

Popular Support for Territorial Expansion: Does the Appetite Grow with Eating?

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Abstract: *Does an act of territorial expansion lead the public in that state to support further expansion? Even more generally, what are the sources of mass preferences regarding expanding their state's territory? Despite these questions' centrality to some of the most important events in international and domestic politics, hardly any research has addressed them systematically. This study begins by evaluating hypotheses derived from theories with relevant implications and tests them using pooled survey data collected in Russia in May 2013 and November 2014, a period spanning Russia's momentous annexation of Crimea. While connections between identity politics and expansionism are detected, these connections are revealed to be highly contingent on local context and events. Strong evidence is found that enduring historical legacies of past borders impact expansionism, though even these legacies are not immutable or unidirectional and can also be impacted by major events. Even dramatic events like the Crimea annexation are revealed not to have had a uniform impact across the population: While on aggregate this act does appear to have dampened rather than augmented expansionist sentiment in Russia, it is found to have simultaneously activated identity-inflected expansionism in certain Russian subpopulations, notably those bordering Ukraine.*

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Russia's sudden 2014 annexation of Crimea and the subsequent plunging of US-Russia relations to a post-Cold War low is a stark reminder that perceptions of territory--including the desire to enlarge one's own--remain one of the most important sources of conflict among states. This fact has not been lost on social scientists, who from many disciplinary standpoints (including political science, geography, anthropology) have found that conflicting attachments to the same patches of earth can translate into interstate war, intrastate war, secessionism, and state death (Fazal 2007; Diehl and Goertz 1992; Dunn and Bobick 2014; Hensel 2001; Holsti 1991; P. Huth 1998; Kahler and Walter 2006; Levy and Thompson 2011; Murphy 2013). These works tend to presume that territory has this power because territorial attachments run deep. Some even conclude that conflict over particular lands is an evolved human behavior, reflecting a territoriality urge we share with many other species (Johnson and Toft 2013).

Despite the centrality of popular sentiment in accounts of war over territory, it turns out that we still have many questions to answer. How widespread does popular support actually tend to be for territorial expansion beyond the status quo? Which subpopulations are typically most supportive? And does the acquisition of some new territory engender support for further expansion? Preexisting research has found that the answers can be crucial to leadership incentives actually to initiate territorial conflict (Tir 2010), but it provides little data-based insight into what the answers actually are. Thus while we understand that support for territorial expansion can vary across individuals and over time (O'Leary, Lustick, and Callaghy 2002), we know little about the precise nature of this variation.

A broad search of extant literatures thus turns up hardly any systematic, theory-oriented public opinion research on individual-level variation in territorial expansionism. A voluminous body of theory on when states will try to conquer other states (e.g., Gilpin 1983; Glaser 2010; Mearsheimer 2014; Waltz 2010) does frequently posit a strong role for some kind of mass sentiment (Doyle 1986; Kant 1983; Russett 1994; Snyder 1993), but the public opinion implications are generally not tested with quantitative rigor. Relatedly, the growing and sophisticated body of survey-based work on public support for war--most of it on the United States--does not tend to address the specific issue of territorial expansionism (Aldrich et al. 2006; Hayes and Guardino 2011; Mueller 1973; Stein 2015).² A few studies do examine the consequences of territorial conflict on aspects of public opinion, especially support for incumbent leaders, but generally not on actual support for expansion itself (Frye 2018; Hale 2018; Levy and Vakili 1992). The studies that do pioneer research into public opinion on territorial expansion, therefore, are few in number, mostly consisting of non-theory-oriented analyses of simple levels of support for specific instances of expansion over time or across (at best) a handful of demographics (e.g., Balzer 2014; Konradt and Langenbacher 2013; Kornprobst 2008). In fact, only a lone systematic analysis of public opinion was found that directly addresses the questions at hand, a study concluding intriguingly that ethnic minorities in Russia as of 2013 tended systematically to be more supportive of restoring USSR borders than were ethnic Russians (Alexseev 2016).

The present study trains researchers' attention directly on the question of who supports the territorial expansion of one's own country and why, providing a theoretical framework and empirical baseline that can structure future social science research. It does so by taking advantage of survey data gathered in the Russian Federation during both May 2013 and

² This situation contrasts sharply with research into another form of state territorial revisionism, secessionism, on which much systematic public opinion research is available on individual-level variation in support for secession (Barrio and Rodriguez-Teruel 2017; Hale 2008; Laitin 2001; Nadeau, Martin, and Blais 1999).

November 2014. These dates bookend Russian President Vladimir Putin's stunning annexation of Ukraine's Crimean peninsula. Since this event constitutes the only instance of unilateral territorial annexation of another state's territory in Europe since the second world war, this case is important to study in its own right while also offering something close to a singular opportunity to explore whether actual territorial expansion spawns a desire for further expansion.

Since there is virtually no prior theoretical literature addressing public opinion on support for territorial expansion that can be used to frame an analysis, the present study seeks guidance from theories of nationalism, historical legacies, worldviews, and geographic place that have implications for mass-level expansionism that are not yet precisely formulated or systematically tested. Overall, findings do not support notions that territorial expansionism is somehow a natural expression of national, religious, or other forms of identity. Instead, while we find links to identity politics, whether identity points in the direction of territorial expansion is highly contingent on local context and events, opening up possibilities for manipulation. At the same time, strong evidence is found for the importance of enduring historical legacies of past borders, though even these legacies are not immutable and can also be impacted by major events. And even dramatic events like the Crimea annexation are found not to have a uniform impact across the population. While on aggregate this act's result appears to have been to dampen rather than augment expansionist sentiment in Russia, it greatly activated identity-inflected expansionism in certain subpopulations, notably in Russia's regions that border Ukraine. Thus if territoriality does reflect evolved behavior, it is strongly moderated by other evolved behaviors that do not necessarily point to state expansion.

Establishing a Theoretical Framework for Inquiry

A natural starting point for studying individual-level variation in public support for state territorial expansion is to identify testable implications of existing theories on related subjects. This section considers theories of: nationalism and identity; historical legacies; international norms and worldviews; and geographic place.

1. Theories of Nationalism and Identity

One particularly widespread approach links territorial expansionism to nationalist or irredentist sentiment. By these lights, strong identification with an ethnic, religious, or national group can give rise to desires for: incorporating ethnic kin abroad into a home state (Brubaker 1996; Csergo and Goldgeier 2013), reclaiming land that is symbolically important for the group (Saideman and Ayres 2008), or establishing the dominance of one's own group over other groups, which could be accomplished by subjugating them through territorial conquest as well as through other ways of demonstrating high status and power in international affairs (P. K. Huth 1999; O'Leary, Lustick, and Callaghy 2002; Paul 2014; Zarakol 2010). Indeed, "nation" itself is often defined as an ethnic group associated with a particular territory, which may or may not initially be united in a single state (Gellner 1983; Hechter 2000). If true and important, these suppositions yield two general hypotheses:

H1. Individuals expressing the strongest attachment to their country will be more likely than others to support the general territorial expansion of their country, especially to areas of symbolic historical importance.

H2. Individuals belonging to a country's dominant identity group will be more likely than others to support forms of territorial expansion that incorporate ethnic kin.

At the same time, the broader literature on nationalism and identity supplies no agreement that we should find any systematic relationship between ethnic or national identification and specific attitudes toward specific territories or to territorial expansion in general. Volumes of scholarship have found that attachments to particular lands are not given, but instead subject to processes of social construction (Anderson 2006; Penrose 2002; Posner 2005), elite manipulation (Hobsbawm 1992; Kaufman 1996), or international mediation (Allee and Huth 2006). Indeed, such processes can produce dramatic change in territorial attachments over a short period of time, even including the diminution of senses of attachment to lands about which people have long cared very deeply (Mylonas and Shelef 2014; Shelef 2010). These theories would tend to expect variable, not necessarily constant, relationships between individual-level identity and expansionism over time:

H3. Major events will be associated with changes in patterns of support for territorial expansion among identity groups associated with the state.

