the Hungarians especially in Dunajská Streda mentioned below. These splits can sometimes be strong enough to cause bitter local government stalemates, in spite of the shared ethnicity of the disputants. From a democratic perspective, such tensions are preferable to potential one-party rule by the initial ethnic party, and may aggregate interests more effectively than councils with large ratios of independent candidates. At the same time, these tensions can have a damaging effect on the effectiveness of local government.

Another pattern is that where local enclave councils include a country's titulars (Slovaks, for example), these local titular parties can play a swing role between the two disputing parties, potentially gaining concessions as a result. This dynamic reverses the role that is often played by ethnic minority parties in state level politics, as a swing element between the titular groups. In enclaves, it is titulars that are the minority, and thus the source of potential swing voting between the fragmented parties among the local majority ethnic group.

For comparability, seat ratios on the council are used as the unit of analysis across the study.[1] This focus is due to the different kinds of electoral systems that generate the seats across the

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[1] Chibber and Kollman give a good justification (p. 63) of why they do not focus on seat share but rather on vote share. Because the electoral systems in their study are comparable, this is a reasonable step. But for the

cities in the broader study. Although local council elections in Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia are conducted with a quite straightforward proportional election system, in Slovakia, local council elections take place via districts linked to individual council seats. Local council members in Slovakia are then elected by a first-past-the-post system in those districts. Due to these different local electoral systems, the vote shares across the countries appear in different forms of measure. Because of this problem, the best means to make an actual comparison of local council party systems is with the seat number allocation by party or for independent candidates.

For the election of local councils, Slovakia uses s majoritarian first-past-the-post (FPTP) election system with single-member districts – in contrast to local council elections in North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia which use PR list systems. The majoritarian, district system in Slovakia tends to encourage a focus on candidate personality that is less a feature of PR systems due to their party list aspect. However, the role of personality under PR is not eliminated entirely, especially in local politics. Locals may have a sense of who is part of which party, and know some local candidates personally in a way that remains more powerful than in statewide elections. In local elections, personality can really matter.

In addition to personality, a party's level of organization at the local level is crucial, especially in PR elections where they are the focal point of the ballot. Some parties retain durable power in particular cities partly due to a high organisational capacity at the local level or the skills and efforts of particular individuals. In the next town, the same party may have weaker organization levels. The role for organization also points to a potential for the influence of geography. There is some degree of networking across towns, especially between those that are proximate and with good transport links. The emergence of the Most-Híd party in Slovakia from the city level, and the way it organized across cities to become a larger force, is an important part of the enclave politics story there.

After council seats are filled, there can be a dramatic process of the formation of the council leadership. This process can be especially fraught under conditions of PR elections, as the proportional configurations can create politics around coalitions and alliances that can last weeks until the first post-election council meeting. But even in the district-selected councils in Slovakia, there can be some drama in the appointment of committee heads. Often referred to as the "founding" council meeting, this meeting is often where key offices are decided. This paper does not focus strongly on mayoral elections, but mentions them as part of the overall story of these local council elections. Mayoral elections often take a two-round form, in which a candidate might win with an absolute majority in the first round. However, without an absolute majority, a second round

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cases here, comparability required a focus on seat share, due to the different electoral systems across the cities of the broader study.

is held a few weeks later between the top two candidates in the first round. It is notable that this separate election process establishes some independence of mayors from the council. But in some systems, as in Serbia (check details), the mayor might be selected from within the new council.

The substantive remainder of the paper presents the election results available from a first cut at the materials from the cities of interest in Slovakia. There are a few information gaps at this time that should be filled in at later stages in the ongoing broader project. I provide a brief sketch of some of the main conclusions I draw from the city evidence, and end with a summary conclusion.

Table 1: Cities of interest in Slovakia*

Name Slovak / Hungarian	Population	Percent Hungarian	Percent Slovak	Percent Other Roma	Czech
Dunajská Streda/ Dunaszerdahely	22,477	74.53	19.46	2.77	.51
Komárno/ Komárom	34,349	53.88	33.51	4.11	.68
Šamorín/ Somorja	12,726	57.43	34.30	.22	.50
Velký Meder/ Nagymegyer	8,859	75.58	13.97	.51	.86

*Note: these are indicative, as the electoral districts and the census territory do not necessarily align given the district-based structure for the elections. This is in contrast to the Macedonian municipalities which have quite clear boundaries. Check

