

Modern Greece: Self-Determination Becomes a Justification for Statehood

The Greek Revolution of the 1820s has long appeared a precedent-setting case of nationalist mobilization given the resulting birth of modern Greece – the world’s first state recognized for a particular people. Through attention to key events and developments in the southern Balkan peninsula prior to and during the war, this paper challenges predominant assumptions of the conflict as a nationalist, or even ethno-religious, insurgency. The irony of the world’s first state recognized for a particular people is further underscored: that it owed more to the great powers than to the Greeks themselves.

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This paper is a draft chapter of a book tentatively entitled *International Politics and the Global Odyssey of the Nation-State Concept*. The book introduces the now sizeable body of recent historical research on empires to multi-case studies of state proliferation as well as international relations work on international order. Not well known across the social sciences, this nuanced historical research allows for consideration of the often contingent and situational nature of ethno-religious and/or national identification in ways that earlier historical work, often marked by assumptions of the power of nationalism, did not. My book focuses on the interaction of activists and great powers in the emergence of new states in the Americas, Balkans, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Middle East (the major waves of proliferation after the initial wave in western and northern Europe). A bibliography can be made available on request.

Greece's reemergence was a precedent-setting event: the first instance of the great powers linking sovereignty with a specific population.¹ The country's birth inaugurated self-determination as a basis of statehood, setting a precedent for new states not recognized solely according to the modern principles of *de facto* independence and/or *uti possidetis*. Greece would be established for the Greeks – though the 1830 London Protocol recognizing frontiers and political features affirmed the new state's multi-confessional and ethnically diverse character.² Less well known is the inaugural use of population transfer as a form of conflict resolution through enhancing ethno-religious separation. French troops oversaw the move of about 2,500 Muslims transferred to Smyrna via French ships in November 1828 to reduce chances of further massacre, “inaugurating a state practice that would become as common as it was tragic throughout the nineteenth century.”³

With the recognition of Greece, the great powers underscored the idea of aligning territory and demography to an unprecedented degree. Nationalist or ethno-religious mobilization would then seem essential, if not the predominant force, for Greece's birth. Jennifer Mitzen accordingly characterizes the initial uprisings of 1821-22 as a nationalist revolt – since the rebels framed their demands with reference to their self-identification as Greeks.⁴ Mikulas Fabry claims that the primary basis of Greece's recognition owed to a people freeing themselves, namely *de facto* independence, in his study of modern state recognition practices.⁵ Even Stathis Kalyvas categorizes this complex mosaic of a conflict as secessionist and ethnic (including religious divisions),⁶ or as a nationalist insurgency.⁷

Yet, as Kalyvas's overview of the conflict indicates,⁸ these characterizations sit uneasily with closer consideration of events. Greek expatriate activists and Philhellenes were the main actors advancing recognition of a nation-state centered on the reconstruction of Ancient Hellas,⁹ even though the territory at issue was a world away. The incipient Greece was, after all, a small, isolated area of the Ottoman Empire populated mostly by illiterate

¹ Weitz 2008: 1317; Mitzen 2013: 144

² Weitz 2008: 1317

³ Rodogno 2012: 86

⁴ Mitzen 2013: 143

⁵ Fabry 2010: 98

⁶ Kalyvas 2011: 207

⁷ Kalyvas 2015: 23

⁸ Kalyvas 2015: 15-31

⁹ St. Clair 2008: 22. Indigenous Greeks had some influence in shaping Philhellene discourse (Gourgouris 1996: 141).

Christian peasants.¹⁰ Prior to the conflict, most inhabitants' primary source of identification lied with their local community and kinship networks with little awareness of Greek nationality.¹¹ Though insurgents possessed multiple objectives and interests,¹² a key goal among local rebel leaders was to oust their Ottoman overlords and make themselves rulers, mimicking the powers of the already-existing warlords controlling large areas of Ottoman territory.¹³ Local appeals to the nation-state idea and efforts to appear as a state in the making largely reflected an understanding of how to best court external forces.¹⁴

While parts of the incipient Greece were already autonomous, a closer look at the uprising(s) does not neatly figure into existing assumptions of nationalist/ethnoreligious revolt or the pre-existence of a Greek people – or Philip Roeder's claim that a sub-state administrations matter greatly for states in-the-making.¹⁵ Though the idea of modern Greece existed as a cultural construct,¹⁶ the Greek people were then what Stathis Gourgouris labels a 'dream nation' rather than an actually-existing society.¹⁷ Networks of competing interests made up the incipient state with the potential for fracturing during the 1820s conflicts.¹⁸ Rebel fractiousness was an additional impediment for the development of *de facto* statehood,¹⁹ with Western-trained troops making up only a fraction of fighting forces composed of sizeable bands featuring former paramilitary police forces, armed peasants, and former bandits.²⁰ Nor did Greece's eventual borders match the territorial endpoints of indigenous insurrection. British military and naval commanders played a key role in the acquisition of more territory than the local forces occupied, or that powers had initially

¹⁰ The population of the Peloponnese in 1821, an area comprising roughly half of the incipient Greek state, included about 40,000 Muslims and 350,000 Christians (figures from Gallant 2016: 41).

¹¹ Gallant 2016: 94

¹² Gallant 2016: 38

¹³ St. Clair 2008: 22, 95, 104; Dakin 1973: 88. Though the South American secessions were not preceded by similar uprisings, support for local and regional autonomy appeared among the less well off merchants and commoners (Adelman 2006: 365).

¹⁴ Dakin 1973: 315

¹⁵ Roeder 2007

¹⁶ Gourgouris 1996: 73

¹⁷ Gourgouris 1996, Gallant 2016: 84

¹⁸ Brewer 2001: 125, Dakin 1973: 160; Gallant claims that the first phase of the conflict appeared to be a civil war (206: 41).

¹⁹ Assumption of *de facto* statehood for Greece mentioned in Fabry 2010: 98

²⁰ Gallant 2016: 64

anticipated, challenging Fabry's assumption that participation in the insurrection largely determined the new state's borders.²¹

The Greek case shows substantial reliance on the great powers for the new state's birth. During the 1830 London Conference the great powers effectively created Greece, with a final settlement establishing a Greek Kingdom coming several months later but before negotiations over boundaries in July 1832.²² Scholars accordingly tend to describe Greece's realization as the unintended outcome of the intersection of European powers' interests,²³ or constitution as an international public power,²⁴ and agreement on the categorization of a disjointed array of conflicts as the 'Greek problem.' Another view assigns responsibility to the Greek activists, including the diplomat Count Ioannis Kapodistrias (Alexander I's joint foreign minister from 1816-22),²⁵ for utilizing and potentially even stimulating great power rivalries for the benefit of Greece – with local rivals generally disinclined to link the Greek cause with any single foreign power.²⁶

Yet, the European powers did not initially seek direct involvement in the 1821-22 uprisings. The rebels managed to hold their primary positions until 1825, before descending into internal conflict when the threat from Ottoman forces appeared to diminish. The stalemate ended when Sultan Mahmud II (1808-39) called on the modern and French-trained Egyptian forces to spearhead an invasion of the Peloponnese, complemented by Ottoman attacks to the north. Faced with certain defeat, local Greek leaders responded with an appeal to Britain to support Greece's independence. Confronted with the ongoing possibility of Russian intervention in support of the insurgents, Britain made an agreement with St. Petersburg in 1826 regarding status for Greece as an autonomous, albeit tributary, state with borders yet to be determined. London could then forestall increased Russian influence in the Mediterranean at a time when Russian forces were positioned on the Ottoman frontier,²⁷ while

²¹ Fabry 2010: 98. Nor does Mitzen consider British military assistance to the revolt and its subsequent implications for border recognition (2013: 176). Fleming notes French considerations of spurring uprisings among the Greeks "with the aim of creating a divisive and diversionary uprising in the very lands the French soon hoped to conquer" (1999: 90, 97-98).

²² Mitzen 2013, 172-173

²³ Bass 2008, Rendall 2000, Rodogno 2012: 88

²⁴ Mitzen 2013

²⁵ Though Kapodistrias was known as Iannis Capo D'Istria prior to his acceptance of the presidency of Greece, I adopt the anglicized version of his name for the sake of consistency.

²⁶ Latter point made by Dakin 1973: 157, 160.

