

Can Nationalism and Globalism coexist within the post-Soviet Space?

ABSTRACT. In the aftermath of the collapse of the USSR, the successor states faced two profound tensions: the need to adapt to general rules of globalization and at the same time to preserve and develop their nation's originality. It is under these circumstances that some former Soviet citizens start to form a stronger attachment to their national identity, whereas others start to embrace more global patterns and values. As a case sui generis, the current study discusses the reality and nature of the two phenomena of globalisation and nationalism within the context of the former Soviet Union. Employing a multilevel approach relying on survey data from the 2011 World Value Survey and the 2013 International Social Survey Program National Identity III, this paper analyses how a former Soviet Republic's level of globalisation is related to its citizens' perceptions of their national identity. The results confirm that through contact with the processes of globalisation, some post-Soviet people become more aware of their nation's distinctiveness and, as a result, develop a stronger relationship to their national identity. At the same time, others become happier to identify themselves as citizens of the world. In summary, the current study suggests that globalism and nationalism do not necessarily have to contradict each other; rather, they seem to exist conjointly within the former Soviet Space.

KEYWORDS: globalisation; national identity; multi-level analysis; post-Soviet space

Introduction

Growing populism and populist movements around the globe illustrate ordinary citizens' continued belief in their national identity in today's fast changing and multi-cultural world (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Kaldor 2004; Malešević 2019; Nodia 2017). Indeed, political events of the last few years (including Marine Le Pen's candidacy for the 2016 French Presidential election and Donald Trump's victory in the US Presidential election) show that contemporary nationalism often arises from below as so-called "resistance identity" against the top-down elite-oriented institutionalized global narrative (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Cummings 2012; Isaacs 2015, 2018; Kaldor 2004; Malešević 2019; Nodia 2017; Rees & Williams 2017). In particular, people who consider themselves to be disadvantaged by processes of globalisation are drawn

to embrace those kinds of “resistance identities” against their political establishment (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Nodia 2017). Nevertheless, this does not necessarily entail that globalism and nationalism cannot coexist in today’s globalised world (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Shin 2003). Rather, they seem to be readily compatible due to the twofold impact of globalisation. Previous scholarship has shown that especially winners of globalisation are expected to become happier to develop a world citizen identity through their contact with the forces of globalisation (Kriesi et al. 2006; Shin 2003). These countervailing influences of globalisation emphasize the need for a greater understanding of the complex and contested relationship between globalisation and contemporary national identities. Interestingly, despite the existing ongoing theoretical debates over the links between these two phenomena, most studies operating from a quantitative perspective in this field to date have only focused on a single nation and cross-national comparisons, limited primarily to Western and European states and the Western world in general (Antonsich 2009; Ariely 2012, 2011; Kunovich 2009). As a case sui generis, this study seeks to emphasize why post-Soviet citizens’ national identification with their nation is disproportionately affected by the side effects of globalisation, in discussing the reality and nature of globalisation and national identity within the context of the former Soviet Union (Berg 2002; Bhandari & Heshmati 2005; Danilova 2009; Hobsbawm 2012; Kerimova 2009; Panov 2010). To that end, the present study employs a multilevel approach (Hox 2010) to examine the relationship between different dimensions of national identity and globalisation across thirteen former Soviet Republics.

Before entering into the specific statistical analysis, the first part will touch briefly on the broader debate on the phenomenon of globalisation and the different schools of thought on the occurrence of nationalism and national identity and how the reality of those phenomena may be best described and conceptualized within the post-Soviet space. The paper then briefly summarizes various interpretations of the relationship between nationalism and globalisation and the previous studies that have examined this relationship to date with regards to the former USSR. Employing data from two large cross-national surveys – the 2013 International Social Survey Program (ISSP) National Identity III and the 2011 World Values Survey (WVS) – the present study explores the way(s) in which a former Soviet country’s level of globalisation is related to four dimensions of national identity across thirteen former Soviet Republics.

Globalisation and National Identity: Two much contested concepts!

The majority of quantitative studies agree that there seems to exist a correlation between peoples' identification with their nation and globalisation (Antonsich 2009; Ariely 2012, 2011; Jung 2008; Jones & Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009: 577). However, they differ on whether globalisation has a positive or negative influence on people's national identity. Moreover, it is not only the nature of the correlation between these two concepts that remains contested: the reality of both phenomena is also highly criticized and hotly debated among academics.

Despite the enormous size of existing literature on globalisation, there is no substantial agreement on how its causal dynamics and structural consequences may be described (Held et al. 1999). Some scholars, like the hyperglobalists, call globalisation a real, largely invisible, phenomenon that heralds the beginning of a new epoch of human history (Ohmae 1995, 2005), whereas others question its existence and call it a myth (Hirst & Thompson 1996). And yet others, such as the transformationalists, acknowledge the existence of globalisation, but argue that its future directions remain unpredictable (Baldwin 2016; Held et al. 1999; Held & McGrew 1998; Rosenau 2003; Scholte 1997). Generally speaking, globalisation can be defined as an increase of cross-border flows of goods, services, money, people, information and culture (Ariely 2012; Baldwin 2016; Blum 2015; Caselli 2008, 2013; Figge & Martens 2014). Thus, in contrast to hyperglobalists' assumption, globalisation seems to mean more than simply the opening up of national economies for international trade, consumption and the movements of factors of production across international borders (Al-Rodhan 2006; Baldwin 2016; Caselli 2008; Hedetoft & Blum 2008; Krimse 2010). It is far more complex and multifaceted and therefore multidimensional (Axford 2013; Figge & Martens 2014; Georgantzas et al. 2010; Held 1997; Kerimova 2009). Drawing on that background, it seems crucial for any analysis that seeks to observe the impact of globalisation on people's national identification to go beyond a superficial consideration of the economic aspect of globalisation (Malešević 2019; Martell 2007; Spencer & Wollman 2002).

In contrast to the debate on globalisation, it seems widely accepted among academics and ordinary citizens that all human beings have to possess a national identity (Malešević 2002, 2011). However, there exists little empirical evidence that proves the existence of national identity "either before or after modernity" (Malešević 2011: 274).