Some researchers drawing on the Social Identity Theory school of social psychology argue that individuals belong to multiple groups at the same time, and that they may prioritize some over others as sources of self-esteem. Since self-esteem derives heavily from being part of high-status groups, people not only tend to identify most strongly with the highest-status groups but also have incentive to compensate for the loss of status in one group to which they belong by raising the status of other groups to which they belong (Lieberman 2009; Tajfel 1982). One influential cross-national study in this tradition finds a tradeoff between identification with their state and with their economic class: people who are the worst off economically are more likely to identify with their state because they derive low self-esteem from their economic situation and high self-esteem from their state, especially when theirs is a high-stature state (Shayo 2009). If true, it follows that people who perceive downward economic trends would be more likely to support territorial expansion as a way of increasing the status of their state and hence augmenting the self-esteem they derive from membership in their country:

H4. Individuals who perceive negative economic trends will be more likely than others to support territorial expansion.

Other theories positing tradeoffs between economic and social group identification posit a different logic: The pursuit of nationalism tends to come at an economic cost, meaning that nationalism is most likely to be supported by those who can best “afford” it, the wealthier. In this sense, nationalism can be seen as a “luxury good for the rich” (Laitin 2007, 97). We obtain:

H5. Individuals who perceive positive economic trends will be more likely than others to support territorial expansion.

2. Theories of the Historical Legacies of Borders

Another body of theory posits that support for territorial expansion has less to do with identity politics than with whether the new borders have roots in preexisting administrative

boundaries. Relevant literature suggests two primary mechanisms. One school of thought treats state borders as “focal points” around which nations coordinate their self-defense (Goemans 2005). Popular acceptance of new borders that expand territory will be greater if the new borders correspond with old borders because they are more likely to have a focal quality. By implication, the focal quality of old borders should be strongest among those with the deepest personal experience with the old borders. A second school of thought focuses on socialization, the idea that individuals raised to consider one set of borders to be legitimate are more likely to continue to see them as meaningful even after the borders officially disappear (Darden forthcoming; Darden and Mylonas 2016; Shevel 2011, 180). In this sense, “socialization” can be interpreted as a process through which individuals learn to treat borders as being among the “thick points of personal reference” that have significant implications for their life chances (Hale 2008). Since these reference points involve informal practices and relationships, they continue to have meaning as points of personal reference after their formal recognition disappears (Puddifoot 1997). Both schools would thus lead us to expect:

H6. Older individuals will be more likely than younger ones to support territorial expansion that involves the recreation of previous state borders.

H7. Any disproportionate support from older individuals for territorial expansion that involves the recreation of previous state borders will be greater than that for other forms of territorial expansion (i.e., expansion based on ethnic principles).

The two schools differ, however, in what they would expect should a state succeed in partially restoring old borders. If borders matter primarily as a focal point, we would not expect old people to become any more or less supportive of expansion to the full old set of borders. If borders matter primarily as socialized points of personal reference, however, a partial restoration should partially quell restorationist desires among the old by weakening the discrepancy between the current and former state of affairs. The two schools are thus distinguished by:

H8. A partial restoration of past borders will reduce support for territorial expansionism, particularly among older people.

3. Theories of Ideology, Norms, and Worldviews Involving Territory

Other theories focus on how notions of territory are constructed as part of certain worldviews that have implications for how one’s state—and the complex of relationships it represents—relates to existing borders (Agnew 2005; Elden 2010; Murphy 2005; Sack 1983). Examples of particular ideologies or norms that influence state behavior range from the “manifest destiny” of the United States (Weinberg 1963) to the global communist ideal of the Soviet Union (Ulam 1968) to the “Eurasianism” of Russia’s Aleksandr Dugin (Laruelle 2009; Shevel 2011, 189) to the “right of conquest” that was widely recognized in the 19th century but became increasingly rejected by the end of the 20th (Korman 1996). Related to this perspective is a large interdisciplinary literature that connects territorial expansionism with concepts of empire and colonialism that are often still bound up in the worldviews of at least some individuals in former imperial powers (Ellis 2012; Goldstein and Lubin 2008; Healy 1970; Joy

2003; Trigger and Griffiths 2004; Weeks 1997). Together, this rather motley set of theories would lead us to expect:

H9. Support for territorial expansion will be associated more strongly with people whose views of their state's place in the world align with the views expressed in locally important expansionist ideologies or express loyalty to parties that profess such ideologies.

4. Theories of Geographic Place

Geographers have long established not only that the meaning of territory can be perceived in very different ways in different local contexts (Linke and O'Loughlin 2015; O'Tuathail 1996), but that state borders do not typically correspond to all important spatial communities or fields of interaction that can shape preferences (Agnew 2005; Murphy 2013). Border regions on both sides of an international boundary, for example, can be highly interdependent and even share a local political economy and cultural identity. This means that we might well expect some parts of a country to foster different preferences regarding the annexation of any particular new territory. The particular ways in which geographic place will impact preferences are likely to be highly context-specific, thus for now we advance the general hypothesis here:

H10. Location in parts of a state that would be affected in different ways by territorial expansion will be associated with different attitudes to territorial expansion.

5. Theories (or the Lack Thereof) of the Impact of Expansion on Expansionism

Interestingly, we have hardly any theoretical work that specifically problematizes one of the central issues that motivate this study: whether one act of territorial expansion impacts support for further territorial expansion, not to mention what factors may moderate any detected impact. One can find two general perspectives in journalistic accounts and the statements of policymakers, however. First, many fear that successful acts of expansion will “whet the appetite” and encourage people to support further acts of expansion. Such fears can be found expressed in those who warn that appeasing aggressors by not intervening decisively to thwart them will only lead to additional aggressive acts. References to Munich are common in this context, and can be found, for example, motivating the coalition that mobilized to drive Iraq out of Kuwait in the early 1990s and calls for more forceful actions against Putin to punish him for Crimea. Second, an alternative logic is also sometimes voiced: Perhaps acts of expansion do not whet but instead satiate, at least partially addressing concerns that might have motivated expansionism in the first place. These arguments tend to view publics as unlikely to support efforts at full world conquest.

The Case for Russia as a Case

The Russian Federation offers a uniquely useful opportunity for an initial systematic inquiry into the public opinion dimension of territorial expansionism. For one thing, it is a country where the issue of territory has been on the table ever since it emerged from the collapsing USSR in 1991. Equally importantly, despite its authoritarian nature, it is also a country in which high quality survey research is possible, making relevant data available for

study. Russia is also a country whose potential for expansionism matters greatly for world security.

The rarity of forceful territorial expansion in the survey-research era is arguably one reason why hardly any theory-oriented survey research has been published to date on the subject, but Russia helps social science out here as well. With its 2014 annexation of the Ukrainian territory of Crimea, Russia became the most powerful openly expansionist challenger to the internationally recognized territorial status quo, and the only country actually to annex another's territory in Europe since World War II. This makes Russia arguably the single most important substantive case of state territorial expansionism to study in the post-Cold War era and thus a good place to start building theory. Thus while this study focuses on testing theories that are potentially generalizable to other countries, it is important for both policy and theory to have a strong understanding of Russia in its own right. Finally, the Crimea annexation provides a singular methodological opportunity: By studying survey data collected both before and after an actual act of unilateral territorial aggrandizement, data of a type that are to the best of this author's knowledge only available in Russia, one can gain insight into how (or whether) an initial act of expansion whets or satiates popular appetites for state territory.

