Right-Wing Political Violence in Turkey in the 1970s

Abstract

During the 1970s, Ülkü Ocakları (Idealist Hearths), which was the home of the radical nationalist youth in Turkey and the center where this youth is shaped ideologically and culturally, was one of the most active organizations in Turkey. The aim of this paper is to analyze the development of the far-right movements in Turkey, departing from the case of the idealist (ülkücü) movement, and focusing on the why and how of its repertoire of action which is composed mainly of political violence. In doing so, the paper is going to bring together two different sets of literatures, namely social movements and Turkish politics. Methodologically, the paper employs Protest Event Analysis, based on an original dataset of 5361 protest events, prepared by a daily review of Turkish daily Milliyet for the period between 1971 and 1985.

Selin Bengi Gumrukcu
Visiting Scholar
Rutgers University, New Brunswick
bengigumrukcu@gmail.com

Introduction - The 1970s in Turkey

Deep political and economic crises marked Turkish politics in the 1970s. Incapable politicians and increasing polarization contributed to the political instability, which resulted in quite often changes of the governments. Even though there were only two national elections held in the 1970s (namely the elections of 1973 and 1977), Turkey was ruled by ten different governments from 1971 until the military coup in September 1980. Economic crises accompanied the political ones, thanks to the oil crisis of 1973-1974, the intervention to Cyprus and a series of indecisive governments. In addition, internal migration and the rapid urbanization caused by it created a challenging environment for the youth and the social bases. All these political, social and economic changes in the society fostered political mobilization.

It is not possible to avoid the role of military, which came to consider itself as the guarantee of the Republic and the founding principles of Turkey, while talking about the political life in the 1970s in Turkey. The military made two significant interventions to the political life in Turkey during covered period of this study. While the first one, in the form of a memorandum issued in 1971, emptied the streets for a relatively short time, the coup held in 1980 reshaped political life in Turkey for good. This instability and crises environment provides the background to the reconstructing and analysis of the cycle of protest of 1970s in Turkey.

Another marking feature of the decade in Turkey, in relation to the political crisis of the 1970s, was political violence, which became an aspect of everyday life especially from the mid-1970s[1]. 5000 people are estimated to lose their lives from 1976 to 1980 because of the violent acts (Sayarı 2010).; a fact that helped the welcoming of the September 1980 military coup by the general public. Thus, in order to understand the development of the wave and the dynamics of institutionalization and radicalization, it is important to understand the use of violence in Turkey during the period covered.

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[1] While it is generally accepted that there has been an increase in the violent acts in the late 1970s, scholars of Turkish politics do not have a consensus on when exactly radicalization started: for example, while Yayla (1989) argues that the (second) wave of terrorist movements started in 1973, Sayarı (2010) mentions 1976 and Ahmad (1993) mentions 1977.

Analyzing cycles of protest is useful for understanding the development of political violence, since it is one of the most frequent outcomes of a cycle (Della Porta, 2008: 222).

Defined as a "phase of heightened conflict across the social system" (Tarrow, 1994: 153), a cycle of a protest has some features that distinguish it from other periods of mobilization. These distinguishing features are "a rapid diffusion of collective action from more mobilized to less mobilized sectors; a quickened phase of innovation in the forms of contention; new or transformed collective action frames; a combination of organized and unorganized participation; and sequences of intensified interactions between challengers and authorities which can end in reform, repression and sometimes revolution" (Tarrow, 1994: 153).

Methodology

In order to analyze the state of protests in Turkey in the 1970s, this study relies on Protest Event Analysis (PEA). PEA is a quantitative content analysis method used to "systematically map, analyze and interpret the occurrence and properties of large numbers of protests by means of content analysis, using sources such as newspaper reports and police records" (Koopmans and Rucht, 2002: 231). While PEA might be conducted based on different resources such as police records/archives, newspapers are still the main source due to some comparative advantages such as ease of access, reliability, continuity and ease of coding (Rucht and Neidhardt, 1998: 71). As Koopmans (1995a: 253) writes "it is the poverty of the alternatives that makes newspapers so attractive".

For the specific case of Turkey, it was hard to rely on other sources. While the number of biographical works or memoirs are increasing it is still difficult to base an entire study on them. On the other hand, the existing written material of the period such as leaflets, etc. are limited to the organizations that have bureaucratic structures (Ergüden, 2012: 82); a fact that makes these documents biased. Thus, newspaper archives emerge as one of the most useful "documents" for the Turkish case.

