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Can Violence against Both the Ethnic “Other” and Ethnic “Self”
Be Still Considered “Ethnic”?

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While debates on causes and effects of ethnic violence go on within and outside the academic community, the generally accepted definition of ethnic violence remains unchallenged. In trying to understand ethnic violence, we formulate new theories, complement or refute old ones, and select appropriate research methods, but rarely do we question the definition itself. What virtually all approaches to intergroup violence, whether they ascribe the ethnic character to it or disprove it, have in common is the assumption that all we need to do is to show evidence that the ethnic “other” is targeted (not) exclusively. As we will see below, this is precisely what the definition guides us to do. I set out in this paper to examine the practical implications of the commonly used definition of ethnic violence and propose an alternative, more inclusive perspective. Specifically, I argue that our entire understanding of ethnic violence tends to be misguided by the exclusive focus on ethnic difference. By problematizing the notion of ethnic difference, I do not suggest that it has no place in our analysis of ethnic war/violence. Far from it. Rather, I argue that coupling violence against the ethnic “other” and sacrifice of ethnic kin would greatly improve our understanding of ethnic violence.

I use the Bosnian civil war of 1992-95 as a case study to re-examine the definition of ethnic violence. In the first part of the paper, I will analyze the commonly used definition of ethnic violence proposed by Brubaker and Laitin (1998) and suggest ways how to improve it in order to better reflect observed practices of ethnic violence. In the second part of the paper, I will show how targeting of *both* out-group members (strategy of expulsion or what we commonly call “ethnic cleansing”) and in-group members (strategy of re-settlement) were integral to ethnic violence during the Bosnian war. Thus, two types of violence were inextricably intertwined and are treated here as integral parts of the definition of ethnic violence. Let us now examine in detail the definition of ethnic violence that is commonly used in explaining and describing inter-group violence. Most definitions of ethnic violence are variants of Brubaker’s and Laitin’s definition (1998):

Violence perpetrated *across ethnic lines*, in which at least one party is not a state (or representative of state), and in which the putative *ethnic difference* is coded—by perpetrators, targets, influential third parties or analysts—as having being integral rather than incidental to the violence, that is, in which the violence is coded as having being meaningfully oriented in some ways to the *different ethnicity* of target (p.428, emphasis added).

The fundamental feature of the definition is the notion of *ethnic difference*. It is mentioned three times in this rather succinct definition. In particular, the ethnic “master cleavage” manifests itself in ethnic identities of actors involved in war (“violence perpetrated across ethnic lines”), as well as in the direction of violence (“oriented to the different ethnicity of target”). The definition explicitly says that targeting of the ethnic “other” is *integral* to the violence. The absence of any reference to violence against in-group members suggests that this type of violence, if it occurs at

all, must be *incidental*. For example, Korb (2016) notes that in the course of events, which actors never fully control, the violence tends to spill over onto groups that are not originally targeted, that is, it is incidental (p. 380). However, taking into account the sacrifice of co-ethnics, when occurring in *the same process* in which the ethnic “other” are targeted, would make our definition more complete and encompassing.

Furthermore, we need merely to look at the definition to realize that the ultimate objective of ethnic violence is *not* part of the definition. Generally, when we discuss ethnic wars, we tend conflate the ultimate goal with immediate ends. This is in contrast to the literature that focus on rebels in African civil wars, whereby rebels are classified based on the ultimate goal they fight for: anti-colonial rebels, majority rule rebels, reform rebels, warlord rebels, and parochial rebels (Reno, 2011; Kasfir, 2015).¹ The omission of the ultimate end from our definition of ethnic violence leads us to assume that the end goal is to target the ethnic “other.” It follows from this then that violence oriented towards victims who share the same ethnicity with perpetrators would not fall into the category of ethnic violence. The question we need to ask is the following: Is targeting of out-group members a secondary (an immediate) goal or the ultimate end of ethnic violence? We can improve our understanding of ethnic violence if we de-couple the two types of ends. If targeting of the ethnic “other” is an immediate rather than the ultimate goal, then can we identify other secondary goals? What are they? Furthermore, if targeting of out-group members is indeed a subordinate goal, then we must ask subordinate to what end? As I

¹ I find this classification based on the ultimate objective of rebel organizations more useful than the categorization of civil wars based on the presence or absence of ideology (“ideological (revolutionary) wars” versus “ethnic wars,” respectively). The former seems to emphasize similarities among civil wars (for example, all rebel organizations regardless of their ultimate objectives will try to establish some kind of governance structures in the controlled territory). It is interesting to note that the literature on rebels and rebel governance does not recognize the category of “ethnic rebels.”

will show in this paper, violence against out-group members and targeting of in-group members are both *subordinate* to the *ultimate end* of establishing a rigid ethnic order (territorial ethnic homogeneity).