A person's felt pride of her nation may be more a by-product of the ideology of her country's political elites, which the person perceives to be her national identity, rather than her own perception or reflection of her own ideology (Malešević 2002, 2011). Therefore, it is not national identity that previous scholars tried to measure, but the national ideology, produced by a state's elites to unite their citizenry. What we call national identity according to Malešević (2011) can be rather named as a kind of solidarity among people through face-to-face contact, who live in the same country, speak the same language and/or share the same ancestry. In a nutshell, any study discussing the concept of national identity has to clearly define what it seeks to measure and question why it takes this hotly debated concept for granted.

Globalisation and National Identity within the former USSR

Taking into consideration the controversial and hotly debated reality of both concepts globalisation and national identity, why should their existence be considered of particular importance within the post-Soviet space and in doing so, to Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity? The collapse and the subsequent dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 heralded the beginning of a new epoch for the former Soviet countries (Berg 2002; Bhandari & Heshmati 2005; Ohmae 1995, 2005). For the first time the previously closed Soviet republics opened up their borders for the free circulation of goods, money, ideas, commodities, values, culture and people, and in doing so came in contact with the phenomenon of globalisation (Bhandari & Heshmati 2005; Kerimova 2009; Panov 2010).

In the wake of the break-up of the USSR, globalisation not only started to affect national economies and states, but it also had sufficient impact on the cultural and social level of individuals (Kerimova 2009; Spencer & Wollman 2002). Because of the opening up of the borders to a variety of cross-border cultural flows, former Soviet citizens got in touch with other cultural and social values, which they had previously perceived as foreign. Sometimes, they might have even adopted these new principles as their own and in doing so, may have started to question their previous identity (Dreher 2005; Kerimova 2009; Spencer & Wollman 2002). In short, globalisation and its side effects are real and herald the beginning of a new century, at least for the former USSR (Baldwin 2016; Kerimova 2009; Ohmae 1995). The processes of globalisation, therefore, are alleged to have a disproportionate impact on various aspects of the lives of new successor states' citizens (Baldwin 2016; Berg 2002; Danilova 2009;

Hobsbawm 2012; Kerimova 2009; Panov 2010). Drawing on this background and in accordance with previous research (Martens et al. 2010: 577), this study defines globalisation within the context of the post-Soviet space *as a real, sometimes invisible process that intensifies cross-national economic, political and social interactions and interconnectedness.*

The existing theoretical debates on national identities in post-Soviet countries illustrate certain peculiarities in the way national identity was institutionalised in the post-Soviet Union (Brubaker 1996, 2011; Khazanov 1997). In carving up the former Russian empire in nationally mono-ethnic national republics, which were expressly defined as the state for an ethno-culturally defined 'core' or 'titular' nation, the Soviet leadership linked national territory with an ethno-cultural understanding of nationhood. As a result, the Soviet government introduced official national identity categories amongst their citizens (Brubaker 1996, 2011; Kazhanov 1997; Wheatley 2007). Considering the Soviet Nationality Policy's legacy, the concept of national identity may be generally described as *a constructed, multidimensional dynamic concept that leads a community sharing a particular set of civic and ethnic characteristics to the subjective belief that they are part of a single community.*

Various interpretations of the relationship between Globalisation & Nationalism

Given their contested nature, globalisation, national identity, their interrelationship is likely to be complicated. According to scholars in psychology (Arnett 2002), globalisation leads people to change how they think about themselves in relation to their social environment. Therefore, globalisation can encourage people to reassess and sometimes even to change their identification with their nation (Arnett 2002; Hermans & Dimaggio 2007). In developing psychologists' argument further, some scholars in politics and sociology (Ariely 2012, 2011; Guibernau 2004; Kaldor 2004) argue that by breaking down the homogeneity of the nation-state, globalisation not only leads to a stronger cultural interconnectedness, but also favours cultural disconnectedness. Given its huge influence on the nation-state, the majority of previous quantitative studies, agree that there seems to exist a correlation between people's identification with their nation and their country's degree of globalisation (Antonsich 2009; Ariely 2012, 2011; Jung 2008; Jones & Smith 2001; Kunovich 2009).

Generally speaking and in accordance with transformationalists (Held & McGrew 1998; Held et al. 1999; Rosenau 2003; Scholte 1997) and sceptics (Hirst & Thompson 1996),

previous theoretical scholars on nationalism and globalisation acknowledge that the role of nation-states has slightly changed, but, contrary to hyperglobalists, they are still needed in a globalised world (Anderson 2005; Breuilly 2011; Castells 2011; Connor 1972; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 2012; Kaldor 2004; Smith 1991). As result of the nation-states' changed role, previous schools of thoughts on nationalism also predict the two concepts of nationalism and national identity to alter. Contemporary national identities mainly arise as a counteraction either to so-called 'Nebenerscheinungen' [= outgrowths] of globalisation, such as mass-immigration (Anderson 2005; Breuilly 2011; Connor 1972; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 2012; Smith: 1991, 2011), mass-communication (Connor 1972; Kaldor 2004) labour insecurity, cultural homogenisation, fears, frustration, hostility (Anderson 2005; Barber 1993; Breuilly 2011; Castells 2011; Connor 1972; Gellner 1983; Hobsbawm 2012; Kaldor 2004; Kinnvall 2004; Nodia 2017; Smith 2011), or as a backlash or protest against political elites (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Nodia 2017). In contrast to previous quantitative studies' findings, the general canon among the debates on nationalism and globalisation foresees globalisation to have a twofold influence on people's perception of their nation's identity. Those citizens who are disadvantaged by the processes of globalisation are expected to develop a stronger attachment to their national identity as a by-product of being exposed to globalisation, whereas the winners of globalisation become more happy to identify themselves as world citizen (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017; Shin 2003).

