

**Who Deserves Independence?
A Dataset of Secessionist Grievances**

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There are more than 60 contemporary secessionist movements around the world and all of them advance arguments for why they deserve independence. These include a history of conflict with the state, illegal occupation, and the democratic right to choose independent statehood, among others. Yet, no one has conducted a comparative analysis to see how these claims stack up, and attempted to answer the question: do some movements deserve independence more than the rest? We target this gap in the literature by constructing a dataset of “Secessionist Grievances.” We begin with normative theories of secession to identify a set of grievance indicators and we specify how they are operationalized. We then tally the results for each contemporary movement and discuss the broader patterns.

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Who deserves independence? There are more than 60 contemporary secessionist movements around the world, and all of them advance arguments for why they should be allowed to break away from their parent state and form an independent sovereign state. The West Papuans contend that they have suffered human rights abuses at the hands of the Indonesian Government. The leaders of Somaliland point to their sound government institutions, contrast them with the limited capabilities of Somalia, and argue that they have earned their sovereignty. The Catalans maintain that they are a nation that has a right to choose their political fate. The Kanaks of New Caledonia posit that they should be independent given the principle of decolonization. All of these groups believe that they should be independent. Yet, no one has conducted a comparative analysis to see how these claims stack up, and attempted to answer the question: do some movements deserve independence more than others?

We target this gap in the literature by constructing a dataset of Secessionist Grievances. A central challenge in doing this is the fact that such grievances are normatively-based, and are therefore not easily quantified and/or normalized. For example, how does one quantify the intensity of a remedial right to secession and compare it with the intensity of a primary right? We suspect that it is the difficulty of making such comparisons that has prevented scholars from attempting to create a dataset of grievances. Nevertheless, it would be quite useful for scholars and practitioners to have access to these kind of data.

Our method proceeds as follows. We begin with a dataset of all contemporary movements. Next, we examine normative theories of secession to identify a set of grievance indicators and we specify how they are operationalized. We divide the secessionist grievances into three categories: restorative grievances, rights grievances, and functional grievances. Restorative grievances aim at capturing movements who had a measure of statehood in the past, or are recognized under the UN as having a decolonization claim.

Rights grievances aim to capture human rights abuses by the central government towards a secessionist movement. Functional grievances address the issue of earned sovereignty; some secessionist movements claim to deserve independence because they have a proven track record of governance.

After dividing the grievances into three categories, we tally the scores and rank the secessionist movements for each type of grievance. For each of the three categories, the scores range from 0-1. After tallying the scores for each category, we then do a combined score. The combined score is reached by adding up each movement's score in the respective categories. The combined scores range from 0-3. Finally, we rank the secessionist movements based on their combined score. By ranking the groups with all the grievances tallied, we hope to answer the question: who deserves independence?

After adding the three categories, the secessionist movement that comes out on top is the Sahawaris. They scored high in all three categories. In second are the Palestinians, followed by the Southern Cameroons in third.

Data

The first step in constructing a dataset of secessionist grievances is to establish a list of secessionist movements. Following Griffiths, we define a secessionist movement as a “self-identified nation inside a sovereign state that seeks to separate and form a new [recognized] sovereign state.”¹ To count, the movement must last at least one week, include at least 100 people, lay claim to a territory not smaller than 100 square kilometres, possess a flag, declare independence, and claim territory that is contiguous with the larger state. This is a broad definition that includes both the violent and non-violent cases, occasions of decolonization and dissolution, and instances of *de facto* statehood. However, it excludes

¹ Griffiths 2016, 205.

self-determination movements who aim for a level of autonomy that falls short of full independence – the Gallegos, the Manx, the Zanzibaris. Some of these groups may become fully secessionist, or may have been in the past, but they are not presently.² Griffiths records a total of 60 movements in existence as of 2017, the last year for which data was collected.