Combining the objectives of quality and quantity, the criteria provided by Koopmans (1995a: 255), namely continuity, quality, national scope and political color, are employed in order to determine the newspaper to be covered for this study. The four main national newspapers published during the taken period are *Cumhuriyet, Milliyet, Hürriyet* and *Tercüman.* Among these newspapers, *Milliyet,* published since May 3, 1950, seemed to be the best source for this study. Its stance is at the center of the political spectrum, it had a high circulation during the 1970s[2], and it was the daily with the highest number of pages (about 13-14 pages during the analyzed years). Moreover, the main topics of the daily were the domestic events and sports (Kejanlıoğlu, 1995: 241), which makes it an important resource for protests in Turkey.

In order to collect newspaper-based data on protests and employ PEA, one should have an operational and clear understanding of what a "protest" is. Instead of adapting one of the definitions provided in the literature, the present study covers a broad and detailed list of action forms including both "conventional" and "unconventional" forms ranging from demonstrative (mass demonstrations, gatherings, etc.) and confrontational (boycotts, hunger strikes, occupations, etc.) forms to violence (clashes, threatening, bombing, etc.). In order to represent the diversity of the protests carried out during the covered period, this study does not rely on a specific motivation (i.e. political) behind the protests, but also covers culturally, economically, etc. motivated events. To be able to represent the variety and diversity of the protests in Turkey, every issue of the daily *Milliyet* are reviewed for the fifteen years period starting from March 13, 1971, Saturday until the end of 1985 using the daily's digital archive. The newspaper articles were coded[3] manually, according to the codebook prepared for this study, in order to generate data. As a result, 1761 articles have been coded with the help of the *Filemaker* database software. Overall, the design resulted in a data set of 5361 protest events in Turkey in 15 years period, from 1971 to 1986.

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[2] The circulation of this daily was between 182000 and 189000, which made it the fifth among the newspapers with high circulation.
[3] While no sampling methods were applied during the archive reviewing process, due to the intensity of the events in the period covered and the fact that most of the articles report more than two events, a sampling method to code every other article is employed.

Wave of Protest of the 1970s

The wave of protests in Turkey in the 1970s is clearly demonstrated in Figure 1, presenting the absolute numbers of protest events, based on the newspaper data, from 1971 to 1985. In the periods between 1971 and 1973 and after 1980 the number of protests is insignificant; they only increase after transition to civilian rule following these periods. On the other hand, the increase in the number of events in 1974 and the sharp decline in late 1980 is also evident. It is also clear that the protest wave reached a peak in 1977. The changes in the political opportunity structure can be listed as the reasons lying behind these general dynamics of the wave. To be more precise, two closures and one opening in the POS can be listed: Turkish armed forces intervened in politics by a memorandum in March 1971 asking for the resignation of the then government, and the following repression especially towards the left-wing, and the following interim government can be seen as the reason of low activity between 1971 and 1973 when a national election was held. In 1980, on the oher hand, the military intervened this time in the form of a coup and the junta ruled the country for three years until the general elections held in 1983. Concerning the opening, the general amnesty issue in 1974 that released most of the main cadres of the movements who were imprisoned after the memorandum in 1971 facilitated the increase in the number of protests.

Figure 1: Numbers of protest events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

The far-right (composed especially of students) was an important part of the street protests in Turkey in the 1970s. *Ülkü Ocakları* (Idealist Hearths), the main organization of the right-wing youth, was one of the most active organizations in Turkey during the 1970s. Today, it is still one of the biggest organizations in Turkey with about a thousand branches and 20 thousand members. as the home of the radical nationalist youth in Turkey, *Ülkü Ocakları* serves as the center where this youth is shaped ideologically and culturally. While the *Ülkü Ocakları* are unofficially affiliated with the Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi, MHP), their ideological path of the have always been more radical than the party[4], which is the successor of the first extreme-right party in Turkey. The radicalism of the *Ülkü Ocakları* could be observed not only for the ideological aspects, but also for the uncompromising and 'tougher' methods used in the political struggle.