Previous Studies' Findings and Methods in the Field of Post-Soviet Studies

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the successor states, as all constructed nations do, faced two profound and often contradictory challenges: the need to adapt to general rules of globalisation and at the same time to preserve and develop their own nation's originality (Blum 2008; Hedetoft & Blum 2008; Kerimova 2009; Nuruzadeh 2017; Solovyev 2008). A number of scholars have argued that in response to these challenges, some former Soviet citizens start to develop a stronger attachment to their national identity whereas others become more likely to define themselves as citizen of the world (Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Ismailzade 2005; Surucu 2002). Nowadays within some post-Soviet countries, globalising forces are perceived to be a threat to a particular post-Soviet nation's cultural heritage and identity. As a result, they might encourage the formation of so-called 'negative' and 'resistance' identities among post-Soviet citizens (Gudkov 2000). These identities are

typically inspired by strong religious particularism and anti-Westernism (Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Danilovich 2010; Hedetoft & Blum 2008; Ismailzade 2005; Kerimova 2009; Nuruzadhe 2017; Solovyev 2008). Furthermore, the usage of anti-Western and anti-globalisation propaganda by companies for the purpose of economic competition (Danilova 2008) and by politicians to strengthen their political legitimacy in the successor states (Ó Beacháin & Kevlihan 2013; Gudkov 2000; Hedetoft & Blum 2008; Rees & Williams 2017), highlight the growing awareness of the impact of globalisation on national identities in post-Soviet countries.

In line with the general canon among the debates on nationalism and globalisation (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017), previous qualitative studies found globalisation to have a countervailing impact on post-Soviet citizens' identification with their nation (Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002). They expect some former Soviet people to develop a stronger attachment to their nation's identity out through the contact with the processes of globalisation, while other start to form a more global, world citizen identity. Those scholars have observed the impact of globalisation on post-Soviet countries by examining official government documents (youth, language, immigration, culture, religion, education, foreign & security policies), speeches of political elites (president, presidential candidates, MPs) or even by drawing from national statistics or cross-national surveys (Adams & Rustemova 2009; Bekzhanova 2015; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Guliyev 2007; Kerimova 2009; Omelicheva 2011; Nunuzadeh 2017; Rees & Williams 2017; Uffelman 2011). Others conducted either in-depth interviews with politicians and academics (Antonsich 2011; Kim 2011), or with a minority group amongst a post-Communist country's population (Blum 2016; Commercio 2014; Gladkikh 2018; Krimse 2010; Ibold 2010). The question arises, therefore, to what extent previous qualitative studies' findings can be used to deliver a general statement on ordinary post-Soviet citizens' identification with their national identity.

This seems highly questionable in the light of the increasing and continued support of populist movements in the West. Those movements illustrate well that sometimes contemporary national identities may even arise from *below* as so-called 'resistance identities' against the top-down elite-oriented institutionalized global narrative (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Cummings 2012; Kaldor 2004; Isaacs 2015, 2018; Rees & Williams 2017). This seems to be particularly true if the masses consider themselves losers from globalisation, as they are much more likely to develop so-called

'resistance identities' against their political establishment (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Nodia 2017). Therefore, there may exist large gaps between how nations are imagined by a state's elites and how they are perceived by their citizens (Barrington et al. 2003; Castells 2011; Isaacs & Polese 2015, 2016). Thus, any study qualitative or quantitative that seeks to measure the impact of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' perception of their national identity adequately should focus its analysis on the individual level (and not elite level) and therefore, should seek to engage in an active dialogue with ordinary former Soviet people.

The present study rectifies previous qualitative studies' oversight by examining the statistic correlation between a former Soviet country's degree of globalisation and its citizens' attachment to their national identity.

Data

The current study's objective is to test whether the macro-condition – a former Soviet republic's level of globalisation, the independent variable– affects ordinary post- Soviet people's attachment to their national identity, the dependent variable. For that, a generalized logistic multilevel regression analysis (Hox 2010; Sommett & Morselli 2017) has been carried out. This method takes into account that level 1 variables (people) are nested in different contexts (level 2—countries), and in doing so, allows the examination of country-level variable effects (globalisation) on individual-level results (national identity) (Ariely 2011, 2012; Hox, 2010). Thus, individuals and countries are conceptualized as a hierarchical data set, whereupon the individuals are nested within those post-Soviet countries.

In order to measure a former Soviet citizen's national identity among four dimensions (*Willingness to Fight*, *Patriotism*, *World Citizen* and *Nation Citizen*) as binary dependent variable, data was drawn from the 2011 WVS and the 2013 ISSP National Identity III cross-national surveys. Both surveys collected data from a representative sample of the adult population (older than 16) in thirteen post-Soviet countries: Azerbaijan, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. However, prior to the generalized logistic multilevel regression analysis, those respondents who do not belong to the 'core national group' (e.g. Russians in Kyrgyzstan) had to be excluded. As a result, the number of respondents differ for the national identity dimensions. Therefore, it appeared to be preferable to examine for each dimension of national identity the direct

influence of the country-level variable globalisation separate. In the succeeding paragraph, the generalized logistic multilevel regression analysis' variables' measurements are discussed in more detail.

Measurement

Explanatory Variables: Age, Education, Gender, Social Class and Urban vs. Rural

In a hierarchical data set, there is only one single outcome or response variable (in this study national identity), but several explanatory variables at all levels that need to be considered for a multilevel analysis (Hox 2010: 10). Since globalisation influences various parts of a society differently, five individual-level explanatory variables were examined: *gender* (0= male, 1= female), *age* (Age < 36, Age < 51, Age < 67 and Age < 93), *education* (university degree versus no university degree), *social class* (upper class, middle class and working class) and *urban/ rural*. Controlling these five explanatory variables on the respondents' level seemed crucial, especially because younger and well-educated people who live in more urban areas are expected to respond more positively to processes of globalisation than older and less educated people (Ariely 2012, 2011; Connor 1972; Kunovich 2009). Additionally, respondents' gender may affect their perception of their national identity (Ariely 2012, 2011; Kunovich 2009). Generally speaking, men are more proud of their country than are women, older individuals are more proud than younger, and the less educated are more proud than better educated people (Davidov 2009; Smith & Kim 2006; Wimmer 2017). Finally, overall people living in more rural areas, who consider themselves to be disadvantaged by processes of globalisation, are expected to identify themselves less as world citizens than citizens living in cities, who benefit from being exposed to globalisation (Castells 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017). In extreme cases, they might even develop so-called 'resistance identities' against globalisation and, as a result, a stronger attachment to their national identity (Castells 2011; Nodia 2017). Thus, in order to control for this winners versus losers of globalisation narrative, this study additionally controlled for the individual-level explanatory variables *social class* and *urban/rural*. Both respondents' level explanatory variables were generated from the WVS respectively from the ISSP data set. The variable *urban/rural* was measured as a binary variable; *urban* (> 50'000 citizens) = 1 and *rural* (< 50'000) = 0, whereupon the numbers refer to the size of the settlement in which the respondent lives. The

individual-level variable *social class* was measured among three categories; *upper class*, *middle class* and *working class*.

