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Abstract
This paper leverages a two-case comparison of Russia and Turkey's trajectories of desecularization over the past four decades in order to build upon the general research on religious resurgence in political science.

Paper Title: Dismantling Secularism: State-Religion Alliances in Russia and Turkey

State-religion alliances can go terribly wrong. In 2016, the alliance between Turkey's dominant AKP party and the Gulen religious organization went terribly wrong resulting in a failed coup attempt. In Russia and former-Soviet republics, many of the protest movements that brought down communism had religious elements and organizations involved (Weigel, 1992). It was the unspoken rule of new nations constructed in the 20th century that they would have secular governments with the removal of religion from the public sphere (Van der Veer & Lehmann, 1999). Turkey was founded as a secular state in 1923 by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. Soviet Russia repressed religion under a communist, atheist regime. Nevertheless, both of these countries experienced a religious resurgence and the regimes formed alliances with faith-based organizations at the end of the 20th and beginning of the 21st centuries.[1] Under what conditions would historically-secular authoritarian states form alliances with faith-based organizations?

This is an important question whose explication has significant implications for better understanding the similarities and differences between authoritarian and democratic regimes.

[1] A faith-based organization (FBO) here is used interchangeably with religious organization. In Russia, the Russian Orthodox Church is the main Faith-based Organization and is thought of as nearly synonymous with "religious elites." In Turkey, tarikats, cemaats, and the Diyanet are the main faith-based organizations of concern. "Religion" is a complicated concept that has a multiplicity of meanings: beliefs, practices (both individual and collective), symbols, values, norms. Disaggregation of the term "religion" reveals more than twenty separate understandings of the term (Menchik, 2018). The three most common conceptualizations of religion in political science are as identity, ideology, and institution (Gryzmala-Busse, 2012)."Religion" can be seen as an identity, an ideology, and an institution. Generally, most scholars view religious resurgence as an increase in religious beliefs and practices, and it can be measured through observations of practices and by means of interview and survey questions.

The study of faith-based organizations will enable a deeper understanding of the functioning of civil society in authoritarian regimes as well as shed light on variations seen in authoritarian regimes. The answer also has implications for development and outlook for democratization: should the state's choice to ally with religion be seen as a strategic decision that ultimately increases its position by weakening civil society actors? Or is the decision more an accident or a gamble that an incoming regime (or party) makes, knowing all the possible risks, but nonetheless having no other options? Are states always stronger than religious groups and is it correct to assume that the regime co-opts religion? Or are there cases where religious groups can infiltrate the state and co-opt the state? Or is a concept like state-society embeddedness more fruitful for understanding the relationship?

Literature Review

This study draws upon three main bodies of literature: the sociology of the state, economics of religion, and authoritarianism literature. The state literature helps to characterize and measure the features of powerful states: state-society embeddedness, state-business embeddedness, nature of the state bureaucracy, state capacity (Woo-Cumings, 1999; Migdal, 1988). This literature also emphasizes the interests and perspectives of the state and considers the goals, costs and benefits for the leader for cooperating or repressing civil society actors such as FBOs (Evans et al, 1985). Economics of religion examines the "marketplace of religion" and provides a religion or faith-based oriented perspective. It takes religion as a "club good" and assumes that religious organizations try to market their product, religious practice, in order to maximize the number of adherents (Iannaccone,1998; Iyer, 2016). It also assumes that religious

organizations are in competition with other organizations from both the same and different faith traditions (Iyer, 2018).[2] Authoritarianism scholars study the characteristics of authoritarian regimes explaining how democracies and authoritarian regimes transition as well as explicating the similarities and differences (Levitsky & Way, 2002; Gandhi, 2008; Svolik, 2012). Together these three literatures provide insights into why state actors would cooperate with FBOs.