For the availability of data on this subject, the social science community can thank Pål Kolstø, Helge Blakkisrud, and their "New Russian Nationalism (NEORUSS)" project, based at the University of Oslo and funded by the Research Council of Norway and the Fritt Ord Foundation.³ As part of this project, Russia's ROMIR agency first interviewed a nationally representative sample of 1,000 adult Russian citizens face to face during May 8-27, 2013, in order to study the broad subject of Russian nationalism. The March 2014 annexation of Crimea and subsequent events then led the researchers to conduct a second survey in November 5-18, 2014, to study the degree to which this geopolitically earthshaking event had produced changes in Russian attitudes to nationalism. The second wave of the survey thus included most of the same questions, used the same methodology, though included slightly more respondents (1,200 instead of 1,000) to generate more precise estimates. The present study pools these results to obtain a single dataset consisting of 2,200 observations.

Because research on individual-level variation in support for territorial expansion is in its infancy and lacks a single common wisdom to examine, this study endeavors to establish a broad framework for future analysis and an empirical baseline for future studies rather than to single out any one theory for testing. At the same time, it is important to avoid the dangers of data-mining, or the willy-nilly testing of large numbers of variables.⁴ This study, therefore, relies on the five theoretical approaches discussed above to guide decisions on what factors should be included in an initial statistical analysis designed to identify correlates of expansionism for future research.

Russian Support for Territorial Expansion in 2013 and 2014: The Dependent Variable

So how much support is there in Russia for territorial expansion? Table 1 presents findings from the NEORUSS survey, giving the English translation of the key question as it was

³ These data are available at <https://www.hf.uio.no/ilos/english/research/projects/neuruss/>. For context and further analysis of these data, see Kolstø and Blakkisrud (2016).

⁴ Data-mining refers to a practice by which researchers toss all kinds of variables without theoretical guidance into a regression analysis in order to identify those variables that register as statistically significant. The problem, of course, is that if one applies the common 95-percent standard for statistical significance, one out of every twenty such variables can be expected to appear significant while the correlation is actually spurious.

posed to respondents in both 2013 and 2014.⁵ The first finding that leaps to mind from the NEORUSS 2013 survey is that Russians prior to Crimea’s annexation were strikingly dissatisfied with the territorial coverage of their state. When asked what the borders of their state should be and given a list of four options, as summarized in Table 1, only 36 percent replied that they should stay the same as they were at that time. These status quo borders were those inherited from the USSR, of which Russia (then called the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic, RSFSR) had been one of 15 constituent “union republics.” These are the borders are today’s Russian Federation that became recognized by the international community and enshrined in a host of international agreements.

Table 1. Distribution of Views on Territorial Expansion in Russia, May 2013 and November 2014 (percentage points, NEORUSS surveys)

| “In the course of history the borders of states sometimes change. In your view, what should be the borders of Russia? Please choose the answer that best corresponds with your point of view.” | 2013 | 2014 |
|--|------|------|
| 1. The same as they are now, but without the Islamic territories of the North Caucasus | 13 | 11 |
| 2. The same as now | 36 | 45 |
| 3. The same as now, but with the addition of territories of the former USSR populated by Slavic peoples | 21 | 19 |
| 4. The same as were the borders of the USSR | 21 | 16 |
| Hard to say | 2 | 3 |
| Refuse | 6 | 6 |

Because only 2 percent found it hard to answer the question and just 6 percent refused to answer, the survey reveals that a clear majority actively preferred a set of boundaries for the Russian Federation that was different from the status quo back in 2013, prior to the annexation of Crimea. Very importantly, however, not all of the territorial revisionists wanted to enlarge the country: 13 percent of all respondents averred that ideally Russia would shed the troubled Islamic territories of the North Caucasus, seen by many as a source of instability, crime, and unwanted migration. But some 42 percent did think it would be better if Russia were bigger. Among the expansionists, 21 percent preferred uniting the whole former USSR while another 21 percent favored limiting Russia to only the parts of the former Soviet Union inhabited by Slavic peoples.

These findings should not be interpreted as support for military annexation or any other particular method for achieving expansion, of course, nor do they tell us how intensely people feel about these preferences. The question did not ask people what price they would be willing to pay for expansion, what risks they would agree to take, or what means (such as military force) would be justified. It asked only about what borders Russia “should” have. Nevertheless, the fact that over two fifths of the population held a preference for enlarging Russia does at least suggest that Russian President Vladimir Putin had grounds to suspect that expansionist activity could find substantial support among the population even before his propaganda machine could seek to gin up further support for it, as would be expected by the theoretical approaches discussed above linking expansionism to public attitudes.

⁵ Frequency estimates are calculated with weights provided by the survey agency to bring the sample into line with key known population parameters in Russia.

Table 1 also sheds light on how patterns of support for territorial expansion in Russia changed after the Crimea annexation. Perhaps most remarkably, the results provide strong grounds for rejecting the theory that successful territorial expansion increases public support for further expansion. After Crimea, backing for the territorial status quo actually went up, by about 9 percentage points, while support for the two expansionist alternatives dropped by a cumulative 7 percent. At the same time, however, a simple bivariate logit analysis finds that this difference is only statistically significant at the 93 percent level, just short of the 95-percent standard conventionally used for determining statistical significance.⁶ What explains these patterns, and are some subpopulations influenced by the events of 2014 in different ways than others?

Correlates of Territorial Expansionism in Russia: A First Cut

To explore the micro-level correlates of expansionism, this study begins by examining the difference between people who (as indicated in the data reported in Table 1) support any form of territorial expansion (coded 1) and all others (coded 0). Adopting a logit model appropriate for binary dependent variables, it regresses this variable on indicators designed to test the hypotheses developed above.⁷ Because the results of logit models are not readily interpreted, this study takes an additional step to calculate quantities that are readily comprehensible and can be presented clearly in graphic form: full effects. A factor's full effect is the average amount of change in the outcome variable that is calculated to result if one raises the causal factor's value from its minimum in the dataset to its maximum while holding all other variables at their actual values.⁸ A full effect thus reflects an "observed-value" approach of the kind recommended by Hanmer and Kalkan (2013, 263) for reporting such results. Results appear here in graphic form to facilitate easy interpretation, with tables reported in the appendix containing the quantities from which the figures were calculated.

Figure 1 presents an initial, straightforward cut into the data using this method, with the dots reporting the estimated full (average) effects that each variable is posited to have on the probability of an individual's supporting expansionism and the lines (whiskers) protruding from each dot capturing the 95-percent confidence interval.⁹ These lines intersect with the red horizontal "zero" line when we cannot rule out the possibility of zero effect with at least 95-percent confidence. We discuss these results here as we also introduce the measures used to test the theories outlined above.


⁶ The logit coefficient is $-.34$, $p=.072$, and the 95-percent confidence interval is $(-0.716, 0.032)$.

⁷ Following a common practice, to avoid listwise deletion of observations and the subsequent loss of information, variable means are substituted for responses of "hard to say" or "refusal to answer."

⁸ In more technical language, the full effect of a variable on an outcome is simply its average marginal effect on that outcome when all variables are converted to a scale on which the lowest actually-observed value in the dataset is 0 and the highest value is a 1. Full effects are easier to interpret than average marginal effects because the former convey the full impact of the variable as it goes from its minimum to its maximum, facilitating the comparison of the magnitude of effects across variables, whereas average marginal effects will vary greatly depending on how each variable is scaled, making results harder to compare across variables and producing intractably small coefficients for finely gradated variables like age, which in our dataset ranges from 18 to 90.

