

Tourism Industry in *de facto* States

Internal and External Legitimization Strategies of Statehood

Félix-Antoine Cloutier

Political Science, Université de Montréal
felix-antoine.cloutier@umontreal.ca

Magdalena Dembińska

Political Science, Université de Montréal
magdalena.dembinska@umontreal.ca

Work in progress

In September 2015, South Ossetia celebrated with pomp the 25th anniversary of its “independence.” Dignitaries from Russia, Abkhazia, Nagorno-Karabakh, Transnistria and even the two self-proclaimed “republics” of Donbass attended speeches, marching bands and parades, to the sound of the national anthem and flags waving in the wind. The following year, Abkhazia hosted the third World Cup of the Confederation of Independent Football Associations, ConIFA, founded in 2013. ConIFA brings together football teams representing unrecognized states, small island nations, autonomous regions, minorities and stateless persons who are not affiliated with the FIFA. The four Eurasian *de facto* states as well as Donetsk and Lugansk are all members of this singular sports confederation. Among the fifty member teams of ConIFA, twelve attended the World Cup in Abkhazia: Somaliland, Kurdistan, Northern Cyprus, Lapland, Rhaetia, United Koreans from Japan, Western Armenia, Padania, Punjab, Székely and the Chagos Islands. A rather particular and obviously controversial tournament, which brings to light the issues of recognition of groups and states, issues of geopolitics, nationalism and secessionism.

For the participants, this World Cup is a way to increase their visibility and raise awareness of their struggles which would otherwise be little known. It is also a moment of real theatrical performance and emotion, with parades, flags and national anthems. It is a perfect opportunity to show the whole world the capacity of the hosting entity in terms of security and infrastructure; to expose the “state” attributes of the host political entity to the international press in the audience. Joshua Keating, an international news commentator who followed the Somaliland team during their stay in Abkhazia, has even published a book on the *Invisible Countries* (2018).

These international events are important touristic attractions. Tourism counts as another recent effort to render these countries visible. After approving in 2017 a Concept for the Development of Domestic and Foreign Tourism (Postanovlieniye no. 362, 2017; Government of Transnistria 2017), in 2019, Transnistria adopted its very first seven-year tourism plan totalling a budget of nearly one million US dollars (Novosti Pridnestrovyya 2019a; 2020b). The Ministry of Economic Development of “Pridnestrovie,” responsible for implementing the new project, announced its short-term objectives, including the creation of a new tourist logo, the development of new products - tourist guide, souvenirs, etc. - and the English translation of the names of the main streets (Dulgher 2020; Неудобный 2019; MDEP 2019; Novosti Pridnestrovyya 2019a). An impressive colourful and user-friendly tourist website is now available in Russian and in English (<https://pridnestrovie-tourism.com/en/>).

De facto states represent “anomalies” in the international system. Without being recognized *de jure*, the separatist entities that are beyond the control of the capital, have developed state attributes. The universe of *de facto* states includes a dozen territorial entities around the world, not to mention the other dozen *de facto* states formed and disappeared, which have either been reinstated in the centre or recognized as *de jure* states. Among them, Somaliland, Kosovo, Northern Cyprus and Kurdistan. Four of these regions lie in the post-Soviet space: Abkhazia and South Ossetia in Georgia, Transnistria in Moldova and Nagorno-Karabakh in Azerbaijan. Following civil wars, separatists claim independence in the name of the principle of people's self-determination and the popular support for the separatist cause, while central states claim reunification in the name of principle of territorial integrity. Ceasefires are signed, but peace processes remain frozen. Without being recognized by the international community, these separatist entities escape the control of the respective capital and, over the years, have developed the attributes of a state.

To explain their survival over time, in addition to the geopolitical factors, research is henceforth oriented towards their internal dynamics and the political processes of internal and external legitimation that aim at gaining the support of, respectively, the population and the international community. Their viability depends on their infrastructural capacity to provide security (internal and external), public services, to ensure a relative level of socio-economic well-being, and even of democratic rules of the game. Although the different legitimation strategies are now largely studied, tourism industry has got little attention, if at all. Yet, major investments in tourism projects (hotels, casinos, soccer stadium) are being put in place. In the absence of recognition, the tourism industry serves the legitimation purposes and is an interesting object of study.

The focus on the tourism industry allows to orient the research towards the political and economic actors, but also to bring a material angle to the study, in terms of public and socio-economic benefits. Indeed, tourism industry contributes to both the construction of a collective identity (nation-building) and to state-building. On the one hand, it projects an image of the state and of the national identity (museums, monuments) for the exterior (international tourists) but also for the interior (citizens, local tourists). On the other hand, tourism industry participates in output legitimization as it comes with the construction of infrastructures (roads, hotels, casinos), the creation of jobs and revenues that can then be reinvested in the services to the population. This paper aims to demonstrate the interest of studying tourism industry as a strategy of legitimization in *de facto* states. It is argued that tourism industry not only serves both internal and external legitimization but is a “two-in-one” strategy serving both identity and output legitimization.

The paper brings together literature from political science on *de facto* states, nation- and state-building and legitimization, and from political geography, on tourism. Its theoretical contribution is supported with (preliminary) empirical data from and observation in one *de facto* state in particular, Transnistria, which is explicitly using tourism and tourism industry for external and internal legitimization.

External Legitimization of De Facto States and Tourism

The 2016 ConIFA World Cup comes one month after the Union of European Football Associations (UEFA) and FIFA accept Kosovo's membership, allowing it to compete in the 2016 Summer Olympics in Rio and then at the FIFA World Cup in 2018. For the ConIFA teams gathered in Abkhazia, this recognition constitutes a precedent which, in the opinion of the regions having unilaterally declared their independence, is reminiscent of the “precedent of Kosovo” in 2008; recognition to which they aspire. Indeed, although Kosovo may still be considered part of the universe of de facto states, it has been officially recognized by some one hundred countries, members of the United Nations.

