

Non-dominant groups in Kosovo: a marginalized view on (de)securitization of minorities after conflict

Marius-Ionut Calu

Regent's University London

calum@regents.ac.uk

Paper presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021
Do No Cite Without the Permission of the Author

Abstract

Through the case-study of statebuilding in Kosovo, this paper discusses how the (de)securitization of minorities after conflict is particularly problematic when seen from the marginalized perspective of non-dominant ethnic minority groups. The main argument is that the adoption of a multiethnic statebuilding model of governance, including consociational power-sharing arrangements, has triggered unintended consequences for the (de)securitization of non-dominant minority groups in Kosovo (other than Serbs). One key consequence is the securitisation of even the most vulnerable groups in Kosovo. By exploring various social, economic, legal, political and identity characteristics of non-dominant communities in Kosovo, this paper shows the need for a more inclusive understanding of security beyond the threat of physical violence. This would permit, among other things, to distinguish between the different layers and types of de(securitization) identified by this research. Otherwise, desecuritization remains ineffective and cannot escape the straitjacket of emergency politics. In conclusion, the long-term risk of managing minority rights through one-size-fits-all approaches is that statebuilding in plural societies will always struggle to de-securitize minority rights and develop 'normal' politics of diversity.

Keywords: Kosovo; securitization; desecuritization; multiethnic; minority rights; power-sharing; statebuilding; diversity; identity.

Introduction

This paper considers the securitization and desecuritization (Hansen, 2012; Nancheva, 2017; Skleparis, 2018) of non-dominant minorities in Kosovo in the context of adopting a post-conflict and post-independence far-reaching provisions and legislation on minority rights protection. Inspired by recent work addressing the position of non-dominant groups in divided societies (Agarin, McCulloch, Murtagh, 2018), this paper contributes to research on securitization through a focused case-study qualitative analysis of the impact of peacebuilding measures like power-sharing on the (de)securitization of non-dominant minority groups in Kosovo. More precisely, this paper examines Kosovo's focus on reconciling the majority Albanians and minority Serbs, while overlooking the de jure and de facto situation of Bosniak, Turkish, Roma, Ashkali, Egyptian, Gorani, Montenegrin and Croat communities. By 'situation' I mean integration, accommodation or marginalization, all depending on the security, socio-economic, political, cultural and territorial characteristics of each group aside. Moreover, by employing previous research consisting of document analysis and primary data (interviews), this paper explores unintended consequences of implementing a multiethnic framework of governance on (de)securitization of minority groups.

Among other issues, I aim to reiterate negative effects of one-size-fits-all measures like power-sharing, group differentiation, focus on political representation and rights, ethnic decentralization and seek to answer the following research questions: *To what extent have non-dominant groups in Kosovo been both securitized and de-securitized by post-conflict legislation and efforts to manage diversity?* and *Can the policies, tools and institutions designed for multiethnic governance in Kosovo spark effective desecuritization?*

While similar literature looking at minorities in Kosovo has almost exclusively focused on the Serb community (Beha, 2014; Loncar, 2015), the smaller non-dominant minorities have also been affected by the post-conflict peacebuilding arrangements. This means that non-dominant groups, which may or may not have had clear role in the conflict and, thus, with an unclear position in the reconciliation and statebuilding processes, have by default also been included in a security discourse that portrays minorities as a 'threat to the society and social order'. Equally, then, my aim is to show how (de)securitization discourses have the power to turn even the smallest and most vulnerable minority groups into referent objects of security.

As a result of their (ethno-) political mobilization and aspirations to fully benefit of their unanticipated rights, even the smallest communities can become more differentiated and

segregated from the rest of the society. Therefore, I argue that extensive formal provisions for minorities, including non-dominant groups, do not necessarily translate into effective integration or accommodation and may become instead tools for securitization, resistance and unintended marginalization. In addition, this paper aims to highlight the need for more research looking at cases of statebuilding arrangements and security discourses that do not differentiate clearly between minorities and their distinct security roles during and after conflict. In other words, what are the consequences of treating all minorities as potential security threats or as referent objects of security?

This paper also illustrates how promoting minority rights in Kosovo through security, legal and political provisions intersects with the complexity of needs and requirements coming from different minority groups. This may act in favour or not of minority groups depending on the particular characteristics and priorities, as well as the will and capacity of each of them. Therefore, (de)securitization in this paper has a broader definition that goes beyond the making and breaking of identity as an existential threat outside ‘normal politics’ (Buzan et al., 1998; Aradau, 2006; Behnke, 2006; Weaver, 1995). The marginalized perspective of non-dominant minorities employed here highlights a more inclusive understanding of security beyond physical violence, given the intricacies of these groups’ own threat perceptions.

The legal and institutional framework in Kosovo vis-à-vis the management of minorities, the individual data and results discussed here investigate the risks of perpetuating a security, social and political hierarchy among minority groups. The main dilemma that this paper addresses is the variation regarding minority rights protection towards the smaller communities in Kosovo and the risky character of generalized provisions for state security and inter-ethnic reconciliation. Formal provisions and post-conflict specific measures like power-sharing consociational features cannot fully guarantee security, social cohesion and the legitimization of the state by all its constituent ethnic groups. Altogether, this paper investigates the inconsistency regarding minority politics in Kosovo and the unintended consequences of one-size-fits-all (de)securitization discourses and practices.

1. Securitization of multiethnic governance

Transitional societies challenged by their multiethnic/multinational character have often been at risk of developing politics and practices of segregation. This is visible not only in societies divided by conflict, where the reproduction of a security dilemma makes it very difficult to build sustainable governance, but also within peaceful negotiations (parliamentary or such) between majority and minorities as regards institutional frameworks for coexistence. In these situations, endless discussions and failure to make compromise may result in poor communication, lack of trust and may induce segregation. Such problems may occur when the majority perceives minimum requirements of the minority as a first step towards secession, while the minority regards the maximum offer of the majority as a first step towards assimilation.

Another problem facing post-conflict liberal-democratic polities like Kosovo with plural societies is the applicability of solutions offered by internationally driven statebuilding missions. Solutions formulated by the international community can be the adoption of multicultural policies or integrative institutional arrangements. The objectives of such solutions may be accepted by the groups that are in course of negotiating arrangements for coexistence within the same political community, but the irreconcilable character of interests and repetitive failures to make compromise have demonstrated over time that international recommendations are not necessarily effective and appropriate.

Given that the main objective is to remove the root causes of conflict, to promote human security and to create a stable peace (Barnett, 2006), liberal peacebuilding missions support democratization, establishing a legislative framework, equal rights, free elections and development of a civil society. The aim is to spread *liberal peace* by creating states organized around these liberal principles designed to maintain domestic and external stability. Moreover, by having to address different concerns of human security and national security at the same time, liberal peacebuilding has often prioritized short-term security goals (end of large-scale state-sponsored violence, peace between main groups) through securitising speech acts and practices that trigger long-term unintended consequences.

An example of such consequences in Kosovo is that, because of the initial focus of the international mandate on state institutions and inter-group conflict (Serbs vs. Albanians), it has become more difficult to differentiate between inter- and intra-group violence, and between securitization and desecuritization of ethnic groups: ‘the initial focus on very specific threat

constructions shaped the political process in powerful terms, because it inscribed exactly these threats in the discourses and practices of statebuilding and resulted in other threats of violence being “overlooked” as political significant in public communication’ (Bonacker et al., 2018: 489).

