

Modernization, Secularization and Ethnic Conflict: The Kurdish Question in Turkey

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April 14, 2019

Paper Presented at the 2019 ASN World Convention, Columbia University 2-4 May 2019.

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Abstract

The literature on the relationship between modernization, secularization and ethnic conflict has different variants, and different predictions regarding the relationship between these variables. I focus on the Kurdish question in Turkey and analyze this relationship for both major ethnic groups, Turks and Kurds, with individual-level survey data to capture attitudes, and district-level conflict data to capture behavior. The findings suggest that secularization increases inter-ethnic tolerance and decreases the likelihood of conflict in a context where adversaries share the same religious identity.

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1 Introduction

The Kurdish question in Turkey has been one of the longest-lasting ethnic conflicts in the world. It is also heavily affecting the Turkish society. According to the survey *Kurt Meselesi'nde Algı ve Beklentiler* [Perceptions and Expectations in the Kurdish Question] (Konda 2010), one in every five people among the Kurds and one in every ten people among the Turks said that someone close to them was hurt or killed because of the violent conflict.¹ Not only is the conflict harmful because it costs lives, but it also has been gravely interfering with and preventing progress in many other dimensions; such as democratization and accession to the European Union (Kirisci 2004), economic development (Altan 2002) and has been used as a justification for human rights violations (Icduygu et al. 1999) and persecution of the opposition by the state (HRW 2017).

Another salient issue that polarizes Turkish citizens is religiosity/secularism. The center-periphery cleavage and its repercussion, religious-secular tension is one of the major factors that has been shaping Turkish politics and political behavior for decades, or even centuries (Mardin 1973). The top-down modernization attempts by the governments and the state elite has been embraced by a significant portion of the public. Yet, another significant portion of the public has resisted modernization. The clearest reflection of this tension can be found in the polarization between secular and religious groups, be it social interactions (Toprak 2009), attitudes (Esmer 1999), voting behavior (Carkoglu 2012a; Carkoglu and Hinich 2006), or the military coups (Kadioglu 1998).

Regarding the direction of the relationship, the literature on modernization and ethnic conflict can be classified in two categories: those that expect modernization to breed ethnic conflict, and those that expect modernization to diminish ethnic conflict. Regarding secularization as one aspect of modernization, my main aim is to assess which of these theories best explain the attitudes and behavior of the Turkish and Kurdish people in Turkey.

¹It is very likely that this proportion has increased since the violence in Kurdish-majority areas in Turkey has intensified since mid-2015.

Unlike many other ethnic conflicts in the world, the conflict between Kurds and Turks has no religious dimension. A vast majority of both ethnic groups are Sunni Muslims, which might be a factor likely to bind the two groups together. Indeed, the discourse of the Turkish state officials has emphasized this common religious identity with the hope of alleviating the conflict (Somer 2005). Moreover, such arguments have found their way into the academia (Yavuz 1998) and some studies have presented evidence that more religious people are likely to be more tolerant towards the other group (Sarigil and Karakoc 2016), or are likely to be less ethnic nationalist (Ekmekci 2011), although there are also studies that find more religious people to be less tolerant (Carkoglu and Toprak 2007; Yesilada and Noordijk 2010).

Considering the ethnic conflict environment in Turkey together with the salience of the secular-religious divide and the predictions of the theories concerning the relationship between modernization and ethnic conflict, I believe that it is crucial to examine the effect of modernization on ethnic conflict in the Turkish context.

In the empirical analysis of this paper I first examine the relationship between modernization and tolerance at the individual level and find that more secular Kurds and Turks are more likely to be more tolerant towards each other. Next, I examine if such a relationship exists between secularization and actual instances of ethnic conflict. Using district-level data, I find that more secular provinces are less likely to have ethnic mob violence.

The paper is structured as follows. In Chapter 2 I examine the literature on modernization, secularization and ethnic conflict. Chapter 3 presents a brief overview of the ethnic conflict in Turkey. Chapter 4 evaluates the ethnic conflict in Turkey in light of the literature and derives the hypotheses, chapter 5 outlines the data and the method, chapter 6 presents the results and their discussion before the conclusion in chapter 7.

2 Literature on Modernization, Secularization, and Ethnic Conflict

Modernization can be described as the process of transformation of "traditional ways of life" (Deutsch 1961, 493) and social, economic, political structures into more developed and contemporary forms. Broadly, there are two variants of theories that examine the relationship between modernization and ethnic conflict. First of these is modernization theories which expect that with modernization and industrialization societies and individuals would be more secular and that religion's importance would diminish over time (Durkheim 1997, Weber 1958), a popular belief until the mid-20th century (Mills 1959; see Newman 1991 for an overview of the literature). In the view of this strand of theories, modernization and social mobilization cause a commonality among different groups via getting them exposed to each other and each other's cultures, a bigger market, unified education system; in sum more contact with each other (Durkheim 1997). Modernization, consequently, can diminish the difference between the groups, result in assimilation towards the institutions of the core and create a new homogenous identity whereby ethnic affiliations become less relevant. Norris and Inglehart (2004) underline the importance of existential security in the individuals' formative years in shaping people's religious/secular attitudes later in their lives. They expect lower income nations to have higher levels of religiosity. Secularization, in turn, curbs people's commitment to traditional norms and renders people more tolerant towards cultural change (2004).

Inglehart and Welzel argue that the 'human development sequence', which means modernization, renders people more tolerant towards the out-groups (2005, p.273) Similarly, Inglehart et al. (2015) demonstrate that improved 'existential conditions' and 'life opportunities' make them less intolerant of diversity and less willing to 'fight for their country', and therefore more peaceful. Considering that secularization is a core aspect of modernization, these accounts suggest that there can be a link between secularization and tolerance towards

the out-group.

Hence, Inglehart's materialist/postmaterialist values distinction (1998) can be helpful in understanding the relationship between modernization, secularization and ethnic tolerance (Weldon 2006) and it can help explain ethnic conflict's relationship with secularization and ethnic conflict. Following the theories posited by Inglehart (1998), Norris and Inglehart (2004) and Inglehart and Welzel (2005), we can expect those who are brought up under more secure conditions to be more secular and more tolerant towards the out-groups. This would imply that these people would be less likely to approve discrimination or violence towards the out-group, which makes ethnic conflict less likely to occur.

The empirical evidence suggests that there can be a complex link between religiosity and tolerance towards the out-group. Allport and Kramer (1946) demonstrate that more religious people (church-goers) have more racial prejudice in the U.S. context. Two decades later, Allport (1966), and Allport and Ross (1967) still argued that on average churchgoers in the U.S. have more ethnic and religious prejudice than do non-churchgoers, though Allport and Ross (1967) demonstrate that the relationship could be curvilinear, very frequent church-goers having lower prejudice compared to less frequent church-goers. To account for this nonlinear relationship, Allport and Ross distinguish between extrinsic and intrinsic religious orientation, where those with intrinsic orientations are less prejudiced than those with extrinsic orientations. By extrinsic religious orientation they mean those who are religious due to instrumental and utilitarian motives, for whom religion can "provide security and solace, sociability and distraction, status and self-justification" (1967, p.434), while intrinsic believers are more likely to internalize their creed.