The Idealist Hearths

Ülkücü (idealist) movement, also known as "Grey Wolves", is composed of far-right militants with strong ties with the MHP. Due to these strong ties, in the following I will first provide some background information on the MHP and its ideology, before giving detailed information about the activities of the Grey Wolves.

MHP is the successor of the first extreme right-wing party in Turkey, Republican Peasants' Nation Party (*Cumhuriyetçi Köylü Millet Partisi* - CKMP), that was founded in 1948 by General Fevzi Çakmak. After four years under the rule of former colonel Alparslan Türkeş, the party changed its name to Nationalist Action Party in 1969. The ideological stance of the party was shaped by the "Nine Lights Doctrine" (*Dokuz Işık Doktrini*)[5], offered by Türkeş himself, who "embraced an

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[4] The MHP is labeled as a "strongly nationalist, racist, xenophobic, anti-democratic and strongly statist" (Arıkan, 2002: 373) party.

[5] "The nine 'lights' or principles are as follows: (1) Nationalism (which not coincidentally comes first), defined as the sentiment feeding the Turkish nation with a desire to raise Turkey to the peak of civilization - safe, prosperous, happy and modernized. (2) Idealism, characterized as the wish to serve one's nation and secure its independence, liberty and well-being. (3) Morality, the basis of society, which ought to conform to local Turkish traditions and beliefs. (4) Social-mindedness, said to comprise the protection and encouragement of free enterprise; the provision of economic incentives to holders of small capital; and statewide organization of social welfare. (5) A Scientific Mentality, encouraging well-planned study and research. (6) Liberalism, guaranteeing all conceivable freedoms, political and otherwise, to every single

ultranationalist ideology that relied on a combination of pan-Turkist, monoculturalist, authoritarian, anti-communist, and essentialist moralist elements" (Celep, 2010: 390). *ülkücülük* (idealism) is another principle identified with the movement. Having a different connotation than nationalism (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26), *ülkücülük* "signifies the idea of serving one's own state as opposed to a commitment to the prosperity and well-being of a particular ethnic community" (Öniş, 2010: 31). Another important component of MHP's ideology is Turkism (*Türkçülük*). Accordingly, power, warfare and militarism, which are seen as the important aspects of a being a Turk, constitute significant motives for the movement. Turkish nationalists usually accept the idea that "warfare is an inherent cultural and even a racial tendency of Turkish nation and that having superior military capability is one of the quintessential and defining characteristic of Turkish identity" (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 23-4). According to this tradition, Turkish nation is as an army-nation, which is a special ability/capacity of the Turks, a fact that makes the Turkish nation superior to others.

Guided by all these aspects of the Turkish nationalism, the *ülkücü* movement came into existence with the Idealist Hearths, mainly student and youth organizations established in universities.[6] The foundation of first *Ocak* in 1966 at the Faculty of Law of Ankara University was followed by the foundation of other *Ocaks* in various faculties of the same university. In 1968, they started to organize in every university. In 1969, Dündar Taşer, the deputy chairperson of the MHP, called the MHP youth to unite around the Idealist Hearths, which were unofficially founded in big cities by this time. On December 13, 1970, the Idealist Hearths of Turkey founded a union named the Union of the Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Birliği* - ÜOB). At this time, the number of the *Ocaks* was around two hundred.

Turk. (7) Peasant Care that is, according special significance to rural development in schooling, medicine and the modernization of agriculture. (8) Populism, intended to channel all progress and development for the benefit of the nation's overwhelming majority. (9) Industrialization, emphasizing technology and preparing for the nuclear and space era" (Landau, 1982: 601-602).

[6] However, the activities of *ülkücüs* cannot be limited with the *Ülkü Ocakları* since other parts of the society such as the policemen, teachers, and workers had their own *ülkücü* organizations respectively named as Police Union (*Polis Birliği* - Pol-Bir), Association of Idealist Academicians and Teachers (*Ülkücü Öğretim Üyeleri ve Öğretmenler Derneği* - Ülkü-Bir), and MİSK. As in the case of *Ülkü Ocakları*, these organizations also had unofficial ties with the MHP; a fact that can also be read from the title of the case opened against them after the military coup d'état held in 1980: "*MHP ve Ülkücü Kuruluşlar Davası*" (Case of MHP and the *Ülkücü* Organizations).