We augmented this list of secessionist movements in two ways. First, we added secessionist movements who have exited Griffiths' dataset since 2000. In the dataset, a movement ends when the group formally renounces its independence claim, or an agreement is struck granting independence or some other concession short of independence, or five years pass without secessionist activity.³ Although these criteria detect a measure of formal or informal cessation, they are not foolproof because in many cases the underlying desire for independence endures. For example, the Bougainville independence movement ended (according to the dataset) with the 2001 Peace Agreement, yet that region is planning to hold an independence referendum in late 2019. Given that our purpose is to identify the level of grievance rather than the current state of the movement, we concluded that it was best to push the end date back and include a wider set.⁴ As such, ten movements were added, including Lakotah, Assam, Tamil Eelam, Anjuoun, Cabinda, Aceh, Tatarstan, Moheli, Bougainville, Guadalcanal.

Second, we added two prominent independence movements that were left out of Griffiths' dataset because they have not yet declared independence: New Caledonia and Iraqi Kurdistan. For some movements, the declaring of independence is a strategic act, and it therefore made sense to include these two prominent groups. In sum, we utilize a set of 72 movements (see Appendix A). Although there are other autonomy-seeking nations in the world, our set includes the most commonly-discussed cases.

² See Cunningham 2014.

³ Griffiths 2016, 206.

⁴ Although one could argue that the end date should be pushed back further, we felt that 2000 was a reasonable cut off point that picked up the commonly discussed secessionist movements.

Our contribution in this article is not the identification of the units (secessionist movements), but the classification and tallying of their grievances. The concept of a grievance is relatively straightforward. It is what secessionists typically reference when issuing a declaration of independence.⁵ It is the basis of their argument for why they deserve independence. The inhabitants of Britain's 13 colonies in North America claimed that they were denied liberty. Nearly a century later, the Confederate States of America maintained that the federal government was trespassing on their basic rights. The government of Abkhazia currently claims that they function like a state and therefore deserve their sovereignty. For our purposes, we define a grievance as an argument advanced by a secessionist movement for why they deserve or are entitled to independence.

The core challenge in assembling a dataset of secessionist grievances is how to aggregate them. It is not that difficult to list the many grievances that secessionists reference. As we discuss below, there are various indicators that can be used. Was the aspiring nation formerly a state? Does it suffer human rights abuse at the hands of the central government? Does it function like a state and therefore deserve independence? The problem is how to tally the answers. After all, are the answers to these questions of equal weight? Does the fact that a nation was once an independent state matter as much as their current legal status in the country of which they are a part? Each grievance is normatively-derived and there is no obvious way to weight them.

Our solution was to differentiate categories of grievances from specific indicators of a grievance. Here, we identified three categories. The first category pertains to restorative grievances. These are arguments put forth for why independent statehood would be restoring a nation to some prior status. The underlying principle of decolonization is to rectify the

⁵ Armitage 2007.

wrongs of colonialism and restore a region and its people to their independence.⁶ Related arguments regarding inherent sovereignty are made in relation to indigenous groups in the United States and other settler countries. On November 23, 1993, President Bill Clinton stated that “the indigenous Hawaiian people never directly relinquished their claims to their inherent sovereignty as a people, or over their national lands, to the United States.” A related argument has been made somewhat controversially by Catalan secessionists who argue that Catalonia was once a sovereign state prior to Castilian domination. It matters not from the perspective of international law whether Catalonia was once an independent state, but it may give the cause some normative weight in the court of international public opinion. For example, a recent article in *The Economist* implied something about Catalonia’s credentials by saying: “Unlike Scotland, Catalonia was never an independent nation-state.”⁷ In sum, the first category focuses on restorative grievances.

The second category focuses on the rights of the secessionist nation with respect to its home state. These include negative rights like the freedom from persecution, unlawful imprisonment, and even genocide. Human rights issues were a commonly-cited issue for South Sudan, as this article attests: “The more than 98 per cent of people of all tribes in Southern Sudan did not vote for independence for fun. The overwhelming vote for independence precisely meant people earnestly wanted freedom from human rights violations and services for a decent standard of living.”⁸ In addition, this category also includes positive rights like the freedom to choose independence. A 1946 article on the Faroe Islands had this to say on the topic: “Persons everywhere who uphold free institutions will respect the right of the Faeroes people to determine their own destiny.”⁹ In sum, the rights category includes

⁶ Grant 1999; Crawford 2006; Fabry 2010.