Scheepers et al. (2002) conduct a cross-national test of Allport and Ross' (1967) hypothesis. Their main findings confirm Allport and Ross. They demonstrate that those who identify as Catholics and Protestants support prejudice against ethnic minorities more than the non-religious do. Furthermore, more frequent church attendance increases prejudice. On the other hand, in line with Allport and Ross, they find that intrinsic religious orientations

tend to reduce prejudice.

The second variant of theories that consider the relationship between modernization and ethnic conflict expect ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict to increase with modernization. This variant of theories can be classified under two subcategories. Those that emphasize material aspects and those that emphasize psychological aspects.

Modernization can mobilize people along ethnic or nationalist lines due to elites' attempts for industrialization (Gellner 1983). In addition to this, conflicting material interests (or competition over material resources) can exacerbate ethnic mobilization and ethnic conflict. This can be due to elites' political ambitions (Bates 1974), or differential modernization of different groups such as inequalities across groups (Melson and Wolpe 1970) that may cause the "wealthier, better educated and more urbanized...to be envied, resented, and...feared by others" (Bates 1974, p.462).

Inter-ethnic inequalities and resulting ethnic mobilizations are even sometimes interpreted within the core-periphery framework, with 'cultural division of labor' (Hechter 1975), where the 'exploited' ethnic group at the periphery ethnically mobilizes against the 'exploitative' core. For instance, such inequalities may be visible in the form of job discrimination or exclusion from political power. Hence, getting more educated, moving to the urban areas and therefore more cultural contact in such a context increases ethnic consciousness and mobilization (Hechter 1975), and therefore the likelihood of ethnic conflict. All in all, an individual from a discriminated ethnic group can increase her life chances by either assimilating to the dominant identity, or demanding more power for her ethnic group. Where the cultural markers are very hard to overcome (such as skin color or language) and where assimilation is not an optimal strategy, individuals can prefer to mobilize along ethnic lines.

The material interest approaches attracted criticism because they were often unable to explain why people would mobilize along ethnic rather than class lines. Moreover, Horowitz asserts that the material interest approaches are not empirically supported because "ethnic groups and social classes rarely overlap perfectly" (1985, p.105). Instead, several scholars

argued that a social-psychological theory of ethnic conflict that emphasizes the importance of identities per se, together with symbolic and emotional factors would have better explanatory power. The social-psychological theories emphasized factors related to a struggle for self-esteem or “group entitlement, conceived as a joint function of worth and legitimacy” (Horowitz 1985, p. 226), an interaction of reason, emotions and passion (Horowitz 2001), cultural awareness of co-ethnics and other ethnic groups due to factors that accompany economic development, such as literacy and communication technologies that made people “more aware of the distinctions between themselves and other people” (Connor 1972, p.329), or “group myths that justify hostility, fears of group extinction” (Kaufman 2006, p.47).

Regarding the secularization aspect of modernization, Anderson (1983) argues that nationalism provided a secular alternative to religion’s role of providing a reason for ‘human suffering’ and a sense of continuity and meaning. According to this line of thought, then, secular people could adopt nationalism as a way of providing solving their existential crisis and being more nationalist can result in increased hostility towards the other ethnic groups.

3 Modernization, Secularization and the Ethnic Conflict in Turkey

The modernization process in the Ottoman Empire, Turkey's predecessor, was first initiated as a response to the military failures the Empire continuously suffered at the Western and Northern borders. It started as modernization of the army and later gradually spread to the other aspects of the state and the society (Poulton 1997). After the severe military defeats and the huge land losses in the Balkan Wars and the First World War, the Turkish state elites and the intellectuals embraced Turkish nationalism while previously dominant ideologies of Ottomanism and Islamism lost favor. Later, in the newly founded Turkish Republic, Turkish nationalism was a "constitutive ideology of a secular and modern 'nation-state-society'" (Yegen 2007, 120). Together with aiming to develop other aspects of modernization, the new regime took firm steps towards initiating secular reforms.

A paradoxical aspect of Turkish modernization is that the 'secular' Turkish identity has always contained Sunni Muslim identity at its core. The Turkish state's secularism project never aimed to completely eliminate Sunni Muslim identity from Turkish identity; all it did or aimed to do was to reduce the public role of religion, which can be described as privatization of religion in Jose Casanova's (1994) terminology. "[A]ll Muslims were considered potential members of the early Republican national community. This meant that non-Turkish Muslims such as Kurds..., theoretically could assimilate by learning Turkish language and culture" (White 2013, p.30), while non-Muslims were regarded as outsiders. Hence, it could be misleading to regard the new Turkish identity as totally isolated from religious aspects.

As the Turkish society further modernized and secularized in the following decades of the republican establishment, the degree of modernization and secularization was uneven across the center and periphery. The main cleavage line in Turkish politics and society was, and probably still is, between the center which was secular, modern, urban and educated,

and the periphery which was religious, traditional, rural and less educated (Mardin 1973). Turkish party system has been mainly shaped around this cleavage (Carkoglu 2012a) and the power struggle between the two poles lead to military coups where the army removed the representatives of the periphery from power to hand it back to the state elite (Kadioglu 1998, p.189) in 1960, and arguably in 1971 and 1980.

In 1984, the PKK initiated its attacks against Turkish security forces and there has been an ongoing warfare between the PKK and the Turkish armed forces in the Kurdish-majority areas of South-Eastern Turkey. Around 40,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives in this conflict (Somer 2011, p.256). Moreover, according to one estimate 2 million (Gulbey 1996, p.18) and according to another 1 million (Yavuz 2007, p.68) Kurds had to migrate from their villages to larger cities due to forced evacuations. The attacks of PKK have radicalized the Turks against the Kurds (Zurcher 2004), many Turkish people equate Kurdish ethnic identity with being a PKK sympathizer (Kirisci and Winrow 1997, pp.132-3). The armed struggle leads both Kurds and Turks to perceive each other as enemies (Kalaycioglu 2005), creating hostile attitudes towards each other as well as helping more nationalist and less conciliatory parties gain electoral support (Kalaycioglu 2005; Kibris 2011), further deteriorating the conflict. State repression towards the Kurds is also a key factor that radicalizes Kurdish identity and leads many people to join the PKK (Tezcur 2016).

4 Turkish Case in Light of the Theories and the Hypotheses

Applying different theories that examine the relationship between modernization, secularization and ethnic conflict to this case, we can construct several hypotheses. Here, I examine modernization and secularization separately, even though secularization is one aspect of modernization. This is because the conflict in Turkey is a hard case for the secularization theory since both groups share the same religious identity, while it is not a hard case for other aspects of modernization.

Although there are different levels of modernization among Kurdish people, there is ethnic mobilization in every segment of the Kurdish society (Ozcan 2006; Tezcur 2016), regardless of their level of education, material well-being, or where they live. Many Kurds in Turkey live in severely underdeveloped Kurdish regions, with very low percentage of schooling, bad health facilities, infrastructure, security, and undersupplied public services, or if they move to the big cities and start to live in the slums, joining unemployed masses. It is possible that either of these render Kurds equally vulnerable to repression and ethnic mobilization.

Kirisci and Winrow (1997) argue that migration to the Turkish-majority Western cities can make Kurds more aware of the "socioeconomic disparities between the regions and therefore ethnicities" (1997, p.136) and therefore can be more conscious of their ethnic identity which makes them "vulnerable to the propaganda of the PKK" (p.136). On the other hand, the migrated people can "develop a vested interest in becoming integrated into a society that still provides considerable opportunities in upward social mobility" (p.136) and thus an individual would have less incentive to emphasize his/her ethnic Kurdish identity and less often get involved in a conflict.

