The Importance of Christianity and Customs/Traditions for National Identity of European Countries

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Abstract: Christian religion has been losing its salience for national belonging in Europe. However, values, symbols, customs and traditions derived from Christianity keep their importance as markers of national identity. Analyses based on the ISSP 2003 and 2013 National Identity data from 18 European countries show that the importance of Christianity as a criterion of national belonging decreases over time and its salience differs according to the level of secularization and belonging to a religious group. It decreases among Christians in religious countries and increases among religious Christians in secular countries. In contrast to the declining role of Christianity, the emphasis on the customs and traditions as markers of national identity has not been changing. While it stagnates among members of Christian churches, the emphasis on traditions and customs increases among the non-religious Europeans. This finding supports the argument about the strengthening trend towards identitarianism and civilizationism embracing values, symbols, institutions, customs, traditions derived from Christianity in Europe.

Introduction

Europe has been a Christian continent for centuries. In recent decades, Europeans, however, have become increasingly secular. They delegate religion to the private life and values, symbols, institutions, customs, traditions, and festivities derived from Christianity have been vanishing or are challenged.[1] Decades of immigration from non-Christian cultures raise concerns about national and cultural identity in many European countries. In particular, the growth of Muslim minorities is increasingly viewed as threatening as many Muslim immigrants and their descendants considers themselves primarily Muslims rather than nationals of the host country (Pew 2006; Verkuyten & Martinovic 2012; Maliepaard & Verkuyten 2018). Different gender and family relations, specific codes of female dress, dietary and prayer requirements in schools and work, and Islamic festivities are often perceived as incompatible with European cultural norms, values, institutions, customs, traditions. Such concerns about European cultural norms and values are symbolically expressed by increasing restrictions on women's dressing signalling Islamic faith and modesty. Bans on the headscarf and face veils are spreading across the Europe: France (2004), Belgium (2011), Spain (2013), Netherlands (2015), Bulgaria (2016), Switzerland (2016). Austria (2018), and Denmark (2018).

Cultural threat over values, symbols, institutions, customs, and traditions is politicized not only in countries where Muslims make more than 5% of population (Kymlicka 2010, Trittler 2017). On one hand, the promotion of immigration from culturally distant countries, struggle against xenophobia and racism, and celebration of ethno-cultural diversity is taking place in media, school curricula and churches in many European countries. Moreover, Christian churches actively care for migrants and refugees (Lyck-Bowen & Owen 2019). On the other hand, many

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[1] Changing "Merry Christmas" festive greetings to "Happy Holidays" or "Season´s Greetings", banning displays of Christmas cribs at public places, rebranding Christmas markets at Winterfest markets, the antiracist movement against Dutch St. Nicolaus helper Black Pete (Zwarte Piet), converting empty churches to mosques, ….

Europeans do not seem to redefine the national community in response to immigrant inflows (Wright 2011). Electoral support for political parties championing nativist, nationalist, anti-immigrant, and anti-Muslim themes is on the rise in Switzerland, Austria, Slovenia, Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Italy, France, Netherlands, Germany, Czechia, Bulgaria, Slovakia, Slovenia, and Greece (BBC 2018).

In this cultural conflict, references to secularized Christianity – as culture (Mouritsen 2006: 77) – have become increasingly central for the new populists as well as mainstream political parties.[2] In the inaugural speech of his new parliamentary term, Hungarian prime minister Victor Orbán named the new political cleavage rising in European states: liberal democracy versus "21st Century Christian democracy which guarantees human dignity, freedom, and security, protects the equal rights of men and women, the model of the traditional family, puts the brakes on anti-Semitism, protects our Christian culture, and provides opportunity for the maintenance and development of our nation" (Tomlinson 2018).