²⁷ Positioning of Russian forces noted by St. Clair 2008: 315.

St. Petersburg could enhance its influence through the recognition of local autonomies (as it had for the Principalities and more limited autonomy for Serbia).

These goals explain, at least on the surface, why prospects for a Greek state only improved as the revolt lost its local inertia given increased fractiousness among the rebels, the absence of effective government, and all but certain defeat by Egyptian-Ottoman forces. But there is more to the story. Since major powers determined the international recognition of an area's independence and sovereignty, they held the power to shape nationalist discourse towards demonstrating the existence of a territorially-based, linguistically-defined nation.²⁸ Expatriate and Philhellene activists, actors possessing much greater contact with major intellectual trends in Western Europe than the indigenous Greeks, were the genuine promoters of making a Greek nation-state.²⁹ European governments lacked accurate information on the primary drivers of the revolt's outbreak, and tended to evaluate events within the frames of larger European policy while taking their respective national interests into consideration.³⁰ This confluence of incentives, events, and interpretations led the representatives of great powers to understand conflict drivers in a similar way – as part and parcel of the revolutions appearing on the continent³¹ – despite the mismatch between such categorization and a chaotic reality on the ground.³² Such thinking was understandable given that all European powers perceived liberal revolutions on the continent as a threat, with events in the Morea (encompassing most of the Peloponnese) and nearby then more easily appearing another liberal revolution.

Yet, major powers proved reluctant to recognize even a nominally independent Greece confined to a small area. Nor did all Greeks welcome recognition, signaled by the departure of many inhabitants from Greece to the Ottoman Empire shortly after the

²⁸ Gagnon 2004: 17

²⁹ Gallant notes the rebels' early effort to portray the conflict as religious, rejecting Ottoman tyranny over a Christian population, rather than as a national struggle linked to liberal ideals in the aftermath of the French Revolutionary wars (2016: 44). In a subsequent chapter on irredentism, Gallant claims that "the War of Independence had been fought on the ideal of liberation of all Greeks in the Ottoman Empire and their inclusion in the Greek nation state" (99).

³⁰ Latter points made by St. Clair 2008: 29-30.

³¹ Mitzen 2013: 105, 126; Rendall 2000; Woodhouse 1973: 115-116, 118, 126; St. Clair 2008: 30. Brewer details the initial reactions of each major power, with only Prussia clearly in support of collective action (2001: 107).

³² Gourgouris 1996: 73

new state's birth as well as during the second half of the 19th century.³³ Recognition of Greece occurred with minimal Greek involvement in the determination of key elements (i.e. borders, terms, timing), and with the decisions reflecting great power policy rather than local dynamics. None of the major powers acted with the intention to fulfill Greek interests,³⁴ instead prioritizing the powers' interests as well as the maintenance of the international order, with rebel forces instruments to use accordingly in the management of imperial competition. While potential existed for expatriate and Philhellene activism to have influenced the powers' understandings and actions,³⁵ the mixed British reaction to the fateful 1827 clash in Navarino Bay discussed below raises questions over whether ethical concerns regarding massacres of Greeks and rumors of mass Greek displacement mattered more than *realpolitik* for British policy towards the Greek cause – contra Kalyvas' claims of moral suasion's influence.³⁶ Motivations surrounding the activities of the London Greek Committee, a central British Philhellene association, were not clear cut. Though the Committee brought much public attention to the atrocities against the Greeks after its founding in March 1823, the diverse membership included few genuine philhellenes. Members instead tended to share an interest in reform and improvement, with the true philhellenes tending not to have much of any connection with the Committee.³⁷

After consideration of the context for the emergence of the uprisings, this chapter looks more closely at the details of the insurrection itself and shows why labeling as a nationalist or even ethno-religious insurgency vastly oversimplifies conditions on the ground and overemphasizes the nationalist narrative. A following section examines the nexus of the great powers' problem-framing and events on the ground, showing the powers' ironic role in the recognition of the first state linked with a particular people.

³³ Kumar 2017: 105

³⁴ Dakin 1973: 252-253. Schroeder claims that “Ever since 1824, Russia's main aim had not been to liberate the Greeks but to force Austria to accept Russian leadership of the Holy Alliance, Russian freedom of action within it, and Russian domination over the Porte and in the Balkans; and Canning, sometimes unthinkingly, but usually knowingly, had supported this anti-Austrian aim” (1994: 650).

³⁵ Less clear is whether the roughly 1,000 volunteer expatriate and Philhellene fighters affected the fighting.

³⁶ Kalyvas 2015: 32

³⁷ Woodhouse 1969: 80-81, 92. See St. Clair 2008 for considerable detail on the various waves of Philhellene volunteers during the conflict and their respective causes. Philhellenism in England, for example, was weak initially and then reached its apex in 1824 – the year of Byron's death.

The Context for the 'Greek Revolution'

Greeks had held the highest rank among the Ottoman Empire's non-Muslim population and had a reputation for economic success, holding key positions in trade, shipping and navigation, among other industries. Favorable conditions for Greek merchants and merchant ships emerged from opportunities provided by the French revolutionary and Napoleonic wars, and commerce-spurring treaties of Karowitz (1699), Küçük Kaynarca (1774), and Jassy (1792). From the 1770s to the outbreak of the uprisings, an extensive trading network of the Greek diaspora developed linking the Ottoman Balkans, Russia, and the eastern Mediterranean economies.³⁸ After the post-1815 global economic crisis, Greek merchant shipping declined nearly forty percent on average between 1815-1820 after Greek merchants could no longer derive handsome profits from the French blockade of Britain.³⁹ These developments affected much of the Balkan peninsula, with the Porte responding to conditions of near famine with a resentment-escalating tax increase.⁴⁰

For the Ottoman Empire, increased international engagement beginning in the 18th century contributed to the high status of the Phanariots – elite Greek-speakers owing their privileged position to service in the higher levels of the empire's administration and based in Constantinople's wealthy Phanar quarter. Located in the same quarter, the Christian Orthodox Patriarchate tended to be in Greek hands, with the Patriarch holding supreme authority over all Ottoman Orthodox Christians. The Patriarchate and the Phanariots, both intimately linked with Greek culture, tended to be loyal to the Ottoman regime given its continued support for their privileges. Yet, the Phanariots also possessed the potential to promote the varied interests of France, Russia, and Austria, particularly in the late 18th century.

Like other cases of Balkans-oriented nationalisms, the rise of modern Greek nationalism occurred more among the diaspora communities in Europe than in the Ottoman lands. The ideology of nationalism, after all, had only emerged in the late 18th century.⁴¹ Hellenist discourse drew a direct link between Europe's first civilization – the Greeks of

³⁸ Gallant 2016: 22

³⁹ Gallant 2016: 33

⁴⁰ Gallant 2016: 33

⁴¹ Kumar 2017: 28

classical antiquity – and then existing Greeks.⁴² While suggesting broader belief in rigid ethnoreligious categories, the concept of a Hellenic nation that emerged from the Greek Enlightenment was originally multiethnic.⁴³ Greek-speaking Vlachs, Slavs, Albanians, and Romanians could become Greek and rise to high positions, with ethnic labels often marking differences in the division of labor rather than ethnicity (i.e. merchants would tend to be assumed as Greek).⁴⁴ Only after the emergence of a modern Greek state would Greek national identity be linked exclusively to religion and language.⁴⁵

The 18th century witnessed weakening of the Ottoman Empire, long before the early 19th century uprisings. Key conflicts eroding the empire's strength included the 1787-91 Habsburg-Ottoman and 1768-1774 and 1787-92 Russo-Ottoman wars, not to mention Napoleon's 1798 invasion of Egypt. The French occupations of the Ionian islands, though under Venetian rule, also framed a context hospitable for destabilization. External challenges came from Austria, Russia, and Persia in light of Ottoman military decline associated with a reluctance to adapt to trends in military innovation linked to the deterioration of the janissaries.⁴⁶ The Janissary Corps was a once revered military caste that became a hereditary, self-propagating, and widely disliked element by the 18th century, eliciting self-interested and disorderly behavior that could be a catalyst for rebellion until Mahmud II abolished the corps in 1826. Ottoman weakness made it necessary to work more closely with European powers, with considerable efforts taken to adopt some European administrative and military technologies and practices.