We have scholars who rightly refuse to reduce complex and ambiguous processes of civil war to binary cleavages. They have strongly argued that civil war involves a myriad of overlapping and/or conflictual identities, motivations, interests, and actions (Kalyvas 2003; Brubaker and Laitin 1998; Mueller 2000). As a result, Kalyvas (2003) notes that “[i]f targets of violence are selected along lines that go *beyond* group attributes, then the violence *cannot* be described as simply ethnic, class based, etc” (p. 481, emphasis added). Similarly, Gagnon (2004) disputes the thesis that the war in Croatia (and in Bosnia) was an ethnic war, showing how political elites were just as unscrupulous in targeting their respective ethnic kin as they were towards the ethnic “other.” Similarly, Longman (2004) points out that in Rwanda, where the Hutus committed genocide against Tutsis, the Hutu government also targeted Hutus for their opposition to the regime and its policies. Although the Liberian civil war was fought along ethnic lines and civilians were targeted for their different ethnicities, Reno (2011) argues that it was the way the pre-war patronage system disintegrated, rather than grievances, including ethnic grievances, which led to the emergence of multiple predatory rebel groups in Liberia.

What is interesting here is that scholars who critique the “master cleavages” approach do not necessarily object to the definition of ethnic violence, even though the notion of ethnic difference is central to the definition itself. If only violence where targets are selected along ethnic lines are classified as ethnic, as Kalyvas seems to suggest, then one cannot but wonder if ethnic violence exists at all in reality. We all agree that there is no such a thing as “pure” ethnic violence. It is the incomplete definition of ethnic violence that often supports or contributes,

explicitly or implicitly, to two major misconceptions about ethnic violence: a) ethnic violence is non-political (or non-ideological) and b) a product of exclusive targeting of ethnic “other.”

This ethnic war-ideological war divide is not only artificial and misleading, but essentially contradictory. For example, the literature on ethnic war focuses on nationalist ideologies and political programs of ethnic/nationalist parties (Hågerdal, 2019, p. 61). Yet, ideological wars are also struggles, whose successes often depend on the ideology of nationalism (Kalyvas and Kocher, 2007, p. 185). Others focus on the state as the object of struggle to draw a line between political and (non-political) ethnic conflicts. For example, Sambanis (2001) defines ethnic war as “war among communities (ethnicities) that are in conflict over the power relationship that exists between those communities and the state” (p. 261). He stresses that the core of the struggle between the state and ethnic groups is “the survival of ethnic identity” (of the latter) and then contrasts it with a struggle over the state-apparatus, a feature that is supposedly particular to non-ethnic wars (p. 266).

The supposedly non-political nature of ethnic violence perpetuates the myth that ethnic violence is the expression of irrational hatreds and historical antagonisms among ethnic communities (Kaufman 2006; Arfi 1998). In turn, the emphasis on “irrationality” and emotions reinforces the view that there is very little political about ethnic violence. The assumption that ethnic violence is only about targeting of individuals for their different ethnicities, which is explicit in the definition, reinforces the misconception that ethnic conflicts are non-political or non-ideological. Not all political violence is ethnic in character, but all ethnic violence is political. If the state is the object or one of agents of ethnic violence or both, then ethnic violence must be political by definition. Furthermore, the “survival” of ethnic identity is possible, according to ethnic nationalists themselves, only by securing control over the state-apparatus, not

necessarily at the central level. In other words, a struggle over the state-apparatus is embedded in ethnic conflict.