Malik (2011) reflects that "It is not just believers who are worried that Europe is 'denying its Christian roots'. It is an argument being increasingly heard from non-believers and non-Christians too". People worry that values of 'Western civilization' are under threat, from Islam on the one side, and Marxists and the 'liberal intelligentsia' on the other. As a response, the identitarian Christianism is on the rise in Europe (Brubaker 2017). The identitarian Christianism is not about a religion, it is about the Christian culture embracing secularism, freedom of expression, gender equality, minimal set of gay rights, and rejecting anti-Semitism. It is also civilizationism understood in antithetical opposition to Islam on Christian soil. "Christianity is

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[2] Christianity as religion, however, was mentioned by Slovak government as the criterion for acceptance of refugees during 2015 Migration crisis and the idea to accept Christian migrants only was soon appropriated to follow by Italian interior minister Matteo Salvini (ANSA 2015).

embraced not as a religion but as a civilizational identity understood in antithetical opposition to Islam" (Brubaker 2017: 1194). According to him, civilizationism does not supersede nationalism; it is a new articulation of nationalism in the world of rootless cosmopolitan elites indifferent to fellow nationals and favouring culturally distant others. Goodhart (2017) warns against coming backlash between liberals from 'anywhere' having portable of achieved identities, feeling comfortable with multiple cultures and conservatives from somewhere having usually ascribed identities belonging to particular places and feeling uncomfortable with cultural changes.

Caldwell (2010) argues that the mass immigration has been made possible by Europe's enforcement of secularism, tolerance, and equality. But when immigrants arrive, they are not required to adopt those values, they already have values of their own. "One of the most pressing issues facing liberal democracies today is the politicisation of ethno-cultural diversity. Minority cultures are demanding greater public recognition of their distinctive identities, and greater freedom and opportunity to retain and develop their distinctive cultural practices" (Kymlicka, Cohen-Almagor 2000: 89). Multiculturalism practiced in many European states (the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden, United Kingdom, Germany) as a political management of ethno-cultural diversity, took safe and appreciated markers of immigrants cultures – cuisine, music and clothing – and treated them as authentic cultural practices to be preserved by their members and safely consumed as cultural spectacles by others ('3S syndrome'; Muchowiecka 2012). However, such an approach ignored customs and traditions that are not worthy of being celebrated or even of being legally tolerated (Kymlicka 2010: 99).[3] Today it is seen not as the solution to, but as the cause of, Europe's myriad social ills like segregation, poverty, increase of criminality, unemployment, extremism, terrorism and has been criticized by mainstream

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[3] These are marriage of minors under 15, forced marriage, polygamy, female circumcision.

politicians, such as David Cameron, Nicolas Sarkozy, Angela Merkel (2010 - 12). Reflecting upon these political developments, Kymlicka (2010: 97) argues that "we are indeed in a post-multicultural era".

Culture, religion, and national identity

Language, religion, customs and traditions are considered parts of the cultural understanding of nationhood (Berghe 1987; Smith 1991; Shulman 2002). Western and Eastern Christianity, the legacy of the Reformation, counter-Reformation and modern secularism, shaped the cultural orientation of Europe (Delanty 2019). The legal principle *cuius regio, eius religio* expressed in Peace of Augsburg (1555), which ended conflict between Roman Catholics and Protestants within the Holy Roman Empire led to cultural homogenization at the ruler´s territory and provided a model for later modes of national homogenization (Brubaker 2012). Christian denominations has served as modes of social organization and played an important role in shaping basic value orientations and institutional structures of European nations.

Christianity - as religion - loses the salience for national belonging in the European countries. Modernization has led Christian Europeans to moderate secularism, and in many European states, Christianity (or particular Christian denomination) is not an important criterion of belonging to the nation. Immigration from non-Christian countries has brought, however, concerns about cultural identity of nations and the urge to define national community on the basis of values, customs and traditions. Smith (2002, 15) defined a nation as 'a named human population occupying a historic territory and sharing common myths and memories, a public culture, and common laws and customs for all members'. Values, beliefs, customs, conventions, habits, languages and practices are transmitted to the new members who receive the culture of a particular nation (Guibernau 2004). The process of identification with a specific culture

implies a strong emotional investment able to foster solidarity bonds among the members of a given community who come to recognize one another as fellow nationals (Gellner 1983). Furthermore, they imagine and feel their community as separate and distinct from others (Anderson 1983).