On one hand, the state has a lot to gain if it cooperates with FBOs. First, an official state religion can provide the state with legitimacy and moral authority that comes from an ancient tradition with rich spiritual symbols and holy rituals. This favored religious organization can give the regime moral gravity and authority (Johnston & Figa, 1988; Koesel, 2017; Toft et al, 2011). Second, the strengthening of a central religion associated with a country's glorious past, like the Russian or Ottoman empires, can instill national pride and create a nationalistic ideology in the population that could mobilize the country into new development projects or military interventions (Kinvall, 2004; Woo-Cumings, 1999). Third, a state that can cooperate with religious organizations could have access to the strong social networks that religious organizations command so as to secure votes (Weitz-Shapiro, 2014; Wuthnow & Evans, 2002). Especially in hybrid regimes or semi-authoritarian contexts, a new party can quickly gain control of the reigns of power by means of the religious vote. Fourth, faith-based organizations provide both religious and non-religious services that cover the gamut from education, food distribution, health, child care, and employment etc (Iyer, 2018). By strengthening and coordinating the work

[2] The economics of religion perspective focuses on the competitiveness of the domestic religion marketplace of a country. Depending on the demographic-religious makeup of a country and the history of state repression against religion, the religious marketplace would be more or less competitive. A country like India that has a large diversity of religions and minorities should have a more vibrant marketplace than a country that has only one religion without any divisions within that religion.

of faith-based organizations, regimes could better provide services for its people and take some credit for improving the material and educational status of its people.

On the other hand, state-religion cooperation brings lots of serious risks. First, by cooperating with FBOs and perhaps by giving these organizations state resources and endorsement, the state is strengthening religion, a source of moral authority that throughout history has challenged governments (Koesel, 2014). That is, the state's cooperation with religious organizations can backfire because cooperation leads to strengthening of religion and stronger religious leaders could ally with the regime's opposition if the relationship loses its value. Religions have the symbolic and moral authority to mobilize rebellion (Read, 1979). Second, in order to gain the legitimacy offered by a historically central religion, the state does not have to cooperate; it can coopt the religious organizations instead (Koesel, 2017). Third, by cooperating with one religion and not all religions, the state would most likely have to repress other religious organizations, an action that is costly (Sarkissian, 2015).

Utilizing a comparative historical approach to trace historical variation over time, this study will build upon and expand the work on authoritarianism and religion begun by Koesel (2014) and Sarkissian (2015). Koesel (2014) develops an interest-based model for understanding why the state cooperates or conflicts with religious organizations in China and Russia. Koesel makes rational actor assumptions that downplay the networks and more complex relationships that state and faith actors share. Sarkissian (2015) examines the amount and types of repression observed in sixteen different authoritarian countries. By focusing on such a large number of cases, Sarkissian misses some of the nuances that an in-depth focus on two cases misses. My

contribution is to process trace the critical factors in history that allows for critical junctures and changes from no cooperation to cooperation or vice versa.

Research Design and Preliminary Hypotheses

My research design consists of applying comparative historical analysis (Mahoney & Rueschemeyer, 2003) to a two country case study of Turkey and Russia since they have somewhat similar trajectories.[3] These countries are chosen because they were both founded as secular nation-states that replaced large empires. Both countries experienced cycles of secularism and religious resurgence over the past century. These states have at various times in history exhibited a "repressing most by favoring one" approach in which the state allies with a majority "state religion" and represses all the rest (Sarkissian, 2015). My countries provide within-case variation over historical time in terms of cooperation and non-cooperation. The time period of study will be 1918-2018, basically from World War I to now. Such a large window will allow more observations and more variation in terms of cooperation and non-cooperation. World War I is a natural starting point because both countries were founded soon after the collapse of the Russian and Ottoman empires subsequent to the war's end.