Altogether, different conceptions on the modern state-formation suggest three core functions and responsibilities of the state as a provider of security, representation and welfare (Milliken and Krause, 2002). Hence, the capacity and will of states to perform these main functions of governance have permanently been vital elements of modern state-formation. On the one hand, if security is the ultimate responsibility of the state, it needs to maintain the monopoly on the use of force within its borders and reduce or eliminate external and internal threats. However, security is also about the needs of individuals who make up states, so how can states be secure if the individuals comprising them are insecure? Consequently, these are basic conditions for a state to maintain its authority and avoid state failure or civil wars, which often originate in ethnic, religious, linguistic, or other intercommunal enmities:

But the outbreak of civil war, whether ostensibly ethnic, linguistic or religious in character, is almost always a product of leadership decisions that consciously deprive minorities or oppressed majorities of what they consider their human rights, their equal economic opportunities, their appropriate share of official positions, or the social and political goods that they believe they justifiably deserve (Rotberg, 2007: 86).

Well-established states, where the institutional infrastructure of the state is not under scrutiny, are more prepared to accommodate minorities on some levels, so long as the inherited national identity of the state is not questioned (Betrand and Haklai, 2014). Most Western states’ willingness to accept and even foster diversity has been favoured by the fact that the presence of different ethno-cultural communities within their borders has not been a serious security threat. In other words, even if minority groups gained extensive autonomy and the right to self-determination and, consequently, jeopardized the territorial integrity and social cohesion of the state, there has been little risk of violent conflict. As a result, most Western states have desecuritized ethnic politics by transferring relations between the state and minorities out of the security box and into ‘the democratic politics box’ (Kymlicka, 2010: 107).

However, new states in post-conflict, post-communist or post-colonial contexts focused on consolidating national legitimacy have been particularly prone to accentuating boundaries of exclusion. In the context of post-conflict statebuilding, an integration/assimilation approach may be instantly challenged by the legacy of ethnic divisions and by the mere fact that it would

not necessarily be complemented by a voluntary decision of different groups to integrate and /or be assimilated. In relation to this, complex risks like asymmetrical integration, upholding of segregation or fostering inequality for different ethnic groups have shaped the ‘threat perceptions of potential violence’ and, consequently, the entire statebuilding process in Kosovo (Bonacker et al., 2018: 489). When there is a high level of social division, the state may be perceived as representing the interests of a particular group, or more precisely to ethnic groups in the case of multiethnic states. Through securitization, the political mobilization of minorities may be prohibited ‘and even if minority demands can be voiced, they will be rejected by the larger society and the state. After all, how can groups that are disloyal have legitimate claims against the state?’ (Kymlicka, 2010: 106). Given the state’s internal insecurity, it becomes necessary to strengthen its coercive power, thus the correlation between post-conflict statebuilding and the prioritization of capacity/institution-building designed to create the conditions where states are capable to exercise social control.

In Kosovo, after conflict and after the 2008 declaration of independence, its official pledge to multiethnicity has shown many limitations as indicated by commitment issues to foster the integration and implementation of minority rights, as well as the level of understanding and the acceptance of the new context by both majority Albanians and Serbs as the dominant minority. While the Kosovo authorities have been collaborating for the protection of minority rights as a one of the key conditions for independence (Perritt, 2009), minority Serbs have been highly divided and even though they have shown some commitment to integrate, they have not dropped their non-constitutional ties with Serbia. Therefore, I identify this as a first and principal layer of securitization of ethnic relations in Kosovo, where relations between Kosovo and the Serb community are not seen ‘as a matter of normal democratic debate and negotiation, but as a matter of state security’ (Kymlicka, 2010: 106).

One of the conditions for Kosovo’s partially recognized independence has been to show real and full commitment to respect and include its minority communities in the governance of the new state. Thus, while achieving full international recognition (legal sovereignty) may remain the most difficult task for Kosovo, becoming capable of managing its minorities and, thus, protecting all its citizens equally is a feature of functional post-ethnic conflict states (domestic sovereignty). The legitimacy of its independence and authority may depend more than assumed on a real and comprehensive inclusion of all communities as part of a polity that is capable to move beyond managing diversity as a permanent exercise of (de)securitization of minorities.

2. Post-war securitization in Kosovo

After 1999, Kosovo was under the administration of the UN in accordance with UNSC Resolution 1244, which established a status of autonomy. The Resolution established the United Nations Interim Administration in Kosovo (UNMIK) with the role to administer the province ‘while establishing and overseeing the development of provisional democratic self-governing institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful and normal life for all inhabitants in Kosovo’ (UNSCR 1244, 1999). Moreover, the Kosovo Force (KFOR), the NATO-led international peacekeeping force in Kosovo, was responsible for the transition to peace in Kosovo while also guaranteeing the safe return of the refugees from all communities. UNMIK had a very difficult objective to govern the province and to secure peace while coordinating the local authorities to develop capacity for self-government without pre-settled future status.¹ In addition, despite the fact that policy and legislation were developed and approximated in line with European standards, the implementation process was slow and inefficient. As in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, internationally driven governance hurried to elaborate rules, laws, guiding principles, measures in the absence of legitimacy, capacity and means to make all of these functional. On the topic of ‘Human rights and the protection of minorities’, there was little progress concerning religious freedom, women’s rights, children’s rights and property rights, while minority rights were ‘guaranteed by law but restricted in practice because of security concerns’ (European Commission, 2007).

After five years without any major incidents, ethnic clashes occurred again in March 2004 after unfounded rumours about the drowning of three Albanian children provoked major riots across Kosovo, particularly in Caglavica and Kosovska Mitrovica, involving more than 50,000 Albanians (The Economist, 2004). The three days of rampage left 19 people dead, nearly 900 injured and over 4,000 people displaced, while also damaging or destroying over 700 Serb, Ashkali and Roma homes, 30 Serbian churches and some public buildings (ICG, 2004). The revolt only stopped after NATO transferred further 3,000 soldiers in the province and the Albanian leadership managed to calm things down. Nonetheless, the spontaneous and quick escalation of violence confirmed the fragility of the post-war situation. Kosovo continued to have a troubled society, weak institutions and leadership and risked continuing pushing out minority groups and ‘ultimately consume its own wafer-thin layer of liberal intelligentsia’ (ICG, 2004).

Therefore, the post-conflict domestic insecurity in Kosovo was marked by the perpetuation of ethnic division and the key security challenge to protect the Kosovo Serb community, now representing a decreasing minority in the province that was no longer under the authority of Belgrade. The situation of other minorities was also at risk, particularly Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, who were trapped in the middle of the Serb-Albanian conflict. After 1999 they were generally perceived by the majority Albanians as having collaborated with Serbian and Yugoslav forces during the conflict and, thus, also became a target of securitization, discrimination and marginalization.¹¹ Therefore, the R.A.E. communities portray a distinct form of securitization through which minorities that had a marginal role in the conflict and became associated with one of the main warring groups, risk of being associated by default in discourses and practices of post-conflict securitization. In addition, as the situation of R.A.E. shows, their vulnerable and non-dominant position further diminishes their agency and capacity to become an active part of post-conflict statebuilding, unlike the Serb community as the dominant non-majority group.

The hopes of the international community to build a multiethnic Kosovo has had many obstacles to surpass. Kosovo Serbs have remained the largest minority group in the province with the post-war double issue of mass flight of Serb population and the isolation of remaining Serbs in mono-ethnic regional enclaves. In this sense, the securitization and desecuritization of Kosovo Serbs can also be linked to the *de jure* and *de facto* enclavization of Kosovo after the 2008 declaration of independence. The point I am making here is that different layers of securitization and desecuritization have made it very difficult for Kosovo to pursue the twofold task of integrating its citizens and promoting multiethnicity concomitantly.