It is the different customs that create the differences between people (Verkuyten 2005). When people from different origins live close to each other, the feeling that others have different customs, habits, and ideas is accentuated rather than moderated. After all, people see and experience that a number of supposed differences are not merely stereotypical but have actual implications, related, for example, to gender differences, religious practices, values, norms, and habits (Verkuyten 2005).

This study aims at contributing to sociological research on national identity by investigating how changes the salience of Christianity and salience of customs and traditions in national identity of European states over time. Although social theories argue that the mass migration and growing cultural and ethnic diversity in the European countries led to the rise of identitarian Christianity and renewal of customs and traditions, this hypothesis has not been tested empirically. Moreover, given the intensification of cultural clash between representatives of cosmopolitan multicultural views on society and those defending the traditional national communities, it is likely that these trends might affect different population subgroups differently. In this paper, we investigate how individual level religious belonging and the level of country's secularism is associated with the attitudes towards customs, traditions, and identitarian Christianity.

Data and method

To investigate the changing role of religion and traditions in the definition of national belonging, we used the ISSP 2003 and 2013 data, Module on National identity (ISSP_Research_Group 2012, 2015). In this paper, 18 European countries that collected data in both waves were selected (the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Hungary, Ireland, Latvia, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). In total, responses from 43,341 individuals are analyzed (21,235 observations from 2003 and 22,106 observations from 2013).

Dependent Variables

Two dependent variables are analyzed. The first one is derived from the question "*Some people say that the following things are important for being truly* [NATIONALITY]. *Others say they are not important. How important do you think each of the following is to be a* [RELIGION]". Each country replaced the generic word RELIGION by its dominant religion. In some countries, the reference to the dominant Christian tradition was used (e.g. Catholicism in France, Spain or Ireland, or Lutheran/Protestant Church in Finland or Norway), whereas others ask about being a Christian in general (e.g. Hungary, the United Kingdom). Respondents could choose from four responses ranging from "very important" to "not important at all". The original scale was reversed and the higher value refers to more agreement that belonging to the dominant religion is important for being the true member of the national community.

The second dependent variable is based on the question "*How much do you agree or disagree with the following statements? It is impossible for people who do not share* [COUNTRY'S] *customs to become fully* [COUNTRY'S NATIONALITY]". The responses were recorded on a Likert scale from "agree strongly" to "disagree strongly". The original scale is also reversed

and the lowest value (1) means the lowest emphasis on tradition and the highest values (5) the strongest emphasis on customs and traditions.

Explanatory and Control Variables

All models control for respondent's sex, age, education (in three categories: tertiary, higher secondary, and lower), and year of data collection (2003 v. 2013). In addition, all models incorporate the immigration status of the respondent. This variable distinguishes individuals whose parents were citizens of the country and those who had at least one non-citizen parent. We are aware that this is only a crude indicator of immigration background. However, this is the only immigration-related variable that is included in both waves of data collection. In the case of Slovenia, parents' citizenship was not available in the 2003 survey. To solve this problem, we tested two approaches. First, we excluded Slovenia from the sample. Second, as the 2013 data showed that only a small fraction of Slovenians did not have both parent citizens, we recoded all Slovenian respondents in 2003 as natives. The comparison of models without Slovenia and models treating all Slovenians respondents from 2003 as natives showed a little difference. Thus, we adopted the second approach to maximize the sample size.

The cultural background is measured by the respondent's religious affiliation. We differentiate four religious traditions: no religion, Christianity, Islam, and others. In the regression models, the categories of "no religion" and "other" were merged. The number of adherents to other religions was very small (see descriptive statistics) and there was no significant or substantive difference between non-religious individuals and those belonging to "other religious traditions". In addition, we use the proportion of non-believers, Christians, Muslims, and

followers of other religions as country-level variables. It is used as a proxy for the cultural context of the society.