For example, Serb and Croat nationalists in Bosnia insisted that the only way to protect “national/ethnic interests” was to establish their respective states or state-like entities by appropriating existing or building new state structures at the local and regional levels. Similarly, Bosniak nationalists initially attempted to control the central state structures as a way to protect “Bosniak interests.” As Duyvesteyn argues, non-state actors involved in war with the state are in fact “potential states in making” who consciously use war as a “political instrument” (2000, p. 105). I would paraphrase Duyvesteyn and say that non-state actors waging ethnic war are potential *nation-states* in making. As I will show below, state structures, violence against the ethnic “other,” sacrifices of in-group members, and nation-state are all the elements of ethnic violence.

Kalyvas (2003) notes that ethnic labels are never neutral, because they often imply causation. Furthermore, by using ethnic labels, we tend to portray, tacitly or expressly, ethnic groups as unitary actors. For example, Sambanis (2011) argues that the fusion of individual and collective interests occurs in ethnic war (p. 266). However, “[l]abels coined at the centre may be misleading when generalized down to the local level; hence, motivations cannot be derived from identities at the top” (Kalyvas, 2003, p.481). Yet, the definition of ethnic violence itself rests on ethnic labels and master ethnic cleavages. Indeed, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) use the Bosnian civil war as one of rare examples of ethnic war, stating that “ethnic wars should produce ethnic cleansing or genocide following the ebb and flow of military operations...” (p. 211). In other words, targeting of the ethnic “other” is central to our understanding of the Bosnian war as an ethnic struggle. Although I agree with the authors that Bosnian war was an ethnic war, I find

their argument incomplete due to the failure to acknowledge that “ethnic cleansing” as a process involves the victimization of both ethnic “other” and ethnic kin. In other words, the Bosnian war was an ethnic war not despite but because co-ethnics were also targeted.

In sum, two features integral to the widely used definition of ethnic violence are deeply problematic: a) the privileging of ethnic difference at the expense of violence against the ethnic “self;” and b) the absence of the ultimate political objective of ethnic violence, that is, the conflation of subordinate and ultimate goals. I propose an alternative understanding of ethnic violence which addresses those shortcomings. I define ethnic violence as

Actions, behaviours, discourses, and policies that target individuals of both different and same ethnicities with the view of establishing, preserving, or preventing the reversal of an ethnic order—the ultimate end with reference to the idea of nation-state building.

At the heart of this definition is the ultimate end of ethnic violence rather than the direction of violence, establishing a high threshold for characterizing violence as ethnic. It permits us to eliminate civil wars waged for (an) objective(s) other than creating a new ethnic order, even though they are fought along ethnic lines and/or involve targeting of the ethnic “other.” For example, based on this definition, secessionist wars are not necessarily ethnic wars, even though they may be fought along ethnic lines and have as the ultimate objective the creation of an independent state. Also, I prefer keeping genocides analytically separate from ethnic wars, although some ethnic wars may include a “local” genocide (Srebrenica in Bosnia, for example). However, the definition allows us to classify inter-state wars as ethnic wars, which would be a break with the current tendency to see international armed conflicts as non-ethnic.

Although the reference to the idea of nation-state may appear too restrictive, it is necessary to acknowledge the link between ethnic homogenization and nation-state making, both of which have been part of most of the modern political conflicts and wars in Europe (Korb, 2016, p. 382). Similarly, Kalyvas and Kocher (2007) refer to the notion of nation-state as an important dynamic of ethnic war: “Eventually, the situation would resemble an interstate war between two nation-states, with the ethnically homogenous quasi-states fighting a war of territorial conquest” (p. 211).

This high threshold does not and should not prevent us from taking into account different interests, motivations, and identities of a myriad of actors involved in or who interact with one other as the process of establishing and preserving the ethnic order unfolds. On the contrary, the narrow focus on the ethnic order as the ultimate political end of ethnic violence can help us demystify the notion of “ethnic interests” that various actors both at the local and central levels claim to “defend” or the notion of “ethnic hatred/animosity” that are supposed to be a cause of inter-group violence. In particular, when our analysis of ethnic violence shows that the ethnic kin are sacrificed *for the same goal* and *in the same process* in which the ethnic “other” are targeted, then this gives a different meaning to so-called ethnic interests and intentions and motivations behind claims by nationalist elites or other actors involved in the violence.