Therefore, by analysing the (de)securitization of minorities in Kosovo, I argue that the application of the multiethnic framework in Kosovo has a double problem. Not only is the functionality of minority provisions dependent on the actual capacities of each community, but their inappropriateness in relation to the particular circumstances of minorities can make them counterproductive. Instead of stimulating inter-ethnic cooperation and addressing the needs of each community, the multiethnic institutional and legal setting in post-2008 Kosovo has induced new layers of (de)securitization by putting emphasis on group differences.

3.1. Multiethnic governance and (de-)securitization of non-dominant minorities

Desecuritization of minority rights involves the telling of the stories of the majority and minorities in such a way that those groups do not exclude each other from the political community. The state is presented as a state of and for two or more nationally or ethnically defined groups. To change the story and obtain support for that new narrative can be hard - even practically impossible in the foreseeable future - but it is never logically impossible (Jutila, 2006:181).

Kosovo's institutional capacity to deal with the integration and accommodation of minorities has played a fundamental role in incentivising minorities to assume their rights and integrate as equal political partners. However, it has been particularly difficult for Kosovo to uphold its constitutional commitments to diversity and plural governance in the context of external dependency on international administrators (Hehir, 2010), endogenous socio-economic challenges and state weakness (Kostovicova, 2007). The domestic context of post-war Kosovo has been challenging for the Kosovo Albanians' aim to assume their new status and build a new state, but also for non-majority communities affected by the conflict and, in case of Kosovo Serbs, also by the secession from Serbia. Kosovo's path to independence has required stability and the construction of social cohesion, but in a divided and confusing environment, trying to construct and secure unity has been an impossible mission.

While the multiethnic constitutional and institutional framework adopted by Kosovo had as main objective the integration of the Serb community under the authority of Kosovo as a new state in the post-independence context, the provisions for minority rights protection have had various impact on the non-dominant communities. In terms of representation and participation of minorities as well as the protection of their identities, the legislation was developed for both the central and local levels of governance and deals with political rights government coalition, segmental autonomy, proportional electoral system, and veto right, socio-economic benefits and education, language and cultural rights.

As suggested before, these measures have been largely in line with consociational principles of government coalition (minorities have been part of all post-2008 executives in Kosovo), segmental autonomy (best symbolized by ethnic decentralization of Kosovo), proportional electoral system (guaranteed seats and representation in public employment) and veto rights (veto powers for Kosovo minority MPs over constitutional amendments) (Baliqi, 2008). Thus, as regards the political participation of minorities at the national level, the most visible and important feature is the right to guaranteed seats in the Kosovo Assembly. More precisely, out of the 120 seats in the Kosovo parliaments, 20 are guaranteed for the non-

majority communities. Kosovo Serbs hold 10 seats while the remaining 10 guaranteed seats are divided among the other minorities included in the Constitution.^{III}

The legal framework in Kosovo and the post-conflict measures affecting the securitization of minorities require two main areas of investigation. On the one hand, this paper seeks to understand the incentives for providing far-reaching protection for even the smaller minorities in Kosovo as well as the immediate results and consequences of the relevant policies. It is vital to observe the immediate results and consequences of adopting post-conflict specific consociational measures that apply to all minorities, regardless of their implication in the conflict or their actual need of integration. On the other hand, what also cannot be neglected is that the primary purpose of developing a multiethnic institutional and legal framework has been to address the integration of Serbs. Kosovo has thus designed a multiethnic framework to mainly integrate its largest and most important minority while this inevitably also impacts on the other communities. Therefore, my research findings confirm the risks of unforeseen securitization while also creating a social and political hierarchy among minorities depending on the will and capacity to reach non-dominant minorities too.

Furthermore, by presenting the efforts made to integrate the non-dominant minorities I will highlight the gap between formal and actual implementation of minority rights protection in Kosovo. While smaller minorities in Kosovo have equal legal collective rights with the Serb minority and could potentially benefit from this unanticipated status, on the ground their situation varies from case to case. Formal provisions and post-conflict specific measures like power-sharing features cannot guarantee social cohesion and the legitimization of the state by all its constituent ethnic groups. This paper argues that the inconsistency regarding minority rights protection towards the smaller communities in Kosovo indicates a potential discrepancy between impractical measures that not only obstruct desecuritization but may also foster segregation instead of integration.

3.2. The Bosniak community

According to the results of the 2011 Census, there were 27,533 (1.6%) members of the Bosniak community living in Kosovo, which confirmed them as the second largest minority group after Serbs. Most Bosniaks in Kosovo live in the municipality of Prizren, south of Kosovo. Bosniaks are a Muslim Slav community that does not necessarily trace its origins to Bosnia and Herzegovina but with strong cultural and religious links to the country (OSCE

Community Profiles). As speakers of a Slavic language, Bosniaks are believed to have converted to Islam during the Ottoman times and since then developed a sense of separate ethnic identity (OSCE Community Profiles). The group was first recognized as a distinct category in 1961 by a Yugoslav census that included them as ‘Muslims in the ethnic sense’ (Stevens, 2009: 8). In the 1990s, during the Bosnian war, the term ‘Bosniak’ was adopted for this ethnic group of Slavic Muslims, and the Bosnian language promoted as different from Serbian and Croatian (Baldwin, 2006).

In this context, in the Prizren region, and especially in the municipality of Dragash, the divide between Kosovo Bosniak and Gorani (also Slavic Muslims) is porous, as both minorities share a number of key characteristics, with the main difference deriving from their political affiliations. Bosniaks speak a Slavic language, Bosnian, which represents a vital element for defining their position within the Kosovo society. While this characteristic is a reason of great cultural pride and distinguishes them from other minorities, it also has a negative impact on the community’s integration, especially that ‘the inability to speak Albanian among the majority of the Kosovo Bosniaks remains a determinant factor for the sense of insecurity and the level of freedom of movement exercised by the community’ (OSCE Community Profiles).

As regards political representation, the Bosniak community has been fairly well-represented in Kosovo’s public life compared to other non-Albanian communities. At the central level, the community has three guaranteed seats in the Assembly of Kosovo and four positions of deputy ministers within Kosovo Government. After 2008, the results of the main Bosniak parties in the 2010 and 2014 national elections were slightly higher than the result of the Turkish KDTP party, yet approximately half of the votes gained by Serb parties. Overall, the Bosniak participation in public affairs could be even stronger if there was more unity among its political representatives, thus more on the model of the Turkish community, which had only one main political party representing the interests of its community prior to 2013.

At the local level of governance, despite decentralization being a key feature of the statebuilding efforts and constant lobbying by the community, no Kosovo Bosniak majority municipalities have been established. However, this has not negatively impacted the community’s participation in public affairs and Bosniaks are well represented in the municipalities they live in (OSCE Community Profiles). Bosniaks are also generally aware of the fact that although Kosovo Serbs have been the priority and have been advantaged by the

legislation, this has nevertheless benefited all other minorities. But at the same time, legislation needs to be also backed-up by de facto provisions and benefits (Personal Interviews, 2013).

As regards the security and freedom of movement for Bosniaks, the community has not had significant problems in the five regions of Kosovo besides a number of security incidents reported in the municipalities of North Mitrovicë and Pejë, where ‘[b]oth men and women have been the targets of reported harassment and assaults’(OSCE Community Profiles). Furthermore, Bosniaks have enjoyed unhindered access to social services and social welfare and relatively good access to property and housing. In the post-war and post-independence contexts, the socio-economic situation of the Bosniak community in Kosovo has been difficult, with one of the key challenges being the access to employment, similarly to all communities in Kosovo. Another fundamental issue for the Bosniak minority has been the situation of returns and reintegration, as a high number of Kosovo Bosniaks were forced to leave Kosovo during and after the conflict due to concerns for their own safety, lack of economic opportunities and the difficulty to find jobs (OSCE Community Profiles).