Method

A set of multilevel mixed-effects regressions was estimated (Stata 15 – mixed). These models treat respondents as nested within countries and account for the inter-dependence between the observations. In such cases, the use of OLS regression would be inappropriate as the standard linear models are built on the assumption of independence between observations (Wooldridge 2009). Strictly speaking, the outcome variables are not continuous. Thus, in a supplementary analysis, we estimated a set of generalized structural equation models to see whether treating the outcome variables as categorical would change the conclusions derived from the mixed-effect linear models (available upon the request). The results from the multilevel mixed-effect linear regressions and generalized structural equation models were very similar. Given the complexity of GSEM models, this paper reports results from the multilevel mixed-effect linear regressions.

Models are evaluated not only the significance level using Z-statistics but also by the Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC; Raftery 1995). Given the large sample size, the BIC seems to be a more appropriate measure of model fit. However, it is necessary to keep in mind that BIC penalizes the less parsimonious models (i.e., it tends to choose the model with fewer parameters).

Results

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 shows the characteristics of the sample. In total, 45.8% of respondents are men; the mean age is 48.1. Nearly one out of four respondents achieved tertiary education. The highest proportion of tertiary educated individuals is in Nordic countries and France, the lowest in the Central (Hungary, Czechia) and Southern Europe (Portugal, Spain). As for religiosity, the Czech Republic is the far most irreligious country in the sample with over 60 percent of respondents declaring no religious denomination. This country is followed by the United Kingdom and the Netherlands with over 45 percent of non-religious individuals. In contrast, Ireland, Hungary, and Portugal have the lowest proportion of respondents with no religious affiliation. Among the religious population, Christianity dominates. Other religious minorities are under-represented in ISSP data files: 534 individuals belong to Islam and 295 to other religions. The highest proportion of Muslims was found in Russia, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, France, and Germany. The category "other religion" was most common in the United Kingdom, France, Netherlands, and Switzerland.

<Insert Table 1>

Table 2 reports the distribution of the dependent variable "importance of religion for national belonging" across time and countries. The majority of respondents did not agree that a person has to be a Christian to belong truly to the country's nationality in either of the waves. In general, the agreement that one should adopt Christianity (or its specific branch) to become the full member of the national community was strongest in Russia (over 65%) and in the Catholic countries, such as Portugal, Spain, Hungary, or Ireland (between 39-45 %). In contrast,

respondents from Scandinavian countries, the Netherlands, and France were least likely to agree with the statement (under 20%).

Overall, the rejection of the idea has further risen between 2003 and 2013. Whereas 64% of respondents believed it was not important to be a Christian to belong to the national community in 2003, the proportion has grown to 70% in 2013. Nevertheless, there are notable exceptions to this trend. In Russia, the Netherlands, France, and Slovakia, the strong opposition to the idea that one has to be a Christian or a Catholic to be the true Russian, Dutch, French or Slovak has weakened over time.

<Insert Table 2,3>

In contrast, the agreement with the idea that one does not need to share country's customs and traditions to become a full member of the national community has not changed much over time (24 % in 2003 versus 26% in 2013). Inspecting the distribution of the variable across countries, no clear trend emerges from the data. In some countries, the agreement has risen, while it has fallen in others. Still, some countries did not experience any shift.

Regression results

In the descriptive statistics, we did not test statistical significance or did not control for the compositional shift of the population. Thus, in the following section, we estimate a set of regression models with the dependent variable measuring the importance of religion and the dependent variable measuring the importance of customs and traditions.

Importance of religion

Model 1 in Table 4 is a baseline model that controls the respondent's sex, age, education, and nativity. It also included a dummy variable for the year of data collection. It demonstrates that the agreement that one needs to be a Christian to belong fully to the national community has declined over time.

Model 2 added respondent's religion. The major drop in the Bayesian Information Criterion BIC (from 120,776 to 116,831) supports the hypothesis that respondent's religion is a major determinant of the attitude. The model also indicates that the declining emphasis on Christianity might be partly driven by the changing composition of population. When respondent's religious affiliation was integrated into the model, the coefficient for the survey year halved.[4] As for the role of individual religious affiliation, unsurprisingly, Christians were more likely than non-believers to emphasize that an individual needs be to of Christian faith to become the true member of the national community. In contrast, Muslims were the least likely to agree.