The Empire's weakening and receding periphery facilitated increased independent action among the provincial notables (*ayans*), primarily wealthy landowners, or warlords – some in possession of their own private armies. The Porte had tended to leave in place local rulers with the potential to enhance Ottoman control in the hard to defend border regions, while making efforts to discourage the rise of regional strongmen in interior areas by

⁴² Jusdanis 2001: 111

⁴³ Mackridge 2009: 14

⁴⁴ Latter point made by Mackridge 2009: 56

⁴⁵ Mackridge 2009: 15

⁴⁶ Regarding Ottoman losses and internal changes of territorial control, Hungary, Transylvania, and Bukovina went to the Habsburgs, territorial area on the Black Sea to the Romanovs with protectorate status for Wallachia and Moldavia. Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, Egypt, Mesopotamia, Syria, and Arabia were largely independent.

relocating local lords to distant locales.⁴⁷ Revenue and influence had also passed onto into local hands, leaving many communities subject to the whims of local notables and other power-brokers in their enrichment through tax farming. Following the consolidation of some formerly independent communities into larger estates (*çiftlik*) that facilitated a share-cropping system through extralegal means, *çiftlik* holders tended to dominate their respective areas in political terms while employing armed guards to oversee peasants working the land, leaving at least a portion of the peasantry to witness a general decline in living conditions with political consequences (*çiftlik* holders tended to be Muslim and the peasants Christian).⁴⁸

Most famous and influential of the notables was Tependeleni Ali Paşa, the Ottoman-appointed governor of Ioannina from 1787-1820. Ali Paşa had gained control of much of the southern Balkan peninsula, including significant tracts of privately held land, over the course of several decades.⁴⁹ By the early 19th century, he had carved out a state-like entity featuring an army, treasury, and foreign policy.⁵⁰ Ali's regime, a setup that he eventually patterned according to European models, grew to surpass the strength of the Ottoman state, and gave Britain and France concern over engagement within the eastern Adriatic after the rise of their dominance in the Mediterranean.⁵¹ With the Ottoman Empire's weakening and European powers' consideration of its partition, Ali recognized possibilities for aligning partition plans with his own desires for secession.⁵²

Though delivering some improvements in living standards and increasingly operating independently of Ottoman policies,⁵³ Ali too faced challenges. Local resistance to Ali's hegemony came in the form of two revolts of 1807-08 in Thessaly and the Peloponnese, framed with reference to the recent episodes of rebellion in Serbia labelled 'the Serbian Revolution,' and facilitated by France's position in the Ionian Islands.⁵⁴ The rebels' goal was

⁴⁷ Burbank and Cooper 2010: 140, 147

⁴⁸ Jelavich 1997: 13-14. Gourgouris notes some contradictions in the literature on *çiftlik* production signaling that *çiftliks* may have made up only 15-18% of peasants' labor within the Greek lands and even less in the incipient Bulgaria (1996: 62-63).

⁴⁹ Latter point from Fleming 1999: 54-55. Ali Paşa shifted from serving the Ottoman regime to defying it openly and was executed in 1822. Britain, France, and Russia had tried unsuccessfully to bring Ali Paşa into their respective camps.

⁵⁰ Dakin 1955: 13 (cited in Fleming 1999: 78-79).

⁵¹ Fleming 1999: 18, 23, 33, 81, 118

⁵² Fleming 1999: 11

⁵³ Fleming 1999: 33, 39

⁵⁴ Stamatopoulos 2018: 11, 27

to end Ali's domination, gain more autonomy akin to what Serb rebels acquired, and restore legitimate Ottoman rule, though was quickly put down by Ali's two sons in control of the area.⁵⁵ These events followed the initial Greek revolt against the Ottomans in 1770, though agents of Catherine II had organized it.⁵⁶ Though the 1807-08 revolts held the potential to catalyze the subsequent uprisings,⁵⁷ Mahmud II's efforts to end Ali Paşa's control, a part of the sultan's overall campaign of undercutting all potentially independent entities, determined the timing of the 1821 Greek uprisings. Ottoman forces would be tied up in the effort to reign in Ali Paşa and thus less of a threat to the insurgents, while Greek activists' distrust of this wily ruler expressing interest in assisting the rebellion lessened the likelihood of mutual cooperation.⁵⁸ These events followed Mahmud's efforts to centralize power through the removal of all the strong notables and nearly all governors for the purpose of concentrating power, though initially leaving Ali Paşa in and his Egyptian counterpart Mehmet Ali in place.⁵⁹ The other likely catalyst for the timing of the uprising also demonstrated weak loyalty to the Greek cause: the 1821 January revolt in the Principalities, though more for social and agrarian reform against the local landowners and Phanariot administration than in support of a Hellenic campaign.⁶⁰

The Greek Revolution: A Mosaic of Actors, Motivations, and Events

A closer look at the *local* actors and events associated with the Greek Revolution raises patent doubts about the *predominant* role of nationalist or ethnoreligious mobilization, even for Kapodistrias.⁶¹ The Corfu native had, in fact, been the first secretary of the joint

⁵⁵ Stamatopoulos 2018: 11-13

⁵⁶ Jusdanis 2001: 73, Jelavich 1983: 69, 78

⁵⁷ Stamatopoulos 2018: 27

⁵⁸ Dakin 1972: 34, 36, 43; point about timing also in Jelavich 1997: 41 and Brewer 2001: 35. On the other hand, Gallant 2016: 35-36 and Fleming 1999: 157-158 (footnote 2) claim Mahmud's campaign was a specific response to Ali's efforts to mount an insurrection.

⁵⁹ Fleming 1999: 94 (footnote 58)

⁶⁰ Dakin 1972: 38

⁶¹ The following discussion of the early stages of the Greek Revolution draws from the essays in Clogg 1973; Clogg 2013; Dakin 1972; Dakin 1973; Jelavich 1983; Brewer 2001; Anscombe 2014. I draw primarily from these sources' points of agreement. When authors use 'Turks' to reference the Ottomans and their respective administration and associated military forces (Dakin and Brewer in particular), I replace 'Turks' with 'Ottomans' given that the Turkish element became more prominent only in the early 20th century. And while this book draws empirical evidence from Jelavich 1997 and Jelavich 1983, it does not adopt these texts' general tendency to often presume the existence of national groupness and to claim that mass national uprisings occurred in the Greek and Serbian cases (latter point made in Jelavich 1983: 335).

Russo-Ottoman Ionian Island protectorate – the Republic of the Seven Islands (Septinsular Republic) – founded in 1800 after Russia and the Ottomans expelled the French. In 1809, Kapodistrias entered the Russian foreign service after France regained control of the islands and remained at a distance from the Greek cause until an extended leave of absence from the Russian service beginning in 1822, and then election as Greece’s provisional president in 1827.

The internal history of the revolt mostly revolved around power struggles over the central authority with different factions courting particular European powers. Centralized government remained an idea existing primarily on paper up until April 1827. Groups formed at the outset of the revolt around the ‘primates’ (local leaders) and tended not to be associated with any official organization or political program. While major powers were in contact with various local actors prior to the uprisings, none backed the initial rebellions, with Russia’s Alexander I (1801-25) reversing his earlier absence of expressed objections to the uprising in the Principalities with denunciation at the 1820 Congress of Laibach (Ljubljana),⁶² a meeting in which European monarchs and their representatives considered possible foreign intervention against revolt the powers understood as revolutionary activity. The Congress followed a mutiny in Russia that inclined Alexander to be circumspect towards revolution.⁶³ The tsar believed the Greek revolt to be part of larger European conspiracy that threatened the status quo powers.⁶⁴ Later Alexander sanctioned the move of Ottoman forces into the Principalities.

Yet, only a segment of activists could be categorized as Greek nationalists. Higher-ranking Greeks tended to favor a centralized state they could control for their own personal benefit. The Greek elites – including the Phanariots, higher clergy, provincial notables, and wealthy merchants – had little reason to reject their comfortable positions in Ottoman society. Nor had non-elites planned to pursue the revolutionary change advocated by the Greek intelligentsia prioritizing educational and cultural regeneration in the first two decades of the 19th century, a part of which focused on the diaspora owing to the greater educational opportunities beyond the incipient Greece.