Bosniaks displaced during the war have not returned for reasons similar to those of many from other smaller minority communities: a combination of bad memories, mistrust of the ability and willingness of local authorities to protect them, and lack of economic prospects in Kosovo (Stevens, 2009: 8).

Nonetheless, Kosovo Bosniaks have generally managed to live peacefully alongside both the majority of Albanians (religious ties) and Kosovo Serb community (linguistic ties), and can be considered among the well-integrated minorities in Kosovo. In the words of a Bosniak representative: ‘We are for integration but not for assimilation. But at the same time, this discussion is problematic because we are already integrated, we have been co-existed peacefully with the Albanians for a long time’ (Personal Interviews, 2013). The context of the war, the post-conflict developments and the more recent post-independence social, political and security processes have all required the Bosniak community to reassess their position within the Kosovo society. Bosniaks have thus generally understood the need of institutional social integration as a problem and as a partial threat to their historical status within Kosovo (Personal Interviews, 2012-2013).

The ‘voice’ of the Bosniak community is a good symbol for the marginalization of the non-dominant minorities in Kosovo and of the risks securitization resulting from a top-down statebuilding process: ‘The idea of integration itself is controversial given that we are already part of the Kosovo society. It is one thing to ask migrants for instance to integrate in a society

that they emigrate to and another thing to ask communities that are already a substantial part of the society' (Personal Interview, Ministry of European Integration, 2013). This represents a powerful perspective on the meaning of integration and indicates a potential incompatibility between the rationale and political design of *de jure* measures for integration and *de facto* reality on the ground. Moreover, the endogenous perspective above resonates with the discrepancy between the security of groups and individuals and the contrast between minorities and migrants as a security problem (Huysmans, 1995) given that it may be impossible to desecuritize minority rights:

The potential fluidity of the individual migrant's identity provides a possible escape route from the constraints of the us-them dichotomy. In the context of minority rights, however, the necessity on the part of the minority (and indeed also the majority) for group distinctiveness necessarily blocks this same way out: the language of the individual is subordinated to the language of the collective (Roe, 2004: 290).

Therefore, despite the fact that Kosovo Bosniaks have been among the well-integrated minorities, the post-conflict and post-independence measures and legislation consolidate group differences without reconstructing minority identities as part of the political community of the state, but rather as 'its constitutive Other' (Nancheva, 2017). In this context, the reconstruction of collective identities in Kosovo is not inclusive and more likely to stimulate securitization rather than desecuritization of minorities.

3.3. The Turkish community

The Turkish community represents the third largest minority in Kosovo with a population of 18,738 (1,1%) and is mainly concentrated in the municipalities of Prizren, Mamushë and Pristina. Kosovo Turks have had a significant presence and influence since the Ottoman conquest of Kosovo in the 14th century and they are descendants of the Ottoman Empire and the indigenous population that converted to Islam and adopted the Turkish language and culture. Their privileged status during the Ottoman Empire, the fact that they share the Muslim faith and many cultural traits with Albanians and the notion of Turkish as an elite language among many people in Kosovo, have all helped Turks to become active and well-integrated into Kosovo's society over time (OSCE Community Profiles).

As regards the access to education, like in the case of Bosniaks, a main concern is the shortage of textbooks in Turkish language, which has a negative impact on 'the community's enjoyment of the right to education' (OSCE Community Profiles). Moreover, the increasing

numbers of young Turks going abroad to study universities in Turkey may generate a new long-term problem. While they obtain valuable degrees, upon their return to Kosovo their access to the job market is still limited because they do not speak fluent Albanian as a result of completing their full education cycle exclusively in their mother tongue:

Integration is a very, very wrong word. Nobody explains what it means to be integrated. I don't need to be integrated. I am here, I have always been here. To whom do I have to be integrated?' (Personal Interview, 2013).

This perspective on the idea of integration is shared by most communities in Kosovo and highlights once again the discrepancy between legislation and de facto situation in the difficult post-conflict context. The rationale behind protection and promotion of minority rights in Kosovo does not necessarily take into consideration all cultural, social and regional particularities of each community apart, and further complicate the interplay between securitization and desecuritization of minorities.

In the area of political representation and participation, the Turkish community in Kosovo has been almost exclusively represented by the Turkish Democratic Party of Kosovo (KDTP). The 2010 elections made KDTP not only the second minority party in Kosovo and the non-Serb minority party with the highest electoral score. At the local level, the most important gain for the Turkish community in the post-independence context has been the creation of the Turkish municipality of Mamushë (Mamuşa in Turkish), located in the south-east region of Kosovo. Turks are thus the only non-Serb minority in Kosovo to have been awarded a municipality where they are in majority. The municipality of Prizren, where most Kosovo Turks reside, has also had a strong political representation for this minority.

The main force of the Turkish community has been its political unity as reflected by the political gains at both central and local levels of governance in the 2009 and 2010 elections. Nevertheless, the subsequent fractions within the political leadership of the community and the creation of a new main party has destabilized the Turkish representation. The other challenge for the community is common to all non-Serb minorities in Kosovo and refers to the hierarchical division of the society and their marginalization by the relationship between Albanians and Serbs. Like during the late 1990s, the new situation in Kosovo has also placed 'The Turks and other minorities in the middle of the conflict between Serb and Albanian politics, which has nonetheless been in the detriment of our rights and has reduced the rights we had before the war' (Personal Interview, 2013).

In the context of the poor state of the economy as a whole, the socio-economic situation and employment opportunities for the Kosovo Turk community are reported as relatively good (OSCE Community Profiles). Generally, the older generation's ability to speak Albanian and a high degree of integration have helped them to access the labour market and maintain the community's unemployment rate just above the one reported for Bosniaks but below the rest of the communities in Kosovo (UNDP, 2019). Moreover, the minority's high level of integration into the Kosovo society is also demonstrated by the fact that Turks do not generally make use of the Serbian parallel institutions and services. Instead, Turks choose to use the services and facilities provided by Kosovo institutions and enjoy full access to social services and welfare throughout Kosovo.

Moreover, unlike other minorities in Kosovo, the Turkish community has not been very concerned about the returns and reintegration of its displaced members, mainly because the 1999 conflict did not cause significant migration among Turks. The departures that have occurred after the war have been generally motivated by the poor economy. Therefore, this represents another positive feature of the Turkish minority as it absolves the community from dealing with this complex challenge that has such a big impact on most other Kosovo communities. The analysis of the Turkish community confirms the benefits of being supported by a strong kin-state (Turkey), historical legacy, territorial concentration of the population, economic capacity, political unity and elite level participation. These are all key positive factors allowing minority groups to secure a stronger position within a diverse society, as well as to exercise effective agency in response to norms and practices of (de)securitization.

3.4. R.A.E. communities: Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians

Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians identify themselves as persons belonging to three distinct communities and are as such recognized by the Kosovo legislative framework, Kosovo institutions, and international organisations. The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Mission in Kosovo (OSCE) fully recognises the existence of three distinct communities (OSCE Community Profiles).

As the OSCE statement suggests, after 1999 it has been very important to identify and treat these minorities as three different ethnic groups instead of including them all as one single group under the notion of 'RAE community'. While the grouping of these three communities together by both international and domestic actors has also had positive and practical motivations like creating a stronger social and political representation for them, 'the perceived

attempt for the creation of a new identity' (KIPRED, 2006) has created serious social, political and security concerns for these communities.