Models 3 and 4 test the hypothesis that different religious communities changed in their attitudes towards Christianity as a condition for national belonging differently. Thus, these models include the interaction term between the individual religious affiliation and the survey year. As Model 3 demonstrates, including the interaction term between a Christian affiliation and the year brought a major improvement to the model fit (BIC drops from 116,831 to 116,799). The negative sign of the coefficient suggests that – compared to non-believers – Christians in 2013 were less likely to emphasize the importance of religion than they were in 2003. To better understand the interaction between a Christian affiliation and a survey year, the marginal values (linear predictions) were estimated. These predictions can be understood as

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[4] The 95% confidence intervals suggest that the change in the coefficient size is indeed significant. They ranged from -0.091 to -0.054 in Model 1 and from -0.054 to -0.18 in Model 2.

"average" answers for Christians and non-believers if everything else was constant. A closer look at margins shows that non-believers and members of Christian churches experienced diverging trend even though the changes are relatively small. The non-believers are increasingly more likely to emphasize the role of Christianity in the national belonging (margins shifted from 1.52 in 2003 to 1.58 in 2013), whereas individuals reporting membership in Christian churches experience the opposite shift (margins shifted from 2.29 in 2003 to 2.22 in 2013). Nevertheless, despite this change over time, church members still emphasize the role of Christianity in national belonging much more strongly than non-believers.

Model 4 entered the interaction between Islam and the survey year. Even though the interaction term is positive and the likelihood ratio test is significant, the BIC increased which indicates that the model is over-specified. In other words, BIC shows that the shift among adherents of Islam is not convincing enough to justify the inclusion of interaction. The estimates for Islam have wider confidence intervals indicating that Muslims constitute a relatively heterogeneous group.

Models 5 and 6 enters the country-context into the picture. As Model 5 suggests, the level of secularism (measured by the proportion of non-believers in the country) adds a little to the explanatory power of the model. However, Model 6 integrates a three-way interaction between belonging to a Christian church, the survey year, and the level of secularism. From the point of Bayesian Information Criterion, it is the best fitting model in Table 4. This model demonstrates that the conclusion that Christians are increasingly less likely to emphasize Christianity as a basis for national belonging does not hold for across all countries. This trend is visible only in societies with a large number of – at least nominal – Christians (see Figure 1). In contrast, Christians who lived in highly secular countries were less likely to disregard their faith as a

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basis for national belonging. We can assume that individuals who profess the Christian faith in a highly secular context are a more selective group. For example, they are more likely to adhere to their faith based on their personal decision than on a social expectation. In contrast, in countries where the Church membership is a social norm, many individuals formally belonging to a church feel a little importance of the Christian faith.

<Insert Table 4>

Importance of customs and traditions

In the next section, we estimate a similar set of models with the dependent variable role of traditions. Model 1 is again a baseline model that controls the respondent's sex, age, education, nativity, and the year of data collection. In contrast to the attitudes towards religion, there was no evidence that the importance of customs and traditions has been declining over time.

As Model 2 enters the respondent's religious affiliation, the BIC drops dramatically (from 135,526 to 135,321). Thus Model 2 demonstrates that personal religious affiliation is a strong predictor of the idea that one needs to adopt the country's customs and traditions to belong to the country. Similarly to the attitudes towards the role of religion, members of Christian Churches are the most likely to agree and members of the Muslim community the less likely to agree.

Model 3 integrates the interaction term between belonging to a Christian Church and the year. Thought the BIC stays the same (the difference is 0.86), the likelihood ratio test indicated that the interaction test is significant. The model shows that the gap between Christians and non-believers was declining. As Figure 2 demonstrates non-believers are increasingly more likely to emphasize the role of customs and traditions, whereas members of Christian Churches are

increasingly less likely to believe that people need to adopt the country's customs and traditions. Model 4 tests whether the attitude of the Muslim community has also changed. However, in this case, the interaction term is not significant and BIC increased.