Country-level independent variable: KOF Index of Globalisation

Within this study, at the higher country level is a post-Soviet country's level of *globalisation* (Z), the independent variable. After the comparison of the four well-known and anticipated measurements of globalisation (the A. T. Kearney/Foreign Policy Globalisation Index, the CSGR Globalisation Index, KOF Index of Globalisation and the Maastricht Globalisation Index), it has been concluded that the only index that collected data for the measurement of globalisation systematically and continuously over time is the KOF Index of Globalisation (Caselli 2013). The KOF index of Globalisation is a measure of economic, social and political globalisation created by the KOF Swiss Economic Institute, which is part of the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology (ETH) in Zurich. It determines a country's level of globalisation by measuring the performance of each country across 23 variables, which are then linearly combined to build three main dimensions of globalisation; economic, political and social (Dorado-Morena et al. 2016). These three indicators are linearly merged into one overall index on a scale from 1 to 100, where higher values denote higher levels of globalisation (Dorado-Morena et al. 2016; Dreher 2005). Given Caselli's (2013) findings together with the fact that the KOF index captures a country's level of globalisation among multiple dimensions, the current study uses the KOF index of Globalisation in order to measure its independent variable, a post-Soviet country's level of globalisation among four dimensions: general (Z1), economic (Z2), political (Z3) and social (Z4). For more details regarding the composition and sources of the sub-indexes belonging to the different dimensions of the KOF index of Globalisation, please consider the appendixⁱ.

Individual-level dependent variable: National Identity

On the lower individual/respondents level there is a post-Soviet citizen's level of attachment to her national identity. The operationalization and measurement of national identity within qualitative and quantitative studies is widely debated among academics (Ariely 2011, 2012; Davidov 2009; Malešević 2011). Some scholars argue that it is impossible to measure such a highly complex phenomenon as national identity, while relying on large-scale datasets such as the European Value Study (EVS), World Value Survey (WVS), International Social Survey Program (ISSP) and

Eurobarometer (Malešević 2011). The measurement strategies of large-scale surveys have been criticized for being too simplistic in reducing the complex phenomenon of national identity to a single emotion of pride or shame (Malešević 2011; Sinnott 2005; Smith & Kim 2006). Nevertheless, as discussed earlier, in order to understand and observe contemporary identity narratives, which have developed through contact with globalisation and as backlash to political elites, mass-surveys focusing on the individual are required. Thus, research on sub-national, national and supranational identities in mass populations is not only useful but necessary (Ariely 2011, 2012; Davidov 2009; Hox 2010). Within this study, the dependent variable national identity has been measured among four dimensions, where applicable: *Willingness to Fight*, which measures respondents willingness to fight for their country in the unusual case of a war; *Patriotism*, which measures respondents' love and pride in their nation. *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen*, which capture respondents' sense of national/ global belonging. Due to the available survey data, the WVS 2011 and the ISSP 2013 survey panel data were used to capture these dimensions quantitatively among 13 former Soviet countries. Since the WVS does not feature survey data for Latvia and Lithuania for the year of investigation 2011, the ISSP panel survey, which contains data only for *Patriotism*, *Nation Citizen* and *World Citizen*, had to be incorporated. As a result, the generalized logistic multilevel regression analysis for the variable *Willingness to Fight* only features 11 former Soviet countries.

Previous quantitative studies (Ariely 2011, 2012; Kunovich 2009) tend to only include those survey questionnaire scales that are in favour of the respective national identity category. For example, for the national identity category *Patriotism*, these scholars only take into account those respondents who are either "very proud" or "quite proud" [therefore, they *excluded* from the data those respondents who were either "not proud" or "not proud at all" of their national identity]. As a result, they not only exclude valuable respondents, but also automatically assume that globalisation only has an influence on people who are "very proud" or "quite proud" of their nation. In summary, these studies, by computing a linear multilevel regression analysis (Bates et al. 2015), again neglect the complexity and multidimensional character of the phenomenon national identity.

Thus, the current study, runs a generalized logistic multilevel regression analysis (Hox 2010; Sommett & Morselli 2017) in order to investigate the impact of globalisation on post-Soviet citizens' identification with their national identity. This is the first time such

a method has been applied to this puzzle. It allows us to capture four dimensions of national identity *Willingness to Fight* (Y1), *Patriotism* (Y2), *Nation Citizen* (Y3) and *World Citizen* (Y4) as binary variables. Prior to the data analysis, the survey questionnaires from both cross-national data sets had to be changed into binary variables “agree” and “disagree”. For more detail regarding the carried out data management, please consider Appendixⁱⁱ. For the quantitative measurement of the multidimensional concept national identity, please consider Figure 1 below.

Variable	Definition	Variable Scale	Countries	Source
Willingness to Fight	Respondents' loyalty & closeness to a particular nation	1= Yes 0= No	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine & Uzbekistan	WVS 2011
Patriotism	Respondents' love & pride in a particular nation	1= Proud 0= Not proud		
Nation Citizen	Respondents' self-defined sense of national belonging	1= Agree 0= Disagree	Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Estonia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine & Uzbekistan	WVS 2011 & ISSP 2013
World Citizen	Respondents' self-defined sense of national belonging	1= Agree 0= Disagree		

Figure 1. Measurement of individual-level dependent variable national identity

Results

National Identity Dimensions across the former Soviet Republics

Before the results of the multilevel analysis are presented, a descriptive review of the support for the different dimensions of national identity across the thirteen post-Soviet states will be presented. Table 1, in which the thirteen former Soviet republics are sorted according to their level of globalization, indicates respondents' agreement or disagreement with each dimension of national identity across the thirteen different post-Soviet countries. In line with their counterparts in the West (Ariely 2012), more than 70 per cent of the respondents in eleven former soviet republics are willing to fight for their country. Overall, it seems that respondents living in a former Soviet country with a slightly lower level of globalisation (less than 60 per cent) are more willing to fight for their country in the unusual case of a war than those respondents being exposed to a slightly higher level of globalisation. In contrast to the West, within the

former Soviet Union more than 80 per cent of citizens are “very proud” or “quite proud” of their country. This trend is all the greater the lower the extent to which a post-Soviet republic is globalised.