⁶² This meeting was to establish conditions for Habsburg intervention and occupation of the Two Sicilies to quell the July 1820 Neapolitan revolution, an agreement reached without British and French support.

⁶³ Mitzen 2013: 123

⁶⁴ Mitzen 2013: 125

Yet, once the revolt began, many indigenous Greeks as well as the Greek diaspora gave their support for varied reasons: the chaos and lawlessness related to Ottoman state weakness and misgovernment, desire for profit or other forms of gain – the seizure of land in particular, or respect for the Orthodox Church even with the Patriarch’s official denunciation of the rebellion. Other reasons included support for governance along Western European lines, a penchant for conspiratorial action, fears of the consequences of remaining aloof during the campaign, and identification with the Greek cause whether linked more with preserving Greek language and culture, or the regeneration of the Byzantine Empire.

The only fully developed political program came from the well-organized *Filiki Etairia* (the Friendly Society), the Greek revolutionary organization founded in 1814 by three poor Greek merchants in Odessa. *Filiki Etairia*’s was the singular organizational link between activism in the Principalities and the Peloponnese and Rumeli (southern mainland Greece), with the bulk of its early membership consisting of the less prosperous or failed merchants of the diaspora. The organization’s main goal served as a potential means to redeem their lower-class status: the creation of a Greek state with a capital at Constantinople, though more a reconstitution of the Byzantine Empire. After little success in the initial years, the organization grew mainly through the creation of linked secret cells, cultivating false assumptions of support from Russia – particularly Alexander I’s joint foreign minister Kapodistrias as well as the Patriarch, and in the transfer of the organization’s headquarters to Constantinople.

Beyond the examples provided by several Ottoman notables controlling sizeable territorial areas,⁶⁵ inspiration came from key contributor to the Greek Enlightenment Iosipos Moisiodax (1725-1800), and the two primary prophets of the Greek revolutionary cause: Adamantios Korais (1748-1833) and Rigas Velestinlis (1757-98). Both were influenced by the French Revolution, and particularly for Velestinlis, the French Revolutionary Wars. Korais, the inventor of modern Greek culture, was the leading Neohellenic thinker concerned with developing the Greek language in a way that would help construct a Neohellenic culture.⁶⁶ Through an effort to ‘purify’ written and spoken Greek of words of Slavic,

⁶⁵ St. Clair 2008: 22, 95, 104; Dakin 1973: 88

⁶⁶ Gourgouris 1996: 90-91

Venetian, and Ottoman origin and reintroduce forgotten classical terms,⁶⁷ Korais' pedagogical project was oriented toward constructing a national-cultural concept that did not yet exist,⁶⁸ and implemented only after the new Greek state's emergence in 1830. His Paris-based location meant that Korais was a witness to the French Revolution, but far removed from the local struggles leading up to the Greek revolt.

Velestinlis, on the other hand, had experience serving the Phanariot *hospodars* (princes) in the Danubian principalities with sojourns in Vienna in the 1790s.⁶⁹ A Hellenized Vlach and son of a merchant, Vestlinlis was an admirer of the 1796-97 campaigns of Napoleon in Italy as well as French arrival on, and annexation of, the Ionian Islands permeated by talk of liberation. Among the first to formulate plans for a revolt against the Porte, Velestinlis' primary grievance concerned arbitrary and oppressive government. His ideas about government included designs for establishing an egalitarian and inclusive Hellenic Republic encompassing all inhabitants of the Empire (including Muslims), though featuring Greek cultural predominance. The envisioned republic would possess a decentralized legislative order featuring bicameral provincial assemblies working with a centralized legislative body as well as an executive, with an independent judicial power featuring the election of judges. Vestinlis' egalitarian streak appeared in supporting a right to work, social assistance, and appeals for women's emancipation, including military service.⁷⁰ Such ideas were in clear contrast to the Ottoman order featuring a central executive power and the often independent-minded provincial notables.⁷¹

Before the revolt began, *Filiki Etairia* attempted to recruit a leader which led to consideration of Kapodistrias. In addition to his earlier position as first secretary of the

⁶⁷ Jelavich 1997: 269

⁶⁸ Gourgouris 1996: 118

⁶⁹ My discussion of Velestinlis derives from Dakin 1972: 20-22 and Clogg 2013: 28-29.

⁷⁰ Yet, Velestinlis' ideas about the organization of government did not have great effect on subsequent proposals for a constitution emerging during the revolt, some of which resembled elements of the Ottoman system.

⁷¹ Velestinlis' ideas became well-known in the Balkans thanks to the Vienna-based newspaper *Efimeris* serving its readers in the Balkans a mix of Greek patriotism and French revolutionary ideas in multiple languages, as well as the circulation of Velestinlis's revolutionary program, a constitution, a declaration of the rights of man, as well as a widely-sung martial hymn advocating for Christians in the Balkans to cast off their chains. A 1796 return visit to Vienna brought the publication of his well-known twelve part commemorative map primarily illustrating the Hellenic Republic's European sections. Velestinlis pursued his revolutionary program until he met his death in Belgrade in 1798 at Ottoman hands, betrayed by a fellow Greek, and succeeded by Greeks attempting to obtain French support for a revolution.

Septinsular Republic, Kapodistrias played a key role in the 1815 settlement at the Congress of Vienna recognizing nominal independence for the United States of the Ionian Islands – the Septinsular Republic’s successor – under British protection. Though the British administered the islands as a crown colony, the fiction of independence provided an example to other Greeks of very limited self-government. Kapodistrias in the end declined *Filiki Etairia*’s offer of leadership and advised against the revolt, preferring to wait until the next series of wars between the Ottomans and Russia when prospects would improve for gaining autonomy or status as a principality for at least some areas of Greek settlement.

Alexandros Ypsilantis, a Russian Army general and eldest son of a former Wallachian *hospodar*, instead accepted the leadership position and orchestrated the initial failed uprising. Ypsilantis debated between supporting a wider plan of Balkan cooperation or a more limited Hellenic campaign. He was less conflicted over the plan to take Constantinople by capturing the Ottoman fleet, an idea leaked to the Porte by the British ambassador; a plan that established the pretext for Ottoman revenge in the form of the April 1821 massacres. Ypsilantis’ weaknesses as a strategist and leader, perhaps owing to his youth and inexperience, contributed to the rise of other powerholders associated with the revolution, once it became clear that Russia had not and would not provide backing for the uprising. Existing authorities on the islands and the mainland proved reluctant to give up their prescriptive powers.

The revolt most likely began in Moldavia and soon met unfulfilled expectations:⁷² to attract supporters including non-Greeks on the way to the Greek lands as well as keep Ottoman forces at bay in areas requiring St. Petersburg’s consent for Ottoman troop deployment, or even possibly invite Ottoman reprisals featuring atrocities vicious enough to spur Russian intervention. Anti-Ottoman activists had a degree of protection since Russia had formed something of a protectorate over the Principalities in 1774, and after St. Petersburg’s influence increased significantly due to further concessions made in 1783-1802.⁷³ Differences in the forces driving revolt between the Principalities and the Greek lands explain why the

⁷² Debate continues to exist over the originally intended location: the Morea or the Principalities.

⁷³ See Davison 1976 on the varied interpretations of the all-important 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca shifting power to Russia and away from the Porte, and why the expansive view of Russia as the protector of the Ottoman Christians prevailed when the Treaty designated the Porte as the protector of the Ottoman Christians, though did provide St. Petersburg the right to represent Christians in the Principalities.

predicted outcomes did not appear. Landholding and tax issues motivated the peasants constituting the majority of society in Moldavia and Wallachia, while the local landowners (the boyars) and *Filiki Etairia* members possessed more nationally defined goals – with the non-Greek boyars more interested in reestablishing native rule than a Hellenic revival and many peasants deserting after their goals would clearly not be addressed.

Beyond rivalries among the *Etairia*'s leaders in the Principalities, another impediment to coordination came from the general dislike of the local population for the Phanariot-run regime and Greek culture having little influence outside of the towns. Ypsilantis' efforts to link up with Tudor Vladimirescu, the leader of the attempted uprising against the Principalities' Phanariot regime and landowners in January 1821 (but not the Sultan), also came to naught with Ypsilantis fleeing to Habsburg lands after defeat by Ottoman forces in June 1821 and later dying in exile from seven years of imprisonment.⁷⁴ Major Greek figures in the drive for independence faced equally immense difficulties in achieving intra-Greek cooperation. For the *Filiki Etairia* in particular there was the challenge of making an overwhelmingly rural, traditional society into a national body.