The idealists, as mentioned above, had close ties with the MHP, which is one of the main characteristics of the movement (Sayarı, 2010: 203). While being more radical than the MHP (Bora and Can, 2004: 279), *Ocaks* served as the youth branch of the party. On the other hand, they operate as "schools" where the idealist/nationalist youth is shaped and the future leadership cadres of the party are recruited. Indeed, "(…) throughout the 1970s, Idealist Hearths became the most active party group to recruit new members, especially university students, and served as a school where future MHP leaders and activists acquired organizational and leadership skills" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). They also provide the members with a sense of belonging and protection, with the help of the nationwide organization and connection (Tepe, 2000:67-8). Besides serving as a school, the Idealist Hearths also "set the tone of the party's ideological basis" (Çınar and Arıkan, 2002: 26). One main aim of an *ülkücü* is to enlighten and coordinate the people according to idealists' ideas and to get into power by the help of these people (*Ülkü Ocakları* Website, n.d.). Thus, Idealist Hearths support the indoctrination of youth with the party's ideology (Tepe, 2000:67-8).

On the other hand, the MHP also uses the Idealist Hearths to disseminate the party's ideas and ideology into neighborhoods throughout the country. The Idealist Hearths work in a communal setting and mobilize a wide range of people for the movement and, as mentioned above, provide a sense of social solidarity among members (Tepe, 2000: 67-8). For example, being from an *Ocak,* or even knowing someone from the *Ocaks* means in daily life that one has a strong and powerful group behind him/her to protect or save them especially from street battles or personal fights. This provides important opportunities especially for the young people and university youth who are coming to big cities from small towns for education without adequate personal, social and/or financial resources.

The *ülkücü* youth or the members of the Idealist Hearths are also known as the "Grey Wolves". With the empowering of leftist students, the Grey Wolves started to make their presence felt in the streets starting from December 1968 (Zürcher, 2004: 257). As Landau (1982: 594) points out, they were demonstrating, clashing with the leftist youth and marching in the streets in their uniforms,

which led them to be called "commandos". They were trained in special camps, organized by the MHP and claimed to provide "a patriotic education" (Celep, 2010: 132) to the participants.

As mentioned above, the Grey Wolves made their existence felt especially in the 1960s, but their activities and clashes with the left-wing students peaked in 1969 and 1970. In those years "(…) the organization was mostly busy with both oral and written propaganda (in frequent seminars and various bulletins, respectively) and, according to their opponents, with anti-left violence" (Landau, 1982: 594). The *ülkücü* movement also felt the negative effects of the military memorandum of March 1971, though not as harshly as the left-wing, as the ÜOB was closed down. After transition to civilian rule, in search for new ways of organization, the idealists founded the Association of Idealist Hearths (*Ülkü Ocakları Derneği,* ÜOD) in December 1973. It can be claimed that their militancy increased in time, especially during 1974-1977 period, a fact that can be explained by the strong alliance between the Grey Wolves and the MHP, which was a member of Nationalist Front coalitions. As Ahmad (2008: 252) writes, "the pro-Front media popularised the slogan 'Demirel[7] in Parliament, Türkeş in the Street' and the party's militants (…) began to play an even more active role in the violence". In addition to their alliances in the government, the police and the security forces, who became preservers of the MHP under the Nationalist Front governments, protected and shielded the Grey Wolves even under the CHP rule (Zürcher, 2004: 263). They got involved in violent acts; with an effort to legitimize these acts it was frequently indicated that the *ülkücü* youth was helping the state and the government in their struggle with so-called anarchism by using violence. According to the *ülkücü* movement, the country's situation in those years was so serious that without a militaristic and violence-oriented *ülkücü* reaction to communist forces between the 1960s and 1980s, the Turkish state and nation could have vanished (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 25-6). This was in line with MHP's concerns about "a communist takeover by either the Soviet Union or 'collaborators' inside" (Celep, 2010: 132). As Ağaoğulları (1998: 232) indicates, violent events helped the MHP and the *ülkücü* movement to reproduce their ideology, which is, as mentioned above, based on violence.

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[7] The then Prime Minister from the Justice Party (endnote by me).

How did the activities of the right-wing evolve in time? Figure 2 demonstrates the evolution of actions carried out by actors with a far-right ideological engagement[8] over years, from 1971 to 1985. Thus, the graph shows the activities of not only students, but also far-right workers, civil servants, etc.