Table 1. *Overview of support and non-support of national identity dimensions*

Country	Globalisation Index	Willingness to Fight		Patriotism		Nation Citizen		World Citizen	
		Yes	No	Proud	Not Proud	Agree	Disagree	Agree	Disagree
<i>Estonia</i>	82.12	61.8%	38.2%	73.0%	27.0%	98.9%	1.1%	64.7%	35.3%
<i>Lithuania</i>	77.29	-	-	75.2%	24.8%	84.9%	15.1%	15.6%	84.4%
<i>Latvia</i>	74.54	-	-	69.6%	30.4%	78.9%	21.1%	24.5%	75.5%
<i>Ukraine</i>	72.83	56.4%	43.6%	71.6%	28.4%	86.5%	13.5%	60.3%	39.7%
<i>Russia</i>	70.13	70.7%	29.3%	82.3%	17.7%	94.3%	5.7%	50.4%	49.6%
<i>Moldova</i>	65.75	68.8%	31.2%	66.3%	33.7%	96.5%	3.5%	65.0%	35.0%
<i>Georgia</i>	65.68	69.9%	30.1%	97.7%	2.3%	99.5%	0.5%	47.9%	52.1%
<i>Belarus</i>	64.96	78.1%	21.9%	81.8%	18.2%	90.1%	9.9%	49.5%	50.5%
<i>Armenia</i>	62.99	77.0%	23.0%	96.8%	3.2%	98.3%	1.7%	83.7%	16.3%
<i>Kyrgyzstan</i>	60.45	71.8%	28.2%	96.8%	3.2%	94.1%	5.9%	81.1%	18.9%
<i>Kazakhstan</i>	60.32	76.5%	23.5%	95.0%	5.0%	96.5%	3.5%	63.5%	36.5%
<i>Azerbaijan</i>	59.12	66.8%	33.2%	91.6%	8.4%	94.8%	5.2%	43.1%	56.9%
<i>Uzbekistan</i>	47.78	94.0%	6.0%	99.4%	0.06%	99.1%	0.9%	68.0%	32.0%

Moreover, contrary to previous theoretical debates on globalisation and national identity and previous qualitative studies’ findings with regards to the former USSR, the indices in Table 1 show that one cannot locate a clear pattern of relations between a post-Soviet republic’s level of globalisation and their citizens’ support for two out of four dimensions of national identity. Independently of the degree of globalisation, more than 90 per cent of respondents within the former Soviet Union identify themselves as citizen of their nation. Simultaneously, the same people also call themselves citizens of the world. These findings illustrate well that there seems to exist a twofold influence of globalisation on contemporary national identities (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Connor 1972; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017). Some citizens through their contact with globalisation, become more aware of their nation’s distinctiveness and, as a result, may develop a stronger attachment to their national identity, while others become happier to identify as citizens of the world (Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002). However, it remains open, to what extent former Soviet citizens’ support of one of the dimensions of national identity is actually related to a post-Soviet republic’s degree of globalization. Thus, a systematic statistical analysis is required to examine the relationship between globalisation and the different dimensions of national identity.

Direct influence of globalisation

Table 2. Multilevel analysis for the direct effect of globalisation on national identity dimensions

	Willingness to Fight	Patriotism	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	5.475 *** (1.005)	10.688 *** (1.964)	6.250 * (2.478)	3.681 * (1.477)
Gender_Female	-0.797 *** (0.042)	0.154 *** (0.046)	0.119 (0.064)	-0.143 *** (0.034)
Agecate< 51	-0.095 (0.052)	-0.092 (0.058)	-0.087 (0.079)	-0.120 ** (0.042)
Agecate< 67	-0.258 *** (0.055)	-0.004 (0.059)	0.123 (0.085)	-0.169 *** (0.044)
Agecate< 92	-0.793 *** (0.067)	0.206 ** (0.076)	-0.005 (0.107)	-0.274 *** (0.056)
Degree	0.109 * (0.049)	-0.031 (0.062)	0.027 (0.087)	0.066 (0.042)
Middle class	-0.196 (0.137)	0.198 (0.164)	0.263 (0.190)	-0.403 *** (0.118)
Working class	-0.234 (0.140)	0.070 (0.165)	0.405 * (0.193)	-0.511 *** (0.120)
Urban	-0.285 *** (0.043)	-0.297 *** (0.049)	-0.276 *** (0.068)	-0.144 *** (0.035)
Globalisation	-0.054 *** (0.015)	-0.128 *** (0.029)	-0.051 (0.037)	-0.042 (0.022)
Num. Respondents	13127	16436	17686	17113
Num. Post-Soviet countries	11	13	13	13

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

As forecasted by previous research (Ariely 2011, 2012; Kunovich 2009) respondents' *gender* seems to play a crucial role for three out of four dimensions of national identity. The results from the multilevel regression analysis illustrated in Table 2 show that men are, generally speaking, more likely than women to be willing to fight for their country in the unusual case of a war. This finding may stem from the fact that men usually have to complete military service in contrast to women and as a consequence are more socialized than their fellow countrywomen to possible military threats to their country. Furthermore, men seem to be significantly more likely than women to identify themselves as world citizens. In contrast to women in western countries (Davidov 2009; Smith & Kim 2006), women growing up within the former Soviet space seem to feel more pride for their nation than their male compatriots. 7,983 out of a total of 9,368 female respondents are either "very proud" or "quite proud" of their nation. In contrast, only 5,873 of their male compatriots classify themselves in the same way. Considering the slightly lower number of male respondents, the gender quota for the survey question "How proud are you to be of [Nationality]?" is that 85% women and 83% men classify themselves as "proud" or "very proud".

Additionally, the findings regarding the individual-level variables *age* and *degree* seem to contradict previous research's findings on non-Soviet citizens' willingness to fight for their country (Ariely 2012, 2011), who argue that older less educated people are more

likely to go to war for their country than their better educated and younger fellow citizens: Older participants seem to be less willing go to war for their country than younger generations, whereas better educated respondents seem to be significantly more likely to fight for their country than less educated participants. Again one reason for this may be that, like women, older people are not conscripted into the military. However, in accordance with their western fellow citizens, older Soviet citizens are less likely to identify themselves as world citizens than younger respondents (Castells 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017).