Statistics from the Statistical Office of the Slovak Republic, 2011 Population and Housing Census, Municipalities of the Slovak Republic, "Resident Population by Nationality, by Municipalities," pp. 4, 5, and 18. Numbers used to calculate above percentages:
https://slovak.statistics.sk/wps/wcm/connect/d21d8809-a844-4ba0-bb89-961f304365f1/Table_2_Resident_Population_by_nationality_by_municipalities_2011_Census.pdf?MOD=AJPERES&CVID=kojHnpX

Table 2. Dunajská Streda / Dunaszerdahely   41 mandates 1990, 1994, 1998; 25 mandates 2002

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010*	2014	2017*	2018
Együttélés									
MKDM									
Együttélés-MKDM	31	32**							
Independent				4***	7	1	5		
MPP	9	9							
Christian Dems	1								
Christian Dems-DS									
DP-MPP									
DBP / SDĽ									
Communist P									
MKP			41	21	18	13****	16	13	
Most-Híd						11	4	11	
SDA									
Smer									

*Out-of-cycle events. In 2009 the mayor was removed, and there was another mayoral election. In 2017, there was a council reshuffle in which some members switched parties. The new configuration is listed in 2017 (AR).
**In a coalition – among these 32, 18 were Együttélés and 14 were MKDM.
***But of these, 3 were "undeclared" MKP.
****Provided 25 mandates, check

Table 3. Komárno / Komárom   48 mandates 1990; 29 in 1994; 35 in 1998; 25 in 2002 & 2006

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
Együttélés	44*	12						
MKDM		6						
Együttélés-MKDM								
Independent		6	1	3	10	10**	16***	
MPP								
Christian Dems								
Christian Dems-DS			2					
DP-MPP		2						
DBP / SDĽ		2	3					
Communist P		1						
MKP			29	21	14	6**	3	
Most-Híd						9**	6	
Citizens' Coalition			1					
SDA								
Smer					1			

*A coalition was formed with others after the elections.
**Disputed numbers – for Independent, some sources say 9 and some 8. For MKP, some sources say 5. For Most-Híd, some sources say 10 or 11. These discrepancies could be due to officially undeclared parties. Check sources for consistent reporting
*** Disputed numbers – for Independent, some sources say 18. This is possibly due to undeclared parties as mentioned above.

Table 4. Šamorín / Somorja **35 mandates 1994; 25 in 1998; 19 in 2002 & 2006**

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
Együttélés		10*						
MKDM		16						
Együttélés-MKDM								
Independent		5*		2	4	3		
MPP		4						
Christian Dems								
Christian Dems-DS								
DP-MPP								
DBP / SDĽ								
Communist P								
MKP			25	16	15	15	18	
Most-Híd						1	1	
Citizens' Coalition								
SDA				1				
Smer								

*Other sources give 12 for Együttélés instead of 10, but then note that of the 5 independents, 2 of them were running "outside of their party." These differences indicate some of the complexities of party affiliation. Check district history

Table 5. Velký Meder / Nagymegyer   **31 mandates 1994; 25 in 1998; 13 in 2010**

	1990	1994	1998	2002	2006	2010	2014	2018
Együttélés		13						
MKDM		4						
Együttélés-MKDM								
Independent		4*					8	
MPP		9						
Christian Dems								
Christian Dems-DS								
DP-MPP								
DBP / SDĽ		1						
Communist P								
MKP			25			13**	3	
Most-Híd							1	
Citizens' Coalition								
SDA								
Smer								

*Of these 4, 3 are listed as running "outside of their party." It is likely these were Christian Democrats, given counts in other sources.
**Not fully verified; checking.

The tables depicting the Hungarian-majority cities in Slovakia exhibit far fewer parties than do the PR systems in North Macedonia, Romania, and Serbia, an indicator of the reductive effects of the districts with candidate elections by a FPTP majority system (Sartori 1994). The spectrum of Hungarian politics in Slovakia is quite interesting. In contrast to Romania, where the Hungarian RMDSz party was the main actor until the 2000s, in Slovakia there were three Hungarian parties that were especially visible during the 1990s. In 1998, in order to better provide a unified opposition to Vladimír Mečiar, these parties united to form the Hungarian Coalition Party, or MKP.

This coalescence behind the MKP is very visible in the 1998 local elections in these tables for the four cities in Slovakia. In Dunajská Streda, the MKP won all 41 of the available mandates in 1998 (Table 2). In Komárno, the MKP won 29 of the 35 available mandates in 1998 (Table 3), with 1 seat going to an independent candidates and 5 seats to the centrally-active parties of the Democratic Left and the Christian Democrats. The MKP also took all of the available 25 mandates in both Šamorín (Table 4) and Velký Meder (Table 5) in 1998.