Figure 2: Development of protest events organized by far-right militants in Turkey, 1971-1986.

It is worth noting that the figure is almost identical with the one demonstrating the actions carried out by actors with a rightist political orientation. In support of the analysis above, we can observe an increase in the actions starting from 1975 to 1977, when the MHP was a coalition partner of the first Nationalist Front government. However, on the other hand, the level of mobilization decreased gradually starting from 1977, as in the student movement. The military coup in 1980 crushed the *ülkücü* movement as well; it was also repressed and sent to the courts and jails "for attempting to seize control of the state through anti-democratic means and establishing a dictatorship in the country" (Celep, 2010: 132).

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[8] The graph presents data about far-right militants, as it was not possible to track *ülkücüs* in the newspaper articles.

Repertoire of Action of the Right-Wing

In order to analyze the repertoire of contention/action used in Turkey in the 1970s, we should first further elaborate the concept which is "(…) at once a structural and a cultural concept, involving not only what people *do* when they are engaged in conflict with others but what they *know how to do* and what others *expect* them to do" (Tarrow, 1994: 30). In Tilly's own words (1995: 26), the concept identifies "a limited set of routines that are learnt, shared and acted out through a relatively deliberate process of choice".

Tables 1 and 2 present relevant data on the political orientations of the actors involved in violence in the 1970s in Turkey, and the forms of action used by the right-wing in the same period. . Accordingly, right-wing groups carried out the majority of the violent events (52 percent) during the wave; a fact as was also the case for the Italian wave of protest of 1966-1973 (della Porta and Tarrow, 1986: 622). Left-wing groups follow the right-wing ones with a share of almost 40 percent. This shows us that the left and right wing groups were the major actors of violent disputes. Table 2, on the other hand, shows us that the right-wing highly resorted to violence, as about 57% of all their actions are composed of violence.

[Table 1 here]
[Table 2 here]

What kind of violence were these groups with different ideological backgrounds involved in? Table 4 shows the involvement of groups with different ideological stances in different kinds of violence. Accordingly, left-wing groups are more likely to get involved in clashes, bombings and violent acts targeting objects, while right-wing groups are more likely to use attacks and other kinds of violence targeting people.

[Table 3 here]

Mainly represented by the idealist movement, right-wing groups on the other hand employ more violence targeting people. The fact that the idealist organizations' "explicit purpose" is "confronting and containing growing left-wing militancy" (Benhabib, 1979: 16) might help explaining this situation. Since their ultimate goal was to protect the state against the threat of communism, they positioned themselves against the left-wing youth instead of raising claims. In this regard, Ağaoğulları (1987: 204) claims that the violence exercised by idealists followed several stages: "until 1974, it had been staged in universities and other institutions of higher education, and had targeted revolutionary youths. After the RPP [CHP] rose to power (…) the attacks extended to its members, as well as such leftist professional organizations (…). Later still, the guns were turned toward prominent journalists (…), unionists (…), university faculty (…), party leaders (…), and others. (…) Finally, terrorism acquired mass proportions as religious-reactionary circles were instigated to violence against *Alevi*s and "leftists" (including the RPP [CHP]) in Malatya, Sivas, and Kahraman Maraş in 1978 and in Çorum and some other locations in 1980".

Ideology and Opportunity Structures: Motive for the Violent Acts

It is usually stressed that the violent acts in Turkey were initially started by the left-wing groups, and then the nationalist right-wing youth used violence as a reaction to these groups, a reason why they were seen as fighting against 'communism threat' posed by the leftists. Süleyman Demirel, the then Prime Minister, stressed in an interview held in July 1976, for example, that the responsible of the street battles in Turkey were the leftist organizations, refusing to say (even mention) that there is right-wing terror in Turkey. In the same interview, he mentioned that the acts of the idealists were 'reaction' (*Milliyet,* July 24, 1976). Framing their acts of violence as self-defense against the increasing political activities and efforts of the communists to prevent the entrance of *ülkücü* youth to the university buildings, the right-wing was represented as "reacting". However, one of the founders of the first *Ocak* in Faculty of Law in Ankara University, Namık Kemal Zeybek, rejected

this point of view as in a nationalist journal, *Path of the Ideal*, he wrote, "idealist movement is not solely composed of anti-communism. It is not a reaction against communism; it is a serial action. It is a movement, as its name implies" (in Parlar, 1997: 492).