The final two models test the role of secularism. However, in contrast to the attitudes towards the role of religion, there is no evidence that the country level of secularism plays an additional role. These models suggest that the emphasis on customs and traditions were determined by individual religious affiliation, not by the general level of secularism in the country. Moreover, we do not see any evidence that the emphasis on the role of traditions would be stronger in more religious or secular countries.

Conclusion

The aim of this article has been to contribute to the debate on the role of Christian confession and customs and traditions on national identity of European states. Our study shows that Christianity loses its salience for national belonging in Europe. It is partly due to ongoing secularization processes in European societies, partly due to changes of religious composition of populations. Analyses based on ISSP data show, that the importance of Christian confession as a criterion of national belonging differs according to the level of secularization and belonging to a religious group. Members of Christian churches put the highest emphasis on it, obviously. Over time, however, the importance of Christian confession as a marker of national belonging increases among religious Christians in secular countries while its importance decreases among them in religious countries. This paradox may lie in greater proportion of 'nominal believers' in more religious countries. These 'nominal believers' may perceive the national identity less exclusive in terms of religion than 'confessing believers' in more secular countries. This hypothesis deserves, however, further investigation.

Unlike the Christian confession, there is no evidence that the overall importance of customs and traditions changes over time in Europe. Moreover, emphasis on the role of customs and traditions as markers of national identity stagnates among members of Christian churches and increases among the non-religious Europeans regardless of the level of secularization. This finding supports the arguments about the strengthening trend towards identitarianism and civilizationism embracing values, symbols, institutions, customs, traditions stemming from Christianity.

Our study reports about changing national identities of majority Europeans – members of Christian churches and non-believers - more than about national identifications of minorities of non-European ancestry and non-Christian confession as the cross-national ISSP surveys under-represent them. Results are also based on data collected before European immigration crisis in 2015. The advantage of the data is that they reflect trends incoming already before the crisis. Four years after the crisis we may hypothesize that the salience of customs and traditions as a markers of national identity have increased further.

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Figure 1: Marginal predictions for the dependent variable Importance of Christianity for national belonging by the individual's membership in a Christian church and by the share of non-believers in the country

Source: ISSP 2003, 2013

Figure 2: Marginal predictions for the dependent variable Importance of customs and traditions for national belonging by the individual's membership in a Christian church

Source: ISSP 2003, 2013

Table 1: Descriptive statistics of the analytical sample

	Male	Age	Native	Education			Religion			
				lower	secondary	tertiary	None	Christians	Muslims	Other
	%	mean	%	%	%	%	%	%	%	%
Czechia	46.8	46.0	94.6	48.7	39.3	12.1	63.6	36.2	0.0	0.2
Denmark	50.3	47.0	93.8	10.8	52.1	37.1	13.1	85.6	0.4	0.9
Finland	45.9	46.6	97.1	28.7	48.6	22.7	18.6	81.2	0.2	0.1
France	50.8	52.0	90.7	44.2	19.9	35.9	37.8	58.8	2.0	1.5
Germany	50.3	48.4	88.5	39.3	39.7	21.0	36.1	61.7	1.9	0.4
Hungary	43.5	49.7	97.7	56.6	34.0	9.3	10.3	89.5	0.0	0.2
Ireland	38.6	49.1	91.2	29.0	43.4	27.6	8.2	91.0	0.3	0.5
Latvia	41.9	43.4	64.5	17.4	58.7	23.9	32.3	67.1	0.1	0.5
Netherlands	54.1	52.4	94.1	49.4	27.8	22.8	45.1	52.1	1.4	1.4
Norway	48.8	47.0	89.9	24.3	33.2	42.5	15.4	83.0	1.2	0.4
Portugal	42.2	49.1	95.8	73.0	16.0	11.1	9.8	89.6	0.1	0.6
Russia	35.0	47.1	98.5	19.6	57.1	23.3	15.5	79.3	4.5	0.8
Slovakia	39.9	45.0	96.2	42.9	41.4	15.8	14.6	84.9	0.0	0.4
Slovenia	44.9	48.3	97.2	46.7	37.4	15.9	25.9	72.6	1.2	0.3
Spain	47.9	46.8	92.8	61.4	26.1	12.4	14.1	84.6	0.8	0.5
Sweden	48.1	49.1	86.3	43.5	23.4	33.1	25.4	73.7	0.6	0.3
Switzerland	49.5	49.3	71.1	38.2	41.4	20.4	17.9	77.6	3.2	1.3
United Kingdom	41.7	50.5	89.8	51.6	28.8	19.7	46.3	49.3	2.3	2.0
Total	45.8	48.1	91.1	39.7	37.2	23.1	25.6	72.5	1.2	0.7