Following Scott Pegg’s (1998) definition of de facto States - the most frequently adopted definition in the literature – these are entities with sufficient capacity to provide government services to a given population in and over a given territory, with an organized political leadership that enjoys popular support and which maintain effective control for a significant period of time, but which remain illegitimate in the eyes of the international community (for a review of definitions see Bonnot 2014, 22–28). Pegg bases his definition on a distinction between empirical and legal notions of the state echoing the distinction made by Robert H. Jackson (1993) between the internal and external dimensions of sovereignty. The phenomenon combines the existence of state attributes, on the one hand, and the lack of international recognition, on the other. In terms of Stephen Krasner’s (1999) fourfold definition of sovereignty, a de facto state is a contested entity that claims the “Westphalian” right to self-government, which maintains “internal sovereignty,” but which fails to secure “legal sovereignty.”

The latter though is subject to political processes and politics, and needs to be earned. Kosovo is a case in point. Having unilaterally declared itself independent from Serbia in February 2008, Kosovo was quickly recognized as an independent state by several Western countries, including the United States, France and Germany. As of November 2019, 98 out of 193 UN member states recognize Kosovo, and breakaway regions across the globe are therefore building on this precedent in their struggle for independence. It is also with reference to the case of Kosovo that Russia, following the Russo-Georgian war of August 2008, recognizes South Ossetia and Abkhazia. A gesture that will then be followed by Nicaragua, Venezuela, Nauru and, since May 2018, by Syria.

Thus, some states recognize Kosovo, but not South Ossetia or Abkhazia. Others, such as Spain or Romania, do not recognize any of the three for fear of creating the conditions for secessionism in their own territory. It should be noted that some UN members who recognized Kosovo subsequently withdraw their recognition or send ambiguous messages. In short, international recognition is a political rather than a legal matter.

Legal scholars Cedric Ryngaert and Sven Sobrie (2011) argue that the prevalence of politics above norms is a recent phenomenon, dating back to the break-up of the USSR and of Yugoslavia, followed by the precedent of Kosovo and then followed by the partial recognition of the two entities of the South Caucasus. According to them, state recognition was more consistent before then. The traditional legal framework included two norms: the definition of the state contained in the Montevideo Convention of 1933 on the rights and obligations of states as well as *ius cogens*, that is, the peremptory norm of international law. The state as a subject of international law should have (a) a permanent population, (b) a defined territory, (c) a government, and (d) the ability to enter in relation with other states. This definition emphasizes the factual conditions and the functional capacity of the entities, leaving significant leeway for interpretation. This discretionary room for maneuver is, however, limited by the simultaneous ban on recognizing territorial entities as States in case these follow any violation of international law (*ius cogens*), such as war and/or unilateral secession (also Bonnot 2014, 16-17). Thus, if the functional capacity of separatist entities is the result of such a violation, the international community, that is, the sum of states, is bound not to recognize them.

This normative framework changed when in December 1991 the European Commission issued a Declaration on the Directives concerning the recognition of new states in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. It includes the right to external self-determination, i.e., independence, traditionally conferred only on countries from a colonial context. To be recognized, the entity must commit to upholding democratic standards, including human rights and minority rights. Since then, the recognition procedure has been marked by uncertainty. On the one hand, two principles of international law conflict and seem irreconcilable: the principle of the right to territorial integrity versus that of the right to self-determination. On the other hand, the room for maneuver related to the interpretation of factual conditions is no longer limited by *ius cogens*, contributing to the growing politicization of the issue of state recognition.

In that context, the separatist entities need to convince UN member states that they are functional, stable, democratic and thus deserve and earn their legal and Westphalian sovereignty (Caspersen 2011) – that they are legitimate.

Since the 2010s, we have seen the emergence of studies focusing on the processes state- and nation-building; on the strategies put in place in de facto states that would sustain the claim of “earned sovereignty.” Without going into detail here, the researchers examine the political attitudes of “citizens” in de facto states. The polls carried out by a team of three researchers, John O’Loughlin, Vladimir Kolossov and Gerard Toal, contribute to our knowledge of the support of the population for the separatist cause and the de facto authorities (O’Loughlin, Kolossov, and Toal 2011; 2015; Toal and O’Loughlin 2013b; 2013a). Other scholars, such as Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2012), are interested in elites and their competition, electoral systems, and political parties. Scholars observe democratization processes in the South Caucasus de facto states, in Transnistria, in Somaliland or Kosovo (Broers 2005; Caspersen 2008; Popescu 2006; Matsuzato 2008; Tansey 2007; Walls and Kibble 2011; Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2012); some highlight the introduction of policies to protect the rights of minorities (Comai and Venturi 2015); others explore economic survival strategies (Blakkisrud et al. 2020). Authorities in de facto states put some effort to legitimize themselves and the “state”; externally they display their ability to govern, to provide and even to entertain.

State-like receptions serve the purpose on the diplomatic level. On June 4, 2019, for the Days of Europe, on the street in front of the Shevtchenko University, Tiraspol, one could walk through some twenty kiosks displaying European countries and the scholarships they offer. Dignitaries from embassies and consulates stationed in Chisinau visited for the occasion and were welcomed by the Transnistrian “gouvernement” representatives, including the “Minister” of Foreign Affairs, Vitaly Ignatiev. After the speeches, the diplomats were invited to the Bender.y fortress, recently renovated with European funds, for a guided tour, a concert by the Symphonic State Orchestra followed by one by the State Chorale of Pridniestrovie. A sumptuous dinner with local delicacies was offered subsequently (author in the field). Tourism aims at similar displaying and letting experience the “statehood” to the masses. One of the strategies for the development of Transnistria in 2019-2026 (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2018) reads as follows: “activation of enterprises in the sphere of entertainment and recreation, improvement of the city park, development of cultural work on the basis of urban and rural houses of culture, including the holding of competitions, concerts, festivals, and other mass events that help to attract tourists.”