Furthermore, respondents living in a more urbanised areas seem to be less likely to be willing to go to war for, less proud of their country and less likely to identify themselves as citizens of their nation (see Table 2). Compared to the general canon in the West (Castells 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017) that predicts people, associating with the middle class and living in cities, to be more likely to identify themselves as world citizens as a by-product of being more exposed to foreigners, former Soviet citizens, living in more urbanised areas, affiliating with the middle class, tend to associate themselves less as world citizens. In line with their Western counterparts, post-Soviet respondents who describe themselves as belonging to the working class, are more likely to identify themselves as citizen of their nation than as world citizen. Thus, the results for the individual level variable *urban* and *social class* highlight the countervailing influence of globalisation on contemporary national identities within the former USSR (Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002). Some people, through contact with “Otherness” (which may be foreigners or global symbols and businesses as McDonalds), become more aware of their nation’s distinctiveness and as a result, may develop a stronger attachment to their national identity, while others become happier to identify as citizens of the world (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Connor 1972; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017).

In line with previous quantitative studies in this field (Ariely 2011, 2012), respondents living in a former Soviet country with a higher level of globalisation are less willing to go to war for their country and less likely to be proud of their nation than their fellow citizens living in a former Communist country with a lower level of globalisation (please see Table 2). However, such correlations do not seem to be evident from the results for the other two dimensions of national identity. Therefore, the overall findings from the multilevel analysis show that globalisation seems to only affect former Soviet

citizen's willingness to fight for and their level of pride in their nation. As discussed earlier, in order to account for measurement comparability errors of the KOF index of globalisation it might be useful to further distinguish the measurement of globalisation into political, economic and social forms of globalisation (Caselli 2013; Dorado-Moreno et al. 2016). This separation may offer further insights into the complex interrelation between globalisation and national identity within the former Soviet space. Thus, in the succeeding paragraph, the influence of the different dimensions of globalisation on the four dimensions of national identity is analysed separately.

Is it economic, political or social globalisation?

Table 3. Multilevel analysis for the direct effect of economic, political & social globalisation on respondents' willingness to fight for their country

	Willingness to Fight		
Intercept	3.785 *** (0.924)	3.637 *** (0.844)	4.802 *** (1.071)
Gender_Female	-0.797 *** (0.042)	-0.797 *** (0.042)	-0.797 *** (0.042)
Agecate< 51	-0.095 (0.052)	-0.096 (0.052)	-0.095 (0.052)
Agecate< 67	-0.259 *** (0.055)	-0.259 *** (0.055)	-0.258 *** (0.055)
Agecate< 92	-0.795 *** (0.067)	-0.796 *** (0.067)	-0.794 *** (0.067)
Degree	0.109 * (0.049)	0.109 * (0.049)	0.109 * (0.049)
Middle class	-0.240 (0.137)	-0.199 (0.137)	-0.197 (0.137)
Working class	-0.240 (0.140)	-0.238 (0.140)	-0.235 (0.141)
Urban	-0.287 *** (0.043)	-0.285 *** (0.043)	-0.285 *** (0.043)
Economic Globalisation	-0.029 * (0.015)		
Political Globalisation		-0.024 * (0.012)	
Social Globalisation			-0.043 ** (0.016)
Num. Respondents	13127	13127	13127
Num. Post-Soviet countries	11	11	11

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

Overall, the results indicate any kind of increased level of economic interconnectedness (like increased trade and growing economic prosperity) to have a significant negative influence on only one dimension of former Soviet citizens' national identity, on their willingness to fight for their country (See Table 3). Additionally, political and social forms of globalisation seem to reduce respondents' willingness to fight for their country (for more details consider Table 3).

Table 4. Multilevel analysis for the direct effect of political & social globalisation on respondents' level of pride of their nation

Patriotism		
Intercept	7.865 *** (1.403)	8.952 *** (1.760)
Gender_Female	0.154 *** (0.046)	0.154 *** (0.046)
Agecate< 51	-0.093 (0.058)	-0.092 (0.058)
Agecate< 67	-0.006 (0.059)	-0.005 (0.059)
Agecate< 92	0.204 ** (0.076)	0.205 ** (0.076)
Degree	-0.030 (0.062)	-0.031 (0.062)
Middle class	0.199 (0.164)	0.199 (0.164)
Working class	0.069 (0.165)	0.070 (0.165)
Urban	-0.298 *** (0.049)	-0.297 *** (0.049)
Political Globalisation	-0.084 *** (0.020)	
Social Globalisation		-0.101 *** (0.026)
Num. Respondents	16436	16436
Num. Post-Soviet countries	13	13

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

In contrast to previous qualitative studies' forecasts (Gudkov 2000; Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002), a post-Soviet country's increased level of economic globalisation does not affect their citizens' patriotic feelings to their nation at all. At the same time, increases in political and social interconnectedness appear to lessen sentiments of patriotism to a statistically significant extent (see Table 4).

In line with the findings for the overall aggregated KOF index of globalisation, while controlling for political globalisation, former Soviet citizens living in more urbanised areas seem to become less likely to be willing to go to war for, less proud of their country and less likely to associate themselves with their nation (see Table 5). Also the trend, that people living in cities are less likely to identify themselves as world citizen through the contact with political forms of globalisation, gets reaffirmed (see Table 5). However, the findings indicate that citizens' likeliness to identify themselves as world citizen does not seem to be directly affected by any kind of globalisation.