⁹ The results in tabular form can be found in the appendix as Table A1.

Figure 1. Full effects of factors on probability of support for expanding Russia in pooled 2013-2014 datasets with 95% CI



To begin, we find further confirmation that the annexation of Crimea (and all other events intervening between the 2013 and 2014 survey) did not lead to an increase in support for the territorial expansion of Russia. Instead, controlling for all the other variables examined in this study, the Crimea annexation’s full effect on expansionism appears to have been negative on the order of about 8 percentage points; in other words, being interviewed in 2014 instead of 2013 makes one about 8 percent less likely to support expansion. We cannot, however, rule out that the effect was zero with the traditionally required 95-percent level of confidence since the confidence interval (barely) intersects the zero line. We now turn to an evaluation of the theories discussed above with respect to the data in Figure 1.

First we turn to theories of nationalism. To test hypotheses H1 and H2, which posit respectively that support for expansion will be greater for individuals who are most proud of their country or belong to the dominant identity group (here, ethnic Russians and adherents to the Russian Orthodox Church), the study includes measures of state pride,¹⁰ Russian nationality,¹¹ and Orthodoxy.¹² To explicitly capture senses of ethnic kinship or enmity that may be driving

¹⁰ A binary variable based on NEORUSS question 9: “How proud are you that you are a citizen of Russia?” Response categories include: “1. I am very proud, 2. I am more proud than not, 3. I tend not to be proud, 4. I am not proud at all.” Respondents answering 1 (the very most proud) are coded 1 and all others coded zero.

¹¹ A binary variable based on NEORUSS question 7: “Please tell me, to what nationality do you belong?” Respondents can give more than one answer, though in the entire pooled 2013-14 dataset only two chose Russian as a second nationality. Anyone answering “Russian” for the first or second response is coded 1, all others 0.

¹² A binary variable based on NEORUSS question 69: “Do you profess any religion? If so, which?” Those indicating the Russian Orthodox Church are coded 1 (category 4 in the survey), all others 0.

expansionist sentiment, the study also includes a measure of the degree to which (on a scale of 0-10) individuals feel that Ukrainians “fully share the values and fully adhere to the behavioral norms accepted in Russia” and a scale of “islamophobia.”¹³ The most striking finding is that none of these variables are significant predictors of territorial expansionism in Russia.

We now turn to hypotheses that assume tradeoffs between the economy and nationalist desires for expansion and posit that: (H4) people who perceive negative economic trends will be most likely to support expansion to compensate for threatened economic self-esteem with augmented national-pride self-esteem; or (H5) people who perceive positive economic trends will be most likely to support expansion because they can afford it as a “luxury good.” The study thus includes two five-point scales capturing whether people perceive their own “pocketbook” trends to be positive¹⁴ or believe that the Russian economy as a whole has gotten better in the previous year.¹⁵ These variables, too, turn out not to be significant predictors of separatism. The data thus cast doubt on notions that support for expansion is primarily about national identity (at least, in any simple, linear way).

The study finds strong support, however, for theories positing that expansionism is strongly influenced by legacies of preexisting borders. As expected in H6, the oldest individual in the sample is expected to be close to 20 percent more likely to support expanding Russian territory, and we have more than 95 percent statistical confidence that the real effect is non-zero. At this point, however, we cannot distinguish between the possibilities that the old borders are serving as cognitive focal points or are the products of socialization as points of personal reference, a question to which we will turn below.

The analysis also includes several measures designed to test H9, which expresses theoretical expectations that support for expansionism is likely to be linked to ideologies or worldviews that express or imply the desirability of state expansion. Since this body of theory expects specific measures to be highly context-specific, the study measures likely sympathy for state expansion in three ways. First, since the rejection of Western norms and values is linked by some to expansionist tendencies in Russia as a way of countering the West (Laruelle 2009), a simple measure of anti-Westernism is included.¹⁶ Because calls for expansion are also linked to theories like “Eurasianism” that portray Russia as a historic “heartland” of a non-Western civilization destined for dominance in its greater region, a measure is also included that captures identification of Russia with European civilization (Shevel 2011, 191–92).¹⁷ Finally, because

¹³ A binary variable coded 1 if an individual, asked whether they fully/tend to agree/disagree with the following proposition, select “fully agree”: “Islam is becoming a threat to social stability and Russian culture.”

¹⁴ Based on NEORUSS question 75: “How has the material situation of your family changed over the last twelve months?” Responses include: 1. Significantly improved; 2. Improved a little; 3. Remained unchanged; 4. Worsened a little; and 5. Significantly worsened.” This scale is reversed so that higher values intuitively represent more positive economic sentiments.

¹⁵ Based on NEORUSS question 74: “What do you think, over the last twelve months has the state of Russia’s economy: 1. Significantly improved; 2. Improved a little; 3. Remained unchanged; 4. Worsened a little; and 5. Significantly worsened.” This scale is reversed so that higher values intuitively represent more positive economic sentiments.

¹⁶ A binary variable based on NEORUSS question 66: “There exist different opinions on what relations should be between Russia and the West. What do you think, how should Russia treat the West? 1. As an enemy. 2. As a rival. 3. As a partner. 4. As a friend.” Answers of 1 or 2 are coded 1, all others 0.

¹⁷ A binary variable based on NEORUSS question 37: “People often discuss Russia’s place in the world. Tell me, please, do you consider Russia to be a part of European civilization or something else? Please choose the answer that seems most correct to you.” Respondents selected between: “1. Russia is basically a part of European civilization, 2. Russia is basically a part of Asiatic (eastern) civilization, 3. Russia is a mix of European and Asiatic

research has found that meso-level organizations like political parties can often lead mass-level attachments to national territory (Mylonas and Shelef 2014; Shelef 2010), this study identified major parties that Russians might plausibly identify with stands on territorial expansionism to see if support for these parties correlates with support for expansionism. This is operationalized in the NEORUSS survey by whether individuals self-reported having voted for these parties' presidential candidates in the most recent presidential election (2012): Vladimir Putin, who in 2014 actually carried out a major act of territorial expansion; Communist Party leader Gennady Zyuganov, whose party is linked with an expansionist ideology of world communism as well as USSR revanchism; and LDPR leader Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the major candidate most closely identified with ethnic Russian nationalism and territorial expansionism.¹⁸ None of these variables comes anywhere close to statistical significance, indicating that support for expansion is not strongly linked to ideologies as expressed in party attachments, anti-Westernism, or a vision of Russia being outside European civilization.

Finally, Figure 1 reports results from a test of H10, the expectation that support for expansion will be spatially patterned in ways reflecting varying regional relationships to possible expansionist projects. This study of place initially considers people living in regions (oblasts, krais, republics) that actually border countries that could be included in different possible acts of expansion. They would be among the most directly affected by such acts and would also likely have the most personal experience with the regions to which Russia could expand. Separate binary variables are thus coded 1 for individuals living in regions sharing borders with Ukraine¹⁹ and Kazakhstan,²⁰ and since the NEORUSS sample did not include any regions on Russia's Caucasus border, a binary variable was added instead for those bordering Russia's own North Caucasus regions.²¹ This study also posits that giving Russia's vast expanse, people living furthest away from the likeliest expansion projects might have display distinct relevant dispositions, so a binary variable was included coding 1 residents of Russia's Far East (as defined by the Far East Federal District). The study also includes a final binary variable capturing individuals living in one of Russia's highly cosmopolitan "two capital cities" (Moscow and St. Petersburg), long argued to display rather distinct political dispositions (Zubarevich 2011). As it turns out, support for expansionism generally does not appear to be spatially patterned: none of these variables are statistically significant predictors of expansionism. That said, residence in a Ukraine-border region come close, and would pass a somewhat more lax 90-percent significance test. This will become relevant later in the analysis.