Tourism aims at legitimizing the “state” and the “nation” by showing stability, security, modern infrastructures and by strategizing around nation-branding. Tourism can be quite useful for state elites since its development may foster their “prestige” and “representation of progress, prosperity and power” (Pretes 2003, 134; M. E. Smith 1997, 204). It is a form of “hegemonic, or official discourse” about the nation as it transforms landscapes into touristic activities worth visiting (Pretes 2003, 127) and thus controls the image of the nation. Nation-branding strategies are a set of communicative (marketing) tools aiming at crystallizing and institutionalizing a positive and “market-friendly” image of the nation (Aronczyk 2008; Kaneva and Popescu 2011, 192). In return, nation-branding “maintain” and even “extend” the nation “as a legitimate entity in the context of globalized modernity”, “as a project for sovereignty and self-determination” (Aronczyk 2008, 43; 2013, 5). As a soft-power tool, nation-branding works at controlling the symbolic representation of the nation-state with an internal and external audience (Kaneva 2011). It is especially important for de facto states since they generally have a bad image which, in return, reduce their legitimacy and lessen the chance of tourists pouring in. “President” Krasnoselsky stated in 2019 that the “image forming” was crucial since it would “popularize” the state for its future recognition. (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2019d).

In 2017, the creation of a “welcoming image” of Transnistria is mentioned explicitly as one of the objectives of the development of tourism (Postanovlieniye no. 362, 2017; Government of Transnistria 2017). The “formation of an attractive image of the republic” is repeated as an objective in 2018 in the Strategy for the Development of Transnistria for 2019-2016 (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2018). The latter document points to various ways to do so such as the “organization of a single national Pridnestrovian exposition for participation in international tourism exhibitions [and] conducting advertising campaigns in domestic and foreign mass media in order to form the image of the Pridnestrovskiaia Moldavskaia Respublika as a region favourable for tourism.” While meeting with Transnistrian “state” officials and businessmen, Karsnoselsky has been reported arguing for the importance of using the proper name of the entity – Transnistrian Moldovan Republic or Transnistria – for all communication purposes and added that the message that should be vehicled for tourists should be “peace, security, the rule of law, the absence of corruption, a good environment and the opportunity to invest” (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2019b). Contrary to the stereotype painting Transnistria and other de facto states as “black holes,” the aim here is to make Transnistria “sunny and hospitable again” (prof. Dmitry Sevastianov from Leningrad State

University at the VII Pridnestrovian International Investment Economic Forum, reported in *Novosti Pridnestrovyia*, 11 October 2019); to show the “republic” as “demilitarized” and “clean”; a “brand” to cherish (interview with a tourist agent, Tatiana Yaskova, *Piervyi Pridniestrovskiy*, Feb 13, 2021; *Первый Приднестровский* 2021). A brand that will in the near future be epitomized in a tourist logo of the country for which the Transnistrian authorities launched a competition. One of the options, submitted by a Russian designer Artemy Lebedev, “combined the symbolic images of the Dniester, a bunch of grapes, fortresses and elements of nature” (*Novosti Pridnestrovyia* 2020b). The journalist further reports that Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Economic Development, Sergey Obolonik, was happy when the World Tourism Organization “reacted” to this work on the logo and was “intrigued”. International visibility of the de facto state might thus be on the rise.

Tourism means crossing borders. Borders and their control have an important place for the development of state’s infrastructural power. Developed by Michael Mann (1984), the concept of the state infrastructure of power comprises three components: the territorial reach of the state, its capacity (external and internal security, extraction of economic resources, services to the population, efficiency of institutions policies) and the effects of the state on society (see also Soifer 2008). The importance of the border has been widely argued for in the field of border/bordering studies. The work of Anssi Paasi (1996), James Anderson and Liam O’Dowd (1999) or Williams Walters (2002), underline, on the one hand, the ideological and symbolic role of borders in the formation of the population as a known and governable entity and, on the other hand, their role as instruments of regulation of populations, their movements, their security, their wealth and their health.

Border crossing has a symbolic effect on acknowledging the end of one entity and the beginning of the other. Experiencing easy crossing of the border will also have an impact of the first impression of the “State.” Things changed in Transnistria over the last few years. Since 2018, border crossing has been considerably eased: one just has to show a European passport, for example, to be allowed to stay in the region as a tourist for 21 days. The border is crossed easily and systematically by public transportation. Once the administrative border is crossed, a reconstructed road leads to Bender.y and to Tiraspol passing by the impressive Sheriff football stadium. Entering through the checkpoint on the Moldovan side, one can leave through the border with Ukraine comprising three check points, though: Transdnistrian, Moldovan and Ukrainian.

Further “simplifying the rules for crossing the border and temporary registration of foreign tourists” are announced in the Strategy for Development plan as is further enhancing safety for tourists (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2018). Tourist experience is also said to be enhanced with the “organization of zones of free wireless access to the Internet” and the use of topographic and touristic signalization in several languages (some of these in Russian and in English are in place as of March 2021, as reported in Novosti Pridnestrovya 20 March 2021).

All these efforts to develop tourism and to legitimize Transnistria in the eyes of the international community have direct consequences for the internal legitimization of the “state”. These consequences include socio-economic developments but also, as mentioned by the tourist agent Tatiana Yaskova, through external tourist eyes, Transnistrians can build confidence in their own country (Первый Приднестровский 2021).

Internal Legitimization of De Facto States and Tourism Industry

Aspiring to external legitimacy, that is international recognition of their independence, or at least of their right to separation and/or to irredentism, de facto states rely on two arguments: on the one hand, the principle of the self-determination of peoples and, on the other hand, the internal legitimacy of the “government.” From Max Weber (1919) to David A. Easton (1965) through Seymour Martin Lipset (1959) to contemporary authors Christian Soest and Julia Grauvogel (2016), internal legitimacy is defined as the ability of leaders to rally and to mobilize popular support, that is the acceptance and loyalty of citizens. Internal legitimacy of the separatist cause and of the existing authority also serve external legitimization cause.