The main outcome variable of interest is cooperation between regime and religion which can vary over time within the same country. At one moment in time, a state can cooperate with a FBO and later it can switch to non-cooperation. Coding cooperation will happen at the FBO level and cooperation is counted only when certain conditions are met. First, the state needs to be

[3] This study employs Mill's most similar systems design where the outcome (cooperation between religion and regime) varies over time with-in the cases. Indonesia is another possible shadow case or full case to employ to add more observations. Like Russia and Turkey, Indonesia shows the variation in cooperation and non-cooperation at different times in history, and it was founded as a secular state despite having a large religious population.

substantially strong; this study will exclude cases where states are weak.[4] Second, there needs to be evidence that state representatives or bureaucrats are supportive of a faith-based organization by providing subsidies or other benefits. My operationalization of "cooperation" leaves room for both state co-option of religion and religious cooption of the state (Koesel, 2017). Cooperation often is not equal as one side tries to dominate the other to use it resources and advantages.[5] The type of cooperation may change over time depending on the relative strengths of religion vis-a-vis the state.

Figure 1: Variation in Dependent Variable in Cases of Russia and Turkey

	Turkey	**Russia**
Cooperation	1950-1960 1970-1980; 1989-1997 2002-2018	1997-2018 1941-1959
Non-Cooperation	1924-1950 1960-1970 1982-1989 1997-2002	1922-1941 1959-1997

There are several possible domestic-level variables which might explain why a state or party might cooperate at different times in history. First, "religious competition" between FBOs is another possible variable that the economy of religion literature discusses.[6] Increased religious competition can result in increased fundamentalism and polarization especially in areas where

[4] In those cases, the state does not have many options and so the state's alliance is more out of necessity than choice in those cases. More interesting here are cases where the state has options and chooses nonetheless to ally with religion.
[5] Also the regime can cooperate with one religious organization but not another. Furthermore, cooperation does not mean the absence of state repression of *all* religion, it just means that the state is *not* repressing the FBO with which it is cooperating.
[6] In this literature, FBOs are viewed as firms that are competing with other religious firms. The more competition there is, the more the FBOs have to differentiate their religious services, nonreligious services, and their marketing messages.

there are a diverse set of religions because the FBOs feel the need to "innovate" their messages in order to stay competitive (Iyer 2018, 71-72). Iyer suggests that the religious competition variable can be one channel by which economic inequality in a country can lead to increase conflict between religious communities (Iyer 2018, 181). Second, state capacity, measured by the per capita tax revenue extracted by the government (Dincecco & Katz, 2014), matters because richer, more efficient bureaucratic states will not need to rely on the social networks and social welfare provision services of FBOs as much. So, for instance, we see weaker states in Africa rely on religious organizations for social networks and foreign donations (Sarkissian, 2015; Nitsan Chorev in office hours). But richer, more efficient states often have their own sources of capital generation and welfare provision which would replace any need to rely on the socio-economic benefits that FBOs could provide. In the same way, when Turkey and Russia have more state capacity, we might predict that those periods are the time when they do not cooperate as much. Third, the amount of electoral competition also matters (Sarkissian, 2015). A state with a heavier authoritarian grip on the reigns of power will be able to repress religion more easily and will be less likely to need or to want to ally with religion.[7]

Other important possible explanations include an actor-level explanation that examines the personal networks of political actors. A political actor who has a social network with a high percentage of religious believers might be more inclined to form alliances with a FBO (Nelson, 2014). The shared religious beliefs or religious background/training could explain why there might be cooperation. An international-level argument could be made based upon the timing of US alliances with religious groups as a weapon against the atheist Soviet Union during the Cold

[7] Saudi Arabia and China can repress religion perhaps because the governments are so powerful. But interestingly, the Saudi state both represses religion and allies with religion, while China doesn't ally with religion but straight out represses most FBOs.

War (Kirby, 2002). In addition, the US used religious rhetoric and propaganda to frame the US as the moral crusader against the Soviet Union might have created a ripple effect through transnational networks and set off a religious resurgence in countries around the world in the 1980's (Cull, 2008).