Overall, at this stage of the analysis, only theories of historical legacies find clear and strong support. Support for territorial expansion appears strongly related to an individual's age. There are hints, though, that actual acts of annexation themselves (Crimea in 2014) and residence in a region bordering the "victim" country (Ukraine) may also be shaping attitudes since both variables would pass a 90-percent significance standard but not the more conventional 95-percent threshold. We begin following up on these hints below.

(eastern) civilizations, 4. Russia is a separate civilization that is not part of European or Asian (eastern) civilizations." Individuals are coded 1 if they gave response 1, 0 otherwise.

¹⁸ A separate binary variable is created for those reporting voting for each one of these candidates (0 otherwise) in response to NEORUSS question 73: "Did you take part in the RF's presidential elections of March 4, 2012? If so, for which of the following candidates did you vote?"

¹⁹ In the sample: Voronezh and Rostov oblasts and Krasnodar Krai.

²⁰ In the sample: Novosibirsk, Omsk, and Saratov oblasts and Altai Krai.

²¹ In the sample: Stavropol and Krasnodar krais.

Did 2014 Change the Relationship Between Key Variables and Expansionism?

The finding of a borderline significant relationship between the timing of the survey (2013 versus 2014) and support for territorial expansion gives rise to several questions. Initially, is it possible that the events of 2014 altered the way in which different factors tested here are related to preferences for expansion? If so, and because 2014 seems if anything to have reduced expansionism in Russia, this could mean that some factors were more potent predictors of expansionism before Russia's actual act of expansion than after it. This, in turn, gives rise to the possibility of heterogeneous effects: Could it be that 2014 dampened some factors' association with expansionism while heightening this association for other factors? To address these questions, the study adapts an approach developed by Barrington (2012) to identify whether major events alter underlying relationships linking variables in mass surveys. Specifically, a logit model is estimated that includes year interaction terms for each of the variables tested in the analysis reported in Figure 1 (that is, for each variable, the interaction term multiplies that variable by the binary variable for year 2014). If the interaction terms are statistically significant, we gain confidence that the relationship between that variable has changed between 2013 and 2014. In addition, this technique allows one to generate separate estimates for the full effects of variables in 2013 and 2014, giving us a sense of the magnitude of any such change.

The results appear in Figure 2, with each subgraph reporting the estimated effect of a given factor in 2013 and 2014.²² As can be seen, there is little change associated with the difference between 2013 and 2014 for most of the variables tested--in most cases there is little change in estimated full effects or, at least, the 95-percent confidence intervals overlap to such an extent that we cannot clearly identify a difference between effects in the two years. Thus while 2014 does appear to have slightly diminished the effect of age on expansionism, this effect is not statistically significant, though the study will drill deeper into this below.


Most of the pronounced changes instead have to do with geographic place: While bordering Ukraine had no effect at all on expansionism in 2013, it suddenly became a strong predictor of support for territorial expansion after the annexation of Crimea and all the events that surrounded it in 2014. Specifically, in November 2014, living in a region bordering Ukraine made one over 20 percent more likely to support territorial expansion. This explains why the result in Figure 1 was not statistically significant: the association was driven almost entirely by the 2014 data. The other stand-out change is also spatial but is unanticipated by theory: residence in areas bordering the North Caucasus becomes a significant predictor of opposing expansion, with a full effect of about 16 percentage points.

This exercise also starts to uncover some support for theories of nationalism, but specifically H3, the proposition that ethnic attachments to territory can be situationally influenced by events as opposed to being necessarily deep-seated and immutable. In particular, Figure 2 reports that ethnic Russians go from not standing out at all in support of expansion in 2013 to being about 11 percent more likely to support it in 2014. This effect is right at the standard threshold of statistical significance, however, registering with a significance level of 94.3 percent in the logit analysis.

Overall, this deeper dive into the data does reveal that 2014 shaped patterns of support for territorial expansion, it did so only for certain parts of the population. Moreover, the events of 2014 did not work in a single direction: ethnic Russians and people living near Ukraine's border became more supportive of expansion, while most others (especially those in the North Caucasus and, more tentatively, older people) became less supportive of it.

²² The results in tabular form can be found in the appendix in Table A2.


Figure 2. Change in factors' full effects on probability of support for expanding Russia 2013-2014 (95% CI)



Do Different Types of Territorial Expansion Matter?

Heretofore, this study has considered “expansionism” as a general category but some of the theoretical perspectives discussed imply that support for augmenting territory should depend heavily on the particular form such expansion would take. This study thus now exploits the fact that the NEORUSS survey broke the category of expansion down into two categories, one that might be considered identity-based without particular historic precedent (expansion to include only former Soviet territories populated by other Slavic peoples²³) and one that is primarily based on historic precedent (expansion to the borders of the former USSR). The outcome variable that is analyzed here is coded 1 for supporters of what we will call for convenience “Slavic expansion,” 2 for backers of “Soviet expansion,” and 0 for all others. What follows thus reports the full effects of the same set of factors on support for these forms of expansion calculated from a multinomial logit model, a class of models appropriate for identifying the correlates of different outcomes when there are more than two outcomes and these are not ordered.

To begin, breaking down forms of expansionism in this way does not substantially change this study’s aggregate findings regarding the impact of 2014. Figure 3 repeats what we know from Table 1, that support for Soviet expansionism went down slightly more than did support for Slavic expansionism, but adds lines spanning 95-percent confidence intervals that confirm these differences are not statistically significant (though the result for Soviet expansionism comes close).²⁴



Turning now to the correlates of different types of expansionism, Figure 4 presents the findings regarding specifically Slavic expansion and Figure 5 conveys those for Soviet expansion.²⁵ Several important results stand out when we consider the two graphics together. Most dramatically, we learn much more about the relationship between age and expansionism: It turns out that age is an extremely strong predictor of support for Soviet expansionism at the same time that it is a predictor of *opposition* to Slavic nationalism. The oldest individuals in the

²³ Primarily Ukrainians, Belarusians, and Russians living outside of Russia.

²⁴ The p-value in the multinomial logit analysis is 0.067.

²⁵ The findings can be found in tabular form in Table A3 in the appendix.

sample are thus found to be well over 20 percent more likely to back restoration of the old Soviet borders under Russia's flag, but are actually about 10 percent likely to oppose expansion projects aimed at uniting only those Soviet lands populated by Slavs. This supplies striking strong support for H7, the notion that the age effect on expansionism is specifically about the cognitive and relational legacies of particular past borders, not about expansionism generally and not about expansionism as an expression of ethnic identity.

Figures 4 and 5 also yield new insight into the relationship between living in a region with a Ukrainian border and expansionism: Bordering Ukraine is a predictor precisely of the desire to unite Slavic lands, with a full effect of about 10 percentage points. A Ukraine border has no significant effect on preferences for restoring the borders of the USSR. This strongly indicates that the Ukraine border effect is primarily about identity (uniting only Slavs) rather than expansionism generally or some kind of historic memory of unity, which would have led us to expect support for Soviet expansion as well. We can also rule out that the identity effect involved is simply reflecting senses of ethnic commonality that might be present in regions bordering Ukraine: The Ukraine-border effect holds even though the study controls for perceptions of the degree to which Russians perceive Ukrainians to be similar to themselves, a variable that is insignificant in all models estimated in this study. Combining these results with the finding from Figure 3 that the Ukraine-border effect appears only in 2014, it would strongly appear that the conflict playing out in eastern Ukraine has had the effect of provoking a local surge in pan-Slavic sentiment in neighboring Russian regions. Indeed, these are the parts of Russia that have surely been most directly impacted by the conflict, including the passing through (or basing) of Russian troops (regular and irregular) and the receiving of initial inflows of displaced persons.