⁷ *The Economist*, *The Catalan Question: In Two Minds*, July 18-August 3, 2018.

⁸ “South Sudanese nationalism in post independence era,” Jacob K. Lupai, 27 July 2012, *All Africa*

⁹ “New Nation,” *Washington Post*, September 21 1946

negative and positive rights, which roughly correspond to the concepts of remedial and primary rights.¹⁰

The third category centers on issues of functionality. Consider this statement from Yousuf Sheikh Madar, Spokesperson for the Republic of Somaliland: “The Republic of Somaliland is a *de facto* entity. The Republic of Somalia, which came into existence in July 1960 by the merger of ex-Italian Somali territory (the south) and British Somaliland (the north) is non-existent today.”¹¹ The sentiment expressed here is about earned sovereignty, and it is commonly used by *de facto* states who feel that they should be awarded the status of sovereignty given the standards of governance they have achieved. In contrast to restorative grievances, which plea for a return to a lost status, or rights-based grievances that focus on the current relationship with the parent state, functionality-based grievances focus on the breakaway nation itself, and what it has accomplished.

These categories represent different ways to think about secessionist grievances. They are images for how they can be seen. Different groups or analysts will focus on different categories (or images). In our our dataset, we develop multiple indicators in each category. The results can then be tallied within each category and across them.

Indicators of Grievance

In the restorative grievances category, we use two indicators to reach a score. The first indicator is whether the secessionist movement has ever been, or is currently on, the UN List for Non-Self-Governing Territories.¹² Examples of groups currently on the UN List for Non-Self-Governing Territories include the Sahawaris, the Southern Cameroons, and New Caledonia. Groups that were previously on the list include Irian Jaya (West Papua), Puerto

¹⁰ On Remedial rights, see Norman, 1998; Buchanan, 2003. For more on Choice Theory (or Primary Rights Theory) see Beran 1998; Pavkovic and Radan 2007.

¹¹ “Northern Somali state opposes UN troops,” *Reuters News*, 21 February 1993

¹² “Non-Self-Governing Territories” *The United Nations and Decolonization*.

Rico, and Hawaii. The second indicator for restorative grievances is whether the nation in question was previously a state.¹³ Atjeh, Baluch, and Assam are examples of secessionist groups who are coded as having prior statehood.

In the restorative grievances category, there were three tiers of scores. Groups that ranked first are movements that are currently listed as being on the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories. These groups are: Southern Cameroons, New Caledonia, and the Sahawaris. Groups that ranked second were movements that were once on the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories *or* are listed as having prior statehood. The groups are: Tibet, Assam, Atjeh, Irian Jaya, Baluch, Puerto Rico, and South Yemen. Hawaii is listed as ranking first, but they are not currently on the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories. They were once on the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories (so not currently on it), but they are also listed as having prior statehood. In this case, they receive some points for having been on the list, and also receive points for having prior statehood.

The third tier of rankings is all the other secessionist movements in the dataset, which received a score of 0. These groups are not listed on the UN List of Non-Self Governing Territories (and were not listed in the past), nor are they coded as having prior statehood.

Below we list a ranking of restorative grievances.¹⁴

¹³ Prior statehood was determined using the International System(s) Dataset (ISD), Griffiths and Butcher 2013.

¹⁴ Tables with full rankings and scores available in the Appendix. The score for each category (restorative, rights, and functional) range from 0.00 to 1.00.

Table 1: Restorative Grievances Rankings and Scores¹⁵

| Restorative Grievances Rankings | | |
|---------------------------------|-----------------------|-------|
| Ranking | Secessionist Movement | Score |
| 1 | Southern Cameroons | 0.66 |
| 1 | New Caledonia | 0.66 |
| 1 | Sahawaris | 0.66 |
| 1 | Hawaii | 0.66 |
| 2 | Tibet IV | 0.33 |
| 2 | Assam | 0.33 |
| 2 | Atjeh II | 0.33 |
| 2 | Irian Jaya | 0.33 |
| 2 | Baluch | 0.33 |
| 2 | Puerto Rico | 0.33 |
| 2 | South Yemen | 0.33 |