Source: ISSP 2003 & ISSP 2013

N = 43,341, Weighted

Table 2: Importance of Christianity for national belonging by year and country

	Not important at all		Not important		Fairly important		Very important	
	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013
Czechia	42.2	42.9	29.6	28.2	15.5	16.0	12.7	13.0
Denmark	32.0	43.2	36.4	33.0	17.1	15.2	14.5	8.6
Finland	52.1	54.2	24.8	24.3	12.2	12.1	10.9	9.4
France	67.4	64.7	16.0	17.6	8.0	8.8	8.6	8.9
Germany	43.9	43.0	27.3	32.7	17.4	15.5	11.4	8.8
Hungary	22.2	23.6	33.4	30.2	22.9	25.1	21.5	21.2
Ireland	22.1	43.2	20.5	25.7	26.8	15.7	30.6	15.4
Latvia	37.8	40.9	39.8	33.9	16.2	17.8	6.3	7.5
Netherlands	65.2	56.6	22.1	23.4	6.6	9.4	6.0	10.6
Norway	49.7	49.7	30.0	30.7	11.8	12.3	8.5	7.4
Portugal	17.6	34.8	16.5	28.8	38.8	26.9	27.1	9.6
Russia	20.1	8.7	20.2	17.0	24.5	32.0	35.1	42.3
Slovakia	24.5	20.0	24.5	25.4	26.1	31.3	25.0	23.3
Slovenia	39.7	53.6	27.0	23.2	17.0	14.1	16.3	9.0
Spain	28.4	44.2	27.6	21.5	30.1	20.2	14.0	14.2
Sweden	57.6	69.2	25.4	20.4	10.7	6.2	6.4	4.2
Switzerland	33.6	40.0	27.3	28.7	22.6	17.2	16.5	14.1
United Kingdom	39.9	44.2	25.4	26.2	16.8	14.6	17.9	15.0
Total	38.8	43.6	25.6	26.0	19.0	16.9	16.6	13.5

Source: ISSP 2003 & ISSP 2013

N = 43,341, Weighted

Table 3: Importance of customs traditions for national belonging by year and country