The relationship between secularization and ethnic conflict has been widely discussed in the context of Turkey. Islamist ideology and Muslim identity are regarded as useful

tools that could contain ethnic tensions and resolve the ethnic conflict peacefully (Yavuz 1998, p.12). Islam's preeminent role among the Kurds is asserted to be the foundation of this expectation (van Bruinessen 1992; Yegen 1996). As a result of the strict secularist policies of the Turkish Republic, the ties between the Kurdish and Turkish communities have weakened. Consequently, Kurds, who, under the Ottoman rule identified as part of the Muslim community,² have faced exclusion with rising Turkish nationalism (Entessar 1992; van Bruinessen 1992). Muslim solidarity is hence expected to curb ethno-nationalist tendencies that form the basis of the social conflicts between the Turkish and Kurdish ethnic groups. On the electoral scene, Islamist National View (Milli Gorus) movement, where AKP's roots lie, has always advocated this line of religious unification against ethno-national divisions. The electoral success of AKP's predecessor Islamist parties and as well as the AKP in Kurdish-majority provinces is cited as evidence in support of this argument (Gunter and Yavuz 2007).

Several studies have examined ethnic and nationalist attitudes in this specific case and their conclusions diverge from each other. Sarigil (2010) finds that Kurds are less supportive of Kurdish nationalism (as measured by voting for the ethnic Kurdish party) as they have higher socioeconomic status, but he fails to find any effect of religiosity on nationalist attitudes. This is consistent with the classical modernization theories as well as Inglehart et al.'s (2015) findings, which expect people to become less supportive of nationalism as they are more modern. In contrast, using the same data and measure for Kurdish nationalism that Sarigil used, Ekmekci (2011) finds that more religious Kurds are less supportive of ethnic nationalism, confirming the Islamic solidarity arguments.

Regarding tolerance, different studies, again, reach different conclusions. Sarigil and Karakoc (2016) find that more religious Turks are more tolerant towards the Kurds while religiosity has no effect on Kurds' tolerance towards the Turks. Similarly, Dixon and Ergin (2010) find that more secular Turks are less tolerant towards the Kurds. On the other

²According to the Millet System in the Ottoman Empire, groups were defined with respect to their religion, not ethnicity. See Barkey (2005)

hand, Carkoglu and Kalaycioglu (2007), Carkoglu and Toprak (2007) and Yesilada and Noordijk (2010) find that religious people are less tolerant of social pluralism, though what they consider is not specifically ethnic tolerance towards the Kurds, but a general index of tolerance. Similarly, Esmer (1999) shows that people from the 'center' side of the center-periphery cleavage are more tolerant than people from the 'peripheral' side. Considering that center-periphery cleavage overlaps with the religious-secular cleavage in Turkey, this could suggest that more religious people are more likely to be intolerant.

The Muslim solidarity arguments contradict theoretical expectations by Allport and Kramer (1946). Apart from the findings I summarized above, I know no empirical evidence that demonstrate common Muslim identity has been useful in rendering either side less nationalist or more tolerant. Based on content analysis of several religious and secular newspapers in Turkey, Somer concludes that neither of the two groups' elites are necessarily more tolerant of social pluralism (2011). In a similar work, Somer and Liaras (2010) find moderate newspapers on both secular and religious sides to be relatively more sympathetic towards Kurds and their cultural recognition; however, "hardline religious-conservative and secular opinion setters seem to have been similarly against a relaxation of state policies on the Kurdish question" (p.160). At the very least, these findings suggest that religious elites are not more tolerant towards the Kurds compared to the secular elites.

Another reason that makes me skeptical of the results that find positive association between religiosity and tolerance is the fact that many religious people and elite fail to distinguish between ethnic Turkish identity and Sunni Muslim identity. As I have mentioned before, the ethnic Turkish identity constructed by the republican elite has always had Sunni Muslim identity as a vital aspect at its core. On top of this, the Kurdish conflict has been framed as an ethnic in addition to a religious identity issue by the Islamist parties. White argues that the Islamist National View movement linked Islam to Turkish nationalism, and even worse, it had "a strong racialist component based on Turkishness and Turkish blood and history" (2013, p.39). According to White, the Turkish identity in the minds of the

National View elites was a "modern religio-ethnic national identity" (p.39).

The ultra-nationalist Turkish parties, the Nationalist Action Party [Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi-MHP] and the Grand Unity Party [Buyuk Birlik Partisi-BBP] have also perceived Sunni Islam and Turkish ethnic identity as embedded. The youth organizations of both parties have engaged in many acts of collective violence against Kurdish individuals (for instance, see IHD 2008), among other vulnerable groups.

The Turkish-Islamist synthesis has also adopted a discourse where they alleged that ethnically mobilized Kurds and the PKK were non-Muslims, very often Armenians. To mention a few examples among many, this has been openly expressed by the MHP MP Yusuf Halacoglu who went as far as saying that 80% of PKK members were Armenians³ ⁴ and by Cemil Cicek, who was the deputy prime minister when he not-so-subtly implied that there were "Armenian militants in the PKK."⁵

Based on the discussion above, I propose the following hypotheses:

Classical Modernization Theories

- Hypothesis 1: More modern individuals are more likely to have higher levels of out-group tolerance.
- Hypothesis 2: More secular individuals are more likely to have higher levels of out-group tolerance.
- Hypothesis 3: Increased contact with the out-group increases out-group tolerance.

³<http://www.gundem.be/tr/turkiye/halacoglu-pkk-lilarin-yuzde-sekseni-ermeni>

⁴<http://www.yenicaggazetesi.com.tr/pkknin-ermeni-kimligine-dikkat-113432h.html>

⁵<http://www.haber7.com/siyaset/haber/590587-cemil-cicek-pkkda-sunnetsiz-terorist-var>

Conflictual Modernization Theories

- Hypothesis 4: More modern individuals are more likely to have lower levels of out-group tolerance.
- Hypothesis 5: More secular individuals are more likely to have lower levels of out-group tolerance.
- Hypothesis 6: Increased contact with the out-group decreases out-group tolerance.

Hypotheses 1 and 4, 2 and 5, and 3 and 6 obviously contradict each other as they are derived from rival theories. This means that at most one hypothesis in each of these pairs can be confirmed.

5 Data and Method

In this analysis, I will consider the relationship between secularization and ethnic conflict at two levels: individual and aggregate. For the individual level, I use Konda's 2010 survey Perceptions and Expectations in the Kurdish Question. This is because the survey was specifically conducted for examining certain aspects of the Kurdish question. With this level of analysis, what I do is not different than the studies that examined religiosity and ethnic intolerance before; I examine the relationship between secularization and ethnic tolerance at the individual level, to see if more secular or less secular people are more or less tolerant.

For the aggregate level, I take a step further and consider the behavior of the individuals as the dependent variable in order to corroborate the findings at the individual level and in order to check if intolerance transforms to violent behavior. If similar patterns are also found at this level, it is very good news for the theories, it means that the attitudes are transformed to behavior and that they are not mere correlations of one attitude (such as religiosity or secularization) with another attitude (tolerance) which may not be that surprising to find. Therefore, for the aggregate level I use district-level data from Turkey.