Kristin Bakke, John O'Loughlin, Gerard Toal and Michael D. Ward (2014, 593) divide internal legitimacy into three distinct strands: state legitimacy refers to “a shared belief that the state is as natural as rivers and mountains” (Migdal 2001, 168); the legitimacy of the regime refers to the popular confidence in the elites in power; and institutional legitimacy refers to the citizens’ trust in the proper functioning of the state apparatus. Internal legitimacy therefore refers to the subjective beliefs of those who confer legitimacy on the state, the regime and the bureaucracy.

According to Hillel D. Soifer and Matthias vom Hau (2008), who revisit the concept of the “infrastructural power of the state” of Michael Mann (1984), internal legitimacy can be subdivided into two components: identity legitimacy which depends on the strength of feelings of belonging and output legitimacy. The latter is a function of the effectiveness of political institutions (institutional legitimacy), social and economic well-being, as well as the degree of security (eudemonic legitimacy; Holmes 2016). These two aspects of internal legitimacy - identity and output - correspond respectively to the nation-building and state-building processes, that is to say to the “soft” and “hard” aspects of state building (Kolstø and Blakkisrud 2008). The former is about building a shared identity and a sense of unity within the population that can be achieved through education, propaganda, ideology but also through tourism which has a role in diffusing and institutionalizing myth-symbol complexes of the state. The latter is a matter of establishing the military, administrative, economic bases to ensure the proper functioning of the state. Again, tourism contributes at least to the latter.

Output Legitimization

Socio-economic security - and thus legitimacy - is a real challenge, as most de facto states lack the resources to provide goods to their populations and to rebuild post-war infrastructures. Their economies are far from functional. Yet eudemonic legitimacy (based on the level of prosperity, Holmes 2016), depends on it. Because they are not internationally recognized entities and thus isolated from the international community - even though this isolation varies according to the “engagement without recognition” policies of external actors (Ker-Lindsay 2019; Caspersen 2019) - de facto states have few possibilities to obtain assistance from international financial institutions or external donors, to sell products abroad or to attract foreign investment (Kosienkowski 2020, 191; Blakkisrud et al. 2020). Other than relying on their respective patron-states, de facto states at least try to extract endogenous resources and to provide the population with jobs and goods. Tourism industry seems the latest such endeavour in Transnistria.

In March 2019, talking to “representatives of the presidential executive office, the Ministry of Economic Development, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic, Heads of Tiraspol and Bendery, as well as entrepreneurs interested in the development of the tourism sector,” Vadim Krasnoselsky emphasized the importance of the tourism industry for the economy of the republic

(Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2019b), echoing thus the Strategy of Development for 2019-2026 which identifies “the formation of tourism as a highly profitable industry” (Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2018). In a decision to approve the Concept of the Development of Internal and External Tourism for 2018-2019, Transnistrian authorities explicitly treat tourism as a “catalizator for socio-economic development” and appoint the Minister of Economic Development as the representative responsible for tourism and the tourist industry (Postanovlieniye no. 362, Government of Transnistria 2017).

Tourism industry is about renovating, modernizing, developing infrastructure: new routes and streets, new parks, squares and fountains (Первый Приднестровский 2021). According to the Agency for Development of Transnistria website, “Today, many sanatoriums and prophylactic institutions, historical and architectural monuments are being reconstructed in the region, churches are being restored, modern hotel complexes are being built” (NGO ARDT n.d.). The latest such endeavour being the Catherine Parc in Tiraspol (Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2020a). Under “rural tourism” (point 3.7.3.c) and aiming at domestic tourism, the Strategy of Development for 2019-2026 promises the “organization of programs for children’s recreation in rural areas during school holidays.” Then in a two sections entirely dedicated to tourism (points 3.9.5 and 5.2), the Strategy insists on developing “facilities that provide tourists with a full range of services for accommodation, food, entertainment, information services and more” (Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2018) and the hotel business (Airbnb is already on the Transnistrian market).

Related to that strategy, the Concept supports entrepreneurial tourist initiatives coming from Transnitiann citizens, the development of small entrepreneurship, of a tourist market and of infrastructures. According to the Concept, in 2016, there were only 6 tourist agencies and 9 individual tourist businesses. Domestic and foreign investments to develop the market are explicitly welcomed. A sector that has potential to be developed, according to Tatiana Yaskova, is teaching foreign languages as well as Russian for foreigners (Первый Приднестровский 2021). In December 2020, Krasnoselsky also underlined the need for the training of professional guides (Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2020b). Facing huge economic emigration, the objective here is to reduce unemployment, create “conditions for full employment of young people (...) and the development of small business” (Strategy 2019-2026, pt. 3.7.3; Novosti Pridnestrovyia 2018).

Although most of the resources are directed to Tiraspol and to Bender, the “rural tourism” strategy as well as some developments in other parts of Transnistria (see the tourism website), indicate a strategy of “territorial reach,” to use Mann’s terms discussed above. In the city of Dubossary, for example, “social institutions and housing stock are being restored (...) with infrastructure developing (...) Private hotels are opening along the Dniester in the territory of picturesque settlements” (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2019c). Local factories will probably be included in the upcoming “tourist passport.”

After a few years of planning, in March 2021, a prototype of such a “tourist passport” has been created (MDEP 2020). It is to be used to indicate attractions for visitors but, importantly, it is a result of a “partnership project” between the “state” and business which “will increase the number of potential customers and consumers, and the document holder will have the opportunity to use the services and purchase products at a discount” (Novosti Pridnestrovya 2019b). The aim thus is to attract money and currencies. *À propos*, Novosti Pridnestrovya (2021a) report a representative of a travel agency saying: “Enterprises that produce any kind of product should be interested in tourists. To a large extent, this is advertising that you don’t have to pay for. After visiting an enterprise, seeing the production process, a person will sooner or later buy something of its products.”

