

**Partisanship, Populists, and Plane Crashes:  
Can Populist Partisanship Drive Conspiratorial Beliefs?**

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## **Abstract**

Under what conditions does partisanship shape beliefs in conspiracy theories? More specifically, do populist partisans process conspiracy theories through a partisan lens, as they process other sorts of political information? Using data from Poland, I show that when their party elites endorse specific conspiracy theories, partisans of right-wing populist parties are more likely to believe in those conspiracy theories. However, right-wing populist partisans do not believe in all conspiracy theories more than partisans of other parties. Rather, populist partisanship is only positively associated with conspiratorial beliefs when a partisan's party espouses a conspiracy theory. Furthermore, there are clear differences in levels of belief between partisans of two prominent right-wing populist parties for a conspiracy that only one party champions. Therefore, right-wing populists appear to only have higher levels of conspiratorial beliefs when partisan cues encourage them to believe in a conspiracy. As such, my findings suggest that conspiratorial beliefs operate like other sources of political information, which are vulnerable to partisan cueing.

*Paper Presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021.  
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## Introduction

While the use of conspiracy theories to discredit political opposition and to garner political support is not necessarily new, in recent years, political leaders have increasingly endeavored to leverage conspiracy theories for partisan ends. For instance, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban featured anti-Semitic conspiracy theories about George Soros prominently in his 2018 parliamentary campaign in an attempt to mobilize votes for his Fidesz party. Similarly, former U.S. President Donald Trump spread a conspiracy theory that the 2020 presidential election was rigged to try to maintain power. These false conspiracies, endorsed and espoused by political leaders, have encouraged people to commit violence and even terrorism. Does partisanship motivate people to believe in conspiracy theories?

When political party leaders express support for particular conspiracy theories, can these endorsements affect partisans' beliefs? Under what conditions can partisanship shape beliefs in conspiracy theories? Do partisans process conspiracy theories through a partisan lens, as they do with other sorts of political information?

In this paper, I argue that partisanship shapes information processing about conspiracy theories similarly to how it impacts the way people process other sorts of political information. Extant research has shown that partisan cues increase the likelihood that people will adopt their party's views (Brader and Tucker, 2009; Green et al., 2004). Likewise, I expect that when party leaders espouse particular conspiracy theories, their partisans will be more likely to take up and believe these conspiracies.

Using data from Poland, I show that when their party elites endorse a particular conspiracy theory, partisans are more likely to believe in that conspiracy theory. Conspiratorial beliefs do not appear to cluster together as part of a

conspiratorial mindset. Rather, partisans are more likely to believe in the conspiracies that their party leaders champion and are less likely to believe in the conspiracies that their party leaders reject. As such, partisanship impacts the likelihood that individuals will believe in a particular conspiracy theory.

The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, I explore how partisanship affects the ways individuals process political information. Second, I describe how far-right populist parties may be particularly positioned to shape whether their partisans believe in conspiracy theories. Third, I theorize about the relationship between partisanship and conspiratorial beliefs for six conspiracy theories in Poland. Fourth, I present my detailed findings, which generally show that partisanship is highly associated with belief in particular conspiracy theories.

## **Partisanship and Information Processing**

Partisan attachments are strong and pervasive forces capable of shaping the way people process information in democracies (Bartels, 2002; Brader et al., 2013; Brader and Tucker, 2001; Campbell et al., 1980; Gerber et al., 2010; Samuels and Zucco Jr, 2014). The ways in which partisanship affects public opinion range from impacting opinion formation on particular issues (Campbell et al., 1980; Hajnal and Lee, 2011), to shaping the values voters express (Goren et al., 2009; McCann, 1997), to even shaping the ways in which partisans perceive objective political events (Bartels, 2002).

Extant research has shown that individuals filter political information through pre-existing beliefs and identities, like ideology and partisanship (Kunda, 1990; Berinsky, 2017; Lewandowsky et al., 2005). Individuals are more likely to accept political information confirming their beliefs and to reject political information challenging their beliefs (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Taber and Lodge, 2006; Za-

ller et al., 1992). Moreover, partisans are more likely to support their party's policy positions (Brader and Tucker, 2012), particularly when their party has a consistent ideological image (Brader et al., 2013). Indeed, partisan cues can increase the likelihood that an individual will take up an issue position that their party espouses (Brader and Tucker, 2009). When people strongly identify as partisans, they are more likely to “absorb the doctrinal positions” that their party advances (Green et al., 2004, p.4).

Given that partisanship exerts a substantial influence over the ways in which individuals engage with political information, might partisanship also sway the likelihood that an individual will believe in a conspiracy theory? In order to address this question, I first define what I mean by conspiracy theories and then present some existing research on the links between partisanship and conspiratorial beliefs.

## Partisanship and Conspiracy Theories

Conspiracy theories are ways people make sense of confusing events (Miller et al., 2016). Conspiracy theories explain a past, present, or future event by claiming that a small group of powerful people secretly works against the common good in order to advance its own objectives at the expense of the common good (Miller et al., 2016; Sunstein and Vermeule, 2009; Uscinski and Parent, 2014; Oliver and Wood, 2014).

Existing literature suggests that the way people form opinions about conspiracies is quite similar to the process of forming other political opinions (Oliver and Wood, 2014). Ideological positions help predict who believes in conspiracy theories (Furnham, 2013; Miller et al., 2016; Hartman and Newmark, 2012).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>For example, Lewandowsky et al. (2013) argue that Americans who endorse free-market economics are more likely to reject climate science as well as facts such as HIV causes AIDS and that smoking causes lung cancer.

Indeed, individuals may be more likely to accept conspiratorial beliefs that align with their own views and to critically analyze or reject those that challenge their beliefs (McHoskey, 1995)

Beyond ideological positions, partisan biases can also shape beliefs in conspiracy theories (Smallpage et al., 2017). When officials outside of one's party are implicated in a conspiracy theory, partisans are more likely to believe it than when copartisans are implicated (Uscinski et al., 2016; Pasek et al., 2015).<sup>2</sup> Indeed, some scholars have shown that partisanship can increase the likelihood that people will believe in certain conspiracy theories.

Furthermore, there may be a relationship between right-wing populism and belief in conspiracy theories. Where right-wing populist parties are strong, the association between partisanship and belief in conspiracy theories might be even stronger because the anti-elite and Manichaeian nature of both populism and conspiratorial thinking could make populist partisans even more likely to believe in conspiracy theories.

Extant literature shows that individuals who hold anti-elite views, who have low trust in experts, or who have negative stereotypes of elites are more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Oliver and Rahn, 2016; Bricker, 2013; van Prooijen et al., 2018). Indeed, conspiracy theories painting elites as engaged in some corrupt activities fit nicely into the populist conception of a variety of evil elites in cahoots with each other and undermining "the people" (Vossen, 2010; Fenster, 1999).