The 'self-defense' and 'reaction' rhetoric helped the movement to legitimize itself and its political activities including the use of violence. The idealist movement was trying to legitimize their use of violence while they were also glorifying it. The main given *raison d'étre* of the movement was the relatively effective leftist movement and the 'danger of communism' that it poses. Another aspect of this legitimization attempt was frequently indicating that the *ülkücü* youth is helping to the state and the government in their struggle with anarchism by using violence. According to them "the present government and military forces underestimated or were unaware of the seriousness of the threats that the internal collaborators of the Russian-oriented communism posed and hence it was the duty of the ülkücü movement to get rid of the communist threat in Turkey" (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 25-6). With this legitimizing rhetoric MHP also emphasized the 'weakness' of the state' a fact that helped to convince the public about an existing power vacuum in Turkey, which would possibly result in a communist state. It is worth noting that the movement is still mentioning that their success about preventing the universities from being occupied by communist students and thus failing an attempt of a revolution is disregarded, and their due is not given (Ülkü Ocakları Website, n.d.). The commando camps that emerged through the end of the 1960s to train the right-wing youth, in this regard, appear as a tool to equip the right-wing youth in its fight along with the state against the communist threat posed by the left-wing students. Considered affiliated with the MHP, these camps were generally under control of the former generals who were also in the leadership cadres of the party. One camp was capable to train approximately 100 young people. When the CHP carried this issue to the agenda of the national assembly, Türkeş had to accept the existence of the camps: "The youth branches are doing sports. Here, they are learning judo. The Communists cannot maintain a 'street dominance' by thinking that the country is abandoned. There are young, nationalist people speak the language that they can understand". After Türkeş' acceptance of the camps media organs

close to the party and the movement also started to give information about the daily life in these camps: "Daily routine starts at 6 am and continues till 10 pm. Well-known nationalist writers and teachers are giving seminars after diner. Field exercises/drills are carried out some nights. These young people are keeping ground for two hours both at daytime and night…".

Legitimization of the use of violence by the movement in this way, revealed an encouraging ground for new violent events. As in a vicious circle, these new violent events helped MHP and the *ülkücü* movement to reproduce their ideology, which is actually based on violence (Ağaoğulları, 1998: 232). An important aspect of the idealist movement is its ideology, generally referred as 'doctrine' by the movement itself. Based on *Dokuz Isik* (Nine Lights)[9], this doctrine "symbolizes *Ulkucus'* commitment to the state as well as to holistic, moral, and material development" (Tepe, 2000: 67). More importantly, Turkism (*Türkçülük*) has important roots in the idealist movement and its ideology. Power, warfare and militarism are regarded as an important feature of a Turk. Turkish nationalists usually accept the idea that "warfare is an inherent cultural and even a racial tendency of Turkish nation and that having superior military capability is one of the quintessential and defining characteristic of Turkish identity" (Saraçoğlu, 2004: 23-4). According to this tradition, Turkish nation is considered as an army-nation; this feature does not exist in other nations, a fact that makes the Turkish nation superior than others. The *ülkücü* movement internalized all these aspects of the Turkish nationalism with its ideology and political activities.

Besides the role of the Turkist/nationalist ideology, opportunity structures also enable the use of violence by right-wing movement in Turkey, or at least facilitate it. introduced by Koopmans and Statham (1999: 228) the term "discursive opportunity structure" (DOS) identifies the ideas in the broader political culture believed to be "sensible," "realistic," and "legitimate" and whose presence would thus facilitate reception of specific forms of collective action framing—forms, that is, that would align well with these pre-existing ideational elements. In addition to its ideological background

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[9] As a number, nine is sacred for Islam. These 'lights' here are: Nationalism, Idealism, Moralism, Societalism, Scientism, Indepentism, Ruralism, Progressivism and Populism, Industrialism and Technologism.