The insurgency in the incipient Greece, on the other hand, began with sporadic outbursts of violence in late March coinciding with Ypsilantis' trek towards Bucharest. The revolt owed much to already-existing autonomy with the notables and senior clergy,⁷⁵ island-based ship-owners, and military men constituting social classes with the potential for alliance or conflict. The latter were particularly important for constituting the military arm of the revolt and gained increasing power given the financial gain associated with the provision of fighting forces. Local Greek chieftans led armed bands fighting Ottoman forces since there was no general uprising or mass peasant movement, though many peasants joined in after the outset of the insurrection. The incipient Greece, particularly mountainous areas, held

⁷⁴ A participant in the first Serbian uprising and a wealthy man of peasant background, Vladimirescu pitched his 1821 uprising in the Principalities for social and land reform against the Phanariot administration as well as the boyars rather than the Ottomans. He also aimed to establish rule by a native governor and to convene an assembly featuring all classes, thus lacking connection with any Greek campaign. After several members of *Filiki Etairia* attempted to influence the timing and goal of Vladimirescu's rebellion to improve prospects for a Greek revolt, Vladimirescu visited Ypsilantis to ascertain Russian action and ended up passing information on the would-be Greek nationalist hero to the Ottomans when Vladimirescu was not satisfied with the information Ypsilantis provided.

⁷⁵ The notables, primarily wealthy landowners, had already held a considerable degree of local governing powers under Ottoman rule. Their opponents claimed that their ultimate aim was to use Greek forces to overturn Ottoman rule in their respective domains.

numerous armed bands featuring both bandits as well as irregular forces (*klephts* and *armatoloi*) forming a key part of the rebellion's armed forces.

Challenges to cohesive organization came not only from the differing goals and interests of various actors and their respective social classes, but also from their geographical dispersion: Greeks living on the islands, Rumeli and the Peloponnese as well as the diaspora Greeks and the Phanariots forced from Ottoman service – with the peoples of the varied regions tending to share a mutual dislike. Greek ship captains could also be tempted towards the lucrative business of privateering and piracy of Ottoman commercial vessels and occasionally ships from European countries, a situation matched by Greek land-based forces' temptations for plunder. For the Greek military forces, particularly in the Morea, the revolt provided opportunities for power, prestige, and independence that eroded their earlier subservience to the chieftans, and allowed control over the police forces, access to tax revenue, and resistance to obeying the civil government. This mosaic brought possibilities for shifting alignments on regional and class basis. Further complicating the picture were the significant personal and local rivalries that did not necessarily align with regional or class interests.

Under such circumstances, local conditions were not amenable for Greek self-determination. Centralized and effective government was not even on a distant horizon. While rebel forces managed to dominate much of the Peloponnese and put forth a constitution by late 1822, conditions for the Greek cause looked much grimmer by 1826 given the above-described complexity, the ensuing civil wars of 1824-25, and the imprisonment of Peloponnesian guerrilla leader Theodoros Kolokotronis. Defeat by Ottoman-Egyptian forces appeared imminent.

Greece Emerges: Great Power Problem-Framing and Weakening Rebellion

Following the French Revolution and the subsequent Napoleonic expansionism, the absolutist regimes feared potential internal threats such as nationalists and revolutionaries as much as territorially ambitious European powers. This followed the 1814-15 Congress of Vienna in which major powers of the time – Russia, Prussia, Austria, Britain, and a defeated France – agreed to something like a new European order to oversee the international system and potentially engage in collective action. This consent lasted formally for about five

decades, along with agreement to preserve Western civilization soon encompassed in expressed needs to meet a certain ‘standard of civilization’ (a notion that would lessen in importance later in the century with increasing liberal governance in Western states).

With European governments’ move towards authoritarianism or its enhancement in the post-Napoleonic era, the Greek campaign channeled unfulfilled desires for political liberalism and constitutional government even though the incipient, largely agrarian Greece showed little appetite for liberalism. Such a context facilitated the rise of organized Philhellene activism across Europe, with Greek committees similarly established in Russia and the United States. A new trend in Philhellenism had emerged, towards harnessing appreciation for Greek culture for the purpose of creating modern Greece. For France, Switzerland, and the German states in particular, academics and religious activists alike traced modern Greeks’ origins to the Hellenes, claimed that the latter laid the foundations for European civilization, and that Greece could be reborn by forcing out the Ottoman ‘Turks.’⁷⁶ Support for the Greek cause tended to come from groups in opposition to the respective governments since official opinion from the major powers endorsed the sultan’s legitimate sovereignty over the Ottoman Greeks.⁷⁷ Philhellene activism drew major powers’ attention to Ottoman atrocities against Christian populations, though tending to disregard violence against Muslim populations.

Yet, the extent of Philhellene influence on the powers’ policies remains unclear, though would provide justification for the powers’ intervention in response to atrocities or rumors of mass population removal at pivotal moments. The great powers’ initial characterization of the uprising as a liberal revolt against a legitimate sovereign meant that the powers should support the Porte rather than the rebels,⁷⁸ though rebels’ proclamation of independence emphasized only Ottoman oppression given awareness of the post-1815 turn towards conservatism among European governments.⁷⁹ Defining the 1820-21 Greek revolt as liberal revolt against a legitimate sovereign also helped keep Russia from intervening on behalf of Greeks, an act that the powers considered likely to result in a European war.⁸⁰

⁷⁶ Brewer 2001: 138

⁷⁷ St. Clair 2008: 52, 50

⁷⁸ Mitzen 2013: 104. Rendall also gives this interpretation, and notes that Alexander characterized the Greek revolt in its initial stages as a plot to bring turmoil to the alliance and to encourage the Porte to commit atrocities (2000: 67-68, 71).

⁷⁹ Gallant 2016: 44

⁸⁰ Mitzen 2013: 124

Alexander could then prioritize commitments made at the Vienna Settlement above state interests given assumptions that doing so would preserve European peace.⁸¹

1820 had, in fact, been a significant year for rebellion amidst a wave of secession in the Americas. Spain and then Portugal witnessed military-driven revolt in support of constitutionalism, before rebellion broke out in the Kingdom of Naples in July 1820 and then in Piedmont in March 1821.⁸² A separatist movement followed in Sicily. Major powers believed that revolution anywhere on the continent would lead to a domino effect.⁸³ At the 1822 Conference at Verona, the absolutist monarchies of Prussia, Russia, and Austria expressed support for intervention in Italy and Spain to keep existing absolutist regimes in power in line with conservatism, though rejected by more liberal Britain.

Yet, the Greek case was unlike the 1821 revolts in Naples and Piedmont extinguished by Vienna the same year, while French forces invading Spain in 1823 spurred the flight of the constitutional government from Madrid and then a coup in Lisbon succeeded by the restoration of absolutist monarchy.⁸⁴ With these situations under major powers' control, European politicians could then turn their attention to the only remaining revolt in Europe.⁸⁵ St. Petersburg assumed Russian handling of the situation in the southern Balkan peninsula

⁸¹ Mitzen understands Alexander's prioritization to reflect a newly constructed collective European interest evident in 1821-22, linked with the Concert of Europe inaugurating great powers' ability to act as an international public power through collective governance, showing that states can make commitments that position the international order to serve the public interest (Mitzen 2013: 63, 124). Woodhouse claims that the Tsar became increasingly worried about the threat of revolution in Europe and in Russia itself, and eager to avoid war with the Porte thanks to the increased influence of Metternich on the Tsar's thinking that moved Alexander away from considering a shift towards constitutionalism and popular sovereignty (1973: 114, 116, 118, 126). Dakin notes that the Tsar, under Count Karl Von Nesselrode's influence, gave more attention to events in Spain than to the Greek Revolution – at least in its early phases leading up to the 1821 Hanover meeting and the Congress of Verona a year later (1973: 149). Mitzen too notes that Alexander was more keen to consider intervening in Spain than on behalf of the Greek rebels (2013: 136). [Still need to check Piedmont and Sicily dates].