Case Study 1: Religious Resurgence in Turkey

This section examines the deeply contested topic of religious resurgence in the case of Turkey by surveying major scholarly works in Turkish Studies to highlight future research agendas. There is no consensus on how to evaluate religious resurgence in Turkey since historical narratives about Atatürk's secular state-building project and the role of socio-religious civil society groups are debated. One group of scholars view the Turkish religious revival as a grassroots movement "from below" (Yavuz 2003; Karpov 2010; Akturk 2017). From this perspective, the Kemalist secularization project envisioned by Atatürk and his elite successors failed to completely penetrate Turkey's traditional rural society and were unable to create a new value system for Turkey's large agricultural society (Yavuz 2003: 4). However, as Başkan (2014) argues, the Turkish movement was not like the religious grassroots revolutions of Egypt or Iran since Atatürk's state-building project severely weakened an independent religious civil society by incorporating religious institutions into the state apparatus. Another group of scholars see the resurgence as a "disillusionment with the national elites" and a "reaction to the stresses of modernization" (Casanova 1994, Yavuz 2003, quoted in Başkan 2014). Although the argument suggests that the state secularization project failed, this view remains limited by failing to

recognize that religious institutions were incorporated into the state and religious groups and also political institutions were fundamentally transformed.

When Atatürk founded the Republic of Turkey in 1923, after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, he implemented a series of policy changes that deeply affected the role of Islam in the newly established society and dramatically reshaped religious practices in Turkey. Contrary to some oversimplifying accounts suggesting that Atatürk merely repressed religion, Atatürk actually tried both to establish firm control over it and reshape religion to make it more compatible with a secular state (Başkan 2014). On one hand, Atatürk's religious reforms can be seen as restricting religious practice as he abolished the caliphate, eliminated religion from the public sphere, outlawed the wearing of overtly religious clothing, shut down the Sufi religious organizations (cemaats) and lodges (tarikaats), and closed down religious schools (Yavuz 2003: 5). On the other hand, some of Atatürk's reforms "merged the religious institutions with the state apparatus" (Başkan 2014) so that the state could shape the creation of a new type of religious experience because he symbolically changed the Turkish alphabet from Arabic script to Latin script and the language of the call-to-prayer (Adhan or ezan) in all Turkish mosques from Arabic to Turkish (1932-1950), created the ministry of religion (Diyanet) to control the everyday expression of Islam, made religious leaders government employees, and ordered the first translation of the Qur'an from Arabic into Turkish to make it accessible to practicing Muslims (Wilson 2009; Zurcher 2004; Akturk 2012). Overall, he replaced the religious institutions of the Ottoman Empire with hybrid secular-religious institutions which operated under more Westernizing principles that derived from the ideals of positivism and Enlightenment-based rationality (Zürcher 2014: 238).

The many traditional socio-religious civil society groups that had operated in the Ottoman Empire were forced to go underground or reinvent themselves as different types of organizations. Although they continued to be important centers for communal meeting for Turks, they were quite weakened. The Nakşibendi Sufi Order, especially its Khalidiya lodge that was the most politically active socio-religious group in Turkey, became a model for subsequent Turkish Islamic movements and helped to form a Turkish Islamic identity to counter the Kemalist secular Turkish identity (Yavuz 2003). Although some religious leaders met with their disciples and believers in the privacy of their own homes, the civil society networks that were operating without the permission of the Diyanet ministry were severely weakened (Başkan 2014). Starting in the 1970's, the Islamic anti-secular movement gained momentum and a series of Islamic political parties were formed, the first of which was the National Order Party founded by Necmettin Erbakan who initially created a social movement called "Milli Görüş" (National Vision).[8] Erbakan published a manifesto of the same name, which called for turning away from an imitation of Western values and policies like secularism and a return to the moral and spiritual strength of Islam (Yavuz 2003). He also founded a series of parties which were shut down by the government for violating the state's secularism laws that required the separating of religion from the public sphere.