Breaking expansionism down into types also reveals significant economic effects, but only regarding Slavic expansion and not in a straightforward way: People whose personal economic situation is deteriorating are more likely to support Slavic expansionism (full effect of about 17 percentage points), while those who perceive negative economic trends for the country as a whole are more likely to oppose it (full effect of about 14 percentage points). The fact that economic factors are only significant when it comes to the identity-based expansionist project does lend support to the general notion expressed in H4 and H5 that tradeoffs exist between individuals' economic status and their likelihood of supporting nationalist policies. The finding that pocketbook and sociotropic economic considerations point in opposite directions, though, is unanticipated. But perhaps the key is to take into account that since both considerations are in the equation at the same time, they control for each other. That is, the results may reflect that people who think the economy is doing better than they are personally doing are likely to have more optimism that they will be pulled up by the larger national trend, making them more willing to accept the costs involved in supporting an identity-based project like Slavic expansion. Conversely, those who feel that they are doing better while the overarching economy is weakening may feel vulnerable before the larger negative trend, making them less likely to feel they can "afford" Slavic expansion. This interpretation would support H5, the notion that nationalism can be thought of as something of a luxury good for the better off.

Figure 4. Full effects of factors on probability of support for SLAVIC expansion in pooled 2013-2014 datasets with 95% CI





Figure 5. Full effects of factors on probability of support for expansion to SOVIET borders in pooled 2013-2014 datasets with 95% CI



Other significant findings in Figures 4 and 5 do not clearly relate to the theories on which this study focuses. For one thing, higher education (included as a control variable) is a significant predictor of opposition to Soviet expansion (perhaps reflecting Putin's famous statement that those who regret the USSR's demise have no heart but those who do regret it have no brain²⁶) with a full effect of about 10 percentage points, while it is not a significant predictor of any position on Slavic expansion. Individuals in Moscow and St. Petersburg are about 11 percent more likely than others to oppose Slavic expansion, but do not stand out at all on Soviet expansion. No other variables are statistically significant at the 95-percent confidence level.

Did 2014 Impact Different Types of Expansionism in the Same Way?

Finally, we consider whether the effects of 2014 also differed systematically in shaping the determinants of Slavic as opposed to Soviet expansionism. Figure 6 reports the findings from a multinomial logit model that is identical to that in Figure 4 except that it now includes year interactions, allowing us to calculate how the estimated effect of each factor on Slavic expansionism changes between 2013 and 2014.²⁷ Most prominently, it confirms that living in a region bordering Ukraine became a significant predictor of Slavic expansionism only in 2014, reflecting a statistically significant change. This lends confidence to the interpretation advanced in the previous section that Russia's conflict in Ukraine sparked a localized surge in pan-Slavism among people living in areas through which Russian forces passed and to which conflict refugees were likely initially to flee. Local context clearly matters, and when local context changes, so can support for expansionism.


A novel finding in Figure 6 indicates that 2014 significantly changed the relationship between anti-Westernism and support for Slavic expansion. In 2013, as expected by theories linking expansionism to expansionist worldviews (H9), anti-Westernism is significantly correlated with support for Slavic expansionism. But this effect disappears in 2014, just when anti-Westernism has been well documented to have spiked in response to the conflict. Moreover, it is not clear why anti-Westernism should be associated only with support for Slavic expansionism and not Soviet expansionism. Ultimately, these findings seem inconsistent with H9 and theories of ideology's central role.

Turning to Figure 7, which breaks down factors' associations with Soviet expansionism between 2013 and 2014, we once again learn more about the effects of age. While 2014 did not lead older people to any pronounced change in their level of support for Slavic expansionism, it did lead to a significant drop in their support for Soviet expansionism. With a key part of Soviet territory actually restored, it appears that older people in particular became more satisfied with Russia's borders, their most acute desires accommodated, ceasing to register a preference for returning to the full set of Soviet borders. That said, age still remains a significant predictor of support for Soviet expansionism, simply dropping from close to a 40 percent full effect in 2013 to under a 20 percent full effect in 2014.

²⁶ Vladimir Putin, "Interview of Vladimir Putin with German Television Channels ARD and ZDF," May 5, 2005, <http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/transcripts/22948>, accessed April 30, 2019.

²⁷ The results of the multinomial logit regression that produced the calculations depicted in Figures 6 and 7 can be found in tabular form in Table A4 in the appendix.

Figure 6. Change in factors' full effects on probability of support for SLAVIC expansion 2013-2014 (95% CI)




Regarding theories of geographic place, Figure 7 combines with Figure 6 to confirm that 2014 had mainly affected Ukraine's border regions by promoting pan-Slavism, not by promoting support for Soviet borders. Figure 7 also confirms the finding from Figure 2 that 2014 also produced a surge of opposition to expansionism (a full effect of about 12 percentage points) among Russian regions bordering the North Caucasus, now specifying that this reflected precisely a decline in support for Soviet expansionism. Further research will be necessary, but one plausible interpretation would see this finding as expressing a fear that Russia's intervention in Ukraine could be followed by an attempt to annex parts of Caucasus countries (generally non-Slavic) and this could be destabilizing, a sentiment that those in neighboring regions may fear would be destabilizing. Far Easterners also become about 14 percent more likely to oppose Soviet expansionism in 2014, perhaps because they resent the possibility of major costs for the sake of gaining distant territory, though it is unclear why this opposition would register only for Soviet and not Slavic expansionism. Other spatial variables are not significant.

Figure 7 also reveals some support for theories of expansionist ideology (H9): Individuals who reject the idea that Russia is primarily part of Western civilization became, in 2014, about 11 percent more likely to support Soviet expansionism. In 2013, no significant effect was registered. This would support H9 to the extent one believes that the 2014 conflicts heightened the salience of civilizational identity, making it a stronger driver of preferences for expansion than it had been in 2013. Other variables meant to capture associations with expansionist ideologies are not significant, however.

As for theories of nationalism, Figures 6 and 7 provide no statistically significant reason to conclude that expansionism is primarily driven by nationalism. These findings are, of course, consistent with constructivist theories of nationalism that do not posit essentially immutable and unidirectional associations between state territory and identity.

Figure 7. Change in factors' full effects on probability of support for expansion to USSR borders 2013-2014 (95% CI)



Conclusion

In sum, what has this study found? Table 2 summarizes the results with respect to the theories and hypotheses with which the study began. But we are now in position to go further and venture a more holistic description of the larger processes that are at work. These should then be tested in future studies using other data.