The next category tallied are rights grievances. We use various indicators for rights grievances, but the main takeaway is that this category aims to capture abuses by the central government onto the secessionist movements. We combined indicators from two publications: Minorities at Risk Dataset and Rivka Weill’s 2017 publication on banned political parties and eternity clauses.¹⁶

From the Minorities at Risk Dataset, we used five indicators. The first is whether the group is listed in MAR for the year 2006. Of the total seventy-two groups, fifty-seven are listed in MAR. The next indicator is political discrimination. Political discrimination ranges from no discrimination to an exclusive and actively repressive policy towards the group. The third indicator from MAR is economic discrimination, which measures the extent to which public policies restrict the ability of the group to gain economic opportunities. The fourth indicator measures religious discrimination, and to what extent religious activity is restricted. The fifth indicator from MAR measures language discrimination against the group.

¹⁵ The highest possible score for this category is a 1. Groups meeting all the criteria (currently being on the UN List of Non-Self-Governing Territories *and* having prior statehood) get a 1. However, no group met this criteria. To allocate points, we made currently being on the UN List worth .66 (two-thirds of the possible points), formerly being on the list worth .33 (one-third of the possible points) and having prior statehood worth .33 (one-third of the possible points).

¹⁶ Minorities at Risk 2009; Weill 2017, “Secession and the Prevalence of Militant Constitutionalism Worldwide”.

The last two indicators for rights grievances are whether separatist parties are banned in the country, and whether or not the country has an eternity clause.¹⁷ The logic for these indicators is that a lack of political representation or an inflexible constitution closes avenues by which to address grievances.

Below we list a table for the top five rankings of rights grievances.

Table 2: Rights Grievances and Scores

| Rights Grievances Rankings | | |
|-----------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Ranking | Secessionist Movement | Score |
| 1 | Karens | 0.8232 |
| 1 | Arabistanis | 0.8232 |
| 2 | Kachin III | 0.7644 |
| 2 | Kurds II (Iran) | 0.7644 |
| 3 | Cabinda | 0.7056 |
| 3 | Shans | 0.7056 |
| 3 | Southern Cameroons | 0.7056 |
| 3 | Tibet IV | 0.7056 |
| 3 | Uighurs III | 0.7056 |
| 3 | Palestinians II | 0.7056 |
| 4 | Kashmir II | 0.6468 |
| 4 | Chechnya II | 0.6468 |
| 4 | Tamils | 0.6468 |
| 4 | Kurds II (Turkey) | 0.6468 |
| 5 | Casamance | 0.4704 |

The final category is functional grievances. We use two indicators that capture the group's capability and institutions, relative to the central government. Indicators come from Florea's 2014 "De Facto States in International Politics (1945-2011): A New Dataset".¹⁸ The first indicator is rebel capability, which measures the group's strength relative to the central government. The second indicator is a count of how many independent governance institutions a secessionist movement has built.¹⁹ The functional grievances category measures earned sovereignty, which means that de facto states, former de facto states, and borderline

¹⁷ An eternity clause ensures that a country's constitution cannot be changed.

¹⁸ Florea 2014.

¹⁹ The count goes from 0-10.

de facto states will have a score greater than 0. However, the majority of secessionist movements in this dataset (fifty-one) do not fit the criteria of de facto states, and therefore score a 0 in the functional grievances category.

Below we list a ranking for the functional grievances category.

Table 3: Functional Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Functional Grievances Rankings | | |
|---------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Ranking | Secessionist Movement | Score |
| 1 | Bosnian Serbs | 0.98 |
| 1 | Northern Cyprus | 0.98 |
| 1 | Somaliland | 0.98 |
| 2 | Nagorno Karabakh | 0.91 |
| 2 | Transnistria | 0.91 |
| 2 | Biafra | 0.91 |
| 3 | Abkhazia | 0.84 |
| 3 | South Ossetia | 0.84 |
| 4 | Palestinians II | 0.77 |
| 4 | Sahawaris | 0.77 |
| 5 | Kurds IV | 0.63 |
| 5 | Tamils | 0.63 |

Who Deserves Independence?