Perhaps the most visible de jure example of grouping them as one is the distribution of seats in the Kosovo Assembly, where besides one seat guaranteed for each of the three minorities, one additional seat is offered to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian community with the highest overall votes. Another example is the Law on Communities, which in regard to the economic and social opportunities of minorities in Kosovo, stipulates that 'special consideration shall be given to improving the situation of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities.' Furthermore, using the 'RAE' formula can be considered as against one of the basic constitutional rights of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities to 'freely express, foster and develop their identity and community attributes' (Kosovo Constitution). However, it should be observed that this constitutional right has a positive character, while before 2008, under the UNMIK Constitutional Framework (2001) there was a more firm and clear statement that 'no person shall be obliged to declare to which Community he belongs, or to declare himself a member of any Community. No disadvantage shall result from an individual's exercise of the right to declare or not declare himself a member of a Community.'

These legal provisions have had a significant meaning in the context where, historically, the members of these minorities have either not been recognized belonging to three different groups, or they have not declared or expressed their identity clearly (ERRC, 2011). Furthermore, while Kosovo Roma have traditionally lived in Serb-populated areas and besides their mother tongue, Romani, they can generally also speak Serbian, a fundamental distinctive feature of the Ashkali and Egyptians communities has been the fact that they natively speak Albanian. Therefore, this linguistic characteristic has either facilitated the voluntary assimilation of Ashkali and Egyptians as Albanians or it has simply become the key element of differentiation from the Roma minority. However, the common perception among Roma and the majority Albanians that Ashkali and Egyptians are 'Albanian-speaking Romas who do not want to acknowledge their origins and are looking for new identities' (CoE, 2010), complicates even more the identity problems of these communities.

After the return of refugees in the summer of 1999, and still today, urban myth has it that 'the Roma were collaborators with the Serbs [against the Albanians].' Consequently, it has been important for many individuals to distance themselves from the undesired community for safety purposes (NHC, 2007: 7).

Until recently and especially prior to the 1999 conflict, only the Roma were largely recognized as one of the different ethnic groups living in Kosovo given that ‘Ashkali and Egyptian communities were not yet widely referred to under their current names’ (ERRC, 2011: 9). During the former Yugoslavia and Serbia regimes their official marginalization was sustained through non-recognition, but at the same time, a major factor has also been the decision of a large number of members from all three communities to declare themselves as ‘Albanians’, making self-identification and social cohesion all the more difficult. These issues, in addition to the massive migration of these minorities both before and after the 1999 conflict, are some of the key reason why population estimates for Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians have always been much higher than official statistics.

We are struggling with 99,9% of Kosovo on this issue of not differentiating between the three communities. The government, the internationals, people are all treating us like one community, like a new one, R.A.E., which doesn’t exist in any paper and this is a human right, to respect the identity of others (Personal Interview, Ashkali community, 2012).

Therefore, the lack of social cohesion within the communities and their troublesome official recognition have contributed to the continued marginalization of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian minorities in Kosovo and have affected their ability to ‘participate in the civic and political life in Kosovo’(NHC, 2007: 6). Nonetheless, regardless of how these complex issues of ethnic identity and recognition have obstructed their integration, the fundamental concern is that all three remain the most vulnerable, disadvantaged and discriminated communities in Kosovo, with the worst education and the highest unemployment rates.

Overall, much more efforts are needed to protect and promote the cultural identity of these communities as, for instance, there are no designated protected sites of cultural or religious significance and no plans to facilitate the identification of such sites in the near future (OSCE Community Profiles). In addition, R.A.E. children continue to encounter problems to access and complete their education as they face common factors like social exclusion, poverty, large number of cases of early dropouts from school and cultural tradition affecting many families, whereas girls are particularly affected (OSCE Community Profiles). Improving education of these communities is therefore a critical issue, especially that reports found that the level of illiteracy among Roma is as high as 24.3% (KFOS, 2009). Even though the Kosovan legislation guarantees members of minorities the right to receive public education in their own language and in 2011 the Ministry of Education adopted a new curriculum for Romani language classes, there are no schools or classes in the Romani language in Kosovo.

Moreover, despite provisions to review and draft textbooks and promote the values, heritage and identity of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian communities, between 2009 and 2011 the Kosovan educational system did not contain ‘curricula and textbooks specific or adequately tailored to the culture and history of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians’ (ERCC, 2011: 92).

In Kosovo there was initially only one Roma party, the United Roma Party of Kosovo (PREBK) and the Roma minority has generally been underrepresented at both central and local levels of governance in Kosovo. The poor participation and representation of R.A.E. groups in the public affairs of Kosovo represents for these minorities both a cause and a consequence of marginalization. On the one hand, a critical factor influencing their participation has been ‘the lack of professional and educational credentials that undermine the self-confidence of community representatives to actively engage in municipal politics’ (OSCE Community Profiles).

Generally, these minorities have not been able to organise efficiently and foster political engagement as they rarely participate in public discussions organized across Kosovo at both central and local levels. On the other hand, the low turnout among in the elections has also deprived them of representation, even where they represent a significant part of the local population. Moreover, local authorities ‘have not proactively reached out to Roma to promote their participation in the electoral process and voter registration’(OSCE Community Profiles), despite the fact that in 2009 the Kosovo government adopted an Action Plan for the Implementation of the Strategy for Integration of R.A.E. Communities.

Furthermore, the lack of information regarding job opportunities, the lack of investment in the development of small businesses and the agricultural sector, the lack of qualifications as well as the poor state of the economy as a whole are key reasons why the R.A.E. minorities were reported with the highest rates of unemployment in Kosovo (UNDP, 2019). The Roma community is one of the most vulnerable minorities in Kosovo with a large proportion of its population living in extreme poverty and with fundamental problems like discrimination, unemployment, lack of education and professional skills placing them in an even worse position than Ashkali and Egyptians.

These communities have been relying on social assistance, on contributions from relatives residing abroad and donations from aid agencies, while ‘seasonal agricultural works and self-employment activities are still the dominant types of employment for this community’ (OSCE Community Profiles). In this context, it is extremely difficult for R.A.E. groups to

obtain employment in either public institutions or private companies that are reluctant to hire them, which leaves ‘many individuals and families to rely on social assistance and pensions paid either by Kosovo institutions, Serbian authorities or both’(OSCE Community Profiles).

The Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian groups remain not only the most vulnerable and discriminated communities in Kosovo, but also part of distinct layer of desecuritization and a confusing interplay between ‘normal’ and ‘emergency’ politics (Jutila, 2006: 168). This is due to the lack of social and political cohesion within the communities, their troublesome official recognition, their limited socio-economic resources, unemployment, lack of education and their continued marginalization by the majority and other communities in Kosovo. Nonetheless, it has been very difficult to adjust their situation in the post-conflict context given the legacy of the war and the accusations for taking the side of one party or the other.

3.5.The Gorani community

The Gorani minority has 10,265 residents in Kosovo and is mainly concentrated in the municipality of Dragash. In the past it was difficult to estimate the numbers of Gorani accurately because they have traditionally been migrant workers and also because in the pre-1999 censuses, Gorani (together with Bosniaks and Torbesh) had been generally categorized as ‘Muslim Slavs’. The Gorani are closely related to Bosniaks but constitute a separate Slavic Muslim community residing primarily in Kosovo’s mountainous and most southern municipality of Dragash (Prizren region). Gorani speak a Slavic language referred to as Našuski, which is similar to the language spoken in the western part of Macedonia and different from other Slav dialects spoken in Kosovo (Office for Community Affairs-OCA). The language has not been standardized and no descriptive scholarly work on the Gorani dialect is available. This, together with continuous fights between two political factions, one supporting the usage of Serbian and the other the usage of Bosnian, prevents the Gorani community from advancing a coherent demand for language rights (OCA).