5.1 Individual-Level Analysis

Here, I use survey-data that was conducted in the summer of 2010 by survey research company Konda. I analyze the Kurdish and Turkish subgroups separately. The main dependent variable in this analysis is tolerance towards the other ethnic group. I use three different questions that ask if the respondent is willing to "Accept an individual from the other ethnicity as spouse or child- in-law/neighbor/business partner." If the respondent's answer to all these categories is yes, then I code her as 'tolerant' (0) if she has one or more no answers, I code her as 'intolerant' (1). Similar measures are often used in the tolerance literature.

The main independent variable I use for measuring secularization is "Perceiving being Muslim as a prerequisite for being a Turkish citizen." The less the respondent agrees with

this statement, I conclude that the more secular she is. In order to measure modernization, I use income and education levels of the respondent. In addition, I control for urban residence to control for another aspect of modernization. Another phenomenon the urban residence variable can measure is the contact between different ethnic groups and therefore it can help evaluate the contact hypothesis (Sarigil and Karakoc 2016). To take into account the fact that those who had been personally harmed may be more likely to get more radicalized (Tezcur 2016; Wood 2003), I create a binary variable that measures if the individual had even been directly harmed by the conflict.⁶ In the baseline model, I also control for the age and gender of the respondent.

Next, I construct an extended model for robustness check by adding further control variables. I add one further modernization measure, the household size of the individual. This variable can also help control for the effect of the center-periphery cleavage in Turkish Politics (Kibris 2011). To evaluate contact hypothesis with a different variable and to control for its effect, I add a region control, if the respondent lives in a Kurdish-majority or Turkish-majority district, following Sarigil and Karakoc (2016). It is possible that Kurds who live in Turkish-majority regions have more contact with Turks compared with Kurds who live in Kurdish-majority regions, while Turks who live in Kurdish-majority regions have more contact with Kurds compared with Turks who live in Turkish-majority regions.

Finally, the main measure of Kurdish ethnicity that I use is the native language as declared by the respondent, following Carkoglu (2005). Hence, if the respondent's native language is Kurdish or Zaza, I code them as Kurds. Else, I code them as non-Kurds (Turks). I prefer this measure over self-declared ethnicity because the latter is more likely to include self-selection into that ethnic identity due to social pressure. Expressing that one is Kurdish can be viewed as dangerous and many may prefer to hide their identity in public (Gulbey

⁶This variable is coded as 'affected' if the individual's answer to at least one of these questions is yes: Someone from her family died or was injured, she was forced to relocate/her village was burned/she was threatened, she had to migrate, she was economically affected (change in job, closing business etc.), she was arrested or put on trial, she received bad treatment from the people where she lives. If the individual answered no to all these question, the variable is coded as not affected.

1996). In other words, when we use self-declared ethnic identity, we are likely to capture only those Kurds who are more ethnically mobilized. Anyhow, I conducted all the tests using self-declared ethnicity and the results are not different (not reported).

For robustness checks, I use different dependent and independent variables in addition to the control variables and the different measures of Kurdish ethnicity I mentioned. For the Turkish sample, I check for two further dependent variables: first is the respondent's degree of agreement with the question "Eliminating the 'terror' (by military means) is the only way to the solution of the conflict." Respondents who agree more with this statement should be more likely to be intolerant of the Kurds and accept violence against Kurds. The second dependent variable I use for robustness check is how much the respondent agrees that "Turkish ethnic origin is necessary to be a Turkish citizen." I expect this variable to measure intolerance towards the Kurds since a respondent who regards Turkish ethnic origin to be necessary to be a Turkish citizen is unlikely to regard Kurds as a fellow citizen and therefore more likely to have discriminatory attitudes and intolerance towards the Kurds.

For further robustness checks, I also use two other different independent variables to measure secularization. The first of the measures asks the respondent how much they agree with the statement "The state should support everyone's opportunity of worship regardless of what religion or denomination they belong." At the abstract level, this variable can measure how much the members of the dominant religious identity are willing to see the state be impartial towards all religions, which is a vital aspect of secular attitudes. Moreover, this variable is valuable in the Turkish context because it probably calls to mind the discussions about Alevi's demands for recognition of their places of worship and therefore get material support from the state, as all the Sunni mosques do get (Soner and Toktas 2011). This question is also likely to remind the respondents about the non-Muslim foundations' rights such as owning property or training clergy that had been severely hampered during the republican period (Keyman 2007). The second secularization variable I use for robustness checks is how important it is for the respondent to be defined in terms of her ethnic and

sectarian identity. The respondents who say that it is more important for them to be defined as Sunni-Muslims are more likely to be less secular compared with those who say that being defined as a Sunni Muslim is not important for them.

Unfortunately, Konda did not ask the degree of religiosity of the respondents in the surveys that are conducted in the Turkish-majority provinces. Therefore, I cannot use religiosity as an independent variable. Nevertheless, I argue that secularization should be a better measure than religiosity for the purposes of this study, which is often measured as frequency of worship in the Turkish context (Carkoglu 2012b) as Inglehart and Norris show that Turkish Muslims regarded religion to be very important in their lives but that their frequency of worship was much lower than the former variable would suggest (2004, ch.5). One disadvantage of using secularization rather than religiosity can be that mere frequency of religious worship could better account for what Allport and Ross (1967) call extrinsic religious orientation, which is more directly related to intolerance.

Because the main dependent variable I use (tolerance) is binary, I use Logistic Regression in the models that evaluate determinants of out-group tolerance. For the other dependent variables in the appendix (perceiving Turkish ethnicity as a prerequisite to be a Turkish citizen and thinking that eliminating terror is the only way to end the conflict), I use Ordinary Least Squares Regression.

5.2 Aggregate-Level Analysis

At the aggregate level I explore if provinces with less secular and more religious populations are more likely to experience more collective violence against the Kurds. I conduct this analysis only for the Turkish-majority provinces but not Kurdish-majority ones because there are only 16 Kurdish-majority provinces, which does not constitute a sufficient number of observations for regression analysis. Besides, collective violence against the Turks by the Kurds seldom happens and it is almost impossible to happen in Turkish-majority provinces. I exclude Kurdish-majority provinces from the analysis where I explore violence against

Kurds by Turks because, again, this is unlikely to happen in Kurdish-majority provinces.

The dependent variable I use is mob violence incidents against Kurdish individuals or groups. This is a very imperfect measure, but so far this is the best I can find. This measure is limited to those incidents that the media and the other sources I have consulted have reported. The sources I used are (Akcura 2012⁷ and AMER 2015), which provide a list of collective violence and lynching attempts towards Kurdish individuals. Because the Turkish provinces have vast differences in population (from 76,609 in Bayburt district to 12,573,836 in Istanbul), I use per capita number of mob violence.

The independent variable at the macro level is per capita number of students who attend the 'Quran courses' where children and teenagers are taught to read Quran, Islam's holy book, and about other religious matters. These courses operate under the government through the Religious Affairs Directory. I argue that higher number of children attending such courses should reflect the level of religiosity and secularism in a district because attendance to such courses is totally voluntary (Ayata 1996) and usually depends on the decision of the parents of the children. Children of secular parents are unlikely to attend these courses and secular people very often have negative opinions about these courses, as they are usually seen as 'reactionary' backward institutions (Arat 2010). I obtained this variable from the database of the Religious Affairs Directory.