At the same time, the revised definition of ethnic violence is sufficiently broad to consider any actions, behaviours, discourses, and policies that target *both* the ethnic “other” and part of ethnic “self.” Put differently, the definition does not brush aside the ethnic master cleavage. Equally important, the definition is also broad in the temporal sense. The emphasis on efforts aimed at *preserving or preventing* the reversal of the established ethnic order suggests that ethnic violence does not necessarily end with the signing of peace treaties, but is often part

of political reality after war campaigns end (Korb, 2016). Similarly, ethnic violence as defined here may start well before the outbreak of war as I will show below in the case of the Bosnian ethnic war.

Bosnian War as Textbook Example of Ethnic Violence

After the 1990 elections, the three Bosnian nationalist parties formed a coalition government under whose rule country disintegrated and slid down into civil war: the (Muslim) Party of Democratic Action (SDA), the Serb Democratic Party (SDS), and Croat Democratic Community of BiH (HDZ). Each party claimed to have a popular mandate (within their respective ethnic groups) to defend “national/ethnic interests” of their respective ethnic communities. The analysis of inter- and intra-party communications, especially those that were closed to the public, held both before and during the war, leads us to a conclusion that the principle of ethnic homogeneity was the juncture where Serb, Croat, and Muslim/Bosniak nationalists met.² They did not only agree on the idea of ethnic homogeneity as the final stage of nation-state making, but also employed the exact same methods of implementing it.

One method was to expel the ethnic “other” from the controlled territory mainly, but not exclusively, by way of establishing networks of illegal detention facilities/prisons and attendant exchange of populations.³ Another, equally important, method was the strategic re-settlement of the ethnic kin who lived under the rule of and were ultimately expelled by the other nationalist

² The paper is based on the critical analysis of transcripts of inter-party meetings, assembly sessions (often closed to the public), and government documents that have been used as evidence in various war crimes cases at the International Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia (ICTY). Most documents cited here were also cited in Gordana Božić (2018), *The Limits of “Ethnic War”: Intra-Group Violence and Resistance during the Bosnian War*, PhD Thesis, Political Science Dept., University of Ottawa.

³ Detainees were subjected to beatings, torture, rape, and humiliation. Many detainees were also killed or died as a result of torture.

party. What is important to stress here is that the strategy of re-settlement was not merely a reaction to or the unintended outcome of violence committed by the other warring party, as it may appear at first sight. I argue that Bosnian nationalists consciously created the conditions that facilitated the eventual expulsion of their “own” ethnic kin who happened to reside on the “wrong” “ethnic lands” in order to resettle them in strategic areas. This process of sacrificing part of the ethnic “self” commenced before the outbreak of, intensified during, and continued after the civil war.

Nationalists appropriated existing or established new governance structures in order to draw the contours of the potential state (before the war) and to consolidate the conquered territory (during the war). There is ample evidence that those structures, such as the police, war presidency/crisis staff, local governments, were used to homogenize the claimed territories by targeting the ethnic “other.” It is less known, however, that some of those structures, especially at the local (municipal) level, were also in service of sacrificing part of the ethnic kin. While I acknowledge that out-group members were targeted throughout the war and across Bosnia, in this paper, I will focus largely on nationalists’ strategy to sacrifice their “own” people.

The literature on rebel governance suggest that most rebel organizations make efforts to establish some governance structures in order to provide basic social services to the population, to establish public order, or to mobilize civilians for their ideological goals or material benefits (Kasfir, 2015). However, Bosnian “ethnic rebels” formally created parallel “ethnic” institutions, such as municipal assemblies, in part to facilitate the process of “reciprocal exchange” of populations and attendant re-settlement of ethnic kin among the three nationalist parties in Bosnia. This process assumed a regional dimension, as plans and practices were put in place to exchange populations among three countries, Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia.