Populist and conspiratorial beliefs also may co-occur because both concepts promote a Manichean division of the world (Berlet and Lyons, 2018; Barkun, 2013). Given that populist leaders often appeal to individuals by identifying the true, good people and the corrupt, evil elite (Vachudova, 2020), it seems rea-

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<sup>2</sup>For example, Republicans are more likely to believe in Obama birther conspiracies when compared to Democrats (Pasek et al., 2015).

sonable to expect that those who buy into a Manichean political worldview will also be more likely to support Manichean conspiracy theories. The Manichaeian nature of populist support may allow populist parties to frame conspiracy theories in a way that resonates with supporters and encourages them to accept these alternative facts. Indeed, conspiracy theories that portray some hated elite or out-group as responsible for harming some in-group may particularly attract populist partisans.

More generally, partisan differences in conspiratorial beliefs likely stem from the degree to which party elites propagate conspiracy theories (Enders and Smallpage, 2019b). The extent to which their party elites advocate for particular conspiracy theories likely influences how receptive partisans are to conspiratorial claims (Enders and Smallpage, 2019b). If populist politicians encourage their followers to endorse “counterknowledge” and information provided by alternative “experts” (Ylä-Anttila, 2018) or to construct conspiracy theories to help explain a complicated reality (Abts et al., 2018), then populist supporters may be particularly likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Castanho Silva et al., 2017). Moreover, populist leaders have encouraged their support bases to use motivated reasoning towards most political issues (Hawkins et al., 2018), which might make it easier for populists to exploit their hard-core supporters’ trust and to convince these supporters to believe in certain conspiracy theories.

Furthermore, people at the ideological extremes may be more likely to believe in conspiracy theories (Krouwel et al., 2017; Van Prooijen et al., 2015), particularly those on the far-right of the ideological spectrum (Bergmann, 2018). Various far-right parties – many of which are populists – have risen to prominence and participated in governing coalitions around Eastern Europe (Bustikova, 2014). Some of these far-right parties espouse conspiracy theories (Ramet, 2010; Bustikova, 2019). Therefore, we should more closely examine the ways

in which these parties leverage conspiracy theories as well as how their strategies subsequently affect their partisans' beliefs in conspiracies. This analysis is particularly relevant in countries where multiple radical right parties are major political competitors. In Poland, for example, the far-right populist parties of PiS and Konfederacja respectively captured 43.5% and 6.8% of all votes in the 2019 parliamentary elections to the Sejm.

While some scholarly work points to partisanship – particularly right-wing partisanship – affecting conspiratorial beliefs, the vast majority of this literature has accrued in the U.S. context (Berinsky, 2017; Hofstadter, 1964; Pasek et al., 2015; Duran et al., 2017; Edelson et al., 2017; Enders and Smallpage, 2019a; Hartman and Newmark, 2012; Saunders, 2017; Nisbet et al., 2015). Though valuable research, in the U.S. context, it is challenging to differentiate the degree to which either right-wing ideologies or partisanship shape conspiratorial beliefs simply because the U.S. is a two-party system. Where the right-wing ideology neatly maps onto one political party, we cannot isolate these effects. Moreover, few studies explore whether partisanship similarly shapes conspiratorial beliefs in multiparty systems where different parties leverage different conspiracy theories in unique ways. Therefore, I build upon this research by teasing out these relationships in Poland, wherein multiple prominent right-wing populist parties compete electorally and have combined won slight more than 50 percent of the vote share. By examining a case where multiple right-wing populist parties advance different conspiracy theories, we can better isolate the relationship between right-wing populist ideologies and belief in conspiracy theories and the relationship between partisanship and conspiratorial beliefs. As such, we can begin to identify whether partisanship shapes which conspiracy theories individuals will believe.

## Partisanship and Conspiratorial Beliefs in Poland

In this section, I theorize about how partisanship should shape conspiratorial beliefs in Poland by drawing from two streams of the literature. First, I build upon literature examining how partisanship shapes information processing to suggest that conspiracy theories may act as simply another type of political information vulnerable to partisan cueing. Second, I extend the literature on how partisanship can impact beliefs in conspiracy theories, which has predominately occurred in a two-party system, to contend that in a multi-party system we are better able to tease apart the relationship between partisanship and conspiratorial beliefs in isolation from the relationship between right-wing ideologies and conspiratorial beliefs. As such, I argue that the type of right-wing populist partisanship shapes the degree to which individuals hold specific conspiratorial beliefs in Poland.

In particular, I theorize that partisans should be more likely to endorse the conspiracy theories that their party pushes in their rhetoric and campaigning strategies when compared to partisans belonging to parties that do not propagate those conspiracy theories. The theorized attitudinal pattern – if observed – should suggest that partisanship is capable of shaping beliefs in conspiracy theories much like it shapes other types of political attitudes and beliefs.

Figure 1 shows the variation in the ideological placement of the main political parties in Poland. However, I am largely interested in whether partisanship affects the likelihood of partisans believing conspiracy theories because of the variation in the type and degree to which Polish parties push different conspiracy theories. Thus, in this section, I briefly explain six different conspiracy theories and situate the Polish parties in the relation to the degree to which they endorse and propagate these conspiracy theories about: (1) the Smoleńsk plane crash, (2) the European Union, (3) Jewish influence, (4) the Round Table



Agreement, (5) 9/11, and (6) the influence of cabals. Table 1 summarizes the key political parties and their positions on various conspiracy theories. Konfederacja and PiS – both right-wing populist parties – both endorse conspiracy theories that are anti-EU, anti-Semitic, and are about the Round Table Agreement. Whereas PiS endorses a conspiracy theory about the Smoleńsk plane crash, Konfederacja does not. By contrast, no other political party endorses any conspiracy theory presented – and none of them are populist parties. After explaining these conspiracies in more depth, I generate six hypotheses based on which parties endorse each of the following conspiracy theories.