The rankings presented are useful for assessing types of grievances and which groups score higher on the given indicators. However, it is difficult to discern which category is more “important”. Do groups who score high on restorative grievances deserve independence more or less than groups who score high on rights grievances or functional grievances? To address this issue, we make a combined score category, which aims to paint a fuller picture of secessionist grievances.

For the combined score, we add each group's score from restorative grievances, rights grievances, and functional grievances. The sum of these three scores is the combined score.²⁰

We present a table below on the rankings for the combined scores.

Table 4: Combined Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Combined Grievances Rankings | | |
|-------------------------------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| Ranking | Secessionist Movement | Score |
| 1 | Sahawaris | 1.7828 |
| 2 | Palestinians II | 1.4756 |
| 3 | Southern Cameroons | 1.3656 |
| 4 | Tamils | 1.2768 |
| 5 | Bosnian Serbs | 1.2152 |
| 6 | Kachin III | 1.1844 |
| 7 | Somaliland | 1.0976 |
| 7 | North Cyprus | 1.0976 |
| 8 | Nagorno Karabakh | 1.0864 |
| 9 | Chechnya | 1.0668 |
| 10 | Tibet IV | 1.0356 |

The general pattern is that groups who scored well on more than one category finished higher in the combined grievances rankings. For example, the Sahawaris ranked 1st, 7th, and 4th, in the restorative, rights, and functional grievances categories, respectfully. While the Palestinians did not score in the restorative grievances categories, they were 3rd and 4th for the rights and functional grievances.

De facto states also fared well in the final rankings. Logically, this makes sense. For a secessionist movement to be considered a de facto state, it needs to have the trappings of statehood, without the international recognition.²¹ More likely than not, a de facto state's relative capacity will be higher than the central government, or at parity. Part of being a de

²⁰ Score in the combined grievances ranking can range from 0.0000 to 3.0000.

²¹ Florea 2014; 791-792. Florea lists seven conditions for a territory to qualify as a de facto state. They are: 1) seeks independence, 2) exerts territorial control over a population, 3) is not sanctioned by the government, 4) performs basic governance functions, 5) lacks international legal sovereignty, 6) exists for 24 months, and 7) belongs to a recognized country, but is not a colonial possession.

facto state is being able to hold onto territory for at least 24 months, which suggests a high degree of military capability, relative to the central government.²² In addition, all of the de facto states in the dataset have been, or were, in existence for far greater than two years. In this time, they have built government institutions, which is the second indicator measured in the functional grievances category.

Conclusion

Many secessionist movements claim to deserve independence and point to various grievances to support their claim. In this paper, we compile a dataset of seventy-two secessionist movements, and separate their grievances into three categories. Restorative grievances highlight claims of groups who have held previous statehood or have been recognized as Non-Self-Governing Territories. Rights grievances measure various types of human rights abuses by the central government towards the group. Finally, functional grievances measure earned sovereignty, or a secessionist movement's ability to govern and build institutions.

After ranking the secessionist movements by category, we rank the groups in a combined grievances category. The group with the highest combined scores were the Sahawaris, followed by the Palestinians, and then the Southern Cameroons. Unsurprisingly, groups that score high in various categories score higher when all grievances are combined. An avenue for future research may be to determine whether secessionist movements with more grievances are more successful in their independence goals.

²² Florea's relative capability measure takes into account all capability, including that in which the patron state provides assistance. This is why, for example, North Cyprus is listed as being "much stronger than the government". In this case, the Turkish military presence contributes to North Cyprus' relative capability.