I include several other variables to test for other hypotheses and control for any confounding effects. In order to control for different aspects of the economic development of the district, I use GDP per capita in the district, the average household size (which also accounts for the center-periphery cleavage) and infant mortality (all data from TUIK). I also control for the percentage of the Kurdish population for two reasons: it can test the contact hypothesis as Turks and Kurds are more likely to interact where the percentage of Kurds are higher. Exactly for the same reason, that Turks and Kurds are more likely to interact, Kurds are more likely to be attacked where their percentage is higher.

⁷<http://open-flux.blogspot.se/2012/08/bitmek-uzere-turkiye-linc-yaplms-ya-da.html>

Due to very high levels of unemployment and poverty in their hometowns, many Kurds move to the Turkish-majority provinces and find low-paying jobs. One very common work many migrant Kurds find in the other provinces is construction work (Erder 1997). Turkey has been experiencing a huge construction boom and this has resulted in many more Kurds finding construction work in Turkish-majority provinces. A brief glance at the mob violence against the Kurds show that many were against Kurdish construction workers (AMER 2015), which may or may not have economic reasons (such as job competition). Hence, I control for the average number of construction per capita per year in a district to control for the effect of this factor (I use TUIK data). Unemployment problems are often blamed on migrants (Cochrane and Nevitte 2014). To control for the effect of blaming Kurdish migrant workers for the unemployment that the Turks in the Turkish-majority provinces experience, I also control for unemployment level in the district, using TUIK data for unemployment levels.

Different provinces in Turkey have had different Alevi populations. Unlike Sunni Muslims, Alevis do not pray at mosques or send their children to the Quran courses. They have embraced secularism at very high levels (Carkoglu 2005). Consequently, I want to control for the percentage of the Alevi population to correct for the presence of Alevis in a given district. However, there is no data on the percentage of Alevi population, as Alevis have been persecuted for many centuries and like the Kurds, they are afraid to express their identity (Carkoglu 2005). Hence, I consult Akturk (2012), where he gives a list of provinces that have traditionally had relatively higher numbers of Alevi populations. Finally, I control for two demographic characteristics. First, I control for the percentage of the population who are men over 15 and below 50 years of age in the district because the people who engage in mob violence is almost always young adult men rather than women, children, or older men. Second, I control for the percentage of the population who are above 5 and below 15 years of age because this is the part of the population that attend Quran courses. I obtain both data from TUIK.

For robustness checks, I constructed another independent variable, per capita mosques

in a district. Arguably, this is more likely to measure religiosity rather than secularity compared to the Quran course measure. In this sense, the advantage of this variable is that it can tap onto Allport and Kramer's (1967) extrinsic religious orientation concept. For this dependent variable, I have no reason to control for the percentage of population between 5 and 15 years old, but I should control for the percentage of the population who are men and above 50 years of age since they are the vast majority of group who worship more frequently and worship at mosques.

Finally, because the mob violence incidents are rare events, I replicated these tests with event count analysis. Because there is overdispersion in the Poisson model, I use negative binomial regression. As presented in the appendix, the findings are robust across methods and models.

6 Results and Discussion

Table 1 below shows the OLS regression results for the Turkish sample when the dependent variable, tolerance is measured by "Accepting an individual from the other ethnicity as spouse or child-in-law / neighbor / business partner", the secularization hypothesis is confirmed. In the baseline model more secular Turks are more likely to be more tolerant towards the Kurds. Other aspects of the modernization theory are not confirmed; income and education have no statistically significant effect on intolerance. Consistent with Tezcur (2016) and Wood (2003), I find that Turks who were personally harmed due to the conflict are more likely to be intolerant. Finally, Turks who live in urban areas are more tolerant than those who live in rural areas, consistent with Sarigil and Karakoc's (2016) findings.

The second model in table 1 adds further control variables. The main result does not change; more secular individuals are more tolerant towards the Kurds. Again, in line with the contact hypothesis, Turks who live in the Kurdish-majority provinces are more tolerant towards the Kurds. Another indicator for modernization, household size fails to reach conventional levels of significance.

In table 2 I provide the results from the same analysis for the Kurdish sample. Secularization theory can be confirmed in both the baseline and the extended models. On the other hand, hypotheses concerning other aspects of modernization fail to find adequate support. Only in the baseline model individuals with higher incomes seem to be more tolerant. However, this variable fails to achieve statistical significance after further control variables are added in the extended model.

Further examination of the results from table 2 reveal that, different than the Turkish sample, Kurds who live in the urban areas do not have different tolerance levels than the Kurds who live in rural areas. Yet, Kurds who live in the Kurdish-majority provinces are more intolerant towards the Turks compared to those who live in Turkish-majority areas. Hence, the contact hypothesis finds partial support. Lastly, Kurds who have been directly affected by the conflict are more likely to be intolerant.

Table 1: Results for The Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ethnic Intolerance Towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
Secular (Islam Prerequisite)	-0.362*** (0.021)	-0.360*** (0.027)
Income	-0.010 (0.023)	-0.002 (0.030)
Education	0.002 (0.023)	-0.004 (0.030)
Age	-0.176*** (0.033)	-0.202*** (0.045)
Gender	0.116** (0.048)	0.042 (0.064)
Affected by the Conflict	0.243*** (0.054)	0.283*** (0.070)
Urban	-0.687*** (0.061)	-0.694*** (0.080)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.882*** (0.136)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.879*** (0.165)
Household Size		0.076 (0.049)
Kurdish Region		-0.285* (0.151)
Constant	1.853*** (0.106)	1.930*** (0.155)
Observations	8,213	4,909
Log Likelihood	-5,210.534	-3,042.620
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,437.070	6,109.240

Note: Logistic Regression

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 2: Results for the Kurdish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ethnic Intolerance Towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
Secular (Islam Prerequisite)	-0.169*** (0.051)	-0.134** (0.062)
Income	-0.141** (0.063)	-0.029 (0.075)
Education	-0.093 (0.057)	-0.030 (0.071)
Age	0.041 (0.088)	0.079 (0.110)
Gender	0.232* (0.132)	0.300* (0.164)
Affected by the Conflict	0.220* (0.126)	0.273* (0.154)
Urban	-0.125 (0.140)	-0.051 (0.174)
Has Turkish Relatives		-0.533** (0.252)
Has Turkish Spouse		-0.358 (0.278)
Household Size		0.067 (0.094)
Kurdish Region		0.610*** (0.164)
Constant	-0.220 (0.237)	-0.789** (0.385)
Observations	1,275	867
Log Likelihood	-773.681	-528.134
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,563.363	1,082.268
<i>Note:</i> Logistic Regression		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

One thing should be noted here about the findings regarding the contact hypothesis. These findings can suggest a pattern where individuals who interact with the other group develops higher tolerance towards them, as the contact hypothesis suggests. Nevertheless, these correlations can also exist due to a minority ethnic group's precarious situation in a given region, where the other group constitutes a majority. This is especially more likely to be the case for the Kurds, who may be less likely to report their anti-Turkish feelings when they are also in a minority position in the province they live.

In tables 5 to 14 in the appendix, I test the same hypotheses using different measures for the dependent and the independent variables. The major result seems to be the same: more secular individuals have more out-group tolerance. On the other hand, other aspects of the classical modernization theory and the contact hypothesis find only partial support, while conflictual modernization theories do not find any support.