Table 2. Summary of results with respect to theories and hypotheses evaluated in this study

| <i>H#</i> | <i>Summary of logic</i> | <i>Finding</i> |
|---|--|----------------|
| <i>Theories of Nationalism</i> | | |
| H1 | Stronger attachment to country → expansionism | No |
| H2 | Dominant identity groups support expansionism | No |
| H3 | Identity group support for expansionism is highly contingent | Yes |
| H4 | Negative economic perceptions → expansionism | No |
| H5 | Positive economic perceptions → expansionism | Yes |
| <i>Theories of Historical Border Legacies</i> | | |
| H6 | More lived experience with old borders → expansionism | Yes |
| H7 | Such older people will support only old-border expansionism | Yes |
| H8 | Partly restored old borders reduces expansionism among the old | Yes |
| <i>Theories of Ideology, Norms, Worldviews</i> | | |
| H9 | Expansionist ideologies/worldviews → expansionism | Weak Yes |
| <i>Theories of Geographic Place</i> | | |
| H10 | Expansionism hinges on local context | Yes |

First, legacies of past borders are indeed strong influences on preferences for contemporary borders. This effect is mediated by age, which reflects the length of time individuals in our survey lived under the old borders. Second, actual acts of territorial expansion cannot be said consistently either to whet or satiate appetites for more expansion; instead, this will vary by subpopulation. On aggregate in Russia, Crimea appears to have satiated more than it whetted, especially among the older population, but it did increase expansionism systematically among some groups of people. Relatedly, third, territorial conflict can cause *localized* surges in identity-based expansionism in regions most directly affected by that conflict. This is evident in Russian regions bordering Ukraine, even when identity-related variables are generally poor predictors of expansionism nationwide. Nationalism, the evidence here suggests, is contingently related to expansionism rather than inherently related to it. The conclusion is similar regarding civilizational identity and the importance of expansionist ideologies: While these can play roles, they can be activated and deactivated by contingent events, including actual acts of expansion themselves, making them less than reliable predictors. In the same way, this study also documents surges of opposition to expansion in 2014 in geographic parts of Russia that are affected very differently, as in the Far East and bordering the North Caucasus. Fourth, support for identity-inflected territorial expansion is stronger among people who perceive strong national economic trends relative to their own person material positions, a relationship that is unaffected by actual acts of expansion and that lends support to interpretations of nationalism as a luxury good for the better off.

With these findings with respect to theory, and with other more fine-grained results, this study has established a framework for researching factors that influence individuals' attitudes toward the territorial expansion of their own state. Since such attitudes can arguably facilitate

some of the most momentous and disastrous world events, it is crucial for future studies to pick up where this one has left off. In particular, it will be important to learn whether similar patterns can be found in other countries capable of acting on such preferences, and to follow up on the research in Russia to test the robustness of and mechanisms behind the findings advanced here and to trace variation over time.

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APPENDIX

Table A1. Full effects of factors on probability of support for expanding Russia, pooled 2013-2014 datasets

| | | |
|-------------------------|-------|--------------|
| Year 2014 | -0.07 | [-0.16,0.01] |
| Age | 0.17* | [0.03,0.31] |
| Education | -0.08 | [-0.20,0.04] |
| Female | 0.02 | [-0.02,0.05] |
| Borders Ukraine | 0.08 | [-0.01,0.18] |
| Borders Kazakhstan | -0.02 | [-0.18,0.14] |
| Borders N Caucasus | -0.07 | [-0.20,0.05] |
| Moscow-St. Petersburg | -0.13 | [-0.29,0.03] |
| Far East | -0.02 | [-0.26,0.22] |
| Pocketbook improving | -0.14 | [-0.39,0.11] |
| RF economy worsening | 0.13 | [-0.04,0.30] |
| Russian | 0.08 | [-0.03,0.19] |
| Orthodox | -0.03 | [-0.12,0.07] |
| Pride in RF | -0.01 | [-0.07,0.06] |
| Ukrainians are like us | 0.01 | [-0.13,0.15] |
| Islamophobe | -0.03 | [-0.15,0.08] |
| Anti-Western | 0.01 | [-0.09,0.11] |
| European civilization | -0.01 | [-0.12,0.10] |
| Voted Putin 2012 | -0.03 | [-0.10,0.04] |
| Voted Zhirinovskiy 2012 | -0.03 | [-0.14,0.08] |
| Voted Zyuganov 2012 | 0.04 | [-0.09,0.17] |
| <i>N</i> | 2200 | |

95% confidence intervals in brackets

Note: Calculated using logit model.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A2. Factors' full effects on probability of support for expanding Russia (binary variable), including year 2014 interactions (95% CI, logit coefficients)

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------------|
| Year 2014 | -0.54 | [-1.89,0.80] |
| Age | 1.08** | [0.28,1.89] |
| Education | -0.32 | [-1.24,0.60] |
| Female | -0.07 | [-0.39,0.25] |
| Borders Ukraine | -0.10 | [-0.73,0.52] |
| Borders Kazakhstan | -0.26 | [-1.12,0.61] |
| Borders N Caucasus | 0.21 | [-0.59,1.01] |
| Moscow-St. Petersburg | -0.52* | [-0.91,-0.13] |
| Far East | -0.26 | [-0.77,0.24] |
| Pocketbook improving | -0.56 | [-1.66,0.54] |
| RF economy worsening | 0.11 | [-0.81,1.04] |
| Russian | 0.04 | [-0.50,0.59] |
| 1.orthodox | 0.18 | [-0.30,0.66] |
| Pride in RF | -0.05 | [-0.43,0.33] |
| Ukrainians are like us | -0.02 | [-0.98,0.95] |
| Islamophobe | -0.07 | [-0.79,0.65] |
| Anti-Western | 0.34 | [-0.09,0.76] |
| European civilization | 0.09 | [-0.36,0.53] |
| Voted Putin 2012 | -0.16 | [-0.59,0.28] |
| Voted Zhirinovskiy 2012 | -0.15 | [-0.71,0.41] |
| Voted Zyuganov 2012 | 0.03 | [-0.63,0.69] |
| Year 2014 x Age | -0.63 | [-1.85,0.58] |
| Year 2014 x Education | -0.27 | [-1.58,1.05] |
| Year 2014 x Female | 0.28 | [-0.14,0.70] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Ukraine | 1.03** | [0.47,1.59] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Kazakhstan | 0.40 | [-0.78,1.58] |
| Year 2014 x Borders N Caucasus | -1.03** | [-1.54,-0.53] |
| Year 2014 x Moscow-St. Pete | -0.02 | [-1.09,1.06] |
| Year 2014 x Far East | 0.37 | [-2.10,2.83] |
| Year 2014 x Pocketbook | 0.04 | [-1.25,1.32] |
| Year 2014 x RF economy | 0.75 | [-0.63,2.14] |
| Year 2014 x Russian | 0.53 | [-0.02,1.07] |
| Year 2014 x Orthodox | -0.51 | [-1.29,0.27] |
| Year 2014 x Pride in RF | 0.04 | [-0.43,0.51] |
| Year 2014 x Ukrainians r like us | 0.01 | [-1.24,1.26] |
| Year 2014 x Islamophobe | -0.09 | [-1.01,0.84] |
| Year 2014 x Anti-West | -0.47 | [-1.08,0.14] |
| Year 2014 x European Civ | -0.39 | [-1.45,0.66] |
| Year 2014 x Putin voter | 0.07 | [-0.58,0.72] |
| Year 2014 x Zhirinovskiy voter | -0.05 | [-1.08,0.98] |
| Year 2014 x Zyuganov voter | 0.16 | [-0.92,1.24] |
| _cons | -0.31 | [-1.46,0.84] |

N 2200

95% confidence intervals in brackets

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01

Table A3. Full effect of factors on probability of support for Slavic and Soviet expansion 2013-14

| | Slavic expansion | | Soviet expansion | |
|------------------------|------------------|--------|------------------|--------|
| Year 2014 | -0.02 | (0.04) | -0.06 | (0.03) |
| Age | -0.10* | (0.05) | 0.26** | (0.04) |
| Education | 0.03 | (0.06) | -0.10* | (0.04) |
| Female | -0.01 | (0.02) | 0.03 | (0.02) |
| Borders Ukraine | 0.10** | (0.02) | -0.03 | (0.06) |
| Borders Kazakhstan | 0.02 | (0.04) | -0.04 | (0.06) |
| Borders N Caucasus | -0.01 | (0.02) | -0.06 | (0.07) |
| Moscow-St. Petersburg | -0.11* | (0.05) | -0.03 | (0.04) |
| Far East | 0.01 | (0.11) | -0.02 | (0.05) |
| Pocketbook improving | -0.17* | (0.08) | 0.02 | (0.10) |
| RF economy worsening | 0.14* | (0.06) | -0.01 | (0.07) |
| Russian | 0.06 | (0.04) | 0.02 | (0.04) |
| Orthodox | 0.01 | (0.04) | -0.03 | (0.03) |
| Pride in RF | -0.01 | (0.02) | 0.00 | (0.02) |
| Ukrainians are like us | -0.03 | (0.04) | 0.04 | (0.05) |
| Islamophobe | -0.02 | (0.03) | -0.01 | (0.05) |
| Anti-Western | 0.03 | (0.03) | -0.02 | (0.03) |
| European civilization | 0.01 | (0.05) | -0.02 | (0.03) |
| Voted Putin 2012 | -0.01 | (0.03) | -0.03 | (0.03) |
| Voted Zhirinovsky 2012 | -0.01 | (0.04) | -0.02 | (0.05) |
| Voted Zyuganov 2012 | 0.05 | (0.05) | -0.01 | (0.05) |
| <i>N</i> | 2200 | | 2200 | |