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APPENDIX A

Table 1A: Restorative Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Rank | Secessionist Movement | Restorative Score |
|-------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1 | Southern Cameroons | 0.66 |
| 1 | New Caledonia | 0.66 |
| 1 | Saharawis | 0.66 |
| 1 | Hawaii | 0.66 |
| 2 | Tibet IV | 0.33 |
| 2 | Assam | 0.33 |
| 2 | Atjeh II | 0.33 |
| 2 | Irian Jaya | 0.33 |
| 2 | Baluch | 0.33 |
| 2 | Puerto Rico | 0.33 |
| 2 | South Yemen | 0.33 |
| 3 | Cabinda | 0.00 |
| 3 | Euahlayi Nation | 0.00 |
| 3 | Murrawarri Republic | 0.00 |
| 3 | Nagorno Karabakh | 0.00 |
| 3 | Flanders | 0.00 |
| 3 | Serbs | 0.00 |
| 3 | Arakanese II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Kachin III | 0.00 |
| 3 | Karenni | 0.00 |
| 3 | Karens | 0.00 |
| 3 | Shans | 0.00 |
| 3 | Quebec | 0.00 |
| 3 | Uighurs III | 0.00 |
| 3 | Anjouan 2 | 0.00 |
| 3 | Moheli | 0.00 |
| 3 | North Cyprus | 0.00 |
| 3 | Faeroe Islands | 0.00 |
| 3 | Somali II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Basques | 0.00 |
| 3 | Brittany | 0.00 |
| 3 | Corsica | 0.00 |
| 3 | Savoy | 0.00 |
| 3 | Abkhazia | 0.00 |
| 3 | South Ossetia | 0.00 |
| 3 | Boro/Bodo | 0.00 |
| 3 | Kashmir II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Meitei | 0.00 |
| 3 | Nagas | 0.00 |
| 3 | Tripuras | 0.00 |
| 3 | Arabistanis | 0.00 |
| 3 | Kurds II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Kurds IV | 0.00 |

| | | |
|---|------------------|------|
| 3 | Palestinians II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Padania | 0.00 |
| 3 | Sardinia | 0.00 |
| 3 | Azawad | 0.00 |
| 3 | Transnistria | 0.00 |
| 3 | Lozi | 0.00 |
| 3 | Maori | 0.00 |
| 3 | Biafra | 0.00 |
| 3 | Pashtuns | 0.00 |
| 3 | Bougainville | 0.00 |
| 3 | Abi Sayyaf | 0.00 |
| 3 | Mindanao | 0.00 |
| 3 | Chechnya II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Dagestan | 0.00 |
| 3 | Tatars | 0.00 |
| 3 | Casamance | 0.00 |
| 3 | Guadalcanal | 0.00 |
| 3 | Somaliland | 0.00 |
| 3 | Basques III | 0.00 |
| 3 | Catalans III | 0.00 |
| 3 | Tamils | 0.00 |
| 3 | Malays | 0.00 |
| 3 | Kurds II | 0.00 |
| 3 | Northern Ireland | 0.00 |
| 3 | Scotland | 0.00 |
| 3 | Crimea | 0.00 |
| 3 | Donetsk | 0.00 |
| 3 | Luhansk | 0.00 |
| 3 | Lokotah | 0.00 |

Table 2A: Rights Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Rank | Secessionist Movement | Rights Score |
|-------------|------------------------------|---------------------|
| 1 | Karens | .8232 |
| 1 | Arabistanis | .8232 |
| 2 | Kachin III | .7644 |
| 2 | Kurds II | .7644 |
| 3 | Cabinda | .7056 |
| 3 | Shans | .7056 |
| 3 | Southern Cameroons | .7056 |
| 3 | Tibet IV | .7056 |
| 3 | Uighurs III | .7056 |
| 3 | Palestinians II | .7056 |
| 4 | Kashmir II | .6468 |
| 4 | Chechnya II | .6468 |
| 4 | Tamils | .6468 |
| 4 | Kurds II | .6468 |
| 5 | Casamance | .4704 |
| 6 | Tripuras | .4116 |
| 7 | Assam | .3528 |
| 7 | Nagas | .3528 |
| 7 | Sahawaris | .3528 |
| 7 | Baluch | .3528 |
| 7 | Pashtuns | .3528 |
| 8 | Basques | .2940 |
| 8 | Corsica | .2940 |
| 8 | Irian Jaya | .2940 |
| 8 | Abu Sayyaf | .2940 |
| 8 | Mindano | .2940 |
| 8 | Northern Ireland | .2940 |
| 9 | Serbs | .2352 |
| 9 | Somali II | .2352 |
| 9 | Boro/Bodo | .2352 |
| 9 | Atjeh II | .2352 |
| 9 | Sardinia | .2352 |
| 9 | Azawad | .2352 |
| 9 | Lozi | .2352 |
| 9 | Maori | .2352 |
| 9 | Tatars | .2352 |
| 9 | Crimea | .2352 |
| 9 | Donetsk | .2352 |
| 9 | Luhansk | .2352 |
| 10 | Euahlayi Nation | .1764 |
| 10 | Murrawarri Republic | .1764 |
| 10 | Nagorno Karabakh | .1764 |
| 10 | Kurds IV | .1764 |
| 10 | Bougainville | .1764 |
| 10 | Malays | .1764 |