The Turkish religious resurgence, unlike other more radical movements in the Middle East, has been often classified as a "quiet" or "gradual" revolution or "Islamization-by-stealth" because coalitions and social organizations slowly and steadily built their support networks in launching a gradual revolution which culminated in the present Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi

[8] The five Islamic parties are listed chronologically: 1. National Order Party (Millî Nizam Partisi, MNP): 1970-1971 2. National Salvation Party (*Millî Selâmet Partisi*, MSP) 1972-1981 3. Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, RP)1983-1998 4. Virtue Party (Fazilet Partisi, FP) 1997-2001 5. Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi,* AKP) 2001-present.

(AKP, The Party of Democracy and Development) (Atasoy 2009: 3). The Islamic AKP government, Erdoğan's right-wing party, was the fifth of Islamic parties that finally won enough votes to gain power in 2002. The current AKP government has implemented a number of desecularizing policies which have undone many of the Kemalist secular policies. These changes include, but are not limited to, undoing the law prohibiting the wearing of the headscarf in public institutions in 2013, increasing the number of religious Imam Hatip schools, changing the national educational curriculum to include the mandatory teaching of religion, and increasing the restrictions on alcohol (Kaya 2015; Lüküslü 2016; Kandiyoti & Emanet 2017; Alimen 2018).

To sum up, the Turkish case suggests two broad conclusions about religious resurgence. First, it provides evidence against the modernization and secularization thesis that economic growth results in the increase of secular policies. On the contrary, the economic liberalization and growth of Turkey's middle class, a process begun in the 1980's and continuing under Erdoğan's party, has brought about the increase in the prominence of religion in the public sphere (Yavuz 2003). Second, the Turkish case shows that trying to classify religious movements as "top down" or "bottom up" is tricky because Turkey's movement had elements of both. On one hand, since Atatürk incorporated religious institutions under the control of the state, he institutionalized religious practice, albeit in a more modern-defined way, at the national level (in a top down fashion). On the other hand, the Islamic parties and the religious political movements like "National Vision" and the Nur movement had grassroots support. Nevertheless, religious resurgence in Turkey requires future research that tries to separate outdated theoretical assumptions and one-sided political bias from the analysis.

Case Study 2: Religious Resurgence in Russia

This section investigates the Russian case of religious resurgence represented in the Slavic Studies scholarship to illustrate an alternative path towards desecularization that contrasts with the Turkish case. Scholars demonstrate general consensus that Russia's resurgence after the collapse of the Soviet Union was mostly a top-down state-driven process. Furthermore, the available survey data seems to confirm that grassroots religious civil society was severely destroyed during the Communist period (Howard 2003; Evans et al, 2016). However, I argue that mainstream accounts of religious resurgence in Russia require a better examination to explicate the cases of grassroots religious organization to balance the top-down portrayal.

In 1922, after the founding of the Soviet Union, Lenin began a campaign against the Russian Orthodox Church by closing down monasteries and churches, killing some clergy, and exiling other clergy to labor camps in Siberia (Karpov 2013; Koesel 2014). This anti-religion policy is generally seen to have aligned with the communist ideology that views religion as the "opium of the people" and a conservative and backward social force (Marshall et al 1971: 45-46). He also established anti-religious organizations such as the League of Militant Atheists and the Society of the Godless to root out religion at the grassroots level. Stalin temporarily suspended the anti-religious policy starting in 1941 by to encourage religious-patriotic sentiment to rally against the Nazis in Germany. However, the policy was renewed after Stalin's death in 1953 and lasted until Gorbachev's *perestroika* in 1986 when official state policy towards religion thawed (Karpov 2010, 2013; Koesel 2014).