Therefore, within the community there are those who identify themselves as Gorani and a smaller number who identify themselves as Bosniaks (Personal Interview, ECMI Kosovo, 2012). This split is also caused by the political division between the two groups as the main distinguishing feature between them continues to be that of political affiliation. Moreover, in post-conflict Kosovo the Gorani minority educated in Serbian was caught in the middle of the political stand-off between Kosovo Serbs and Albanians that included the creation of two

education systems in Kosovo. Education in Serbian is available in regions where Serbs, Gorani and Roma reside, and it is currently managed and funded by the Serbian Ministry of Education and follows a Serbian curriculum that differs from that in other Kosovo schools. Most Gorani in the Dragash municipality ‘prefer to enrol their children in Serbia-run schools where instruction is in the Serbian language, which in turn affords greater opportunities for enrolment in Serbian Universities’ (OSCE Community Profiles).

As regards political participation, the Gorani community has been mainly represented by the Gora Citizen’s Initiative (GIG) created as a citizens’ association that took part in the 2000 municipal elections. In 2002, GIG became a political party based in the municipality of Dragash with the main purpose of advancing the rights and interests of the Gorani minority in Kosovo and held the Gorani guaranteed seat in the Kosovo Assembly after the 2010 elections. However, the Gorani representative subsequently joined the Serb parliamentary group of SLS in the Assembly, which indicated the party’s and the community’s close links with the Serbs: ‘The political representation of Goranis is fragile as a lot of issues that happen at the top level of governance influence the smaller communities significantly’ (Personal Interviews, 2013)

Post-independence reports on minorities in Kosovo have evaluated the social and economic situation of Gorani in Kosovo as ‘relatively good’ (OSCE Community Profiles). Nevertheless, given that half of the Gorani people are unemployed (UNDP, 2019) and the number of Gorani working in the public sector is very small, the main source of income within the community is from private family-run businesses. Dragash municipality, where most Gorani live, is also one of the most underdeveloped municipalities in Kosovo. Moreover, the poor access to employment and livelihoods and the challenges in relation to the choice of an educational system represent the main obstacles for the sustainable return and reintegration of Gorani displaced persons (OSCE Community Profiles). Overall, the main problems facing Gorani have been a lack of qualifications, a lack of information regarding job opportunities, language issues, an absence of development in industry, as well as the poor state of the economy as a whole. In this context, marginalization is a challenge for Gorani people too, especially as a large part of the community complains about discrimination due to their ethnicity, which means they often declare themselves as Albanians and take advantage of their proficiency in the Albanian language (OCA).

The examination of the situation of the Gorani community reveals further issues with the protection and integration of minority groups that must face not only common challenges for

non-dominant minorities but must also struggle to preserve and promote a generally accepted notion of their identity. Furthermore, the focus on political representation and participation can undermine desecuritization and the development of measures addressing the preservation and promotion of cultural identity as well as the basic needs of a small minority. As in the case of other minorities discussed here, the political mobilization stimulated by extensive provisions offered by minority legislation and the blurry lines between their cultural and political identities has been counter-productive and has intensified divisions within the community. By not being included in ‘normal’ minority politics, the Gorani minority remain at risk of being affected by new forms of securitization.

3.6. The Montenegrin and Croat communities

We are part of the Kosovo society as we have always been here. But we do not feel as part of the society
(Personal Interview, Montenegrin Community, 2013).

Kosovo Montenegrins and Croats were not included in the 2008 Constitution of Kosovo or the initial Law on Communities and both minorities were officially recognized only in December 2011. As a result, they have been generally excluded from most legal provisions regarding the promotion and protection of minority rights in Kosovo and therefore they are not represented politically and have not been yet granted the right to guaranteed seats in the Assembly. The situation of these two very small communities is illustrative for some of the key the problems with the legislation on minority rights in Kosovo. On the one hand, the focus on developing a framework for the main minority, the Serbs, combined with the inconsistency of the understanding and application of the notion of ‘community’ have undermined the equal inclusion of all minorities and, in the cases of Montenegrins and Croats, their exclusion through non-recognition. On the other hand, the development of a far-reaching system of minority rights protection has stimulated the very small communities to ask for recognition and inclusion in the political life of Kosovo in accordance to the constitutional provisions for minorities. This could become, at least formally, a clear example of overrepresentation and excessive rights leading to segregation rather than integration of minorities.

Given the circumstances described above, Montenegrins and Croats were not included as ethnic categories in the 2011 Census and as a result there is still no accurate data on the population of these two minorities. Kosovo Montenegrins are known to have mainly lived in the Kosovo regions of Pejë and Prishtinë, but, because they have lived alongside Serbs ‘no

specific settlements/neighbourhoods have been identified due to difficulties in distinguishing the two communities' (OSCE Community Profiles). The Montenegrin population was included in the past in censuses completed by former Yugoslavia and over time the figures varied between 20,000 and 30,000 persons, but since the last official estimate (1991), there has been a dramatic fall in the numbers of Montenegrins living in Kosovo in the context of war and massive migration in the region due to security and to socio-economic concerns.

Montenegrins are a South Slavic community that originates from Montenegro, they are predominantly of Christian Orthodox faith and they speak Montenegrin or Serbian as their mother tongue. Montenegrins were recognized as one of the constituent nations of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and they share with Serbs a similar history as well as 'many cultural, linguistic, religious, and traditional traits' (OSCE Community Profiles). The development of a different Montenegrin identity has been mainly inspired by historical reasons (parts of Montenegro were not under the rule of the Ottoman Empire), geographical reasons (remoteness) and then by their recognition as separate ethnic group and the proclamation of its territory as one of the constituent republics of Yugoslavia. In addition, one of the most important developments was the 2006 independence of Montenegro from Serbia as a new state.

We are an old and traditional community in Kosovo. But after the war, it was a big mistake to be associated with the Serb community. This was not true. We are our own community, this is our country too, and we are diaspora of Montenegro. We have tried to integrate for the last ten years by participating and getting involved in the public sphere in Kosovo (Personal Interview, Montenegrin Community, 2013).

Even though the Kosovo Montenegrin political leaders strongly advocate for disassociation from the Serbs, 'many are still reluctant to publicly self-identify as Kosovo Montenegrins, particularly in areas where they are integrated into the Kosovo Serb community, and benefit from institutions financed by the Republic of Serbia' (OSCE Community Profiles). As a result, the situation of Montenegrins is similar to that of Kosovo Serbs and given the linguistic resemblance, many children from this community follow the Serbian curriculum system and attend classes in the Serbian language.

Montenegrins thus also face a poor socio-economic situation given the limited employment opportunities, the limited freedom of movement and the poor knowledge of the language spoken by the majority group in Kosovo. Nevertheless, there little data on the dominant types of employment or level of unemployment for the Montenegrin minority, although the community has received social welfare assistance from Serbia and minimum

salaries derived from pre-war employment by state-owned enterprises (OSCE Community Profiles). Therefore, the existence of the Serbian parallel institutions in Kosovo have had an essential role for the Montenegrin community.

Despite the deferred recognition, Montenegrins have developed a political presence from which to protect the community's interests. Initially, they created in 2008 an Association of Kosovo Montenegrins, which helped them to participate in public affairs and gain a seat within the Communities Consultative Council. In addition, in 2009 and 2010 there were established three Montenegrin political parties: the Montenegrin Democratic Party (CDS), the Montenegrin People's Party (CNS), and the Montenegrin Liberal Party (CLS). The main political problem for the Montenegrin community remains however not having a guaranteed seat in the Assembly despite the recognition of their status as non-majority communities.