Table 1: Polish Parties and Endorsed Conspiracy Theories

Party Name	Smoleńsk	Anti-EU	Anti-Semitic	Round Table	9/11	Cabals
Konfederacja	✗	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
PiS	✓	✓	✓	✓	✗	✗
PO	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
PSL	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗
Lewica	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗	✗

## Smoleńsk Plane Crash Conspiracy Theory

The first conspiracy theory examined in this paper centers on the Smoleńsk plane crash. In April 2010, the Polish president belonging to the PiS party, Lech Kaczyński, and 95 other Polish political, military, and religious officials travelled by plane to the 70th commemoration of the massacre of 21,000 Polish officers and intelligentsia by the Russian People’s Commissariat of Internal Affairs (NKVD) in the Katyń forests in 1940 (Drzewiecka and Hasian, 2018).<sup>3</sup> En route to this

<sup>3</sup>This commemoration was predicted to improve Polish-Russian relations. Throughout communist times, Soviet and Russian political leaders and scholars claimed that the Nazis committed this massacre. In reality, the Soviet NKVD killed these 21,000 Poles. This lie caused a great deal of tension within communist-era Poland. In 1990, President Mikhail Gorbachev acknowledged that the NKVD was responsible and subsequently opened archives containing documents, which confirmed the NKVD’s complicity in the Katyń massacre. However, in 2004, Prime Minister Vladimir Putin closed these archives and stopped releasing materials about Katyń. Putin’s changed policy towards Katyń upset Poles who sought social




Figure 1: Polish Party Positions

commemoration, the plane carrying the Polish president, first lady, and 94 other Polish political, military, and religious elites crashed – killing all of them. This crash in the town of Smoleńsk occurred only a few miles from the site of the Katyń massacre.

Unsurprisingly, almost immediately, conspiracy theories sprouted up about the causes of the crash. From claims that Russians stole top secret documents from the crash site, manipulated the investigation, and lied about the plane crash to claims that Russians actually shot down the plane and killed the survivors later, conspiracy theories blossomed (Żukiewicz and Zimny, 2015).<sup>4</sup> When liberal media sources and subsequent reports revealed that foggy conditions and pilot error were responsible for the crash, some right-wing media claimed that the Russians purposefully sprayed a foggy mist so that the plane would crash (Żukiewicz and Zimny, 2015).

Importantly, these conspiracy theories were not relegated to backwater blogs. Instead, they were published in the popular right-wing newspaper *Rzeczpospolita*, even as liberal newspapers such as *Gazeta Wyborcza* denounced these conspiracies (Żukiewicz and Zimny, 2015; Kofta and Soral, 2019). Furthermore, the populist PiS party immediately leveraged these conspiracies for political support, claiming that the plane crash was an assassination (Wysocka, 2013). Jarosław Kaczyński – President Lech Kaczyński’s surviving brother and the leader of PiS – told then-Prime Minister Donald Tusk, “In a political sense, you bear 100% responsibility for the catastrophe” and claimed that Tusk conspired with Russia to kill the Polish delegation (Davies, 2016). Similarly, PiS Defense Minister

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justice and reconciliation. When Putin invited a large number of Polish officials to the 70th commemoration of Katyń, it signaled a potential path forward for those Poles attempting to promote social justice and reconciliation.

<sup>4</sup>While some right-wing media sources stated that President Lech Kaczyński’s anti-Russian foreign policy in Georgia encouraged Russia to shoot down the plane, other right-wing media published that the plane crash was Russia’s revenge for Poland’s democratization in 1989 and 1991, which–they claimed–led to the disintegration of the Soviet Union (Żukiewicz and Zimny, 2015).

Antoni Macierewicz described the Smoleńsk crash as, “the greatest cover-up in the history of the world” (Davies, 2016).

Since 2010, the PiS party has actively mobilized people on a monthly basis to commemorate the Smoleńsk crash (Tworzecki, 2019). PiS wasted no time claiming that the crash illustrated a division in Polish society between the true patriots and the collaborators (Koczanowicz, 2012; Tworzecki, 2019). Moreover, since coming back to power in 2015, PiS has leveraged state institutions like the Institute of National Memory in order to look for evidence that Polish and Russian officials collaborated to cause this plane crash (Kofta and Soral, 2019).

By contrast, no other party or party leaders examined in this paper have endorsed or mobilized people around conspiracy theories about the Smoleńsk crash. Therefore, I hypothesize that PiS partisans should be more likely to believe in conspiracy theories about Smoleńsk than other partisans.

**H1:** PiS partisans should be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the Smoleńsk plane crash than partisans of other parties.

## European Union Conspiracy Theories

Though only PiS advances conspiracy theories about the Smoleńsk plane crash, both PiS and Konfederacja endorse conspiracy theories about the European Union. Both parties claim that Poland has little ability to influence the EU. Rather, they contend, the EU dictates and constrains Poland’s actions.

PiS Justice Minister Zbigniew Zioboro has accused the EU of waging “an attack on democracy” and an “absurd” attack on the “true rule of law” in Poland when it criticized Poland for its rule of law situation and for discriminating against women, LGBTQ+ people, and minorities (Press, 2020). Additionally, after the European Parliament stated that Poland’s near-total ban on abortion reflected the “systemic collapse of the rule of law” in Poland, PiS-appointed

head of the Constitutional Tribunal Julia Przylebska claimed that, “Members of the European Parliament are entering into the area of the independence of the Constitutional Tribunal...which violates the separation of powers, and thus the foundations of democracy” (Reuters, 2020).

Perhaps even more explicitly, the Konfederacja party platform states, “We will not allow our sovereignty to be further lost to benefit the EU...We reject the concept of the gradual federal construction of a superstate governed by Brussels...There will be no political, economic, and cultural sovereignty of Poland questioned” (Konfederacja, 2019). In addition, in a Konfederacja document entitled “Constitutional Theses of the Confederation: New Order,” the party writes that, “For many years, the EU has been systematically expanding their competences at the cost of Polish national sovereignty” (Konfederacja, 2020). These statements amount to conspiratorial thinking that the EU influences Polish affairs without Poland being able to shape EU policy.

Thus, both PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely to believe in conspiracy theories about the EU than partisans of other parties.

**H2:** PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the European Union than partisans of other parties.

## Conspiracy Theories about Jewish Influence

As is the case with anti-EU conspiracy theories, both PiS and Konfederacja endorse anti-Semitic conspiracy theories.

In reference to the Jedwabne massacre of 1941 – when Poles living in the town of Jedwabne burned alive 300 Jews in a barn –, PiS Education Minister Anna Zalewska stated, “Jedwabne is a historical fact that has led to many misunderstandings and very biased opinions” (Gera, 2016). In response, her interviewer stated, “Poles burned Jews in a barn.” Zalewska responded with,

“That’s your opinion repeated after Mr. Gross” (Gera, 2016).<sup>5</sup> PiS Foreign Minister Witold Waszczykowski backed her claims (Scislowska, 2016). PiS Defense Minister Antoni Macierewicz has also denied the Jedwabne pogrom – as well as other pogroms. Additionally, Macierewicz endorsed the “Protocols of the Elders of Zion” pamphlet in an interview, claiming that, “Experience shows that there are such groups in Jewish circles” (Syal, 2015).<sup>6</sup>

Similarly, Konfederacja MP Grzegorz Braun claimed that Jews, “have waged war against the Polish nation for centuries. In fact, they have always conducted it against the Poles and against the whole Christian world” (ADL, 2019). Braun also stated that Jews want to turn Poland into a “Jewish state” (ADL, 2019). Another Konfederacja MP, Sławomir Mentzen, said that, “You have to tell people that the Jews will get our Polish land, they will set the Poles on a knot, and they will cultivate the fields with them” (Sitnicka, 2019).