Before the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Gorbachev turned to the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) as a moral and material source of support for the implementation of his

glasnost and perestroika policies. Gorbachev brought the ROC back in the public sphere in 1986 with the public celebration of the millennium baptism of medieval Rus' and the ringing of the church bells during the Bolshoi Theater's gala (Koesel 2014: 33). Gorbachev's more supportive church policies continued after the collapse and under Yeltsin's presidency. The 1993 Constitution undid the persecution of public religion by guaranteeing religious freedoms and promoting equality among religious faiths as well as separating church and state (Koesel 2014). Russia's religious resurgence is coded as a "top down" social movement orchestrated by the secular and religious elites, whose interests aligned at the end of Soviet period and beginning of the Russian Federation period (Karpov 2013). In the early 1990's, the interests of the secular and religious elites aligned as Yeltsin and Putin needed a new ideology to replace the discredited communist totalitarian ideology (Karpov 2013). The ROC clergy also preferred to keep their historically dominant position as Russia's official religion and cultural treasure. Additionally, the leaders of the Russian Orthodox Church (ROC) faced a new threat from an open religious market with religious competitors especially the evangelicizing Protestants who would challenge the *de facto* monopoly that the ROC held during Communism when they were officially coopted by the Politburo. The Russian Orthodox clergy and high-ranking religious leaders who were coopted during communist times continued in a similar arrangement under the Putin regime (Karpov 2013).

Karpov proposes that four main components of the political ideology that Putin synthesized from Orthodoxy are nationalism, anti-democratism, ethnodoxy, and religious intolerance. The ideology combines the notion of being Russian Orthodox with the notion of being Russian. In other words, in the imagination of this ideology, a citizen can not be of another

religion and claim to be Russian. Russian-ness is dependent on being Orthodox because ethnodoxy fuses religion and ethnic identities. However, one of the biggest puzzles that this scholarship tries to explain is the high self-affiliation as Orthodox despite low church attendance rates. While 80 percent of Russians self-identify as Orthodox believers, attendance once a month or more is only about 10 percent (Stepaniants, 2017). According to Karpov, four major factors that account for these low levels of grass-roots civil society mobilization are low rate of participation in organized religion, underdeveloped civil society, lack of financial resources to fund civil society movements, and crackdowns on civil society from above (Karpov 2013: 8). By welding religious identity and sentiment to Russian nationalism, the secular elites have strengthened Russian nationalistic ideology and created a more virulent creed that justifies expansionism and intolerance against other religions.

The religious revival can also be observed in the changes to the Russian education system. In the early 1990's, the ROC increased the number of private religious institutions such as Orthodox high schools, seminaries, and Sunday schools to promote religious education with an aim to strengthen their Russian identity (Lisovskaya & Karpov 2010). In 1992, the ROC proposed optional religious lessons to be taught in public schools and put pressure to desecularize the schools. Consequently, most schools taught Orthodox religious lessons by 1997. In 1999, the ROC also established an official partnership with the Ministry of Education for introducing religion officially in the public curriculum (Lisovskaya & Karpov 2010: 289). In 2002, the Ministry of Education announced the creation of the Foundations of Orthodox Culture lessons in all state schools.

The Russian case is mostly a top-down movement in which the spiritual revitalization of the country happened officially at the highest echelons. However, there were still religious activities taking place from below although most of the public reorientation happened from above. Therefore, future research should aim to create a more balanced picture of how greater religiosity of the mass public can reinforce the ideological hegemony of the country can support foreign policy choices. For instance, grass-roots nationalism in Russia that fuses religious and national identity is used to create greater sense of patriotism and support of aggressive military interventions like in the case of Ukraine and Georgia (Laruelle, 2009). Although some work has been done on religious nationalism in foreign policy (Blitt 2011), greater theorizing is needed to understand the relationship between religious resurgence, authoritarianism, and military intervention through neo-imperialistic foreign policies.

The Russian case exemplifies how religious nationalism can facilitate more aggressive foreign policy positions. The ROC has unprecedented access to both the state education and military institutions by having privileges to affect curricula, the administration of training, and religious practices in previously secular areas.[1] An important component of Russia's political ideology is the notion of "spiritual security," or the utilizing the rich history and legacy of the Russian Orthodox faith as a bulwark against the foreign religious and moralistic ideologies represented by Protestant or Catholic versions of Christianity as well as by the Western capitalistic materialist moral perspectives. In 2007, Putin made a public statement where he stated that Russia's traditional religions were just as important as its nuclear shield for its national security (Interfaks, 2007 quoted in Karpov 2013). As we have already seen, religion can offer legitimacy and moral authority as an ideology that can bolster a country's nationalism.