Socio-economic developments related to the tourist industry are used for output internal legitimization of this de facto state. But tourism is not only about the external image and business opportunities. It is also explicitly directed at domestic tourists: on the one hand, as consumers and, on the other hand, as de facto state’s *demos* whose support is needed for internal legitimacy.

Identity Legitimization

In 2019, Transnistria registered 59,070 tourists (10,942 in 2020, a drop due to COVID-19) among them foreign tourists accounted for 19,284 (1,092 in 2020) (MDEP 2021). Clearly, most of the tourist attractions and facilities users are Transnistrians themselves. In the Decision on approving the Concept of Development of Tourism, the objectives and priorities of the domestic tourism are treated explicitly and separately from those of the international tourism (Postanovlieniye no. 362, Government of Transnistria 2017). One of these domestic objectives is to secure national tourist

heritage for future generations and the “education of civil-patriotic and spiritual-moral feelings of citizens of the republic.” The document then goes on to specify that “the main purpose of this type of tourism [domestic] is to educate and participate in patriotic education of the population, including youth, by studying local history, by opening to the world, familiarizing oneself with tourist attractions, everyday life, crafts, trades, traditions and rituals of the peoples who inhabited the territory of Transnistria and who currently live in the Moldovan Transnistrian Republic.”

Clearly, apart from output legitimization, another element of this “two in one” internal strategy of legitimization is the construction of a collective identity. Being the “soft” part of state-consolidation, nation-building is used to create or maintain a collective identity and cohesion (Blakkisrud and Kolstø 2011). This process of strengthening the nation’s identity is particularly important in *de facto* entities. On the one hand, self-determination principle relates to “the people.” On the other hand, in the case of Transnistria and its multiethnic character, it is crucial for this *de facto* state to create a degree of unity. Along small ethnicities such as Bulgarians and Poles, Transnistria is composed of three main ethnic groups that each makes up some 30% of the territory’s inhabitants (Russians, Ukrainians, and Moldovans). While Russian language is clearly the *lingua franca* and the cultural proximity with Russia is significant and publicly maintained (Comai and Venturi 2015; Osipov and Vasilevich 2019), tensions between ethnic groups are low and a Transnistrian “supra-ethnic” identification category, crossing all ethnic and linguistic boundaries, seems to be prevalent and generally accepted (Dembinska and Danero Iglesias 2013). Still, national categories need to be institutionalized, maintained and constantly reproduced (Brubaker 2002; Hutchinson 2005; A. D. Smith 2010). The category is invested and reinvested by ethnic entrepreneurs, such as state institutions, with identity attributes and meanings that connect the past to the present and to the future, according to the needs of the moment (Dembinska; forthcoming). Other than schools as national socialization *milieux*, nation-branding and banal everyday nationalism (Aronczyk 2013; Billig 1995) are part of the nation-building process. Tourism and tourist attractions and sites are important tools in the processes. They are invested with signifiers, symbols, and myths that communicate and “standardize” national identity common understandings (Dembinska 2010, 318; Schöpflin 2000, 81).

Generally treated in relation with its international component or its economic potential (Adams 1998; Ghimire 2013; Sears 1989), the link between domestic tourism and nation-building has been understudied in nationalism and tourism studies. When nation-building is addressed, it focuses on

international tourism and the image of a nation on display (Gillen 2014; Hussin 2018; Leong 1989; Nichols 2001; Storm 2014). Indeed, tourism is mostly conceptualized as an activity for foreigner visitors who insert themselves in or “drop-by” a local context. However, whereas international tourists tend to travel for their individual experience, adrenaline, knowledge that will contribute to their “individual identity,” domestic tourists immerse themselves in a “pilgrimage” where they will feel a sense of belonging and shared reality when in contact with the nation’s myths, symbols and language (Adams 1998, 77). We argue that tourism is oriented, practised, and performed by and for locals and can serve the nation-building process and, thus identity legitimization.

Even though nation-branding has an international, “marketable and monetizable” (p. 3) aim and use, Aronczyk (2013) sustains that it may “raise domestic spirits” (p. 1), that it “help(s) a nation [to] articulate a more coherent and cohesive national identity” (p. 3), to create and re-create the national imaginary (p.9). Importantly, she further explains the “[b]oth national elites and business elites [as national brand managers] express their objectives in terms of ongoing attempts to mobilize diverse peoples with diverse backgrounds into collective units in order to foster material and symbolic loyalties” (p. 9). Clearly, the competition for Transnistria’s tourist logo, mentioned above, seems to stir lively debates on “who we are.” *À propos*, Novosti Pridnestrovyia (2020b) report Ministry of Economic Development, Sergey Obolonik, saying:

“Our citizens reacted responsibly and emotionally to this issue. Personal involvement played remarkable role. It is in the process and is being discussed,” the head of the said. He added that the identity of Pridnestrovie was an issue in the discussion of which as many people as possible should take part. In Pridnestrovian society, there has been repeatedly discussed the issue of the fact that Suvorov’s image should be present on the logo, since it is inextricably linked with the history of Pridnestrovie and is one of its symbols. Commenting on such a proposal, [he] noted that it was important for Pridnestrovians to understand the historical role of their land as a Russian outpost. “These are the symbols that we are used to seeing in our life, which we identify Pridnestrovie with (...) It has a huge number of unusual qualities: multi-ethnicity, a small territory and at the same time a broad array of historical events,” the Minister said.

“[S]ymbols that we are used to seeing in our life” refers directly to the idea of banal nationalism, of the continuous unconscious individual reproduction of the nation in everyday routines of life

(Billig 1995). The logo – and the Transnistrian rubble, for that matter -, as Billig’s “unwaved flags,” are “part of the social environment [and] operates mindlessly” (Billig 1995, 38). The same goes for public spaces, like parks or museums, tourist activities such as family or school field trips, or experiencing local food in restaurants. The domestic audience thus experiences nationalism daily, in a ‘banal’ way in common spaces, *lieux de mémoire* or habitus, “the embodied history, internalized as a second nature.” The goal is to instill a sense of unity and cohesion with references to the past or with the perceived components of the nation’s identity (Nichols 2001; Posch 2018). Transnistria’s objective for the development of domestic tourism is clearly stated as such.