In 1991 and 1992, the three Bosnian nationalist parties formed separate “ethnic” municipalities (“Muslim municipalities”; “Serb municipalities”), claiming that those structures would protect their respective communities.⁴ It is because the SDS spearheaded and dominated the process of state restructuring in 1991, I focus here on *pre-war* Serb structures whose function was in part to facilitate the eventual expulsion of Serbs by Muslim/Bosniak and Croat armed forces. The SDS formed “Serb municipalities” not only in the areas designated as the “Serb space,” incorporating both municipalities with a Serb majority and districts with a Serb minority. They also established Serb structures on those territories which the SDS had no intention to claim and govern but which had a Serb minority. The question then arises why exactly the SDS formed those institutions on those particular territories?

I argue that the function of those structures was to facilitate the eventual expulsion of Serbs so that they could be resettled in the “Serb space,” from which Muslims/Bosniaks and Croat would be expelled. In other words, the two types of violence—targeting both in-group and out-group members—were interdependent and formed parts of the same process of ethnic homogenization. As early as December 1991, it was perfectly evident to Serb delegates sitting in

⁴ In addition to the creation of ethnic institutions at the local level, the Serb SDS and Croat HDZ also formed regional entities, the Serb Republic of BiH and Croatian Community of Herzeg Bosnia, respectively. However, here I focus only on municipal structures. Furthermore, although Muslim nationalists also formed or attempted to form their own “Muslim municipalities” in Banja Luka, Bijeljina, Gacko, and Ključ before the war, most parallel municipalities created in later 1991 and early 1992 were those established by the SDS. During the war, the Muslim SDA adopted the same model and established parallel “Muslim municipalities” in the Croat controlled territories, forbidding Muslims, especially members of SDA, to participate in Croat institutions. It was the struggle over government (civilian) structures that ultimately led to an armed conflict between the Croat armed forces (HVO) and the predominately Bosniak/Muslim Army of BiH in later 1992 and early 1993. See Gordana Božić (2018), *The Limits of “Ethnic War”: Intra-Group Violence and Resistance during the Bosnian War*, PhD Dissertation: University of Ottawa.

the Serb National Assembly that those structures would isolate and further marginalize Serbs at best and create the condition for their expulsion at worst (Stenogram”, 11 December 1991, pp. 21, 24-25). In May 1992, Senior SDS leaders admitted that their earlier claims that those structures would protect Serbs amounted to SDS propaganda and that the real goal was in fact to create the conditions for the re-settlement of Serbs who were eventually expelled by Muslims/Bosniak and Croat territories (“Izvorni zapisnik”, 12 May 1992, p. 38). Indeed, during the war, the SDS local authorities adopted a number of decisions and “conclusions” that called for a “reciprocal exchange” of populations among three parties. The exchange of civilians arbitrarily detained in over thousands of detention facilities established across the whole country illustrates a tacit cooperation among the three parties to radically change the ethnic demography at the local level.

The [Muslim party] SDA and [Bosnian Croat party] HDZ, together with the representatives of the [Serb] Autonomous Region Krajina, must enable for the endangered Serb people, against whom genocide is being orchestrated, collective resettlement, that is, to enable an exchange [of population] based on the principle of reciprocity (“Zaključke,” no. 03-361/92, 1992).

Indeed, a plan for regional, tri-partite exchange of population among Croatia, Serbia, and Bosnia was drafted in Zagreb, Croatia’s capital, as early as summer 1991. According to this proposal, the Croatian government would sacrifice more than a half of the Bosnian Croat community: 209 864 Croats would be exchanged for 213 969 Bosnian Serbs and additional 263 487 Croats for 246 790 Muslims (“Razmjena pučanstva,” July 1991, pp. 4-5). There was a striking similarity between the 1991 plan and the 1941 agreement between Hitler and the leader of the Nazi-puppet state of Independent State of Croatia (NDH), whereby the two dictators called

for exchanges of populations between four regional countries, affecting up to half a million of individuals (Korb, 2016, p. 383).

Furthermore, the author(s) of the 1991 plan pointed out that mutual cooperation among all three parties (Serbs, Croats, and Muslims/Bosniaks) were crucial for the creation of this new ethnic order. There is compelling evidence that the three nationalist parties in Bosnia flexibly coordinated their strategies of violence in order to complete ethnic homogeneity on their respective territories during the war. Central to this cooperation was their willingness to sacrifice their own ethnic kin, who lived on the territory controlled by the other party and thus were by default treated by the local authorities as the ethnic “other.”