Another aspect of "spiritual security" is the notion of "spiritual development" or "security through development which was first discussed in Putin's 2000 *National Security Concept for the Russian Federation* document.

Blitt (2011) argues that the fusion of politics and religion in Putin's Russia has grave implications for its conduct of international security policies, which he calls "Russia's Orthodox Foreign Policy." The Russian Orthodox Church cares about Russia's foreign policy because of the millions of Orthodox faithful living in Russia's bordering countries and former Soviet bloc states. As a leading voice in the Orthodox world, the Moscow Patriarchate of the ROC, sees itself as having responsibility for and spiritual authority over the Orthodox believers in Eastern Europe and the Balkans. The Department of External Church Relations (DECR) is a de facto foreign ministry responsible for diplomatic relations with foreign governments and international organizations that affect the spiritual lives of Orthodox populations in other countries (Blitt 2011: 366). Putin has increased the symbolic dimension of the state-church connection by participating in state religious holidays like Easter, Epiphany, and Christmas, visiting important Orthodox shrines such as Mount Athos, and having Orthodox priests bless military jets and munitions.

In October 2018, the Ukrainian President Petro Poroshenko asked that the Patriarch Bartholomew I of Constantinople grant the Ukrainian Orthodox Church autonomy (autocephaly) from the Russian Orthodox Church. Poroshenko called autocephaly "an issue of Ukrainian national security" (The Guardian 2018). Kiev and Ukraine as a whole can be thought of as sacred territory (Torbakov 2018) for both the Ukrainian and Russian states since Kiev remains as the birthplace of the ROC. Materially speaking, the decision means that thousands of churches

have technically switched jurisdiction from the Moscow Patriarchate to the Kievan Patriarchate, a move which will cost the Moscow Patriarchate a large loss in property and liturgical-related rents. ROC Patriarchate Kirill referred to the notion of Holy Rus' (referring to Kievan Rus' in modern-day Ukraine) many times in his speeches since 2010 (Suslov, 2014). Additionally, the notion of "Russian World" (*Russkii Mir*), which is a prominent ideological theme utilized in Russian state propaganda has been essential in creating an image of Ukraine and other borderlands as part of the Russian cultural and Orthodox sphere.[9]

This Russian case poses some critical questions that have implications for foreign policy. How much was the implementation of this top-down religious resurgence, which was started by Gorbachev and Yeltsin but really nurtured and perfected under Putin, a conscientious choice for Putin to strengthen his bargaining position vis-a-vis the West? If, according to Toft's (2007) *religious outbidding* explanation and Zellman's (2015) framing work, religion can be used for binding one's hands and increasing the domestic audience costs of backing down, then how much was this top-down engineered religious resurgence an instrumental choice of a calculating political virtuoso or an outgrowth of Putin's personal religious belief system?

Some Preliminary Conclusions: Religious Resurgence Generally in Political Science

This section offers a theoretically analytical overview of the main approaches to the notion of "religious resurgence" as treated in political science to point to future research opportunities. I propose a definition of the term, explain two different theoretical approaches to resurgence, and briefly highlight the theories explicating the causes and consequences of it.

[9] Presentation by Sofia Tipaldou at ASEEES 2018.

Various synonyms of "religious resurgence" used in the literature are religious revival, religious awakening, return of religion, desecularization, and counter-secularization. Religious resurgence can be viewed as a type of "large-scale culture shift" or social revolution that takes place in a particular country or around the world (Inglehart 1990). Since "religion" itself is a multi-dimensional concept religious resurgence possibly manifests itself in different ways such as religious norms incorporated into formerly secularized institutions, increase in religious beliefs and practices, religious displays and symbols observed in the public sphere, and religious displays in cultural expression (Karpov 2013: 3).