	Disagree strongly		Disagree		Neither		Agree		Agree strongly	
	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013	2003	2013
Czechia	6.0	5.0	19.3	12.7	22.1	23.5	32.3	32.7	20.4	26.2
Denmark	14.0	17.2	17.3	22.9	7.7	12.0	31.5	29.0	29.5	18.9
Finland	1.5	3.4	19.2	23.0	19.3	16.7	36.9	36.7	23.2	20.3
France	11.3	11.4	14.4	15.1	15.0	14.6	25.9	27.4	33.4	31.5
Germany	5.4	6.8	18.7	21.2	17.3	20.6	37.1	32.4	21.6	19.1
Hungary	3.3	4.1	14.0	7.8	21.1	23.2	35.9	44.5	25.8	20.4
Ireland	3.7	6.2	35.1	35.8	9.0	19.4	42.1	29.8	10.1	8.9
Latvia	2.6	4.3	14.8	13.2	20.2	15.5	40.4	39.3	21.9	27.7
Netherlands	4.2	3.1	20.2	24.7	15.3	18.3	36.8	37.9	23.6	16.0
Norway	3.5	4.2	19.3	25.4	17.5	20.0	39.5	34.8	20.4	15.6
Portugal	5.0	2.0	21.5	19.8	14.0	15.7	43.5	47.6	16.1	14.9
Russia	1.5	1.7	3.9	4.2	7.2	12.7	33.8	38.9	53.7	42.7
Slovakia	5.1	10.4	30.6	22.1	28.9	28.5	23.3	26.6	12.1	12.4
Slovenia	4.2	6.7	26.3	23.5	16.7	19.5	31.4	36.2	21.5	14.3
Spain	3.6	9.3	18.6	16.7	24.9	14.7	46.3	34.3	6.6	25.0
Sweden	7.5	11.5	17.0	20.3	24.6	23.9	34.6	30.0	16.3	14.4
Switzerland	4.5	4.4	32.0	24.4	15.6	15.4	40.4	42.6	7.7	13.3
United Kingdom	3.7	4.4	24.2	19.1	18.3	22.9	37.9	36.2	16.0	17.3
Total	5.0	6.6	19.3	19.3	16.7	18.5	36.1	34.9	22.9	20.7

Source: ISSP 2003 & ISSP 2013

N = 43,341, Weighted

Table 4: Regression models with the dependent variable Importance of Christianity for national belonging

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Male	-0.097**	-0.051**	-0.051**	-0.050**	-0.051**	-0.051**
Age	0.015**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.013**	0.012**
Both parents citizens	0.112**	0.025	0.024	0.026	0.024	0.023
Education (primary, lower secondary)						
higher secondary	-0.184**	-0.162**	-0.162**	-0.161**	-0.162**	-0.165**
tertiary	-0.370**	-0.319**	-0.319**	-0.319**	-0.319**	-0.321**
Year=2013 (v. 2003)	-0.073**	-0.036**	0.061**	0.050**	0.061**	0.103**
Religion (none)						
Christian		0.700**	0.774**	0.768**	0.774**	0.881**
Islam		-0.085*	-0.085*	-0.226**	-0.086*	-0.088*
Interaction: Religion x year						
Christian # year=2013			-0.132**	-0.121**	-0.132**	-0.329**
Islam # year=2013				0.246**		
% of secular					-0.005	-0.004
Interaction: % of secular x 2013						-0.001
% of secular x Christian						-0.004**
% of secular x Christian x 2013						0.008**
Constant	1.474**	1.106**	1.050**	1.054**	1.170**	1.147**
BIC	120 776	116 831	116 799	116800	116 808	116 748

Source: ISSP 2003 & ISSP 2013

N = 43,341

Table 5: Regression models with the dependent variable Importance of customs and traditions for national belonging

	M1	M2	M3	M4	M5	M6
Male	0.089**	0.101**	0.101**	0.101**	0.101**	0.102**
Age	0.009**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**	0.008**
Both parents citizens	0.189**	0.146**	0.146**	0.146**	0.146**	0.144**
Education (primary, lower secondary)						
higher secondary	-0.150**	-0.147**	-0.146**	-0.146**	-0.146**	-0.146**
tertiary	-0.443**	-0.433**	-0.433**	-0.433**	-0.433**	-0.432**
Religion (none)						
Christian		0.172**	0.214**	0.216**	0.214**	0.210**
Islam		-0.265**	-0.265**	-0.235**	-0.264**	-0.259**
Year=2013 (v. 2003)	-0.018	-0.008	0.047*	0.050*	0.047*	-0.013
Interaction: Religion x year						
Christian # year=2013			-0.076**	-0.079**	-0.076**	-0.011
Islam # year=2013				-0.053		
% of secular					0.003	0.002
Interaction: % of secular x 2013						0.002
% of secular x Christian						0.000
% of secular x Christian x 2013						-0.002
Constant	2.978**	2.915**	2.882**	2.881**	2.809**	2.822**
BIC	135 526	135 321	135 322	135332.2	135 332	135 359

Source: ISSP 2003 & ISSP 2013

N = 43,341