⁸² Metternich was particularly troubled by the Naples revolt, fearing a potential domino effect throughout Italy and the German states, and of any peaceful change to constitutional monarchy even though moderates had taken power. Though he preferred unilateral intervention by Vienna, Metternich defined the Naples situation as a European problem that laid the basis for a meeting involving all of the sovereigns. He convened a congress in the small Austrian town of Troppau that resulted in a protocol in the form of a general statement giving European rulers the right to request assistance from allies when faced with a revolt. Though not generalizable to the entire alliance in official terms, Metternich attempted to make it appear so through the use of broad language during plenary sessions (Mitzen 2013: 110-118).

⁸³ Mitzen 2013: 128

⁸⁴ St. Clair 2008: 244. Only London opposed these actions.

⁸⁵ St. Clair 2008: 245

after viewing the area in its sphere of influence, and after Austria and France had handled the above-mentioned events and gained special rights in Naples and Spain respectively.⁸⁶

Subsequent reports of Ottoman massacres contributed to the shift in great power problem-framing and policy towards supporting the Greeks, with Britain in the lead.⁸⁷ The international crisis centered less on the Ottoman treaty violations in the Principalities, and more on the killings coupled with St. Petersburg's claim to protect Christian populations.⁸⁸ While both Christians and Muslims had committed atrocities in earlier years, particularly in the summer of 1821,⁸⁹ pivotal for the shift in problem-framing was the April 1822 Ottoman massacre of Greeks on the island of Chios widely publicized in European states. The Chios massacre came not long after rebels' mass killing of Muslims and Ottoman regime supporters in Tripolitsa, making the war appear mostly as an array of opportunistic massacres by early summer 1822.⁹⁰ Later came the violence committed by Ottoman-Egyptian forces under the command of the Egyptian governor's son Ibrahim Paşa in what Davide Rodogno calls a 'war of extermination.'⁹¹ Britain, France and Russia threatened to intervene to support the Greeks if Mahmud would not agree to mediation, leaving the previous policy consensus to evaporate in 1823-1826 due to declassification of the Greek uprisings as a liberal revolution and the reappearance of great power rivalry until agreement came over recognition of a Greek state. The great powers redefined the problem, beginning with Britain's recategorization of the Greeks as belligerents in March 1823. Though spurred by the question of how Greek ships should be treated by the authorities of the Ionian Islands,⁹² the change of categories provided the Greeks greater advantages in naval warfare (i.e. legalizing the Greek blockade of the Ottoman coast).

While France tended to support the formation of national states and other means of weakening central governments in the Balkans and elsewhere,⁹³ Paris tended to run contradictory policies toward the Greek revolt by simultaneously providing military assistance

⁸⁶ Mitzen 2013: 149

⁸⁷ Brewer 2001: 166-167

⁸⁸ Schroeder 1994: 619

⁸⁹ St. Clair 2008: 7

⁹⁰ Latter point by St. Clair 2008: 92. After unsuccessful external Greek attempts to bring the Chians into the conflict on the Greek side, the main cause of the carnage was the disproportionate Ottoman response owing much to the large number of Ottoman troops on the island (Brewer 2001: 155-156, 165).

⁹¹ Rodogno 2012: 89

⁹² Brewer 2001: 251

⁹³ Jelavich 1997: 23. Only Prussia clearly supported collective action (Brewer 2001: 107).

to the Egyptians and supporting Philhellenism.⁹⁴ France aimed to expand its influence in the Middle East just as Britain had in India, though worried that the incipient Greece would become potential British satellite. By 1823, both Paris and London feared that an independent Greece would fall under St. Petersburg's sphere of influence and then secretly supported Philhellene activism.⁹⁵ British Foreign Secretary George Canning initially reemphasized official British neutrality through establishing an arms embargo for Greece,⁹⁶ while permitting Philhellene support for the Greek cause that would enhance British influence in Greece without risking the great power alliance.⁹⁷

Kapodistrias and his promoters expected the Franco-British rivalry to bring benefits for Greece.⁹⁸ The influential Phanariot Alexandros Mavrokordatos was particularly interested in benefiting from rivalry, though preferred a conservative, westward-focused rather than a Russia-oriented Greece.⁹⁹ Facilitating perceptions of similarity with the Greek disquiet was that the framers of the January 1822 constitution, Mavrokordatos in particular, conveyed support for a strong central government rooted in local administrations, and by insurgents presenting themselves as respectable revolutionaries.¹⁰⁰ Such a presentation helped mask a constitution aimed at substituting an oligarchy of primates for the Ottoman authority.¹⁰¹ Centralized government remained an idea existing primarily on paper up until April 1827,¹⁰² the month in which the Third National Assembly elected Kapodistrias as the new president. Kapodistrias offered the likelihood of enhanced credibility for the Greek cause among the great powers.

European intervention would follow Mahmud II's unsuccessful attempt to suppress the Greek Revolution owing to multiple defeats earlier in 1823.¹⁰³ The Sultan turned to his

⁹⁴ St. Clair 2008: 57, 273-274

⁹⁵ St. Clair 2008: 131, 134-135, 264

⁹⁶ Dakin 1973: 175

⁹⁷ Brewer 2001: 140

⁹⁸ Dakin 1973: 53

⁹⁹ Dakin 1973: 83, 85

¹⁰⁰ Dakin 1973: 88

¹⁰¹ Dakin 1973: 88; St. Clair 2008: 95. Dakin claims that this was a deliberate effort at deceiving Europe. Other accounts fault the Philhellenes' unrealistic accounts of the incipient Greece's prospects and resources (Brewer 2001: 132; St. Clair 2008: 95).

¹⁰² Dakin 1973: 89

¹⁰³ For the Greek revolt, the Porte relied nearly entirely on Albanian mercenaries in 1823 due to competing demands for Ottoman troops, particularly along the border with Russia and in the war with Persia that ended in July 1823 (Brewer 2001: 188).

governor of Egypt, the Albanian chieftain Mehmet Ali, given a need for a better command of the sea. With their French-built ships and training by former personnel of the French navy, the Egyptian fleet would be better equipped.¹⁰⁴ Ali himself was motivated by a dual desire to respond to Greek piracy towards Egyptian vessels coupled with concern over a potential threat to his hoped-for supremacy in the Mediterranean if the Greek revolt continued; St. Petersburg responded by establishing a station in the Mediterranean for the Russian fleet.¹⁰⁵ Egypt's ruler sent his son Ibrahim Paşa to assist Ottoman forces in their efforts to end the Greek insurgency, with Mahmud promising Mehmet Ali control of Crete and Ibrahim governorship of the Morea after a successful conquest of the Peloponnese.¹⁰⁶ Egyptian forces needed some time to undertake preliminary operations, including establishing a strong base in Crete in late 1824, gaining control of the island, and then invading the Peloponnese.

Yet, the respite from fighting the Ottomans during the time of the execution of the Egyptian campaign allowed for heightened fractiousness among the rebels, quarreling that kept them from taking advantage of the Porte's failure to subdue the revolt.¹⁰⁷ Nor did Greek military forces adopt European military systems.¹⁰⁸ Britain's recategorization of the Greeks as belligerents in March 1823 led Russia's Alexander to see an effort to encroach on the Russian sphere of influence.¹⁰⁹ With Britain pursuing a unilateral policy towards the Greeks, Alexander met with Austrian emperor Francis I in October 1823 to retake the reins on the issue through an alliance.¹¹⁰ Russia followed with a proposition of forming autonomous Greek principalities in January 1824. Britain and Russia led the way due to repeated Greek requests for protection to London and the presence of Russian forces on the Ottoman frontier, with St. Petersburg the first to break the alliance with Prussia and Austria.¹¹¹ London and St. Petersburg sought to adopt European strategy modeled on Vienna to avoid a war among major powers.¹¹²

¹⁰⁴ Dakin 1973: 121

¹⁰⁵ Dakin 1973: 121

¹⁰⁶ St. Clair 2008: 226

¹⁰⁷ Latter point made by Dakin 1972: 49

¹⁰⁸ Brewer 2001: 113

¹⁰⁹ Mitzen 2013: 149

¹¹⁰ Mitzen 2013: 149

¹¹¹ St. Clair 2008: 315

¹¹² Mitzen 2013: 152-153

With the subsequent Ottoman-Egyptian military invasion of the Peloponnese in 1825, and particularly the year-long siege of Mesolonghi, powerholders in the incipient Greece began to consider closer association with Britain. Their concern resulted in the Act of Submission to Britain in August 1825 expressing trust in London as the singular guarantor of Greece's independence. Canning rejected the Act given its complications for future cooperation with St. Petersburg;¹¹³ though the death of Lord Byron at Mesolonghi increased the likelihood of British commitment to the Greek cause,¹¹⁴ though one that seemed doomed by 1825.¹¹⁵ While Nicholas I succeeded Alexander in 1825 and soon appeared a more formidable opponent of rebellion, under Nicholas would soon come the highly significant April 1826 St. Petersburg protocol between Britain and Russia agreeing to mediate the dispute between the Porte and the rebels, aiming to establish an autonomous albeit tributary Greek state with borders to be determined. These developments allowed Russia to shift its focus to alleged treaty violations regarding Serbia and the Principalities.¹¹⁶ For London, the threat of possible Russian intervention would also be diminished.