This symmetry is especially notable given the local patterns of fragmentation before this point. The strongest local force to emerge in 1990 among Hungarians was Együttélés, or Coexistence. It had strong majorities in Dunajská Streda in the first few local elections, where the MPP held the second place in the council. Együttélés also remained the strongest party in Komárno, but by 1994 it held 12 seats to 6 for the MKDM and 6 for Independent candidates. In addition to these splits, 2 seats went to the MPP-DB and 3 to centrally-active left-leaning parties. Šamorín provides a nice example of this 1994 fragmentation among Hungarian parties, and is the city where the MKDM at 16 seats came out ahead of Együttélés (10 seats). There is also a solid number of 4 seats to the MPP and 5 seats for Independent candidates. Velký Meder also exhibited a high level of fragmentation in 1994, with Együttélés in the lead (13 seats), but with a sizeable representation of 9 seats for the MPP, then 4 for the MKDM and 4 for Independent candidates.

The MKP dominated the Hungarian political scene after 1998, but some of the fractures under the surface did not go away. One element of these fractures was the fact that it could be difficult to combine 3 elites who had been heads of their own party under one organization. The MKP still kept a strong showing in the 2002 local elections, where in Dunajská Streda, Komárno, and Šamorín it took easy majorities on the councils, but with some seats going to Independent candidates and a few other parties.[2]

By the late 2000s, there were some quite open disturbances within the MKP with conflicts between these elites (cites). These rifts became clear in the 2006 local elections, where the MKP lost sizeable numbers of seats to Independent candidates in Dunajská Streda and Komárno, as well as in

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[2] Information for Velký Meder in 2002 not yet available.

Šamorín.[3] By the 2010 elections, the MKP had lost ground not just to Independent candidates, but also to Most-Híd, a new party of Hungarians and Slovaks founded by former MKP elite Béla Bugár – who had fallen out with other MKP elites. One interesting aspect of Most-Híd is that the bi-ethnic structure is quite pragmatic for district-based elections. For districts that contain both Hungarians and Slovaks, Most-Híd candidates, like Independent candidates, have the advantage that they can obtain votes from both groups. Indeed, there is reasonable evidence that some Slovaks did vote for Most-Híd candidates in local elections (cite AR EG). In Dunajská Streda, the MKP and Most-Híd split the council in the 2010 elections, with the MKP at 13 seats and Most-Híd at 11. One seat also went to an Independent candidate. Between 2014 and 2017, there was an open political conflict between the MKP and Most-Híd. The 2014 election results favouring the MKP thus did not remain in place. Instead, several councillors changed parties, resulting in a different seat configuration by 2017 and a more split result between the MKP and Most-Híd (cite AR).

In Komárno in 2010, the majority (10) went to Independent candidates, with Most-Híd next at 9 and trailed by the MKP with 6. These ratios magnified further in the 2014 elections in Komárno, with Independents winning 16, Most-Híd 6, and the MKP 3. Interestingly, Šamorín remains an MKP stronghold. Velký Meder is an interesting case, where the MKP formed a clear majority in 2010 but by 2014 the majority of council seats were held by Independent candidates.

A crucial insight from these results is that the emergence of Most-Híd is perhaps less mysterious than assumed in the literature. For scholars of ethnic parties, it seems strange that a bi-ethnic party could emerge into a political force at both the local and the national levels. But the incentives provided by the district-based FPTP election system for local elections in Slovakia means that candidates who can appeal to a broad base will have an advantage over those who can only appeal to one ethnicity within their district. The results in the tables demonstrate how not only Most-Híd, but also Independent candidates, have been a reasonable force in these local elections in Hungarian-majority cities.

Conclusion

Literature on party system nationalization focuses on the process by which national parties form at the expense of local parties, as part of a long-term historical process of modernization. But this process has not eliminated ethnic or identity-based parties. I examine local council elections in Hungarian enclave cities in Slovakia to illustrate these dynamics. Unlike many other local council elections in the region that use proportional representation, Slovakia conducts local council elections

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[3] Information for Velký Meder in 2006 not yet available

using a majoritarian, district-based first past the post electoral system. Because the dynamics discussed in Chibber and Kollman take place with this type of electoral system, this alignment allows for an in-depth consideration of their posited nationalization dynamics. These party system frameworks provide a context to consider how ethnic parties at the local level reflect regional-local party dynamics. I present a typology to consider variations across cities that is a function of two factors: reflectivity, or the degree to which city politics in an enclave reflect state level politics, and durability, or the time period that a party might hold local control. A focus on city council politics provides a corrective to studies focusing on party contestation at other levels of government, the focus of most prior studies. It is only at the city level that one can truly examine grassroots driving factors.