Table 5. Multilevel analysis for the direct effect of political globalisation on national identity dimensions

	Willingness to Fight	Patriotism	Nation Citizen	World Citizen
Intercept	3.637 *** (0.844)	7.865 *** (1.403)	6.186 *** (1.613)	2.318 (1.335)
Gender_Female	-0.797 *** (0.042)	0.154 *** (0.046)	0.119 (0.064)	-0.143 *** (0.034)
Agecate< 51	-0.096 (0.052)	-0.093 (0.058)	-0.087 (0.079)	-0.120 ** (0.042)
Agecate< 67	-0.259 *** (0.055)	-0.006 (0.059)	0.123 (0.085)	-0.170 *** (0.044)
Agecate< 92	-0.796 *** (0.067)	0.204 ** (0.076)	-0.004 (0.107)	-0.275 *** (0.056)
Degree	0.109 * (0.049)	-0.030 (0.062)	0.029 (0.087)	0.066 (0.042)
Middle class	-0.199 (0.137)	0.199 (0.164)	0.265 (0.190)	-0.403 *** (0.118)
Working class	-0.238 (0.140)	0.069 (0.165)	0.406 * (0.193)	-0.512 *** (0.120)
Urban	-0.285 *** (0.043)	-0.298 *** (0.049)	-0.277 *** (0.068)	-0.144 *** (0.035)
Political Globalisation	-0.024 * (0.012)	-0.084 *** (0.020)	-0.049 * (0.023)	-0.021 (0.019)
Num. Respondents	13127	16436	17686	17113
Num. Post-Soviet countries	11	13	13	13

*** p < 0.001, ** p < 0.01, * p < 0.05

In conclusion, while controlling for the different dimensions of the KOF index of globalisation once more, the countervailing influence of globalisation becomes visible (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017). While some post-Soviet people develop a stronger attachment to some aspects of their national identity (less likely to call themselves a citizen of the world) others become more global (less proud of their nation and less willing to fight for their country) (Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002).

Conclusion

Broadly speaking, the findings from the multilevel analysis show that there seems to exist a direct effect of globalisation on some aspects of peoples' perception of their national identity in former Soviet countries. In addition, the results support previous quantitative studies (Ariely 2011, 2012; Hox 2010; Kunovich 2009) insofar that respondents' *gender*, *age* and *education* may have an influence on their attachment to their national identity. Overall, men are more willing than women to fight for their country in the unusual case of a war. However, in contrast to their fellow female citizens in western countries (Davidov 2009; Smith & Kim 2006), women growing up within the former Soviet space seem to be more proud of and more willing to identify themselves as citizen of their nation than their male compatriots. Similar contradictory findings can be observed regarding the control variables *age* and *education*. Compared to non-Soviet citizens, older and better educated respondents seem to be less willing to take part in a war for their former communist country than their younger, less educated fellow citizens. Nevertheless, in line with their western countrymen, older Soviet people

are less likely to identify themselves as world citizens than younger respondents (Castells 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017). In short, better educated and younger citizens, who can travel more often and therefore are “advantaged” by globalisation, may become less attached to their national identity and in doing so, may start to develop a so called “world-citizen” identity. However, in contrast to their western counterparts (Castell 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017), post-Soviet people living in cities, tend to identify themselves less as world citizens. Furthermore, the results indicate any kind of globalization to have only a significant negative direct influence on former Soviet peoples’ willingness to fight for, their level of pride of their country and in combination with political globalisation on their likeliness to identify themselves as citizen of their nation. No significant findings can be found for the other category of national identity, world citizen. This trend gets reaffirmed, while observing the influence of the different dimensions of the KOF index of globalisation (economic, political and social) on the four dimensions of national identity. While controlling for the individual-level variable *urban*, the multilevel results indicate that people living in more urbanised areas within the former Soviet space, in accordance with their western fellow citizens (Castell 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017), seem to be less willing to go to war for their country, less proud of their national identity and less likely to associate themselves as citizen of their nation. However, in contrast to their western counterparts (Castell 2011; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017), post-Soviet people affiliating themselves with the middle class and living in cities, tend to identify themselves less as world citizens. Those countervailing influences of globalisation on contemporary national identities get reconfirmed when measuring the impact of economic, political and social globalisation on post-Soviet citizen’s national identity. In summary, some people, through contact with the processes of globalisation, become more aware of their nation’s distinctiveness and, as a result, may develop a stronger attachment to their national identity, while others become happier to identify as citizens of the world (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017).

Briefly, in line with the general canon among the debates on nationalism and globalisation (Baldwin 2016; Bremmer 2018; Castell 2010; Connor 1972; Kriesi et al. 2006; Nodia 2017) and previous qualitative studies (Berg 2002; Blum 2008; Danilova 2009; Gudkov 2000; Panov 2010; Surucu 2002) the multilevel results confirm that globalisation seems to have a twofold influence on post-Soviet citizens’ identification with their national identity in today’s globalised world. The current study, therefore,

suggests that globalism and nationalism do not necessarily have to contradict each other; rather, they seem to exist conjointly within the former Soviet Space.

In running generalized logistic multilevel regression analyses, the current study, as a case sui generis, overcomes limitations of previous studies insofar as it allows the researcher to measure the complex interrelation of these two phenomena more adequately and in a more nuanced way. As a result, this research contains on the one hand a valuable and insightful contribution to the existing literature addressing the debate on nationalism and globalisation in the context of the Soviet space. On the other hand, the quantitative methodological approach contributes to the overall methodological debates on how to observe the impact of globalisation on national identities in general.

Nevertheless, far more research needs to be done. The rise and continued support of populist movements in the West emphasizes that contemporary national identities increasingly arise from *below* as so-called ‘resistance identities’ against the top-down elite-oriented institutionalized global narratives (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Cummings 2012; Isaacs 2015, 2018; Kaldor 2004; Rees & Williams 2017). As the current study’s findings with regards to the individual- level variables *education*, *age*, *social class* and *urban* revealed, especially those former Soviet citizens who consider themselves losers from globalization are more likely to develop a so-called ‘resistance identity’ against their elites’ globalised narrative (Bremmer 2018; Castells 2011; Nodia 2017). Thus, more research on the complex and contested relationship between globalisation and ordinary people’s perception of their national identity is much required. Drawing on the present study’s findings, any future research in this field should focus its’ analysis on the individual level and not the elite level. In addition, future scholarship may embrace the following suggestions:

First, there may exist alternative explanations for post-Soviet citizens’ changed perception of their national identity in addition to globalisation, which should be taken into account (Dyrstad 2012; Masella 2013; Massey et al. 2003; Sasse & Lackner 2018). Therefore, it seems crucial for any future research seeking to observe the impact of globalisation on people’s perception of their national identity to control for additional variables at the individual- and country- level, which large scale surveys are not able to account for (Ariely 2011, 2012). This may allow us to better differentiate between former Soviet peoples’ identity shifts that stem from their contact with the processes of

globalisation and those that result from political, economic crises, wars and other alternative contextual circumstances (Sasse & Lackner 2018).