These statements amount to a clear endorsement of anti-Semitic conspiracy theories on the part of PiS and Konfederacja. Therefore, I expect that partisans of both parties should have a higher likelihood of believing in anti-Semitic conspiracy theories than other partisans.

**H3:** PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about Jews than partisans of other parties.

## Conspiracy Theories about the Round Table Agreement

The fourth conspiracy theory analyzed in this paper centers around the Round Table Agreement, reached in 1989 between the anti-communist Solidarity movement and the communist regime. The Round Table Agreement produced the first set of partly free elections, permitted the formation of a non-communist

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<sup>5</sup>For reference, Jan Gross researched and published a book – *Neighbors* that shows conclusively Poles were involved in the mass murder of Jews in Jedwabne.

<sup>6</sup>“The Protocols of the Elders of Zion” is a hoax pamphlet, which alleges that there is a Jewish plan to control the global economy and media.

government, enabled freer travel, and introduced a market economy. Though largely heralded as a success, a conspiracy theory has sprouted up around the Round Table talks. The Round Table conspiracy theory claims that communists in government and traitors within Solidarity collaborated in order to protect communist interests under the new political system. This outcome was hidden from the general public, according to believers of this conspiracy. Believers also claim that Lech Wałęsa actually served as a puppet of the communist government in these negotiations.

What do political parties have to say about this conspiracy theory? Whereas PiS and Konfederacja endorse this conspiracy theory, no other party in the legislature does.

After returning to power in 2015, PiS ordered the Institute of National Memory to search for evidence showing that Lech Wałęsa, as the leader of Solidarity, collaborated with the communists during the Round Table talks and that he generally collaborated with the communist police (Kofta and Soral, 2019). PiS also used its control over public television and radio to attack the Round Table as a conspiracy between certain disloyal Solidarity leaders and the communist government (Kofta and Soral, 2019). Indeed, Andrzej Zybertowicz – an advisor to PiS President Andrzej Duda – claimed that during the Round Table negotiations Lech Wałęsa “bet on the interests, dealers, [and] people from the secret services of the Polish People’s Republic...[who] used him as a puppet to keep society from looking behind the scenes” of the negotiation process (w Polityce, 2016). Moreover, PiS party platforms often refer to the political influence of the *układ*. These party platforms claim that a shadowy network of people who are rooted in communist times and who – until PiS’ recent reforms to democratic institutions – undermined the Polish state to forestall the emergence of a strong and fair state (PiS, 2005, 2019)

Leaders of Konfederacja have also advanced conspiracy theories about the Round Table Agreement. For example, Janusz Korwin-Mikke – a high-ranking member of Konfederacja tweeted that he is against the Round Table “dictate,” which he implies was influenced by General Czesław Kiszczak – a general responsible for repressing Solidarity and enforcing martial law in the communist period. (Janusz Korwin-Mikke, 2020). Indeed, a year earlier, Janusz Korwin-Mikke also posted on Facebook, “Who decided who would sit at the Round Table? Who invited people to the Round Table meeting? It was the late General Czesław Kiszczak...it was not a spontaneous uprising...It was a comedy orchestrated by General Kiszczak’s people, aimed at giving up power in a way that changed a lot, but kept everything old as is” (Rzeczpospolita, 2021). Perhaps most strikingly, on Konfederacja’s website, it poses the question of why individuals should vote for the party. The first rationale for voting for Konfederacja is that it is the “only anti-establishment choice outside of the Round Table Agreement” (Konfederacja, 2019).<sup>7</sup>

Given the strong endorsement of conspiracy theories about the Round Table by PiS and Konfederacja, I expect their partisans to be more likely to believe in this conspiracy theory when compared to partisans of other parties.

**H4:** PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely to endorse conspiracy theories about the Round Table Agreement than partisans of other parties.

### Conspiracy Theories about 9/11

Some scholars find that conspiracy theories about 9/11 are well-known and politically salient (Cassino and Jenkins, 2013; Stempel et al., 2007; Laine and Parakkal, 2017). Frequently, these conspiracy theorists claim that the terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in 2001 was planned and conducted by the American government rather than Al-Qaeda. While salient in other parts of

<sup>7</sup>Konfederacja leaders did not participate in the Round Table talks.



the world, no political party in Poland endorses conspiracy theories about 9/11. Therefore, there should be no difference in the conspiratorial beliefs about 9/11 between partisans of any parties.

**H5:** All partisans should be equally as likely to endorse conspiracy theories about 9/11, regardless of party.

### **Conspiracy Theories about the Influence of Cabals**

Cabal conspiracy theories generally assert that secret groups decide world affairs – not elected leaders – and these secret groups are attempting to create a totalitarian world order (Amarasingam and Argentino, 2020; Bergmann, 2018). Polish political parties do not endorse general conspiracy theories about unidentified cabals running the world. Thus, there should be no difference in the conspiratorial beliefs between partisans of any parties for conspiracies about a cabal running the world.

**H6:** All partisans should be equally as likely to endorse conspiracy theories about a cabal running the world, regardless of party.

### **Description of Data and Methodology**

To test my six hypotheses, I leverage data from two different sources: Diagnoza Społeczna and GLOBSEC’s Voices of Central Europe project. Diagnoza Społeczna is a nationally representative panel dataset that ran from 2000-2015. I pull data from 2011, 2013, and 2015 – each following the year of the Smoleńsk plane crash and therefore being the first observation of one key dependent variable: belief in Smoleńsk conspiracy theories. Unfortunately, the only question about beliefs in conspiracy theories in the survey by Diagnoza Społeczna asks about Smoleńsk. Therefore, to get a better sense of how partisanship affects different conspiratorial beliefs, I also analyze survey data from the Voices of Central

Europe project, which asks respondents whether they believe in the six different conspiracy theories already described. This data come from a nationally representative survey of Polish citizens conducted by the think tank GLOBSEC. The question wording for each survey question is available in the Appendix in Table 2. Additionally, as shown in Appendix Tables 4, 5, 6, and 7, all substantive findings remain consistent regardless of alternative model specifications, such as controlling for trust in political institutions, support for democracy, views towards elites, and the degree to which respondents feel threatened by Western societies' way of living, the EU, the U.S., migrants, and people who are LGBTQ+.