legitimizing use of violence against the communist threat posed by the left-wing students, MHP also considered power, and the use of it, as a structural motive for the movement itself. The staff and/or the leadership cadres of the party, for example, praised the use of violence in their speeches, indicating for example that the 'MHP is the party of the 'men', not the fearful' (in Ağaoğulları, 1998: 231). Use of violence, in this regard, also used for attracting the sympathizers of the movement composed mostly of the youth (usually secondary and high school students) coming from a low-income socio-economic background. It was also used as a tool to increase the commitment of the current cadres to the movement (Bora and Can, 2004: 292). This, in fact, is in contrast with the general opinion that the use of violence may alienate the sympathizers. As mentioned above, this structure of the *Ülkü Ocakları* provided a sentiment of solidarity among members and an idea that they will be protected and will be a member of the idealist family among the sympathizers. Popularizing the slogan 'Demirel in Parliament, Türkeş in the Street', the media supporting the nationalistic governments also contributed to this (Ahmad, 2008: 252).

Defined as "the set of environmental opportunities and constrains available to social movements" (Della Porta, 1995: 10), the concept of "political opportunity structures" (POS) have had the greatest success in defining the properties of the external environment relevant to the development of social movements (Della Porta and Diani, 2006: 16). An important feature of the POS is the alliance structures. The presence or absence of elite allies, in this regard, is an aspect of the changing political context where social movements operate. The presence of elite allies might facilitate mobilization, and thus increase the level of it on the one hand, and might affect the choice of repertoire of a certain movement on the other. Ideological position of the ally and its role in the political arena are two significant features that would identify the nature of the alliance structure. The proximity in the ideological stance between a political organization and a social movement might allow an alliance between the two. While the influence of the ideological position on the alliance structure is obvious, the support of the ally "depends on whether it participates in government or not, and if it does so, on its position in government" (Kriesi et al., 1995: 59). In this regard, lower levels of mobilization are

expected for a movement with an ally in the government, because of the foreseen chances of reform in favor of the goal of the movement. While the ally might provide the movement with more space for higher levels of mobilization, having an ally in the government might provide protection against legal and penal sanctions as the ally might have its cadres positioned in relevant state apparatus. The presence of allies may also influence the repertoire of action of the group. In this regard, protest events of a group with strong allies generally expected to be less violent than groups without powerful allies, since they have more access to the system and formal politics and would prefer non-violent actions to make their voices heard. On the other hand, one might also expect the opposite, i.e. that well-connected groups might use more radical and violent types of actions since their allies can provide them more room for the use of a more radical repertoire.

The case of radical right in Turkey provides a good case to analyze in this regard. As seen before, the mobilization of the *ülkücüs* increased in the period between 1974 and 1977. This period corresponds to the period when the MHP was a strong partner in the coalition governments known as Nationalist Front governments. In this period, the MHP was very successful in infiltrating state institutions, in such a way to constitute a specific case according to Gourisse (2013: 119). Even though the number of ministries appointed to the party remained low, some of them were of high significance. Gourisse (2013: 134) claims that the party benefited significantly "from Gün Sazak's appointment to the post of minister of Customs and Monopolies in the Second Nationalist Front government to import extensive supplies of arms, bombs, ammunition, radios (*telsiz*), and medicine (most of it from Germany)". Being a coalition partner also provided the party with the necessary resources to reward civil service posts, including the ones in the security forces, to its activists (Bora and Can, 1991: 50-56). It is widely accepted that infiltration of the police and other security forces by the sympathizers of MHP, especially during the period between 1974 and 1977 provided protection for the Grey Wolves (Nell 2008). The police and the security forces, who became preservers of the MHP under the Nationalist Front governments, protected and shielded the Grey Wolves, even under the CHP rule (Zürcher, 2004: 263). This, along with the "information-gathering activities carried out by party

members with posts in the above-named institutions", guaranteed a degree of impunity to the *ülkücü*s which they used to "fully promote destabilization by means of violence" (Gourisse, 2013: 133).