Standard errors in parentheses

Note: Multinomial logit, standard errors in parentheses

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$

Table A4. Effects of variables on probability of support for SLAVIC and SOVIET expansion, including year 2014 interactions, as estimated by a multinomial logit model with the baseline being all who did not explicitly support either form of expansion (95% CI, logit coefficients)

Slavic Expansion

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------------|
| Year 2014 | -0.32 | [-2.26,1.62] |
| Age | -0.16 | [-1.05,0.72] |
| Education | -0.05 | [-1.16,1.06] |
| Female | -0.20 | [-0.50,0.10] |
| Borders Ukraine | -0.22 | [-0.99,0.56] |
| Borders Kazakhstan | -0.06 | [-0.97,0.86] |
| Borders N Caucasus | 0.01 | [-0.57,0.58] |
| Moscow-St. Petersburg | -0.62* | [-1.12,-0.12] |
| Far East | -1.18** | [-1.91,-0.44] |
| Pocketbook improving | -0.96 | [-2.12,0.20] |
| RF economy worsening | 0.44 | [-0.99,1.87] |
| Russian | 0.40 | [-0.28,1.07] |
| Orthodox | 0.34 | [-0.40,1.08] |
| Pride in RF | -0.08 | [-0.53,0.37] |
| Ukrainians are like us | -0.48 | [-1.66,0.69] |
| Islamophobe | 0.14 | [-0.62,0.90] |
| Anti-Western | 0.55* | [0.06,1.04] |
| European civilization | -0.14 | [-0.80,0.52] |
| Voted Putin 2012 | -0.09 | [-0.59,0.40] |
| Voted Zhirinovskiy 2012 | -0.12 | [-0.74,0.50] |
| Voted Zyuganov 2012 | 0.38 | [-0.39,1.16] |
| Year 2014 x Age | -0.22 | [-1.36,0.93] |
| Year 2014 x Education | -0.03 | [-1.67,1.61] |
| Year 2014 x Female | 0.29 | [-0.13,0.71] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Ukraine | 1.55** | [0.74,2.36] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Kazakhstan | 0.17 | [-1.41,1.75] |
| Year 2014 x Borders N Caucasus | -0.45 | [-1.07,0.17] |
| Year 2014 x Moscow-St. Pete | -0.40 | [-1.96,1.16] |
| Year 2014 x Far East | 2.00 | [-0.83,4.83] |
| Year 2014 x Pocketbook | -0.29 | [-1.92,1.35] |
| Year 2014 x RF economy | 0.75 | [-1.24,2.74] |
| Year 2014 x Russian | 0.01 | [-0.79,0.81] |
| Year 2014 x Orthodox | -0.60 | [-1.57,0.37] |
| Year 2014 x Pride in RF | -0.01 | [-0.67,0.66] |
| Year 2014 x Ukrainians r like us | 0.44 | [-1.05,1.93] |
| Year 2014 x Islamophobe | -0.33 | [-1.53,0.86] |
| Year 2014 x Anti-West | -0.66 | [-1.41,0.08] |
| Year 2014 x European Civ | 0.28 | [-0.91,1.48] |
| Year 2014 x Putin voter | 0.10 | [-0.67,0.87] |
| Year 2014 x Zhirinovskiy voter | 0.13 | [-1.15,1.41] |
| Year 2014 x Zyuganov voter | -0.12 | [-1.34,1.10] |
| _cons | -0.94 | [-2.35,0.48] |

Expansion to Soviet Borders

| | | |
|----------------------------------|---------|---------------|
| Year 2014 | -0.56 | [-2.14,1.01] |
| Age | 2.32** | [1.41,3.23] |
| Education | -0.53 | [-1.59,0.52] |
| Female | 0.05 | [-0.39,0.50] |
| Borders Ukraine | 0.04 | [-0.74,0.82] |
| Borders Kazakhstan | -0.53 | [-1.68,0.61] |
| Borders N Caucasus | 0.37 | [-0.76,1.51] |
| Moscow-St. Petersburg | -0.43 | [-0.97,0.11] |
| Far East | 0.19 | [-0.57,0.96] |
| Pocketbook improving | -0.25 | [-1.73,1.23] |
| RF economy worsening | -0.25 | [-1.19,0.69] |
| Russian | -0.17 | [-0.91,0.57] |
| Orthodox | -0.00 | [-0.59,0.59] |
| Pride in RF | -0.02 | [-0.55,0.52] |
| Ukrainians are like us | 0.54 | [-0.59,1.66] |
| Islamophobe | -0.30 | [-1.25,0.66] |
| Anti-Western | 0.07 | [-0.46,0.60] |
| European civilization | 0.30 | [-0.14,0.74] |
| Voted Putin 2012 | -0.22 | [-0.83,0.38] |
| Voted Zhirinovskiy 2012 | -0.18 | [-1.12,0.76] |
| Voted Zyuganov 2012 | -0.32 | [-1.11,0.47] |
| Year 2014 x Age | -1.05 | [-2.67,0.57] |
| Year 2014 x Education | -0.50 | [-1.92,0.92] |
| Year 2014 x Female | 0.28 | [-0.30,0.85] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Ukraine | -0.07 | [-0.85,0.70] |
| Year 2014 x Borders Kazakhstan | 0.70 | [-0.34,1.74] |
| Year 2014 x Borders N Caucasus | -1.83** | [-2.47,-1.19] |
| Year 2014 x Moscow-St. Pete | 0.19 | [-0.80,1.18] |
| Year 2014 x Far East | -1.87** | [-2.99,-0.75] |
| Year 2014 x Pocketbook | 0.43 | [-1.40,2.25] |
| Year 2014 x RF economy | 0.75 | [-0.81,2.30] |
| Year 2014 x Russian | 0.90 | [-0.18,1.98] |
| Year 2014 x Orthodox | -0.37 | [-1.43,0.70] |
| Year 2014 x Pride in RF | 0.04 | [-0.75,0.82] |
| Year 2014 x Ukrainians r like us | -0.53 | [-2.07,1.01] |
| Year 2014 x Islamophobe | 0.17 | [-0.99,1.34] |
| Year 2014 x Anti-West | -0.18 | [-0.82,0.46] |
| Year 2014 x European Civ | -1.30* | [-2.38,-0.22] |
| Year 2014 x Putin voter | 0.00 | [-0.83,0.83] |
| Year 2014 x Zhirinovskiy voter | -0.22 | [-1.72,1.27] |
| Year 2014 x Zyuganov voter | 0.33 | [-0.80,1.46] |
| _cons | -1.30 | [-2.73,0.12] |

N 2200

95% confidence intervals in brackets

* p<0.05, ** p<0.01