This is a conscious strategy even though for domestic vacationers, tourism is seen as an “apolitical” or simply “incidental” practice where activities of pleasure do not involve any, or very few, political interference (Nichols 2001, 3). In addition to combining sites and activities filled with the hegemonic narrative of the nation and its myth-symbol complex (Leong 1989; Posch 2015; Kaufman 2015), tourism is a unique way to establish symbolic boundaries between “us” and the foreigners, reinforcing the distinction with and/or link to the outside world (Storm 2014) - in the case of de facto states, particularly the distinction from the parent-state and the more or less strong link to the patron-state.

Completed in 2020, the Catherine Park (see the official website at <http://ekaterinenskiy-park-tiraspol.tilda.ws/en>) is a recent addition to the capital’s landscape and tourist route, proudly and loudly advertised in the domestic media, including an entire dossier in *Novosti Pridnestrovyya* (2020a). Initiated by the “President” Karsnoselsky in 2018, the space is a reorganization of the De Volan Park, involving modernisation of the space together with ornamenting it with busts of important historical figures, buildings with inscription resembling typical calligraphy and architecture from the 18-19th century, water fountains and a new imposing statue of Catherine the Great (Novosti Pridnestrovyya 2020a). Situated in the centre of Tiraspol, it is surrounded by the statue of Alexander Suvorov but also of Lenin, it is adjacent to the October 25th Avenue, the Supreme Soviet and the “Memorial of Glory” (commemorating the Great Patriotic War and the 1992 war with Moldova). Such a setting gives a sense of historical continuity to the Transnistrian imagined community and reflects the hegemonic identity discourse, particularly since Krasnoselsky took power in 2016, framing it within the *Russkiy Mir* concept and trying thus to “reconcile two incompatible histories – the Imperial and the Soviet” (Marandici 2020, 71).

Spacially central in Tiraspol and symbolically “branding” the nation, the Catherine park is meaningful also because all national holidays are celebrated there and nearby. While the nation is performed there, waving flags and singing the national anthem, it is also practiced in a banal everyday life. Used mainly by locals, the park sees a lot of visitors during warm days, strolling and watching boats and swimmers in the nearby Dniester River or relaxing and playing in the playground for kids that was arranged in the parc itself. Surrounded with historically and politically charged symbols, people gather and walk peacefully, while uncontinuously acquiring identity defining common (patriotic) references. Simply put, the park’s active/relaxing feeling makes the nationalism banal.

In recent years, with the help of the United Nations Development Program, the Transnistrian authorities also undertook the renovation of the Bender.y fortress (UNDP Moldova 2019) – the most important attraction for foreign and domestic tourism. Built by the Ottomans around 1538 during their conquest of the principality of Moldova, it was in the Russian Empire since 1812, then in Soviet Moldova and, finally, until very recently, used by Transnistria for military purposes (Bendery Fortress n.d.). The Bender.y fortress has since been transformed into a museum, an archeological site, and a park and a place for countless festivals and celebrations. Clearly oriented towards welcoming a great number of people and festivities because of its open spaces and concert scenes, the entry fee has preferential rates for citizens of Transnistria and from the Commonwealth of Independent States as well as, importantly for groups and school trips. While the forteress and the adjacent Alexander Nevski Park resemble the imperial style described for the Catherine the Great Park, the surrounding area is crowded with commemorating symbols of the 1992 battle of Bender.y – one of the most significant battles of this short-lived war. A new project envisions a guided tour by trolleybus through this Bender.y myth-symbol complex, expressly inviting local youth to easily visit this historical place with their school, by themselves or with their families (TCB 2021).

As mentioned above, the domestic tourism is to educate civil-patriotic feelings of citizens of the republic and thus constitutes explicitly an identity legitimization strategy of the Transnistrian authorities. By “banally” establishing links between the territory, its past, its culture and its “people”, it potentially makes Transnistria as “natural as rivers and mountains” in the eyes of its inhabitants (Migdal 2001, 168). Although, we detect overwhelming references to the Russian Empire in the new tourist projects, they do not erase the Soviet past. By blending within the Soviet

space, the projects offer a *longue-durée* perspective, they move away from the sole image of Transnistria as being a Soviet skansen and underline this de facto State's links with Russia and the *Russkiy Mir* – distinguishing itself from the framing observed in Moldova (ref.).

Conclusion

With fewer options available than recognized states, tourism is certainly a 'new' way for de facto states like Transnistria to foster, from a domestic and international audience, some support needed to survive or maintain itself. Using legitimization as our theoretical starting point, we argued that tourism serves as a "two-in-one" strategy combining output and identity as well as internal and external legitimization. Since 2010, a renewed interest for internal dynamics of de facto states as emerged to explain their survival. This paper reinforced this focus by mixing internal and external legitimization strategies with the help of tourism, nationalism and nation branding. By showing 'how' Transnistria presents itself to the world and to its own citizens, we've demonstrated that de facto states are always seeking support to preserve and expand their statehood and peoplehood through an array of tactics ranging from parks to museums to a new logo. While the attractions, spaces and activities deployed recently are in no way the whole picture of all the legitimization strategies developed by the Transnistrian state, tourism as a "two-in-one" strategy represents an interesting object of enquiry, simultaneously, looking into internal and external dynamics. Looking into tourism and tourist industry also allows to better grasp that external and internal state- and nation-building work together and are co-constitutive (Barr 2012).