Two weeks before the civil war broke out in Bosnia, Radovan Karadžić, leader of Serb Democratic Party (SDS) and later President of the Serb entity in Bosnia, the Republika Srpska, unambiguously declared to the Serb Assembly, most of whom were SDS delegates elected on the nationalist platform to defend national interests of the Serbs, that a part of the Serb nation had to be sacrificed for the high political end, namely, for the creation of ethnically homogenous Serb entity:

When it comes to the [ethnic] maps, Muslims accepted them. That they will be corrected is another thing... Therefore, I ask you to establish a factual situation [faktičko stanje] on the ground based on justice and law... *Most likely there will be various resettlements* [razna preseljenja], but nothing must be done under pressure. We see that Serbs are leaving Livno, etc. And all of these [resettlements] are natural things brought by a dangerous process, a harsh process of restructuring the state (“Stenogram”, 18 March 1992, p. 64, emphasis added).

The following views expressed by Franjo Tuđman, Croatia's war-time President who exercised direct influence over the Bosnian Croat HDZ, provide additional evidence that the sacrifice of in-group members was an important cornerstone of a new ethnic order in the region. They also illustrate how violence against the ethnic "other" (in this case Serbs in Croatia) was intertwined with the sacrifice of in-group members (here, Croats in north-eastern Bosnia under Serb control). In September 1992, Tuđman informed the Bosnian Croat leadership that future good relationship between Serbia and Croatia was predicated on a mutual exchange of populations:

Our politics must enable us to establish with Serbia some kind of relationship, namely, that certain *planned resettlement of the population is in both their and our interests*, so that for once a normal relationship is established, if not friendly then bearable neighbourly relationship with Serbs ("Zapisnik sa razgovora" 17 September 1992, p. 1, Tape 15. Emphasis added).

When the Bosnian Croat leadership later raised the question of the return of Croats who were expelled from Serb controlled north-eastern Bosnia/Posavina, Tuđman unambiguously stated that their return went against the Croatian national/ethnic interest. They had to be sacrificed:

That problem of the return to Posavina...But now when we are talking among ourselves, *it would not be in [our] interest that Croats return there*. But now, when we are talking among ourselves, it would not be in [our] interest, if it is true that 30,000 Serbs from Croatia settled in Posavina, that those Serbs return to us in Croatia, in Zagreb, etc. ("Zapisnik sa sastanka", 27 March 1995, p. 4, Tape 12. Emphasis added).

The Muslim/Bosniak Party of Democratic Action (SDA) used the concept of multiculturalism and diversity as a powerful propaganda tool, while in practice they expelled Serbs and Croats from the conquered territories. At the same time, they strategically resettled Muslims/Bosniaks expelled by Serb and Croat forces in order to establish a new ethnic order in Central Bosnia. For the SDA, the new ethnic order tramped Bosnian tradition of multiculturalism. In closed meetings, especially in conversations with Franjo Tuđman, the leader of the SDA, Alija Izetbegović, endorsed self-government and even secession of ethnically homogenous regions, specifically, Western Herzegovina with a Croat majority (“Zapisnik sa sastanka”, 21 July 1992, p. 2, Tape 10; p. 1 Tape 13; “Zapisnik sa razgovora”, 24 April 1993, p. 4, Tape 5.).

More importantly, the SDA predicated political stability of and public order in eventual de-centralized Bosnia on ethnic homogeneity of sub-state units. Izetbegović had no qualms about using the expulsion of Muslims/Bosniaks from the Serb territory to illustrate his point that sub-state units (in this case “Croat” cantons) would be stable only under the condition of ethnic homogeneity, namely, the expulsion of the ethnic “other” (in this case Muslims/Bosniaks).

[Decentralization with] stability is possible where Croats have an absolute majority. That [decentralization] is not a problem there; that is not a problem at all. That would be the only stable solution. However, everything else [decentralization of ethnically diverse areas] leads to the creation of an [entity] that would be de-stabilized after first [post-war] elections. There will be outvoting; after the elections, you will have a Muslim rule in a Croat canton (“Zapisnik sa razgovora,” 21 July 1992, p. 3 Tape 12).