In table 3 below, I evaluate the hypotheses with district level data. I use OLS regression with per capita Quran course students as the independent variable and number of attacks per 100000 population as the dependent variable. Starting from a baseline model (with no control variables), I test the hypotheses across 8 different models. The results suggest that provinces that have more per capita Quran course students (my measure of secularization at the district level) have more mob violence against the Kurds. The only instance where the coefficient of this variable fails to reach statistical significance is the first model which does not include any controls. None of the other indicators of modernization at the district level appears to have any statistically significant effect on the outcome variable.

Although there are only 15 cities that have no occurrence of any violent conflict compared to 50 that have at least 1 occurrence, this arguably is a rare event. Hence, I replicate the analysis with event count analysis. Due to overdispersion in the data I cannot use Poisson regression, but instead use negative binomial regression. I use logged number of Quran course students as the independent variable because the variable has positive skew. I present the results in table 4. Again, the conclusion is the same: more secular provinces (as mea-

sured by the number of Quran course students) are less likely to experience mob violence against the Kurds. Other aspects of the modernization theories, except for infant mortality, do not appear to have any significant effect on the likelihood of a mob violence occurring. The infant mortality variable has a positive coefficient, suggesting that more underdeveloped provinces are more likely to experience mob violence against the Kurds.

Table 3: Results at the District Level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Number of Attacks per 100,000 Population							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Quran Course Student per capita	1.679 (7.764)	18.119** (7.284)	18.744** (7.352)	17.664** (7.422)	18.233** (7.475)	20.754** (7.953)	21.383** (8.203)	20.711** (9.082)
Construction per capita		4.594 (6.120)	5.559 (6.262)	5.517 (6.573)	6.738 (6.756)	8.206 (6.943)	7.904 (7.047)	8.150 (7.241)
Percentage Aged 15-50		12.966*** (3.846)	12.397*** (3.926)	13.314*** (3.968)	12.781*** (4.031)	13.685*** (4.149)	13.528*** (4.204)	13.510*** (4.243)
Percentage Kurd		0.019 (0.013)	0.016 (0.014)	0.019 (0.013)	0.016 (0.014)	0.012 (0.014)	0.015 (0.016)	0.014 (0.016)
Percentage Aged 5-15		-3.549 (2.413)	-5.703 (3.661)	-3.709 (2.462)	-6.034 (3.748)	-7.162* (3.941)	-7.128* (3.974)	-6.895 (4.214)
Average Household Size			0.200 (0.255)		0.213 (0.258)	0.257 (0.263)	0.234 (0.273)	0.232 (0.275)
GDP per capita				-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)	-0.00003 (0.0001)
Infant Mortality per birth						53.690 (57.383)	54.609 (57.890)	52.207 (59.918)
Alevi							-0.057 (0.157)	-0.052 (0.161)
Unemployment								-0.003 (0.019)
Observations	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
R ²	0.001	0.342	0.349	0.344	0.352	0.362	0.363	0.364
Adjusted R ²	-0.015	0.287	0.282	0.276	0.272	0.271	0.259	0.246

Note: Ordinary Least Squares Regression *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 4: Results at the District Level - Event Count Analysis

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Logged Quran Course Student	0.80*** (0.19)	1.03*** (0.18)	1.01*** (0.17)	1.03*** (0.18)	1.02*** (0.18)	1.09*** (0.18)	1.08*** (0.18)	1.08*** (0.18)
Population (100k)	0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)	-0.01 (0.01)
Construction per capita		19.56 (12.21)	21.98* (12.16)	19.81 (12.47)	23.14* (12.42)	26.52** (12.36)	22.76* (12.41)	21.98* (12.45)
Percentage Aged 15-50		22.41*** (8.68)	19.12** (8.65)	22.53** (8.87)	19.47** (8.71)	22.02** (8.71)	20.38** (8.59)	20.40** (8.59)
Percentage Kurd		0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)	0.04 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Percentage Aged 5-15		-9.87* (5.51)	-20.95** (9.02)	-9.99* (5.61)	-21.95** (9.39)	-26.47*** (9.42)	-25.69*** (9.21)	-27.13*** (9.47)
Average Household Size			0.88 (0.59)		0.92 (0.60)	1.02* (0.58)	0.83 (0.58)	0.87 (0.59)
GDP per capita				-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0000 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)	-0.0001 (0.0001)
Infant Mortality per birth						257.13* (131.40)	257.41** (130.27)	266.79** (131.45)
Alevi							-0.53 (0.39)	-0.50 (0.39)
Unemployment								0.02 (0.03)
Observations	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65

Note: Negative Binomial Regression

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

In tables 15 and 16 in the appendix, I replicate these analyses using mosques per capita as the independent variable. With a single exception (the 8th model in the OLS regression in table 15), the results suggest that more secular provinces are less likely to experience mob violence. A very likely reason why the number of mosques variable fails to achieve statistical significance is its very high correlation with the control variable we add in the final model, unemployment (the Pearson correlation coefficient between these two variables is -0.61, which is very high).

7 Conclusion

Overall, there seems to be one single clear conclusion to be drawn from the analysis: secularization theories (Inglehart 1998, Norris and Inglehart 2004; Inglehart and Welzel 2005; Inglehart et al. 2015) are helpful in explaining the ethnic conflict in Turkey: Secularization curbs ethnic intolerance and decreases the likelihood of ethnic conflict at the communal level. Hence, my findings run counter to the findings by Ekmekci (2011), Sarigil and Karakoc (2016) and Dixon and Ergin (2010) who find that religious people are more tolerant, but resonate with findings from other contexts such as Allport and Kramer (1946) and Scheepers et al. (2002). The finding that secular people are more likely to be more tolerant and less violent is especially important for the Turkish case since both sides share the same ethnic identity.

The interpretation of these results within the Turkish context suggest that the fusion of the Sunni Muslim and ethnic Turkish identities, and political Islam's emphasis on Turkish nationalism might have resulted in an ethnic conflict environment where more religious Turks are more intolerant towards the out-group. This factor is less helpful in explaining why we see the same pattern in the Kurdish sample. Perhaps, the effect of secularization might be sufficient to render Kurds tolerant and less violent regardless of the political context of mobilization of the Kurdish identity. The answer to this puzzle might also be sought in the dynamics of the birth and mobilization of Kurdish nationalism. Somer (2011) notes that three subgroups of Kurdish nationalists exist: The secular-revolutionary, the traditional elite-based, and the religious/conservative groups. The question 'Why are secular Kurds are more intolerant towards the Turks?' perhaps can be better answered with a study of these groups' influence on mainstream Kurdish nationalism and by exploring whose ideology prevailed over the others', which is obviously beyond the scope of this study.

One novel approach I tried to employ in this study is to examine the relationship between modernization, secularization and ethnic conflict not only at the attitudinal level, but also at the behavioral level. For this purpose, I tried to gather data on collective violence

incidents in Turkey. Unfortunately, this data is problematic by its nature, there are very few sources that I could find and I had to use two of them, one of which reported the incidents from 1992 to 2012 and the other which reported the incidents from 2013 to 2015. These sources gathered their data from the press and it is likely that many other violent incidents were not reported in the press and therefore we only have a biased samples of the events.