| | | |
|----|----------------|-------|
| 10 | Lokotah | .1764 |
| 11 | Anjouan 2 | .1176 |
| 11 | Moheli | .1176 |
| 11 | North Cyprus | .1176 |
| 11 | Brittany | .1176 |
| 11 | New Caledonia | .1176 |
| 11 | Savoy | .1176 |
| 11 | Abkhazia | .1176 |
| 11 | South Ossetia | .1176 |
| 11 | Padania | .1176 |
| 11 | Transnistria | .1176 |
| 11 | Biafra | .1176 |
| 11 | Somaliland | .1176 |
| 11 | Basques III | .1176 |
| 11 | Catalans III | .1176 |
| 11 | Hawaii | .1176 |
| 12 | Arakanese II | .0588 |
| 12 | Karenni | .0588 |
| 12 | Quebec | .0588 |
| 12 | Meitei | .0588 |
| 12 | Dagestan | .0588 |
| 12 | Scotland | .0588 |
| 12 | South Yemen | .0588 |
| 13 | Flanders | .0000 |
| 13 | Faeroe Islands | .0000 |
| 13 | Guadalcanal | .0000 |
| 13 | Puerto Rico | .0000 |

Table 3A: Functional Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Rank | Secessionist Movement | Functional Score |
|-------------|------------------------------|-------------------------|
| 1 | Serbs | .98 |
| 1 | North Cyprus | .98 |
| 1 | Somaliland | .98 |
| 2 | Nagorno Karabakh | .91 |
| 2 | Transnistria | .91 |
| 2 | Biafra | .91 |
| 3 | Abkhazia | .84 |
| 3 | South Ossetia | .84 |
| 4 | Palestinians II | .77 |
| 4 | Saharawis | .77 |
| 5 | Kurds IV | .63 |
| 5 | Tamils | .63 |
| 6 | Kachin III | .42 |
| 6 | Atjeh II | .42 |
| 6 | Chechnya II | .42 |
| 7 | Anjouan 2 | .35 |
| 7 | Mindano | .35 |
| 7 | Casamance | .35 |
| 8 | Cabinda | .28 |
| 8 | Bougainville | .28 |
| 9 | Karens | .21 |
| 10 | Euahlayi Nation | .00 |
| 10 | Murrawarri Republic | .00 |
| 10 | Flanders | .00 |
| 10 | Arakanese II | .00 |
| 10 | Karenni | .00 |
| 10 | Shans | .00 |
| 10 | Southern Cameroons | .00 |
| 10 | Quebec | .00 |
| 10 | Tibet IV | .00 |
| 10 | Uighurs III | .00 |
| 10 | Moheli | .00 |
| 10 | Faeroe Islands | .00 |
| 10 | Somali II | .00 |
| 10 | Basques | .00 |
| 10 | Brittany | .00 |
| 10 | Corsica | .00 |
| 10 | New Caledonia | .00 |
| 10 | Savoy | .00 |
| 10 | Assma | .00 |
| 10 | Boro/Bodo | .00 |
| 10 | Kashmir II | .00 |
| 10 | Meitei | .00 |
| 10 | Nagas | .00 |
| 10 | Tripuras | .00 |