The majority of scholarly works on religious resurgence in political science has been dominated by the theoretical assumptions of the secularization thesis which predicts that religion should decrease with industrialization and modernization processes. Even the question – "What explains the global rise of religion?" – assumes that religion should be disappearing and not re-appearing (Başkan 2014). According to scholarship dominated by this theoretical approach (Thomas 2005; Karpov 2010), resurgence is viewed as opposite of secularization, and resurgence and secularization are seen as *opposing* and *antithetical* social trends. This perspective takes "religious" and "secular" as rather self-evident and straight-forward. Furthermore, every religious resurgence follows a period of religious repression or secularization.[2] Resurgence and its anti-thesis, secularization, are not mere indifferent forces in history but rather processes driven by concrete political and social actors who promotes secular or religious ideologies for the achievement of their political or economic goals. Religious resurgences are said to implemented "from above" when secular elites and/or religious elites decide to adopt desecularizing policies that increase religious norms, beliefs, and practices, while a resurgence "from below" is

orchestrated by grass-roots level civil society actors (Karpov 2010). A second more critical perspective, derived from the recognition that "religious" and "secular" are socially constructed, views religious resurgence as "a series of challenges to fundamental authoritative settlements involving the line between and the content of the religious and the secular" (Hurd 2007: 661-662). Based on a Constructivist theoretical approach, Hurd argues that Western categories of sacred and profane do not always match the same notions of these categories in other countries and cultures. Göle (1997), for instance, writes from this perspective when she describes the religious resurgence in Turkey as a cultural and social conflict between Republican elites (who embraced secular Western ways) and Islamists for control of the habitus, cultural codes and everyday lifestyles. A religious resurgence from this perspective is evident when there is a fierce cultural conflict involving the proper place in public social life of sacred or profane symbols and discourses. In addition to different perspectives on how to theoretically approach "religious resurgence," there are also different theories explaining its causes.

The first theory points to a decline in economic and social indicators leading to religious resurgence. This argument is basically the inverse of the secularization thesis. According to this notion, if economic and social development leads to less religious belief and practice, then the inverse causes a decrease in economic and social development, which also leads to *more* religious belief and practice. That is, a country's citizenry would turn to religion if economic and social development is poor. However, a large amount of evidence from the past two decades has seriously called this thesis into question (Kaufmann 2010; Stark 1999; Willard & Cingl, 2017; Inglehart & Norris 2004). For instance, Berger (1999: 17), originally a proponent of the secularization hypothesis, reversed position and stated, "the assumption that we live in a

secularized world is false. The world today […] is as furiously religious as it ever was, and in some places more so than ever. This means that a whole body of literature by historians and social scientists loosely labelled 'secularization theory' is essentially mistaken." The Norris & Inglehart (2004) variation on this secularization thesis points out a positive correlation between existential insecurity and religious belief and practice. Namely, if the average citizen of a country is more insecure than they will most likely also be more religious than the average citizen of a more secure country. Another theory suggests that religious symbols, norms, and cultures are often utilized in nation-building or regime legitimizing public relations campaigns by political elites (Johnston & Figa, 1988; Koesel, 2017; Toft et al, 2011). Political elites will sometimes incorporate religious beliefs and practices into their political ideologies which brings about a type of desecularization or religious resurgence from the "top down." A corollary of this theory is that we often see a top-down religious resurgence at the same time that we see an authoritarian turn or a reversal of democratization trends (Koesel 2014, 2017).

The biggest room for future research exists for theorizing why religious resurgence matters. Most of the theories take its consequences for granted without scrutinizing the underlying assumptions. For example, Huntington (1993, 1996) suggests that there would be a "clash of civilizations" in which religious and ethnic identities would be the source of the conflicts. However, this theory does not spell out exactly in a convincing fashion with empirical evidence why this would be the case. One new area for research, that I hope to explore in the future, is the way that religious nationalism, more widely used in state ideologies by secular elites, influences state foreign policies and contributes to more aggressive military interventions.

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