The nature of the data also may cast doubt on the validity of the methods that I employed. Even though I have data of events that happened between 1992 and 2015, I did not prefer a time-series cross-sectional analysis, and ignored the temporal dimension. My justification for this is that I have a rare events data and including the temporal dimension may result in a dataset that has very few occurrences for most of the provinces in a given year, but a lot of occurrences for most of the larger provinces each year, which could bias the results. Considering that the explanatory variables I used are not expected to vary significantly over time, pooling across years may not be problematic. Nonetheless, a next step towards answering the doubts concerning this issue is to employ an event count analysis with panel data.

I also feel the need to emphasize that one should be cautious in attaching causal interpretation to the findings in this paper. This study is purely observational and even though the district-level analysis takes a step towards confirming the findings at the individual-level, presence of a causal effect would be better established via a panel study that (hopefully) can exploit some random secularization or modernization shock across the provinces. For instance, one can look at a temporal change in the level of secularization in the district and its effect on the violent events, or even better, a randomized shock that abruptly changes the level of secularity in the district (such as the sudden inflow of migrants of Turks from Bulgaria, who are drastically more secular than the average population, or establishment of public universities in some provinces but not others). Unfortunately, it is debatable if such shocks are truly random and they are difficult to find. Furthermore, it would be hard to account for the movement of the population in response to these events, which could result

in bias due to spillover effects. Nevertheless, these possibilities can be explored in the future to provide a more conclusive answer to the questions asked in this study.

Finally, I would like to emphasize that a cross-national, multi-level analysis may also be helpful in clarifying the relationship between modernization, secularization and ethnic conflict. In this study I only examine the relationship between these variables in a single country, with no counterfactual. It is likely that conflictual modernization theories and classical modernization theories are partially correct at the same time. Modernization and secularization at the country-level may result in ethnic mobilization and conflict as often argued for the famous cases of Quebec, Scotland and Belgium (Mughan 1979; Newman 1991). However, at the same time, modernization and secularization can increase tolerance at the individual level. This possibility remains as a research opportunity to be studied.

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Appendix

Robustness Checks

Table 5: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ethnic Intolerance Towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
State Should Support Worship of All Religions	-0.258*** (0.025)	-0.201*** (0.033)
Income	-0.045** (0.022)	-0.025 (0.030)
Education	-0.098*** (0.022)	-0.084*** (0.029)
Age	-0.194*** (0.032)	-0.201*** (0.044)
Gender	0.112** (0.048)	0.070 (0.063)
Affected by conflict	0.247*** (0.053)	0.297*** (0.068)
Urban	-0.680*** (0.060)	-0.664*** (0.080)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.928*** (0.133)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.880*** (0.162)
Household Size		0.105** (0.048)
Kurdish Region		-0.248* (0.148)
Constant	2.125*** (0.122)	2.037*** (0.173)
Observations	8,239	4,935
Log Likelihood	-5,329.590	-3,129.701
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,675.180	6,285.402

Note: Logistic Regression

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 6: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Ethnic Intolerance Towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
Defining Oneself With Religious Identity	-0.275*** (0.025)	-0.283*** (0.033)
Income	-0.030 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.030)
Education	-0.044* (0.023)	-0.047 (0.029)
Age	-0.173*** (0.032)	-0.188*** (0.044)
Gender	0.111** (0.048)	0.060 (0.063)
Affected by the Conflict	0.260*** (0.053)	0.307*** (0.069)
Urban	-0.662*** (0.060)	-0.675*** (0.078)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.873*** (0.134)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.932*** (0.163)
Household Size		0.091* (0.048)
Kurdish Region		-0.272* (0.148)
Constant	1.514*** (0.102)	1.563*** (0.149)
Observations	8,239	4,927
Log Likelihood	-5,325.531	-3,112.967
Akaike Inf. Crit.	10,667.060	6,249.935
<i>Note:</i> Logistic Regression		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 7: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Extinguishing Terror	
	(1)	(2)
Islam Prerequisite for Turkishness	-0.114*** (0.010)	-0.122*** (0.013)
Income	-0.012 (0.012)	-0.019 (0.015)
Education	-0.066*** (0.012)	-0.043*** (0.015)
Age	0.012 (0.017)	0.023 (0.022)
Gender	-0.023 (0.025)	-0.049 (0.032)
Affected by the Conflict	0.016 (0.027)	-0.005 (0.034)
Urban	-0.111*** (0.029)	-0.124*** (0.037)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.055 (0.067)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.193** (0.080)
Household Size		0.051** (0.024)
Kurdish Region		-0.059 (0.075)
Constant	3.369*** (0.052)	3.325*** (0.074)
Observations	8,097	4,838
R ²	0.035	0.039
Adjusted R ²	0.034	0.036
<i>Note:</i> OLS Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 8: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Extinguishing Terror	
	(1)	(2)
Defining Oneself With Religious Identity	-0.153*** (0.013)	-0.168*** (0.017)
Income	-0.014 (0.012)	-0.022 (0.015)
Education	-0.069*** (0.012)	-0.048*** (0.015)
Age	0.014 (0.017)	0.030 (0.022)
Gender	-0.017 (0.024)	-0.045 (0.032)
Affected by the Conflict	0.018 (0.027)	0.002 (0.034)
Urban	-0.099*** (0.029)	-0.113*** (0.037)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.055 (0.067)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.190** (0.079)
Household Size		0.044* (0.024)
Kurdish Region		-0.075 (0.074)
Constant	3.289*** (0.051)	3.255*** (0.073)
Observations	8,123	4,855
R ²	0.037	0.041
Adjusted R ²	0.036	0.039
<i>Note:</i> OLS Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 9: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Turkish Ethnicity Prerequisite	
	(1)	(2)
Islam Prerequisite for Turkishness	-0.474*** (0.009)	-0.474*** (0.012)
Income	-0.029*** (0.010)	-0.031** (0.014)
Education	-0.035*** (0.010)	-0.030** (0.013)
Age	-0.005 (0.014)	0.009 (0.020)
Gender	-0.017 (0.022)	-0.004 (0.028)
Affected by the Conflict	0.035 (0.024)	0.065** (0.030)
Urban	-0.081*** (0.026)	-0.075** (0.033)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.285*** (0.060)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.258*** (0.072)
Household Size		0.005 (0.021)
Kurdish Region		-0.005 (0.067)
Constant	2.850*** (0.045)	2.814*** (0.066)
Observations	8,141	4,865
R ²	0.292	0.305
Adjusted R ²	0.292	0.304
<i>Note:</i> OLS Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 10: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Turkish Ethnicity Prerequisite	
	(1)	(2)
State Should Support Worship of All Religions	-0.071*** (0.012)	-0.053*** (0.016)
Income	-0.081*** (0.012)	-0.085*** (0.015)
Education	-0.153*** (0.012)	-0.139*** (0.015)
Age	-0.023 (0.017)	0.004 (0.023)
Gender	-0.034 (0.025)	-0.006 (0.033)
Affected by the Conflict	0.093*** (0.027)	0.142*** (0.035)
Urban	-0.111*** (0.029)	-0.095** (0.038)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.398*** (0.069)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.325*** (0.082)
Household Size		0.052** (0.024)
Kurdish Region		0.073 (0.077)
Constant	2.538*** (0.060)	2.367*** (0.086)
Observations	8,157	4,883
R ²	0.059	0.070
Adjusted R ²	0.058	0.068
<i>Note:</i> OLS Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 11: Results for the Turkish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Turkish Ethnicity Prerequisite	
	(1)	(2)
Defining Oneself With Religious Identity	-0.157*** (0.013)	-0.166*** (0.017)
Income	-0.070*** (0.012)	-0.075*** (0.015)
Education	-0.127*** (0.012)	-0.115*** (0.015)
Age	-0.015 (0.017)	0.015 (0.023)
Gender	-0.027 (0.025)	-0.0004 (0.033)
Affected by the Conflict	0.095*** (0.027)	0.139*** (0.035)
Urban	-0.095*** (0.029)	-0.080** (0.038)
Has Kurdish Relatives		-0.361*** (0.069)
Has Kurdish Spouse		-0.322*** (0.082)
Household Size		0.040* (0.024)
Kurdish Region		0.042 (0.076)
Constant	2.392*** (0.051)	2.289*** (0.075)
Observations	8,156	4,873
R ²	0.072	0.085
Adjusted R ²	0.071	0.083
<i>Note:</i> OLS Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 12: Results for the Kurdish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Intolerance Towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
Islam Prerequisite for Turkishness	-0.169*** (0.051)	-0.131** (0.062)
Income	-0.141** (0.063)	-0.042 (0.075)
Education	-0.093 (0.057)	-0.040 (0.071)
Age	0.041 (0.088)	0.073 (0.110)
Gender	0.232* (0.132)	0.294* (0.164)
Affected by the Conflict	0.220* (0.126)	0.264* (0.153)
Urban	-0.125 (0.140)	-0.073 (0.174)
Has Turkish Relatives		-0.556** (0.251)
Has Turkish Spouse		-0.363 (0.277)
Household Size		0.070 (0.094)
Kurdish Region		0.645*** (0.163)
Constant	-0.220 (0.237)	-0.989*** (0.376)
Observations	1,275	867
Log Likelihood	-773.681	-530.898
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,563.363	1,085.796
<i>Note:</i> Logistic Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 13: Results for the Kurdish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Intolerance towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
State Should Support Worship of All Religions	-0.173** (0.072)	-0.206** (0.086)
Income	-0.159** (0.062)	-0.058 (0.075)
Education	-0.149*** (0.056)	-0.082 (0.069)
Age	0.030 (0.088)	0.063 (0.110)
Gender	0.276** (0.132)	0.344** (0.164)
Affected by the Conflict	0.198 (0.126)	0.263* (0.154)
Urban	-0.098 (0.140)	-0.038 (0.175)
Has Turkish Relatives		-0.595** (0.257)
Has Turkish Spouse		-0.360 (0.277)
Household Size		0.091 (0.094)
Kurdish Region		0.684*** (0.163)
Constant	0.128 (0.316)	-0.602 (0.434)
Observations	1,281	871
Log Likelihood	-779.234	-529.958
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,574.468	1,083.917
<i>Note:</i> Logistic Regression	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Table 14: Results for the Kurdish Sample