| | | |
|----|------------------|-----|
| 10 | Irian Jaya | .00 |
| 10 | Arabistanis | .00 |
| 10 | Kurds II | .00 |
| 10 | Padania | .00 |
| 10 | Sardinia | .00 |
| 10 | Azawad | .00 |
| 10 | Lozi | .00 |
| 10 | Maori | .00 |
| 10 | Baluch | .00 |
| 10 | Pashtuns | .00 |
| 10 | Abu Sayyaf | .00 |
| 10 | Dagestan | .00 |
| 10 | Tatars | .00 |
| 10 | Guadalcanal | .00 |
| 10 | Basques III | .00 |
| 10 | Catalans III | .00 |
| 10 | Malays | .00 |
| 10 | Kurds II | .00 |
| 10 | Northern Ireland | .00 |
| 10 | Scotland | .00 |
| 10 | Crimea | .00 |
| 10 | Donetsk | .00 |
| 10 | Luhansk | .00 |
| 10 | Hawaii | .00 |
| 10 | Lokotah | .00 |
| 10 | Puerto Rico | .00 |
| 10 | South Yemen | .00 |

Table 4A: Combined Grievances Rankings and Scores

| Rank | Secessionist Movement | Score |
|-------------|------------------------------|--------------|
| 1 | Sahawaris | 1.7828 |
| 2 | Palestinians II | 1.4756 |
| 3 | Southern Cameroons | 1.3656 |
| 4 | Tamils | 1.2768 |
| 5 | Serbs | 1.2152 |
| 6 | Kachin III | 1.1844 |
| 7 | Somaliland | 1.0976 |
| 7 | North Cyprus | 1.0976 |
| 8 | Nagorno Karabakh | 1.0864 |
| 9 | Chechnya II | 1.0668 |
| 10 | Tibet IV | 1.0356 |
| 11 | Karens | 1.0332 |
| 12 | Transnistria | 1.0276 |
| 12 | Biafra | 1.0276 |
| 13 | Cabinda | .9856 |
| 14 | Atjeh II | .9852 |
| 15 | South Ossetia | .9576 |
| 15 | Abkhazia | .9576 |
| 16 | Arabistanis | .8232 |
| 17 | Casamance | .8204 |
| 18 | Kurds IV | .8064 |
| 19 | New Caledonia | .7776 |
| 19 | Hawaii | .7776 |
| 20 | Kurds II | .7644 |
| 21 | Uighurs III | .7056 |
| 21 | Shans | .7056 |
| 22 | Baluch | .6828 |
| 22 | Assam | .6828 |
| 22 | Kurds II | .6828 |
| 22 | Kashmir II | .6828 |
| 23 | Mindanao | .6440 |
| 24 | Irian Jaya | .6240 |
| 25 | Anjouan 2 | .4674 |
| 26 | Bougainville | .4564 |
| 27 | Tripuras | .4116 |
| 28 | South Yemen | .3888 |
| 29 | Pashtuns | .3528 |
| 29 | Nagas | .3528 |
| 30 | Puerto Rico | .3300 |
| 31 | Northern Ireland | .2940 |
| 31 | Corsica | .2940 |
| 31 | Basques | .2940 |
| 31 | Abu Sayyaf | .2940 |
| 32 | Tatars | .2352 |
| 32 | Somali II | .2352 |

| | | |
|----|---------------------|--------|
| 32 | Sardinia | .2352 |
| 32 | Maori | .2352 |
| 32 | Luhansk | .2352 |
| 32 | Lozi | .2352 |
| 32 | Donetsk | .2352 |
| 32 | Crimea | .2352 |
| 32 | Boro/Bodo | .2352 |
| 32 | Azawad | .2352 |
| 33 | Murrawarri Republic | .1764 |
| 33 | Malays | .1764 |
| 33 | Lokotah | .1764 |
| 33 | Euahlayi Nation | .1764 |
| 34 | Savoy | .1176 |
| 34 | Padania | .1176 |
| 34 | Moheli | .1176 |
| 34 | Catalans III | .1176 |
| 34 | Brittany | .1176 |
| 34 | Basques III | .1176 |
| 35 | Scotland | .0588 |
| 35 | Quebec | .0588 |
| 35 | Meitei | .0588 |
| 35 | Karenni | .0588 |
| 35 | Dagestan | .0588 |
| 35 | Arakanese II | .0588 |
| 36 | Guadalcanal | 0.0000 |
| 36 | Flanders | 0.0000 |
| 36 | Faeroe Islands | 0.0000 |