As mentioned before, the Croat minority was also not included as a separate community in the 2011 census and represents by far the smallest ethnic group in Kosovo with an estimated population of only 259 residents (OSCE Community Profiles). The few Kosovo Croats live in small villages located in two different regions: the Gjilan region and in the Prishtinë region. In the past, several thousand Croats used to live in these two regions, but most Croats left Kosovo in the 1990s and especially during the 1999 conflict because of the lack of security and economic opportunities in combination with the support for relocation offered by Croatia. Kosovo Croats are Catholic Slavs thought to originate from 14th century traders that came to Kosovo from Dubrovnik and who speak Croatian as their mother tongue. Therefore, their religious background and the local Roman Catholic Church represent the key elements for preserving the distinct Kosovo Croat identity. In general, Kosovo Croats make free use of their mother tongue in most public spaces, but the community does not feel completely at ease to do so in all public spaces and use Serbian to interact with public authorities, 'thus at times experiences difficulties in relation to the lack of adequate translation and interpretation in the two municipalities where the community resides' (OSCE, 2011). Moreover, the very few Croat children attend the Serbian-supported educational system and follow its curriculum.

The socio-economic situation of the Croat minority is extremely worrying, especially that the majority of the population are elderly. As reported by OSCE (2011), the Croat community is a 'vulnerable and isolated community [that] lives in extreme poverty and inadequate housing conditions.' In this context, other problems like the lack of public transportation and access to health care, lack of access to telecommunication services and lack

of property titles are all contributing to a marked sense of isolation amongst the community. Lastly, there is no participation of Croats in public affairs mainly because of the small size of their community, the late official recognition of their status as one of the Kosovo communities and the absence of a guaranteed seat in the Assembly.

Croats and Montenegrins thus exemplify almost all challenges, limitations and negative consequences derived from the design and implementation of the multiethnic institutional and legal framework in Kosovo. The capacity and willingness variables explain why they were excluded from the list of official non-majority communities, or in other words, not even included in the hierarchical structure of Kosovo communities. Moreover, the lack of interest in their situation and their limited capability to militate for their rights and to develop a ‘voice’ next to the other communities confirm the ineffectiveness of far-reaching minority rights in the absence of de facto conditions to facilitate their implementation.

Such small and vulnerable communities should have been a priority of the system for safeguarding minority rights and desecuritization because they have almost no capacity to protect, preserve and promote their identity and their particular requirements. By contrast, they were not recognized initially in the post-independence Kosovo and continue to be a victim of the promotion and use of minority rights merely as political rights instead of genuinely understanding them as an interconnected plethora of cultural, social, economic, security and civic rights.

Conclusion

If no one voices a threat in identity terms, or if such a speech act is not accepted by the relevant audience, the issue is not securitized. This is also true for minorities. Debates on minority issues are not always emergency politics or more intense than other political, economic or human rights debates. Minority rights are not always questions of life and death (Jutila, 2006: 183).

This paper has drawn on in-depth empirical analysis of Kosovo minorities and showed that to better understand the securitization and desecuritization of minorities it is indispensable to include the perspective and agency of different non-dominant groups. For this reason, I looked at how dilemmas of (de-)securitization of minorities are deeply connected to legal, political, social, economic, as well as identity, historical and cultural characteristics of even the smallest communities and argued that there may be different types or layers of (de)securitization of minorities. Whilst most peacebuilding measures address the security concerns of the main groups involved in a conflict, the securitization and desecuritization of

other minorities (sometimes not necessarily involved in the conflict) can have very different causes and unintended consequences.

In the case of Kosovo, in the post-conflict and post-independence context, I identified multiple forms of (de)securitization: principal one addressing the situation of Serbs as the dominant minority in relation to majority Albanians (as well as differentiation between Serbs in North and South Kosovo); (de)securitization of non-Serb groups (by default through inclusion in Ahtisaari/independence arrangements around multiethnicity); (de)securitization of R.A.E. (Roma, in particular, involved in conflict supporting Serbs); (de)securitization of non-dominant minorities with closer ties to one larger group or another (volatile situation of Bosniaks, Gorani, Montenegrins, Croats); and minimal (de)securitization of stronger minorities (Turkish community having a better position). Therefore, the discourse and practices of (de)securitization are influenced by various factors like size, location, language, history, religion, economy, legal status, politics or presence of kin-states for ethnic minorities.

The in-depth investigation of each of the non-dominant communities in Kosovo therefore helped to better reflect on the various interpretations of minority rights and de(securitization) after conflict. This has been dependent not only on the actions of Kosovo authorities but also on the particular socio-economic, security and political situation of each community apart, as well as their different needs and demands. While it is important to underline the benefits and positive impact of the promotion of diversity and the protection of all minorities in Kosovo, this paper has indicated why instead of integrating or accommodating communities, the focus on multiethnicity may also foster new divisions by stimulating ethno-political identities.

Furthermore, promoting multiethnicity with an actual main purpose to integrate one community (Serbs) has brought the risk of a worsening trend as regards the situation of other minorities. In other words, to support ethnic diversity by emphasising each group's own identities, disregarding appropriateness and assuming the uniform need of integration, may actually nurture division. The dilemmas of what kind of identity is promoted (cultural or political), or whether identity is linked to security threats, explain how multiethnicity/multiculturalism permits actors to reinterpret, misunderstand or exploit the concept when it reaches areas beyond its real scope. As indicated by the situation of R.A.E. communities, vulnerable non-dominant minorities can be disproportionately affected by de(securitization), unlike groups with more capacity and more support from institutions and the majority population. What is poignant about the examples of Croats and Montenegrins as

extremely small minorities in Kosovo is that securitization can portray even the most vulnerable groups (at threat of disappearing) as potential security threats. One clear risk of implementing top-down provisions aiming to protect diversity is then that it can falsely portray minority groups as self-sufficient and condemn them to isolation or extinction. In addition, just like group differentiation poses a dangerous risk for social, economic and political segregation, it also can foster new security concerns.

Protection of minorities should address the issues that make such communities vulnerable in diverse societies. Conversely, the legal provisions for minorities in Kosovo have become attributes for those considered a security and political priority (Serbs) and for those with more capacity to employ their rights. This has consequently created a hierarchy of communities in Kosovo in regard to their social, legal, political, economic and security status. Moreover, groups not directly affected by post-war securitization, may inadvertently become security objects. By treating minority rights merely as questions of life and death (Jutila, 2006), statebuilding processes in divided societies will always struggle to de-securitize minorities and accommodate non-conflict specific and ‘normal’ politics of diversity.

^I ‘undertaking a major reconstruction programme to establish democracy, stability and self-government [...] facilitating the process that would determine the future status of Kosovo, coordinating the international humanitarian agencies, supporting the reconstruction of key infrastructures, maintaining law and public order, promoting human rights, and guaranteeing security and safe return of displaced persons’ in Sahun A., Lourdes, M. & Vallejo, P.R. (2009), ‘The legal construction of the social security system of the Republic of Kosovo’, *International Social Security Review*, 62(1), p. 67.

^{II} For more information See the report by European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), ‘Abandoned minority: Roma Rights History in Kosovo’, December 2011, <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/abandoned-minority-roma-rights-history-in-kosovo-dec-2011.pdf> [last accessed: 10.09.2020].

The same report specifies: ‘The mass return of displaced Kosovo Albanians was immediately followed by the expulsion or flight of non-Albanians, including Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians from and within Kosovo. Every Romani, Ashkali and Egyptian community visited by the ERRC during the mid-1999 field mission had half or fewer of its pre-war inhabitants. According to some sources, more than 100,000 Roma, Ashkali and Egyptians left the province prior to the conflict, during the conflict and after the NATO intervention.’