In order to disentangle whether right-wing populist ideologies or partisanship is more important, I identify observable patterns that should allow us to assess my theory more transparently. First, we can compare the degree to which these right-wing partisans believe in all conspiracies compared to the degree to which other partisans believe in these conspiracies. If partisanship does not matter, but right-wing populist ideologies do, then we should find that PiS and Konfederacja partisans are more likely to believe in all conspiracy theories when compared to other partisans. If partisanship does matter, then we should expect to see that PiS and Konfederacja's partisans should only have a higher likelihood of believing in the conspiracy theories that their party endorses when compared to other partisans. Second, we should see a clear gap between PiS and Konfederacja's partisans when it comes to belief in the Smoleńsk conspiracy theory. Whereas PiS espouses this conspiracy theory, Konfederacja's party leaders do not. Thus, if partisanship matters, we should see a clear gap in belief in the Smoleńsk conspiracy theory between PiS partisans and all other partisans. Third, we should see that across time, belief in the Smoleńsk conspiracy is consistently higher for PiS partisans than for other partisans.

## Results

Are partisans more likely to believe in the conspiracy theories advanced by their party or are partisans of some parties simply more likely to believe in conspiracy theories in general?

I first test H1 – that PiS partisans will have a higher probability of believing in Smoleńsk related conspiracies than other partisans. To examine the associations between partisanship and beliefs in various conspiracy theories, I first model the probability of believing in the Smoleńsk conspiracy with a generalized linear model and a binomial link function, using the Voices of Central Europe data. I control for education, gender, residence type, and age.<sup>8</sup> Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3 further underscore that partisans may process conspiracy theories like other forms of political information.

PiS and Konfederacja partisans appear high on most conspiratorial beliefs, yet, the gap between these partisans and partisans of other parties are statistically and substantively significant for only certain conspiracy theories. PiS partisans are more likely to believe in the Smoleńsk conspiracy theory when compared to partisans of other parties. However, Konfederacja’s partisans have just as low of a predicted probability of believing in this conspiracy as other non-PiS partisans. This gap in conspiratorial beliefs between right-wing populist parties is not only statistically significant, but also is quite substantive. Indeed, for a conspiracy that arguably has the strongest political partisan cues in Poland – in that PiS leaders died in the crash and the party continues to mobilize partisans around it on a monthly basis – we see some of the most substantial gaps between PiS partisans and all other partisans. Therefore, this data appears supportive of H1: PiS partisans are more likely to believe in the

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<sup>8</sup>The substantive findings are the same if I control for any combination of the following variables: views towards elites, democracy, and minorities as well as trust in political institutions.

Smoleńsk conspiracy theory than other partisans.

This finding also suggests that supporters of right-wing populist parties are not necessarily more likely to believe in all conspiracy theories. Rather, their party might need to endorse the conspiracy theory in order for them to be more likely to believe it. The sizeable gap in the predicted probability of believing in the Smoleńsk theory between PiS partisans and Konfederacja partisans is quite notable. It encourages us to explore whether conspiratorial beliefs are actually quite targeted and somewhat based in partisan predispositions.

Does partisanship similarly shape other conspiratorial beliefs? I now examine H2 – that both PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely to believe in a conspiracy theory against the EU than partisans of other parties because their parties have endorsed anti-EU conspiracies. Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3 show that when compared to other partisans, both PiS and Konfederacja partisans are significantly more likely to believe in a conspiracy theory that claims the EU dictates to Poland and that Poland has no chance to influence the EU. This gap is not only statistically significant, but also appears substantively significant as there is a sizeable gap between partisans of Konfederacja and PiS and partisans of other political parties, who have a much lower predicted probability of believing in the anti-EU conspiracy theory. As such, it seems that partisanship may shape beliefs in an anti-EU conspiracy theory.

I now turn to assessing H3, which theorized that PiS and Konfederacja partisans should be more likely than other partisans to believe in an anti-Semitic conspiracy theory claiming that Jews have too much power and secretly control governments around the world because both PiS and Konfederacja's leaders endorse this conspiracy. As we can see in Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3, though the predicted probability of believing in this conspiracy theory is higher for partisans from PiS and Konfederacja than for most other partisans, the

gap is neither statistically nor substantively significant when comparing these partisans to PSL partisans. By contrast, a substantive and significant gap exists between the partisans of Lewica and PO and the partisans of Konfederacja and PiS. Thus, I find some degree of support for H3.

Furthermore, H4 – that PiS and Konfederacja partisans will endorse conspiracy theories about the Round Table agreement at higher rates than partisans of other parties – appears supported in Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3. Konfederacja and PiS partisans are more likely than other parties’ partisans to believe that Solidarity made a deal with the communists in 1989 and that these former communist officials still rule Poland. Moreover, this gap is not only statistically significant, but is also quite sizeable, which offers support for the idea that the rhetoric used by PiS and Konfederacja politicians has influenced their partisans’ beliefs on the Round Table talks.

In general, PiS and Konfederacja partisans are more likely to believe the conspiracy theories that their party officials endorse when compared to other partisans who belong to parties that do not support these conspiracy theories. However, this finding could simply reflect higher levels of conspiratorial thinking among PiS and Konfederacja partisans more generally. If this were the case, then partisans of PiS and Konfederacja would be more likely to endorse all conspiracy theories when compared to other partisans – regardless of whether their party actually spread or endorsed a particular conspiracy theory. Is this pattern what we observe? Or, as I theorized, do gaps between partisans from different parties only exist for conspiracy theories around which certain parties mobilize?

It does not appear that PiS and Konfederacja partisans are simply more likely to believe in all conspiracy theories when compared to other partisans. As mentioned earlier, only PiS partisans are more likely to believe in the conspiracy

theory about Smoleńsk than any other partisans. Konfederacja's partisans are just as unlikely to endorse this conspiracy theory as other parties' partisans. This pattern may emerge because only PiS endorses this conspiracy theory.

Moreover, as theorized in H5, Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3 reveal that neither a substantive nor a statistically significant gap between partisans of any party exists for beliefs in 9/11 conspiracy theories. When asked whether the respondent thought that 9/11 was planned and conducted by the American government, there were not meaningful differences in the levels of belief in this conspiracy theory between different partisans. Since no Polish party propagated 9/11 conspiracy theories, this finding suggests that the way in which partisanship shapes beliefs in conspiracy theories likely has to do with whether the party endorses a conspiracy theory – not whether some parties simply attract more conspiratorial thinkers.

This tentative conclusion is further buttressed when examining H6. I hypothesized that all partisans should be equally as likely to endorse a conspiracy theory that claimed that world affairs were decided by secret groups that are attempting to establish a totalitarian world order because no party has endorsed this conspiracy. Figure 2 and Appendix Table 3 offer support for H6, as there are not substantively or statistically significant differences between partisans belonging to different parties in the predicted probability of endorsing this conspiracy.