The data presented in Figure 2, showing the distribution of violent acts according to different ideological orientations of actors over time, supports this observation: from the end of 1973 to the end of 1978, violent events are mostly attributed to the right-wing groups. This provides further evidence for the hypothesis that the strong alliances in the government led the way to the radicalization of the right-wing groups, since it was the Nationalist Front governments, who ruled Turkey for almost 3.5 years of this period. Thanks to the unwillingness of the CHP and the AP to form a coalition, the two relatively small parties were able to take part in the governments. In this regard, engaged in "semiloyal behavior"[10], "(the AP) tended to treat the violent actions of the extremist rightist groups with organic ties to its coalition partner, the MHP, 'with leniency' and toleration" (Özbudun, 2013: 72). Caused mainly by the "young radicals in high schools and universities" (Hwang, 2009: 33) who were somehow affiliated with the MSP, the periods of Islamist violence, although remain significantly low as discussed above, coincide with the Nationalist Front governments as is showed in the figure.[11]

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[10] Semi loyal behavior can be characterized with "(…) willingness to encourage, tolerate, cover up, treat leniently, excuse or justify the actions of other participants that go beyond the limits of peaceful, legitimate patterns of politics in a democracy" (Linz in Özbudun, 2013: 72).

[11] Landau wrote in 1973 (272) that "religious youths have recently had violent altercations with the Nationalists' youth organization".

Figure 2: Numbers of violent protest events according to ideological orientations of actors in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Conclusion

Ülkü Ocakları, whose ideology (doctrine) is based on a militaristic ground, has been and is one of the significant actors of street mobilizations in Turkey. Parallel to increasing left-wing mobilization in the 1970s, the *ülkücü*s were highly active on the streets. The 1970s is marked with use of violence on a daily basis, a fact that prepared the legitimizing ground for the military coup of September 1980. The data presented in this draft paper reveals the fact that the *ülkücü*s engaged in mass violence in this period. violent patterns are inherent in the ideological basis of the idealist movement which is based on Turkism (Türkçülük). Accordingly, power, warfare and militarism are seen as important aspects of a Turk. However, it is not possible to explain the use of mass violence by the ülkücüs solely by its ideology. As well as the mutual dynamics between rival groups in these periods, one should also consider the alliance structures, which is an important aspect of the political opportunity structures, in order to analyze the level mobilization and the choice of repertoire to be employed. The data presented in this draft paper revealed that the levels of mobilization of the ülkücü youth in Turkey increased during the period of Nationalist Front governments. Thus, it might be discussed that having a strong ally in the government, even if it was a coalition government, facilitated the mobilization of

the ülkücü movement. While a partner in this coalition government, the MHP achieved a great success in infiltrating the state institutions. Even though, the number of ministries attributed to the party was not high, they were of crucial importance as explained above. It was not only the ministries, but also the civil service posts including the security forces that the party infiltrated. This fact provided a significant degree of impunity to the ülkücü youth. In addition, in this period the administrative staff of the MHP was praising the use of violence in their speeches, such as indicating that the 'MHP is the party of the 'men', not the fearful' (in Ağaoğulları, 1998: 231). Using violence constituted an attraction instrument for the sympathizers of the movement who are generally very young (usually secondary and high school students) and coming from the low-income neighborhoods. It was also used as a tool to increase the commitment of the current cadres to the movement (Bora and Can, 2004: 292). This fact is in contrast with the general opinion that the use of violence may alienate the sympathizers. This structure of the Ülkü Ocakları provided a sentiment of solidarity among members and an idea that they will be protected and will be a member of the idealist family among the sympathizers. In addition to the political opportunity structures, the discursive opportunities provided both by the MHP cadres and the media also contributed to the use of violence.

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Table 1: Ideological orientations of actors involved in violent events in Turkey, 1971-1986.

Orientations of actors involved in violence	(in %)
Rightists	52.0
Leftists	39.7
Kurdish groups	4.5
Islamists	3.8
Total	100
N	421

Table 2: Forms of actions used by the right-wing in the 1970s

Repertoire	
Conventional	10.5
Demonstrative	14.4
Confrontational	17.5
Strike	.3
Violence	57.3
Total	100
N	382

Table 3: Forms of violence used according to the political orientations of actors in Turkey, 1971-1986 (in %).

Forms of violence	Ideological Orientations of Actors			
	Leftists	Rightists	Islamists	Kurdish groups
Other violence object	10.6	4.2	6.3	0
Other violence people	6.0	26.1	12.0	0
Attack	6.1	34.2	6.3	0
Bombing	9.1	2.8	19.0	0
Shooting	19.7	15.0	25.3	25.8
Clash	48.4	17.8	31.0	73.7
TOTAL	99.8	100	100	99.5
N	168	219	16	19