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>	
	Intolerance towards the Out-Group	
	(1)	(2)
Defining Oneself With Religious Identity	-0.243*** (0.072)	-0.286*** (0.090)
Income	-0.149** (0.062)	-0.045 (0.075)
Education	-0.112** (0.056)	-0.060 (0.070)
Age	0.057 (0.088)	0.093 (0.110)
Gender	0.253* (0.133)	0.296* (0.165)
Affected by the Conflict	0.218* (0.126)	0.275* (0.154)
Urban	-0.100 (0.140)	-0.079 (0.174)
Has Turkish Relatives		-0.541** (0.252)
Has Turkish Spouse		-0.424 (0.280)
Household Size		0.042 (0.094)
Kurdish Region		0.656*** (0.164)
Constant	-0.302 (0.236)	-0.910** (0.377)
Observations	1,279	871
Log Likelihood	-774.555	-528.040
Akaike Inf. Crit.	1,565.111	1,080.080

Note: Logistic Regression *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 15: Results at the District Level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Number of Attacks per 100,000 Population							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Number of Mosques	-3.678 (5.467)	13.421** (5.872)	13.259** (5.988)	13.222** (5.959)	13.028** (6.085)	13.287** (6.280)	13.547** (6.373)	12.312 (7.815)
Construction per capita		8.585 (6.233)	8.153 (6.723)	9.292 (6.758)	8.844 (7.168)	9.151 (7.399)	9.661 (7.598)	9.767 (7.671)
Percentage Aged 15-50		17.216*** (3.565)	16.988*** (3.809)	17.540*** (3.770)	17.301*** (3.982)	17.605*** (4.312)	17.932*** (4.445)	17.499*** (4.744)
Percentage Kurd		0.006 (0.009)	0.008 (0.013)	0.006 (0.009)	0.008 (0.013)	0.007 (0.014)	0.004 (0.016)	0.005 (0.016)
Average Household Size			-0.031 (0.173)		-0.035 (0.175)	-0.037 (0.177)	-0.015 (0.189)	-0.007 (0.192)
GDP per capita				-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00002 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)	-0.00001 (0.0001)
Infant Mortality per birth						10.592 (54.759)	11.322 (55.225)	8.643 (56.514)
Alevi							0.055 (0.158)	0.056 (0.159)
Unemployment								-0.006 (0.021)
Constant	0.509*** (0.118)	-4.681*** (1.026)	-4.507*** (1.412)	-4.738*** (1.054)	-4.546*** (1.429)	-4.677*** (1.594)	-4.865*** (1.694)	-4.702*** (1.807)
Observations	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65
R ²	0.007	0.318	0.318	0.319	0.319	0.320	0.321	0.322
Adjusted R ²	-0.009	0.272	0.260	0.261	0.249	0.236	0.224	0.211

Note: OLS Regression

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table 16: Results at the District Level

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Number of Attacks							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Number of Mosques	0.0004** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)	0.001*** (0.0002)
Population (100k)	0.03*** (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.004 (0.01)	0.003 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.002 (0.01)	0.0001 (0.01)
Construction per capita		31.28** (12.73)	34.77*** (13.34)	26.99** (13.38)	30.07** (13.91)	31.99** (14.16)	30.27** (14.32)	27.64* (14.70)
Percentage Aged 15-50		35.22*** (8.09)	39.06*** (8.76)	32.44*** (8.37)	36.18*** (8.99)	38.51*** (9.37)	37.49*** (9.45)	39.09*** (9.57)
Percentage Kurd		0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)	0.01 (0.03)	0.003 (0.03)	0.01 (0.04)	0.01 (0.04)
Average Household Size			0.37 (0.40)		0.39 (0.40)	0.36 (0.40)	0.28 (0.42)	0.22 (0.43)
GDP per capita				0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)	0.0001 (0.0001)
Infant Mortality per birth						107.88 (140.17)	108.00 (139.62)	116.54 (140.50)
Alevi							-0.23 (0.43)	-0.21 (0.43)
Unemployment								0.04 (0.04)
Constant	0.30 (0.25)	-10.29*** (2.24)	-12.58*** (3.17)	-9.69*** (2.26)	-12.06*** (3.17)	-13.08*** (3.40)	-12.48*** (3.54)	-12.98*** (3.57)
Observations	65	65	65	65	65	65	65	65

Note: Negative Binomial Regression

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01