Therefore, these findings underscore that – at least in Poland – partisanship appears associated with beliefs in particular conspiracy theories, but not the likelihood of believing in conspiracy theories in general. As such, these findings suggest that partisanship shapes belief in conspiracy theories for only those conspiracy theories that one's party endorses. Indeed, from the data presented thus far, the way partisanship appears to shape conspiratorial beliefs seems

much like the way partisans process other, non-conspiratorial types of political information.

### **Partisanship & Conspiratorial Beliefs across Time**

While the findings thus far suggest that partisanship is associated with beliefs in particular conspiracy theories, it is not clear whether these effects remain consistent over time. For partisanship to be a key force capable of shaping beliefs in conspiracy theories, partisans across time should consistently endorse the conspiracy theory that their party claims occurred. Unfortunately, no dataset to my knowledge has collected panel data across time to measure beliefs in all of the conspiracy theories analyzed thus far. However, a panel survey completed by *Diagnoza Społeczna* asks about beliefs in the Smoleńsk plane crash conspiracy theory in its 2011, 2013, and 2015 surveys. Unfortunately, *Konfederacja* had yet to form into a political party during the survey waves. Thus I only have data on whether partisans from PiS, PO, PSL, and the United Left (*Lewica*) believe that the Smoleńsk plane crash occurred because of a conspiracy against the Polish president.

I once again run a generalized linear model with a binomial link function to model the relationship between partisanship and conspiratorial beliefs across time. I control for education, gender, residence type, and age. Once again, all models are consistent if I control for political trust and support for democracy; however, there is not consistent wording for views towards minorities or support for the EU so I cannot fully replicate my previous models.

Figure 3 shows that PiS partisans are more likely to believe in the Smoleńsk conspiracy across time than partisans of other parties. This gap is quite sizeable and remains consistent in the three years of panel data that I can access. After 2011, there is a sizeable jump in all partisans' levels of belief in the Smoleńsk




Figure 2: Partisanship and Belief in Conspiracy Theories. Confidence intervals generated using observed case approach.



conspiracy theory. The greatest jump, however, occurs among PiS partisans. This finding suggests that as the dust settled after the crash and after reports were released in late 2011 by the Polish and Russian governments, which showed that no plot against the Polish government occurred, PiS partisans became substantially more likely to believe in the conspiracy theory. Perhaps as PiS had time to spread its conspiracy and as its partisans had time to read or hear the partisan cueing, belief in this conspiracy increased. Given that no statistically significant difference exists between 2013 and 2015 for any party's partisans, it seems probable that it took some time for the conspiracy to spread to and be accepted by PiS partisans.

## Conclusion

In this paper, I find that important differences exist in conspiratorial beliefs across different types of partisans. Konfederacja and PiS partisans are both more likely to believe in conspiracy theories that oppose the European Union and the Round Table Agreement. However, this does not appear to reflect some broader conspiratorial mindset among radical right partisans. If we look at conspiracy theories about 9/11 and cabals running the world, which are not endorsed by any political party, there are no statistically significant differences between partisans of any political party. Perhaps most interestingly, for a conspiracy theory that only PiS endorses, there is a statistically and substantively significant gap in the predicted probability of believing in the Smoleńsk conspiracy theory between PiS partisans and partisans of all other parties, including Konfederacja. Additionally, over time with the same panel, we can see that belief in the Smoleńsk conspiracy theory spikes after 2011 and stays at a consistently high level for PiS partisans. This finding suggests that after a party has time to spread its conspiracy theory, partisan cueing might work and encour-




Figure 3: Partisanship and Belief in Smoleńsk Conspiracy. Confidence intervals generated using observed case approach.

age its partisans to believe in the conspiracy. Thus partisan endorsement of a conspiracy theory appears important in shaping the degree to which individuals will believe it.

This paper contributes to the broader conspiracy theory literature by helping advance knowledge on how partisanship affects conspiratorial beliefs around the world. Much of the current literature focuses on the U.S. case. By examining how these patterns work in the multiparty context of Poland, it can help us understand the critical ways in which partisanship – independent of broader right-wing ideologies – impacts conspiratorial beliefs. I show that in Poland, conspiratorial beliefs appear heavily influenced by partisan cues, not simply whether one supports a far-right party. Moreover, I provide evidence that belief in conspiracy theories appear to operate like other types of political information, affected by partisan cues.

Further improving our understanding of how partisanship shapes conspiratorial beliefs is important because conspiracy theories are becoming a regular part of the public debate (Bricker, 2013). Since right-wing populists use conspiracy theories frequently in their discourse, it is important to understand how these party cues shape conspiratorial thinking among party bases. As we know from the invasion of the U.S. Capitol building by individuals who were led to believe that an election was stolen by their party leaders, these conspiratorial beliefs may spur mobilization that threaten to destabilize liberal democratic institutions. Given the substantial threat these conspiracy theories can pose to democratic and political stability, it is critical to understand the factors that drive individuals to believe in conspiracy theories. Partisanship appears to be one of these factors.

## Appendix

Table 2: Question Wording for Conspiracy Theories

<b>Conspiracy Code</b>	<b>Question Wording</b>
9/11	The terrorist attack on the World Trade Center in New York in 2001 was planned and conducted by the American government, not Al-Qaeda.
Anti-Semitism	Jews have too much power and secretly control governments and institutions around the world.
Cabal	World affairs are not decided by elected leaders but by secret groups aiming to establish a totalitarian world order.
Anti-EU	EU and Brussels dictates to Poland what to do without Poland having a chance to influence it
Round Table	The “Solidarity” made a deal with the communists during the Round Table negotiations of 1989, and Poland is still ruled by the people who were in power in a socialist regime.
Smoleńsk (Voices of Central Europe)	The Smoleńsk plane crash was staged. The former Prime Minister Donald Tusk made a deal with Russia to kill the then President Kaczyński and the elite.
Smoleńsk (Diagnoza Społeczna)	Which of the causes of the Polish airplane’s catastrophe in Smoleńsk on 10 April 2010 is in your opinion most probable? Chose: Attack or conspiracy against the Polish president