The development of a new and advanced tourism planning is not coincidental. Transnistria is well aware of the interest it generates considering its quite 'authentic' and unique situation. While the growing interest among travellers for Moldova and Ukraine might be a great economic incentive for creating such million-dollar program, it does not provide sufficient answers. As we've demonstrated in this paper, connecting with the outside world, controlling its internal and external national image and attracting domestic support are also major incentives for the Transnistrian government. While there are differences between the other de facto states' tourism industry, we think that these preliminary empirical results highlight the interest behind the study of tourism in these entities.

While the COVID-19 pandemic took a toll on the Transnistrian tourism industry, especially its external component, it might also represent a new and greater opportunity for a great number of states. Indeed, domestic tourism might become an important feature of the post-pandemic world. Thus, tourism practised and developed by locals could exercise a greater role in identity and output legitimization. This fact alone should reinforce our conception of tourism as not only an activity for foreigners or designed for external purposes, but also as a domestic object that has an impact on the maintenance of the state and on the elaboration of a shared identity.

References

- Adams, Kathleen M. 1998. "Domestic Tourism and Nation-building in South Sulawesi." *Indonesia and the Malay World* 26 (75): 77–96. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13639819808729913>.
- Anderson, James, and Liam O’Dowd. 1999. "Borders, Border Regions and Territoriality: Contradictory Meanings, Changing Significance." *Regional Studies* 33 (7): 593–604.
- Aronczyk, Melissa. 2008. "Living the Brand’: Nationality, Globality, and the Identity Strategies of Nation Branding Consultants." *International Journal of Communication* 2 (January): 41–65.
- . 2013. *Branding the Nation: The Global Business of National Identity*. Oxford ; New York: Oxford University Press.
- Bakke, Kristin M., John O’Loughlin, Gerard Toal, and Michael D. Ward. 2014. "Convincing State-Builders? Disaggregating Internal Legitimacy in Abkhazia1." *International Studies Quarterly* 58 (3): 591–607. <https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12110>.
- Barr, Michael. 2012. "Nation Branding as Nation Building: China’s Image Campaign." *East Asia* 29 (1): 81–94. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-011-9159-7>.
- Beacháin, Donnacha Ó. 2012. "The Dynamics of Electoral Politics in Abkhazia." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45 (1–2): 165–74. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.008>.
- Bendery Fortress. n.d. "Brief History of the Fortress." Accessed April 19, 2021. https://bendery-fortress.com/en/o_kreposti.
- Billig, Michael. 1995. *Banal Nationalism*. London: SAGE Publications.
- Blakkisrud, Helge, Nino Kemoklidze, Tamta Gelashvili, and Pål Kolstø. 2020. "Navigating de Facto Statehood: Trade, Trust, and Agency in Abkhazia’s External Economic Relations." *Eurasian Geography and Economics*, 1–25. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2020.1861957>.
- Blakkisrud, Helge, and Pål Kolstø. 2011. "From Secessionist Conflict Toward a Functioning State: Processes of State- and Nation-Building in Transnistria." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 27 (2): 178–210. <https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.27.2.178>.
- Bonnot, Maurice. 2014. *Des États de Facto. Abkhazie, Somaliland, République Turque Du Chypre Du Nord...* Paris: L’Harmattan.

- Broers, Laurence. 2005. "The Politics of Non-Recognition and Democratisation." In *The Limits of Leadership: Elites and Societies in the Nagorny-Karabakg Peace Process*, edited by Laurence Broers. London: Conciliation Resources. <http://www.c-r.org/accord/nagorny>.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2002. "Ethnicity without Groups." *European Journal of Sociology* 43: 163–86.
- Caspersen, Nina. 2008. "Separatism and Democracy in the Caucasus." *Survival* 50 (4): 113–36. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00396330802329014>.
- . 2011. "Democracy, Nationalism and (Lack of) Sovereignty: The Complex Dynamics of Democratisation in Unrecognised States†." *Nations and Nationalism* 17 (2): 337–56. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2010.00471.x>.
- . 2019. "Recognition, Status Quo or Reintegration. Engagement with de Facto States." In *The Politics of International Interaction with de Facto States. Conceptualising Engagement Without Recognition*, edited by Ker Ker-Lindsay and Eiki Berg. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge.
- Comai, Giorgio, and Bernardo Venturi. 2015. "Language and Education Laws in Multi-Ethnic de Facto States: The Cases of Abkhazia and Transnistria." *Nationalities Papers* 43 (6): 886–905. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00905992.2015.1082996>.
- Dembinska, Magdalena. 2010. "Building Trust: Managing Common Past and Symbolic Public Spaces in Divided Societies." *Ethnopolitics* 9 (3–4): 311–32. <https://doi.org/10.1080/17449050903564845>.
- . 2021. *La Légitimation et La Survie Des États de Facto*. Montréal: Les presses de l'Université de Montréal.
- Dembinska, Magdalena, and Julien Danero Iglesias. 2013. "The Making of an Empty Moldovan Category within a Multiethnic Transnistrian Nation." *East European Politics and Societies* 27 (3): 413–28. <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325413484174>.
- Dulgher, Maria. 2020. "BBC about Transnistria's Independence Day: 'Celebrating a Nation That Doesn't Exist.'" *Moldova.Org*, 2020. <https://www.moldova.org/en/bbc-about-transnistriaindependence-day-celebrating-a-nation-that-doesnt-exist/>.
- Easton, David A. 1965. *A Systems Analysis of Political Life*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.
- Ghimire, Krishna B. 2013. *The Native Tourist: Mass Tourism Within Developing Countries*. Routledge.
- Gillen, Jamie. 2014. "Tourism and Nation Building at the War Remnants Museum in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 104 (6): 1307–21. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00045608.2014.944459>.
- Government of Transnistria. 2017. "Об Утверждении Концепции Развития Внутреннего и Въездного Туризма в Приднестровской Молдавской Республике На 2018-2020 Годы." 2017. <http://gov-pmr.org/item/10891>.
- Holmes, Leslie. 2016. "Comparative Conclusions: Legitimacy and Legitimation in Eurasian PostCommunist States." In *Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, edited by Martin Brusis, Martin Schulze Wessel, and Joachim Ahrens. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hussin, Hanafi. 2018. "Gastronomy, Tourism, and the Soft Power of Malaysia." *SAGE Open*, 1–11.
- Hutchinson, John. 2005. *Nations as Zones of Conflict*. London ; Thousand Oaks, Calif: SAGE.
- Jackson, Robert H. 1993. *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Kaneva, Nadia. 2011. "Nation Branding: Toward an Agenda for Critical Research." *International Journal of Communication* 5 (0): 25.
- Kaneva, Nadia, and Delia Popescu. 2011. "National Identity Lite: Nation Branding in Post-Communist Romania and Bulgaria." *International Journal of Cultural Studies* 14 (2): 191–207. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1367877910382181>.