When the war ends...then again numerical ration of [ethnic communities] in the country will be important...One man, one vote...then you will see that cantonization in [Bosnia] will not be sustainable, at least not for the Croatian people... See, the only way [to ensure stability] is to apply Karadžić's recipe and to carry out ethnic cleansing. Say in Central Bosnia where now HVO is trying to take over power...[the Croat rule] will be sustainable only under the condition that [Muslims] are expelled... Karadžić understood what he needed to do. He must kill and expel people, and only then he will be able to sustain his rule (p. 3, Tape 8).

During the war, the SDA strategically re-settled Muslims/Bosniaks who were expelled from Serb controlled Krajina (north-western Bosnia) in municipalities from which the Bosniak armed forces expelled Croats and Serbs. When Croats lost Central Bosnia to the Bosniak armed forces (ABiH), the HDZ demanded that SDA stopped re-settling Muslim/Bosniak displaced people in areas where Croats were numerous prior to the conflict ("Zapisnik sa sastanka", 27 March 1995, p. 5, Tape 6). HDZ insisted that the Bosniak displaced people should be moved to predominately Muslim/Bosniak municipalities in order to preserve the pre-war ethnic composition in the municipalities with a significant Croat presence. They hoped that the military losses on the battleground could be reversed by ballot votes in eventual post-war democratic elections. However, the HDZ had a different plan for so-called "defended" municipalities, where they did not permit Bosniaks and Serbs to return.

Conclusion

I suggested that the current definition of ethnic violence could be improved and proposed an alternative understanding with the focus on the ultimate political end, namely, the creation, preservation, and preventing the reversal of a new ethnic order. The examined definition is sufficiently narrow to exclude many conflicts that are erroneously called ethnic because combatants and civilians were organized along ethnic lines, but broad enough to better reflect complex and complicated processes at work in civil war. I used the Bosnian civil war of 1992-95 as a case that fits comfortably into the category of ethnic conflict.

In particular, I argued that the Bosnian civil war represents a textbook example of ethnic violence, in which violence against out-group members and sacrifice of in-group members mutually reinforced each other. The expulsion of the ethnic “other” was a motor behind the resettlement process, while the permanent resettlement ensured a near-irreversibility of the outcome of the former. Whereas violence against the ethnic “other” attracted much attention in scholar and non-academic writing, violence against in-group members has remained neglected due to the incomplete definition of what constitutes ethnic violence. When violence of in-group members is discussed, it is typically treated as incidental rather than integral to the ethnic violence (Woodward 1995; Burg and Shoup 2000; Gagnon 2004). As a result, those who argue that the Bosnian war was an ethnic war focus on violence against the ethnic “other,” while others who dispute that characterization point to the fact that in-group members were also targeted. I argued in this paper that the Bosnian war was indeed an ethnic conflict not despite but *because* in-group members were targeted along the ethnic “other.”

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Stenogram 11 sjednice Skupštine, 18 March 1992.

Zaključke, no.03-361/92, Srpska Republika BiH, Autonomna Regija Krajina, Krizni štab, Banja Luka, 28 May 1992.

Zapisnik sa razgovora državano-političko vodstva Hrvatske sa predstavnicima HDZ i hrvatskim predstavnicima iz BiH održanog u Zagrebu, 17 September 1992.

Zapisnik sa razgovora Delegacije Republike Bosne i Hercegovine na čelu sa predsjednikom Predsjedništva Alijom Izetbegovićem i Delegacije Republike Hrvatske na čelu s Predsjednikom Republike Hrvatske gospodinom dr Franjom Tuđmanom, održanih u vili "Zagorje" održanog 21 July 1992.

Zapisnik sa razgovora održanog u uredu predsjednika Republike Hrvatske dr. Franje Tuđmana sa gospodinom Lordom Owenom, supresjedateljem mirovne konferencije, Alijom Izetbegovićem, predsjednikom Predsjedništva BiH, Matom Bobanom, predsjednikom HZ HB sa suradnicima održanog 24 April 1993 in Zagreb.

Zapisnik sa sastanka Predsjednika Republike Hrvatske dr Franje Tuđmana sa izaslanstvom najviših dužnosnika Herceg-Bosne i HDZ-a BiH, održanog 27 March 1995.