^{III} ‘the Roma community, one (1) seat; the Ashkali community, one (1) seat; the Egyptian community, one (1) seat; and one (1) additional seat will be awarded to either the Roma, the Ashkali or the Egyptian community with the highest overall votes; the Bosnian community, three (3) seats; the Turkish community, two (2) seats; and the Gorani community, one (1) seat if the number of seats won by each community is less than the number guaranteed’ (Chapter IV, Assembly of the Republic of Kosovo, Art. 64 (2)).

Bibliography

- Agarin, T., McCulloch, A., Murtagh, C., 'Others in Deeply Divided Societies: A Research Agenda', *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 24(3) (2018): 299-310.
- Aradau, C. 'Limits of security, limits of politics? A response'. *Journal of International Relations and Development* 9(1) (2006): 8.
- Baldwin, C., 'Minority rights in Kosovo under international rule', MRG, July 2006.
- Baliqi, B., 'Promoting Multi-Ethnicity or Maintaining a Divided Society: Dilemmas of Power-Sharing in Kosovo'. *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*. 17(1) (2018): 49-71.
- Barnett, M., 'Building a Republican Peace: Stabilizing States after War', *International Security* 30(4) (2006): 87-112.
- Beha, A., 'Minority Rights: An Opportunity for Adjustment of Ethnic Relations in Kosovo?', *Journal on Ethnopolitics and Minority Issues in Europe*, 13(4) (2014): 85-110.
- Behnke A. 'No way out: Desecuritization, emancipation and the eternal return of the political - A reply to Aradau.' *Journal of International Relations and Development*. 9(1) (2006): 62-9.
- Bonacker, T., Distler, W., Ketzmerick, M. 'Securitisation and Desecuritisation of Violence in Trusteeship Statebuilding'. *Civil Wars*. 20 (4) (2018): 477-499.
- Bertrand, J. and Haklai, O., 'Democratization and ethnic minorities'. In *Democratization and Ethnic Minorities: Conflict or Compromise?*, ed. J. Bertrand and O. Haklai, 103-129. New York: Routledge, 2014.
- Buzan, B., Wæver, O. and de Wilde, J., *Security: A New Framework for Analysis*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1998.
- Council of Europe, 'Information fact sheets on the History of Ashkali and Egyptians', 2010.
- European Commission, 'Communication from the European Commission on the subject of the Enlargement Strategy' (Brussels: EU Commission, 2007).
- European Roma Rights Centre (ERRC), 'Abandoned minority: Roma Rights History in Kosovo', December 2011, Available at <http://www.errc.org/cms/upload/file/abandoned-minority-roma-rights-history-in-kosovo-dec-2011.pdf> (accessed 1 September 2020).
- Hansen, L., 'Reconstructing Desecuritisation. The Normative-Political in the Copenhagen School and Directions for How to Apply it', *Review of International Studies* 38(3) (2012): 525-546.
- Hehir A. *Kosovo, Intervention And Statebuilding: The International Community And The Transition To Independence*. New York: Routledge, 2010.
- Huysmans, J., 'Migrants as a security problem: Dangers of 'securitizing' social issues'. In *Migration and European Integration: The Dynamics of Inclusion and Exclusion*, ed. Miles R and Thranhardt D, 53-72. London: Pinter, 1995.

International Crisis Group (ICG), 'Collapse in Kosovo', *Europe Report No. 155*, April 2004.

Jutila, M., 'Desecuritizing minority rights: against determinism'. *Security dialogue*, 37(2) (2006):167-185.

Kosovar Institute for Policy Research and Development (KIPRED), 'Integration of minority communities in the post-status Kosovo' (Pristina: KIPRED, 2006).

———'Kosovo National Elections 2010: Overview and Trends', April 2011.

Kosovo Central Electoral Commission (CEC), Available at <http://www.kqz-ks.org> (accessed 11 September 2020).

Kosovo Foundation for Open Society (KFOS), 'The Position Of Roma, Ashkali And Egyptian Communities In Kosovo. Baseline Survey' (KFOS, 2009).

Kosovo Government, Office of the Prime Minister, 'Strategy for the Integration of Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in the Republic of Kosovo 2009-2015', December 2008.

Kostovicova, D., 'State weakness in the western Balkans as a security threat: the European Union approach and a global perspective', *Western Balkans Security Observer* 2 (7-8) (2007): 10-15.

Kostovicova, D. and Bojicic-Dzelilovic, V. (eds), *Persistent state weakness in the global age*. London: Ashgate, 2009.

Kymlicka, W., 'The internationalization of minority rights'. In *Constitutional Design for divided societies. Integration of accommodation?*, ed. S. Choudhry, 111-140. Oxford: OUP, 2008.

———'The Rise and Fall of Multiculturalism? New Debates on Inclusion and Accommodation in Diverse Societies' *International Social Science Journal*. (61)199 (2010): 97-112.

Lončar, J., 'Power-sharing in Kosovo: Effects of ethnic quotas and minority veto'. In *Perspectives of a Multiethnic Society in Kosovo*, ed. J. Teokarević, B. Baliqi, & S. Surlić, 359-372. 2015.

Milliken, J., and Krause, K., 'State Failure, State Collapse, and State Reconstruction: Concepts, Lessons and Strategies', *Development and Change*, 33(5) (2002) : 753 – 774.

Nancheva, N., 'Securitization reversed. Does Europeanization improve minority/majority relations?'. *Suedost-Europa*, 65(1) (2017): 10-34.

Office for Community Affairs website, Available at <http://kryeministri-ks.net/zyra-e-kryeministrit/zyrat/zyra-per-ceshtje-te-komuniteteve> (accessed 1 September 2020).

Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), '2010 Kosovo Communities Profiles' (Pristina: OSCE, February 2011).

——— 'Implementation of the Action Plan on the Strategy for the Integration of the Roma, Ashkali and Egyptian Communities in Kosovo', 2011.

———'The Kosovo Croats of Viti/Vitina Municipality: A. Vulnerable Community', October 2011.

———'Community Rights Assessment Report on Kosovo', Fourth Edition, December 2015.

Perritt, H. H., *The Road to Independence for Kosovo: a Chronicle of the Ahtisaari Plan*. Cambridge: CUP, 2009.

Roe, P., 'Securitization and minority rights: Conditions of desecuritization'. *Security Dialogue*. 35(3) (2004): 279-294.

Rotberg, R.I., 'The Challenge of Weak, Failing, and Collapsed States'. In *Leashing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World*, ed. Crocker et al., 83-94. Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2007.

Sahún, ML A. and Vallejo, P.R., 'The legal construction of the social security system of the Republic of Kosovo', *International Social Security Review* 62(1) (2009) : 65-89.

Skleparis D., 'A Europe without Walls, without Fences, without Borders: A Desecuritisation of Migration Doomed to Fail'. *Political Studies*, 66(4) (2008): 985-1001.

Stevens, G., 'Filling the Vacuum: Ensuring Protection and Legal Remedies for Minorities in Kosovo', Minority Rights Group International (MRG), 15 April 2009.

The Economist, "The audit of war", 9th September 2004, <http://www.economist.com/node/3178765> (accessed 1 September 2020).

The Norwegian Helsinki Committee (NHC), 'Second-class Minorities: The Continued Marginalization of RAE Communities in Kosovo' (NHC, 2007).

United Nations Development Program (UNDP), Public Pulse Polls and Reports, 2014-2019.

Waever, O. 'Securitization and desecuritization'. In *On Security*, ed. Lipschutz RD, 46-86. New York: Columbia University Press, 1995.

Williams, MC. 'The continuing evolution of securitization theory'. In *Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve*, ed. Balzacq T., 211-222. London: Routledge, 2011.