Table 3: Partisanship and Various Conspiratorial Beliefs

	<i>Dependent variable: Belief in Conspiracy Theory about...</i>					
	Smoleńsk (1)	Cabal (2)	Round Table (3)	9/11 (4)	EU (5)	Jewish People (6)
Konfederacja	-0.005 (0.254)	0.437*** (0.200)	1.133*** (0.246)	0.763*** (0.210)	0.929*** (0.212)	0.824*** (0.210)
Lewica	-0.595** (0.299)	-0.221 (0.184)	-1.081*** (0.212)	-0.212 (0.244)	-1.284*** (0.266)	-0.506** (0.201)
Other	-0.112 (0.251)	0.009 (0.203)	-0.023 (0.196)	0.309 (0.229)	-0.366* (0.206)	-0.197 (0.206)
PiS	1.079*** (0.123)	0.232** (0.111)	0.403*** (0.110)	-0.162 (0.143)	0.654*** (0.109)	0.476*** (0.115)
PO	-0.822*** (0.245)	-0.370*** (0.143)	-0.768*** (0.147)	-0.200 (0.184)	-0.875*** (0.160)	-0.691*** (0.160)
PSL	-0.774** (0.342)	-0.154 (0.200)	-0.631*** (0.201)	-0.358 (0.281)	-0.584*** (0.210)	-0.087 (0.202)
Education	-0.286*** (0.058)	-0.162*** (0.048)	-0.082* (0.049)	-0.126** (0.060)	-0.181*** (0.049)	-0.115** (0.050)
Gender	0.053 (0.107)	-0.056 (0.088)	-0.158* (0.089)	-0.051 (0.111)	-0.161* (0.092)	-0.419*** (0.093)
Residence Type	-0.044 (0.109)	-0.080 (0.090)	0.027 (0.092)	0.065 (0.114)	-0.142 (0.093)	-0.013 (0.095)
Age	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.005* (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
Constant	-0.0004 (0.229)	0.169 (0.192)	0.189 (0.198)	-0.013 (0.233)	0.253 (0.198)	-0.507** (0.200)
Observations	881	884	923	848	949	874
Log Likelihood	-376.216	-584.043	-556.704	-341.718	-532.068	-520.674
Akaike Inf. Crit.	774.432	1,190.087	1,135.408	705.436	1,086.136	1,063.347

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 4: Partisanship and Various Conspiratorial Beliefs

	Belief in Conspiracy Theory about...					
	Smoleńsk (1)	Cabal (2)	Round Table (3)	9/11 (4)	EU (5)	Jewish People (6)
Konfederacja	-0.004 (0.254)	0.433** (0.200)	1.133*** (0.247)	0.760*** (0.210)	0.932*** (0.212)	0.821*** (0.210)
Lewica	-0.571* (0.299)	-0.256 (0.185)	-1.099*** (0.213)	-0.232 (0.245)	-1.260*** (0.265)	-0.525*** (0.202)
Other	-0.100 (0.252)	-0.017 (0.204)	-0.034 (0.197)	0.299 (0.229)	-0.353* (0.206)	-0.212 (0.207)
PiS	1.012*** (0.138)	0.387*** (0.125)	0.469*** (0.124)	-0.086 (0.159)	0.595*** (0.122)	0.547*** (0.129)
PO	-0.807*** (0.246)	-0.399*** (0.144)	-0.782*** (0.147)	-0.214 (0.185)	-0.864*** (0.160)	-0.703*** (0.160)
PSL	-0.775** (0.343)	-0.146 (0.200)	-0.632*** (0.202)	-0.361 (0.282)	-0.587*** (0.210)	-0.085 (0.202)
Education	-0.287*** (0.058)	-0.165*** (0.048)	-0.082* (0.049)	-0.127** (0.060)	-0.183*** (0.049)	-0.113** (0.050)
Gender	0.049 (0.107)	-0.059 (0.088)	-0.159* (0.089)	-0.046 (0.112)	-0.161* (0.092)	-0.420*** (0.093)
Residence Type	-0.035 (0.109)	-0.098 (0.090)	0.018 (0.093)	0.055 (0.114)	-0.133 (0.094)	-0.023 (0.096)
Age	-0.004 (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.014*** (0.004)	0.005* (0.003)	0.017*** (0.003)
Political Trust	0.041 (0.037)	-0.086*** (0.031)	-0.037 (0.032)	-0.044 (0.038)	0.034 (0.032)	-0.040 (0.033)
Constant	-0.092 (0.245)	0.387* (0.208)	0.275 (0.211)	0.097 (0.252)	0.175 (0.211)	-0.415* (0.214)
Observations	881	884	923	848	949	874
Log Likelihood	-375.585	-580.167	-556.017	-341.038	-531.478	-519.914
Akaike Inf. Crit.	775.170	1,184.335	1,136.034	706.076	1,086.956	1,063.828

Note: \*p<0.1; \*\*p<0.05; \*\*\*p<0.01

Table 5: Partisanship and Various Conspiratorial Beliefs

	Belief in Conspiracy Theory about...					
	Smoleńsk (1)	Cabal (2)	Round Table (3)	9/11 (4)	EU (5)	Jewish People (6)
Konfederacja	0.309 (0.302)	0.510** (0.243)	1.007*** (0.286)	0.868*** (0.253)	1.067*** (0.268)	0.870*** (0.262)
Lewica	-0.937** (0.451)	-0.143 (0.207)	-0.996*** (0.235)	0.037 (0.268)	-1.334*** (0.302)	-0.518** (0.227)
Other	-0.084 (0.306)	-0.005 (0.233)	-0.016 (0.233)	0.408 (0.274)	-0.451* (0.245)	-0.103 (0.240)
PiS	1.141*** (0.187)	0.411** (0.163)	0.621*** (0.165)	0.102 (0.209)	0.450*** (0.162)	0.741*** (0.173)
PO	-0.773*** (0.285)	-0.399** (0.162)	-0.705*** (0.167)	-0.140 (0.216)	-0.915*** (0.185)	-0.754*** (0.185)
PSL	-4.340 (104.314)	-0.024 (0.252)	-0.474* (0.248)	-0.348 (0.386)	-0.656** (0.265)	0.122 (0.253)
Education	-0.307*** (0.078)	-0.215*** (0.060)	-0.167*** (0.062)	-0.138* (0.074)	-0.206*** (0.064)	-0.112* (0.064)
Gender	0.134 (0.141)	-0.155 (0.108)	-0.075 (0.112)	-0.068 (0.137)	-0.254** (0.115)	-0.583*** (0.116)
Residence Type	-0.037 (0.143)	-0.077 (0.111)	0.113 (0.115)	0.010 (0.139)	-0.214* (0.118)	-0.043 (0.119)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	0.004 (0.003)	-0.00004 (0.004)	-0.015*** (0.004)	0.005 (0.004)	0.015*** (0.004)
Political Trust	0.019 (0.050)	-0.062 (0.040)	-0.001 (0.041)	-0.049 (0.049)	0.083** (0.042)	-0.043 (0.043)
Anti-Elite	-0.438* (0.245)	-0.022 (0.220)	0.045 (0.221)	-0.575** (0.235)	-0.009 (0.220)	0.115 (0.235)
Constant	0.166 (0.390)	0.664** (0.329)	0.483 (0.329)	0.666* (0.379)	0.333 (0.331)	-0.314 (0.340)
Observations	588	599	612	572	626	587
Log Likelihood	-217.677	-389.684	-360.029	-229.973	-335.890	-336.984
Akaike Inf. Crit.	461.354	805.369	746.059	485.946	697.781	699.968