For the Ottoman Empire, the protocol had been an unwelcome development since at issue was a rebellious province. Other events of 1826 weakened the Porte significantly. Fires in Constantinople, plague, and a janissary revolt created a context in which the Porte accepted Russian demands under threat of war in the Treaty of Akkerman (in Moldavia), which included recognition of Serbian autonomy and special rights for Russia in the protection of autonomy for the Principalities, among other terms. The Russo-British agreement nevertheless gave the Sultan a role to play in the nomination of rulers with all 'Turks' expected to leave the incipient Greece, among other stipulations.¹¹⁷

The following year Canning, rising to the position of prime minister in April, drafted a treaty advancing a Greek-Ottoman armistice and subsequent negotiation of Greece as a tributary state under Ottoman suzerainty signed in London in July 1827 by France, Britain,

¹¹³ Brewer 2001: 253

¹¹⁴ Woodhouse 1969: 135. The fall of Mesolonghi in April led to a temporary lull in Greek fractiousness, particularly within then suspended assembly (Dakin 1973: 195). Its leaders, including Kolokotronis, favored the appeal to Britain for mediation with many Philhellenes also pushing against continuation of British neutrality. Austria and Prussia did not support the Protocol, while France came around to support it (Brewer 2001: 316-317).

¹¹⁵ St. Clair 2008: 293

¹¹⁶ Jelavich 1997: 48

¹¹⁷ Dakin 1973: 54-55, 179

and Russia – with Canning passing away soon thereafter.¹¹⁸ While the 1826 protocol accorded the Greeks the right to mediation as international actors, the Treaty of London elevated their standing with the addition of a major power enforcement mechanism.¹¹⁹ The three powers accordingly agreed to justify intervention in Ottoman territory with reference to the ‘barbarization of Greece,’ namely the rumors circulating of Ibrahim’s intent to exterminate Greeks on the Morea before repopulating the area with Egyptians, with no mention of the Philhellenes.¹²⁰ This idea provided a convenient pretext for the great powers’ justification for intervening in Ottoman lands.¹²¹

Yet, as the year wore on the Greek cause struggled with the central institutions of government remaining politically divided. Planning for a military campaign faced the problem of many leaders of the fighting forces either following their own path or making arrangements with the Ottomans.¹²² The Greeks’ international standing was nevertheless on the rise.¹²³ All parties accepted British mediation in principle, understood to imply intervention by France, Britain, and Russia, with each leader aiming to secure an important place in any ensuing great power agreement for a Greek regime.¹²⁴ Beyond agreement over intervention in the Ottoman Empire’s domestic situation, they accorded the rebels equal status and provide and guarantee them autonomy.¹²⁵

The Treaty of London allowed for joint patrols of French, British, and Russian ships to enforce the armistice, though without involvement in the conflict. The subsequent Protocol of 4 September indicated that even neutral ships with aid for Muslims would be intercepted, with a warning that any Ottoman vessels remaining in Navarino (or Methoni) would increase chances for war, among other points.¹²⁶ This set the stage for the unplanned naval

¹¹⁸ Dakin 1973: 55

¹¹⁹ Mitzen 2013: 156. Mitzen accords considerable significance to the Treaty: the moment when the great powers moved away from possible conflict to Europeanizing the Greek revolt (2013: 155, 158).

¹²⁰ St. Clair 2008: 316. Rumor noted in Brewer 2001: 246, 254, 307; Dakin 1973: 176; Bass 2008 111-136; St. Clair 2008: 237-238. Mitzen notes potential rationalization of the protocol on Canning’s part (2013: 156).

¹²¹ St. Clair 2008: 316. Yet, Bass claims that the rumor helped sway Canning away from strict *realpolitik* support for Ottoman integrity in the face of a clear Russian threat (2008: 111-136)..

¹²² Dakin 1973: 194

¹²³ Mitzen 2013: 156

¹²⁴ Dakin 1973: 198

¹²⁵ Mitzen 2013: 157. Need to recheck

¹²⁶ Brewer 2001: 323. Yet, this account contradicts St. Clair’s claim that the Allied fleet intended to prevent the Ottoman and Egyptian ships from leaving Navarino for potentially more threatening destinations (2008: 332).

battle in Navarino Bay on the Morea's west coast in October 1827 – at a time when the Porte had refused to accept mediation and Ottoman-Egyptian forces overwhelmed the Greeks, though in line with Greek anticipation of a renewed revolt, external intervention, and the claiming of more extensive territory for a Greek state.¹²⁷

The unplanned naval battle ensued on 20 October 1827 that ended with the destruction of the Ottoman fleet and the vast majority of its Egyptian counterpart, a victory that brought confusion among the powers and demands from the Ottomans that included admission that Navarino had been a mistake, payment of an indemnity, and to cease raising the Greek question.¹²⁸ The outcome of the naval battle owed not to advance planning, but to the actions of the commander-in-chief of the Mediterranean Fleet Vice-Admiral Edward Codrington and the other allied commanders, coupled with Ibrahim's dedication to remain allied with the Sultan. Codrington's primary post hoc stated concern was over Ibrahim's alleged intent to lay waste to the Morea despite having only one Greek report (unconfirmed) claiming such depredations at the time.¹²⁹ Codrington was aware of the above-mentioned rumor, however unlikely, of the wholesale expulsion of the Greeks of the Peloponnese and their replacement with Egyptians and other Muslims.¹³⁰ While Codrington appears to have been swayed by potential moral concerns, high level British criticism of the admiral's actions raises questions over whether ethical concerns trumped *realpolitik* among Britain's key decision-makers. King George IV's subsequent January speech at parliament's opening reflected the views of the Tory-dominated cabinet under Canning's successor the Duke of Wellington, a group unsympathetic to the Greek cause and questioning the need to destroy another country's fleet at a time when Britain was not at war with the Ottoman Empire.¹³¹

Appointed the supreme commander of the Greek land forces in the summer of 1826, British General Richard Church played a significant role in the run up to Navarino. With assistance of formal naval officer Frank Abney Hastings, Church undertook a major effort to revive Greek rebellion in summer 1827.¹³² Church also made an effort at tempering disputes

¹²⁷ Latter points made by Dakin 1973: 57. Ibrahim ignored the armistice because Church, Hastings, and Cochrane ignored it (Woodhouse 1969: 139).