Finally, this study only covers one measurement occasion (2011/2013) and therefore, does not allow us to draw any conclusions regarding the causal relationship between globalisation and national identity within the former Soviet space (Ariely 2011, 2012). Only a longitudinal statistical analysis that address the element of time, featuring more than one year of investigation, would do so.

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Appendix

i

POLITICAL GLOBALIZATION		
Measurement Index	Source	Definition
Embassy	Europa World Yearbook (various years)	Absolute number of embassies in a country.
Membership in International Organizations	CIA World Fact book (various years)	Absolute number of international inter-governmental organizations.
Participation in U.N. Security Council Missions	Department of Peacekeeping Operations, UN	Personnel contributed to U.N. Security Council Missions per capita.
International Treaties	United Nations Treaties Collection	Any document signed between two or more states and ratified by the highest legislative body of each country since 1945. Not ratified treaties, or subsequent actions, and annexes are not included. Treaties signed and ratified must be deposited in the Office of Secretary General of the United Nations to be included.

ECONOMIC GLOBALIZATION		
Measurement Index	Source	Definition
Actual flows (% of GDP)	World Bank (2016)	Trade Sum of exports and imports of goods and services measured as a share of gross domestic product.
	UNCTAD (2016)	Foreign Direct Investment, stocks Sum of inward and outward FDI stock as a percentage of GDP.
	IMF (2016)	Portfolio Investment Portfolio investment is the sum of portfolio investment assets stocks and portfolio investment liabilities stocks.
	World Bank (2016)	Income Payments to Foreign Nationals Income payments refer to employee compensation paid to non-resident workers and investment income (payments on direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investments).
Data on restrictions	Gwartney et al. (2016)	Hidden Import Barriers Based on the Global Competitiveness Report's survey question: "In your country, tariff and non-tariff barriers significantly reduce the ability of imported goods to compete in the domestic market."
	Gwartney et al. (2016)	Mean Tariff Rate As the mean tariff rate increases countries are assigned lower ratings. The rating declines toward zero as the mean tariff rate approaches 50%.
	World Bank (2016)	Taxes on International Trade Include import duties, export duties, profits of export or import monopolies, exchange profits, and exchange taxes. Current revenue includes all revenue from taxes and non-repayable receipts (other than grants) from the sale of land, intangible assets, government stocks, or fixed capital assets, or from capital transfers from nongovernmental sources. It also includes fines, fees, recoveries, inheritance taxes, and non-recurrent levies on capital.
	Gwartney et al. (2016)	Capital Account Restrictions Based on two components: (i) Beginning with the year 2002, this subcomponent is based on the question: "Foreign ownership of companies in your country is (1) rare, limited to minority stakes, and often prohibited in key sectors or (2) prevalent and encouraged". For earlier years, this sub-component was based on two questions about "Access of citizens to foreign capital markets and foreign access to domestic capital markets". (ii) Index based on the IMF's Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, including 13 different types of capital controls. It is constructed by subtracting the number of restrictions from 13 and multiplying the result by 10.

SOCIAL GLOBALIZATION		
Measurement Index	Source	Definition
Data on personal contacts	International Telecommunication Union (2015)	Telephone Traffic International voice traffic is the sum of international incoming and outgoing fixed telephone traffic (in minutes per person).
	World Bank (2016)	Transfers Sum of gross inflows and gross outflows of goods, services, income, or financial items without a quid pro quo. Data are in percent of GDP.
	World Bank (2016)	International Tourism Sum of arrivals and departures of international tourists as a share of population. Foreign Population (percent of total population).
	World Bank (2016)	Foreign population Income payments refer to employee compensation paid to non-resident workers and investment income (payments on direct investment, portfolio investment, and other investments).
	Universal Postal Union, Postal Statistics database Number	International Letters Number of international letters sent and received per capita.
Data on information flows	World Bank (2016)	Internet Users (per 100 people) Number of people with access to the worldwide internet network.
	World Bank (2007), International Telecommunication Union (2015)	Television (per 100 people) Share of households with a television set.
	United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (2016)	Trade in Newspaper The sum of exports and imports in newspapers and periodicals in percent of GDP.
Data on Cultural Proximity	Various sources	Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per 100'000 people) Number of McDonald's Restaurants (per capita).
	Ikea	Number of Ikea (per 100'000 people) Number of Ikea (per capita)
	UNESCO (various years), United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database (2016)	Trade in books The sum of exports and imports in books and pamphlets in percent of GDP.

ⁱⁱⁱIn order to dichotomize the WVS and ISSP questionnaire scales into binary scales the following data management had to be carried out: First, since both large scale survey data sets capture respondents' pride of their nation in 2011 among 5 dimensions (1= Very proud, 2= Quite/Somewhat proud, 3= Not very proud, 4= Not at all proud, 5 respectively 0 = I am not [nationality]) first those respondents who identified themselves as not belonging to the 'core national group' had to be excluded in line with previous studies (Ariely 2011, 2012; Davidov 2009, 2010). Afterwards, those respondents who are either very or quite/somewhat proud had to be merged into the general category "proud" and those respondents who are either not very or not at all proud into the general category "not proud". Additionally, the ordinal four-point Likert scale ("Strongly agree", "Agree", "Disagree" and "Strongly disagree") of the two other variables Nation Citizen and World Citizen from the WVS had to be changed into a binary scale, while consolidating those respondents who either strongly agree or agree with the statement "I see myself as a part of [my country's nationality]/ a world citizen or respectively "I feel more like a citizen of the world than of any country" into the dummy category "agree" and those respondents who either disagree or strongly disagree with the same statement into the dummy category "disagree". The ISSP questionnaire captures the Nation Citizen variable slightly differently to the WVS. By asking the respondents "How close do you feel to your country?" the ISSP uses rather different response categories (1= Very close, 2= Close, 3= Not very close, 4= Not close at all). This is why those respondents who are either very close or close had to be merged into the category "agree" and those who are either not very close or not close at all into the general category "disagree", in order to include respondents from Latvia and Lithuania in my study. Moreover, the ISSP features one additional category for my World Citizen variable among 5; Neither agree nor disagree. Since those respondents (Lithuania 320 and Latvia 203) belonging to this category cannot be assigned to either the "agree" or "disagree" dummy category, those respondents had to be excluded from the analysis.