Note:

\*p&lt;0.1; \*\*p&lt;0.05; \*\*\*p&lt;0.01

Table 6: Partisanship and Various Conspiratorial Beliefs

	Belief in Conspiracy Theory about...					
	Smoleńsk (1)	Cabal (2)	Round Table (3)	9/11 (4)	EU (5)	Jewish People (6)
Konfederacja	-0.034 (0.322)	0.243 (0.255)	0.832*** (0.297)	0.648** (0.262)	0.775*** (0.293)	0.529* (0.285)
Lewica	-0.794* (0.455)	-0.042 (0.211)	-0.898*** (0.237)	0.215 (0.277)	-1.292*** (0.322)	-0.387 (0.237)
Other	-0.099 (0.324)	0.056 (0.238)	0.029 (0.237)	0.461 (0.283)	-0.461* (0.261)	-0.070 (0.253)
PiS	0.967*** (0.194)	0.184 (0.171)	0.439** (0.172)	-0.126 (0.220)	0.102 (0.176)	0.427** (0.186)
PO	-0.590** (0.296)	-0.248 (0.166)	-0.574*** (0.171)	0.057 (0.224)	-0.719*** (0.192)	-0.512*** (0.191)
PSL	-4.310 (166.427)	0.108 (0.255)	-0.351 (0.250)	-0.096 (0.389)	-0.490* (0.274)	0.332 (0.259)
Education	-0.290*** (0.080)	-0.193*** (0.062)	-0.146** (0.064)	-0.111 (0.076)	-0.183*** (0.067)	-0.077 (0.067)
Gender	0.260* (0.148)	-0.090 (0.111)	-0.013 (0.114)	0.036 (0.142)	-0.146 (0.122)	-0.519*** (0.122)
Residence Type	-0.012 (0.148)	-0.078 (0.112)	0.137 (0.117)	-0.003 (0.142)	-0.222* (0.123)	-0.049 (0.124)
Age	-0.001 (0.005)	0.004 (0.003)	0.001 (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.005)	0.006* (0.004)	0.017*** (0.004)
Political Trust	0.030 (0.052)	-0.053 (0.040)	0.008 (0.042)	-0.040 (0.050)	0.104** (0.044)	-0.029 (0.045)
Anti-Elite	-0.502** (0.254)	-0.025 (0.224)	0.009 (0.224)	-0.648*** (0.238)	-0.083 (0.232)	0.083 (0.246)
Threat Index	0.273*** (0.052)	0.262*** (0.047)	0.217*** (0.047)	0.252*** (0.053)	0.405*** (0.052)	0.397*** (0.052)
Constant	-0.248 (0.408)	0.288 (0.339)	0.144 (0.340)	0.330 (0.393)	-0.220 (0.351)	-0.910** (0.365)
Observations	588	599	612	572	626	587
Log Likelihood	-203.456	-373.394	-348.890	-218.622	-301.567	-304.432
Akaike Inf. Crit.	434.912	774.788	725.779	465.245	631.134	636.865

Note:

\* p&lt;0.1; \*\* p&lt;0.05; \*\*\* p&lt;0.01



Table 7: Partisanship and Various Conspiratorial Beliefs

	Belief in Conspiracy Theory about...					
	Smoleńsk (1)	Cabal (2)	Round Table (3)	9/11 (4)	EU (5)	Jewish People (6)
Konfederacja	0.063 (0.321)	0.256 (0.256)	0.831*** (0.297)	0.649** (0.262)	0.763*** (0.292)	0.517* (0.285)
Lewica	-0.641 (0.452)	0.082 (0.214)	-0.870*** (0.239)	0.219 (0.279)	-1.213*** (0.324)	-0.315 (0.240)
Other	-0.003 (0.329)	0.147 (0.241)	0.051 (0.238)	0.463 (0.284)	-0.411 (0.264)	-0.008 (0.256)
PiS	0.961*** (0.196)	0.129 (0.174)	0.430** (0.172)	-0.130 (0.221)	0.064 (0.178)	0.395** (0.187)
PO	-0.585* (0.303)	-0.223 (0.168)	-0.568*** (0.171)	0.056 (0.224)	-0.740*** (0.195)	-0.508*** (0.192)
PSL	-4.268 (165.774)	0.152 (0.257)	-0.344 (0.251)	-0.095 (0.390)	-0.489* (0.275)	0.349 (0.261)
Education	-0.241*** (0.082)	-0.131** (0.064)	-0.130** (0.065)	-0.108 (0.078)	-0.120* (0.069)	-0.029 (0.069)
Gender	0.235 (0.150)	-0.143 (0.113)	-0.028 (0.115)	0.034 (0.143)	-0.210* (0.124)	-0.562*** (0.124)
Residence Type	0.014 (0.150)	-0.060 (0.114)	0.145 (0.117)	-0.002 (0.142)	-0.203 (0.125)	-0.034 (0.125)
Age	-0.002 (0.005)	0.002 (0.003)	0.0002 (0.004)	-0.016*** (0.005)	0.005 (0.004)	0.016*** (0.004)
Political Trust	0.014 (0.052)	-0.072* (0.041)	0.005 (0.042)	-0.040 (0.050)	0.090** (0.044)	-0.042 (0.046)
Anti-Elite	-0.474* (0.254)	0.047 (0.227)	0.022 (0.224)	-0.646*** (0.239)	-0.030 (0.232)	0.125 (0.246)
Threat Index	0.242*** (0.053)	0.230*** (0.048)	0.207*** (0.048)	0.250*** (0.055)	0.373*** (0.053)	0.378*** (0.053)
Democracy Views	0.175*** (0.057)	0.210*** (0.046)	0.050 (0.047)	0.007 (0.057)	0.187*** (0.049)	0.150*** (0.050)
Constant	-0.635 (0.430)	-0.097 (0.354)	0.049 (0.351)	0.316 (0.409)	-0.590 (0.366)	-1.192*** (0.377)
Observations	588	599	612	572	626	587
Log Likelihood	-198.731	-362.820	-348.320	-218.614	-294.225	-299.928
Akaike Inf. Crit.	427.462	755.639	726.639	467.228	618.450	629.856

Note:

\* p&lt;0.1; \*\* p&lt;0.05; \*\*\* p&lt;0.01

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