¹²⁸ Latter points made by Dakin 1973: 235-236

¹²⁹ Dakin 1973: 229

¹³⁰ Dakin 1973: 229

¹³¹ Brewer 2001: 334

¹³² Woodhouse 1969: 139, 145. The crux of the question of Philhellenes' influence appears to lie with their effect, if any, on Canning and Church. In summer 1826, the Greek-sympathizing Church accepted the

among the chieftans of the Peloponnese, not to mention the general's success in conquering Ottoman territory in the western areas of what would become the Greek state running along the Arta-Volos frontier (despite unsuccessful efforts to resuscitate the uprising in these areas),¹³³ territory heavily dependent on the military strength of the Albanians.¹³⁴ Aided by the diplomatic skill of Kapodistrias, Church and Hastings were able to deliver a more territorially robust Greece than the great powers had originally intended.¹³⁵ While British investors supplied sizable loans to the Greek rebels in 1824-25, the intended dramatic rise in military forces never actually occurred.¹³⁶

Soon after Navarino, the Porte renounced the terms of the 1826 Akkerman Treaty. Russia declared war against the Ottoman Empire in April 1828,¹³⁷ a conflict limited to bilateral issues with no mention of the Greek revolt. The war ended with Ottoman defeat in 1829 – with Britain, France, and Austria resisting temptations to balance against Russia and widen the war.¹³⁸ While the Sultan ended up going to war with Russia in the Balkans and Caucasus after resisting concessions, Russian forces' arrival at Adrianople in August 1829 brought signs of concession, including the offer of granting the Peloponnese and the islands principality status.¹³⁹ The Sultan followed with signs of agreeing to the 22 March 1829 protocol (establishing a basis for talks at Constantinople) before then agreeing to the establishment of an autonomous Greek state under Ottoman suzerainty and governed by a Christian prince, and accepting the Treaty of London.¹⁴⁰ Negotiations for an armistice began in early September with the Porte agreeing to recognition of the Akkerman Treaty.¹⁴¹

1830 was another significant year for rebellion. Polish nobles attempted to revolt against Russian rule, northern Italians challenged Habsburg rule, the French rebelled

interim government's offer as the commander of the Greek land forces (Brewer 2001: 30). (See also Gallant 2016: 49). Canning had been Foreign Secretary since September 1822.

¹³³ Dakin 1973: 219, 226, 232, 234-235, 268-269, 284, 289, 293; Woodhouse 1969: 137, 144.

¹³⁴ Dakin 1973: 235. For a more critical view of Church's role in the war see Brewer 2001: 300-301, 314, 343.

¹³⁵ Woodhouse 1969: 146

¹³⁶ St. Clair 2008: 294

¹³⁷ St. Petersburg's war declaration only referenced the protocol rather than the subsequent London treaty or the Greek issue (Mitzen 2013: 161).

¹³⁸ Mitzen makes the latter point (2013: 159, 202).

¹³⁹ Dakin 1973: 272. The 1829 Treaty of Adrianople handed to Russia part of the Black Sea coast, lands in the Caucasus, control over the Danube delta, as well as protectorships over Serbia and the Danubian Principalities.

¹⁴⁰ Dakin 1973: 271-272. Need to check the protocol date.

¹⁴¹ Dakin 1973: 272

against their king, while Belgian Protestants and Catholics revolted against Dutch rule.¹⁴² Austrian, Prussian, and Russian rulers responded by agreeing to mutual assistance in future instances of internal disquiet or threats emerging from abroad that was made official in the 1833 Convention of Berlin.¹⁴³ The European great powers had by 1830 agreed to recognize the independence of the Greek Kingdom, and prevented Russia from breaking up any more of Ottoman control in the Balkans.¹⁴⁴ Recognition of Greece continued with the great powers resisting competition to gain influence over the affected territorial area, a response markedly different than the other events categorized as revolts. In May 1832, France, Britain, Russia, and Bavaria signed a convention recognizing an independent Greek kingdom with Otto von Wittelsbach of Bavaria as king; official agreement from the Sultan and a Germanic confederation followed in July.¹⁴⁵

The Greek state resulted from the first of several 19th century great power interventions cast in humanitarian terms, featuring great power recommendations of population removal to avoid future massacre.¹⁴⁶ Following Navarino, France, Britain and Russia allowed French troops to occupy the Peloponnese, forces that were to oversee the withdrawal of the Egyptian Army and to ensure the departure of all Muslim civilians to avoid future massacre.¹⁴⁷ British, French, Russian and Ottoman officials discussed the move of Muslims from the Peloponnese in Istanbul, talks that led the Ottoman regime to accept their departure within six months.¹⁴⁸ French troops oversaw the move of about 2,500 Muslims transferred to Smyrna via French ships in November 1828. The removal of Muslims stemmed from a belief among Europeans that subsequent massacres would be avoided via population removal, particularly of Muslim communities, and the forging of more homogeneous groups whether religious or ethnic.¹⁴⁹ There was also the

¹⁴² Burbank and Cooper 2010: 337

¹⁴³ Burbank and Cooper 2010: 338

¹⁴⁴ Findley 2010: 47

¹⁴⁵ Dakin 1973: 290

¹⁴⁶ Rodogno 2012: 33

¹⁴⁷ Bass notes the more humanitarian concerns of Britain and France and the *realpolitik* interests of Russia (2008: 148-49). Ther notes the Greeks' intent to drive out all 'Turks' (2014: 47); though Kapodistrias only came around to supporting the dispatch of French forces to expel the Egyptians from the Peloponnese once the Porte would have to fight Russia and a more favorable northern border would need to be acquired through military efforts rather than great power diplomacy (Dakin 1973: 251).

¹⁴⁸ Kolluoğlu 2013: 536

¹⁴⁹ Rodogno 2012: 33

aforementioned rumor that all Greeks would be removed and replaced with Muslims after Ibrahim's predicted triumph.

Beyond great power policy, several factors illuminate why Greece was the first new state framed as a nation-state outside of Western Europe – rather than Serbia. Key was international Philhellene activism. There was no Serbian equivalent – even though European politicians, statesmen, journalists and others observed and sometimes intervened in political developments associated with nation formation in the Balkans.¹⁵⁰ Moreover, the expansion of the Mediterranean Greek diaspora owed to the rapid growth of the Greek merchant marine in the final decades of the 18th century and in the early 19th century linked with the French revolution and Napoleonic wars, developments without a Serbian equivalent. Insurgents in the Peloponnese also acted more aggressively than Christian rebels in 1804 in light of the fact that the Ottoman counterinsurgency campaign in Belgrade ended with Ottoman success and revenge taken against Christians by military and administrative forces returning to the area – with the same governor in 1820 that served in Belgrade when Ottoman control returned in 1813.¹⁵¹ The primary goal of the Serb rebels was not to end Ottoman rule but rather to force out the detested janissaries,¹⁵² with the Serbs in the Habsburg Empire rather than in the incipient Serbia the primary incubators of Serbian nationalism.¹⁵³ Limited Serbian autonomy came after Napoleon's defeat in 1815, when Russia forced Mahmud II to give Serbia the status of an autonomous vassal principality.¹⁵⁴ Orthodox identity also held privileged status compared to other non-Muslim populations in the Ottoman lands with the Greek Orthodox Church and its ecclesiastical leader initially serving as the primary representative of all Orthodox Christians, at least until the situation changed when an Exarchate emerged separate from the Greek-dominated Patriarchate, strengthening Bulgarian national identity.

Conclusion

¹⁵⁰ Hajdarpasic 2015: 10

¹⁵¹ Anscombe 2014: 67-68

¹⁵² Dakin 1973: 34, Burbank and Cooper 2010: 342

¹⁵³ Pantelić 2016: 432

¹⁵⁴ Latter point by Findley 2010: 36

Closer attention to details of the Greek case cast doubts on its categorization as a nationalist or even ethno-religious insurgency. Only a few, if any, indigenous Greeks could have thought of themselves as a people deserving of a nation-state. While the Phanariots, rebel leaders, and other local elites would have likely understood, and in some cases embraced the Greek nationalist cause, the examples of local powerholders like Ali Paşa and Mehmet Ali in Egypt signaled the possibility for simply replacing the Ottomans with rule by set of local elites, a more familiar and understandable option than the nation-state concept.

Nor were the 1820-21 uprisings an indication of a 'liberal revolt' – as categorized by the great powers. The conflict revealed a number of cleavages among the local population. Local leaders' motivations often lied with acquiring control over their respective local areas. Close attention to the uprisings also shows that British military and naval intervention mattered greatly for Greece's emergence, and the positioning of its borders well beyond key areas of indigenous insurgency (though with some rebel holdouts not included within Greece's borders). While a part of this area was already functioning autonomously, Roeder's sub-state hypothesis, though applicable, needs considerable assistance to explain the Greek case.

After Greek independence, many Greeks lived above Greece's northern border, at least until Greece expanded – a territory doubling in size after the 1912-13 Balkan Wars. A sizeable number left Greece for better economic opportunities in the Ottoman Empire. This dispersion contributed to the centrality of irredentism to Greek foreign policy for nearly a century through the goal of territorial expansion to allow Greeks nearby to be included within the Greek state's borders.