- Kaufman, Stuart J. 2015. *Nationalist Passions*. Cornell University Press.
- Keating, Joshua. 2018. *Invisible Countries: Journeys to the Edge of Nationhood*. Yale: Yale University Press.
- Ker-Lindsay, Ker. 2019. "The Stigmatisation of de Facto States. Disapproval and 'Engagement without Recognition.'" In *The Politics of International Interaction with de Facto States. Conceptualising Engagement Without Recognition*, edited by Ker Ker-Lindsay and Eiki Berg. Abingdon, Oxon, UK: Routledge.
- Kolstø, Pål, and Helge Blakkisrud. 2008. "Living with Non-Recognition: State- and Nation-Building in South Caucasian Quasi-States." *Europe-Asia Studies* 60 (3): 483–509. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09668130801948158>.
- . 2012. "De Facto States and Democracy: The Case of Nagorno-Karabakh." *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 45 (1–2): 141–51. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2012.03.004>.
- Kosienkowski, Marcin. 2020. "The Patron-Client Relationship Between Russia and Transnistria." In *De Facto States in Eurasia*, edited by Tomáš Hoch and Vincenc Kopeček, 183–207. London: Routledge.
- Krasner, Stephen. 1999. *Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
- Leong, Wai-Teng. 1989. "Culture and the State: Manufacturing Traditions for Tourism." *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 6 (4): 355–75. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15295038909366762>.
- Lipset, Martin Seymour. 1959. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy, Economic Development and Political Legitimacy." *American Political Science Review* 53: 69–165.
- Mann, Michael. 1984. "The Autonomous Power of the State: Its Origins, Mechanisms and Results." *European Journal of Sociology* 25 (1): 185–216.
- Marandici, Ion. 2020. "Multiethnic Parastates and Nation-Building: The Case of the Transnistrian Imagined Community." *Nationalities Papers*, 48 (1): 61–82.
- Matsuzato, Kimitaka. 2008. "From Belligerent to Multi-Ethnic Democracy: Domestic Politics in Unrecognized States After the Ceasefires." *Eurasian Review* 1 (November): 95–119.
- MDEP. 2019. "Приднестровье Туристический Справочник - Pridnestrovie Tourists' Guidebook." Министерства экономического развития ПМР - Ministry of economic development of Pridnestrovie.
- . 2020. "Паспорт Туриста и Фирменный Стиль Приднестровья | Министерство Экономического Развития Приднестровской Молдавской Республики." 2020. <http://www.mer.gospmr.org/videomaterialy/2020/yanvar/pasport-turista-i-firmennyj-stil-pridnestrovyia.html>.
- . 2021. "ОСНОВНЫЕ ПОКАЗАТЕЛИ ТУРИСТИЧЕСКОЙ ДЕЯТЕЛЬНОСТИ ЗА 2019 ГОД." 2021. <http://mer.gospmr.org/gosudarstvennaya-sluzhba-statistiki/informacziya/osnovnye-pokazateli-turisticheskoy-deyatelnosti/press-vypusk-osnovnye-pokazateli-turisticheskoy-deyatelnosti-za-2019-god-bez-individualnyh-predprinimatelej.html>.
- Migdal, Joel S. 2001. *State in Society: Studying How States and Societies Transform and Constitute One Another*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- NGO ARDT. n.d. "Туризм в ПМР — АРДТ." Accessed March 24, 2021. <http://ngo-ardt.com/turizm-v-pmr.html>.
- Nichols, Karen. 2001. "Tourism as a Nation-Building Tool in the Baltic Republics." *Middle States Geographer* 34: 1–9.
- Novosti Pridnestrovyua. 2018. "Стратегия развития Приднестровской Молдавской Республики на 2019 – 2026 годы." *Новости Приднестровья*. 2018.

- <https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/18-12-17/strategiya-razvitiya-pridnestrovskoy-moldavskoy-respubliki-na-2019>.
- . 2019a. “President Instructed to Develop a Draft Law on Tourism by March 1.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2019. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/19-12-03/president-instructed-develop-draft-law-tourism-march-1>.
- . 2019b. “The PMR President Held a Meeting on the Development of Tourism in Pridnestrovie.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2019. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/19-12-03/pmr-president-held-meeting-development-tourism-pridnestrovie>.
- . 2019c. “TOURIST ROUTES NETWORK IS DEVELOPING IN THE DUBOSSARY DISTRICT.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2019. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/19-08-14/tourist-routes-network-developing-dubossary-district>.
- . 2019d. “VADIM KRASNOSELSKY: IT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE PRIDNESTROVIE MORE POPULAR.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2019. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/19-04-18/vadim-krasnoselsky-it-necessary-make-pridnestrovie-more-popular>.
- . 2020a. “Catherine Park in Details and Symbols.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2020. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/20-09-15/catherine-park-details-and-symbols>.
- . 2020b. “Приднестровьем заинтересовалась Всемирная туристическая организация.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2020. <https://novostipmr.com/ru/news/20-02-06/pridnestrovem-zainteresovalas-vsemirnaya-turisticheskaya>.
- . 2021a. “Industrial Tourism in Pridnestrovie - Interesting Places to See.” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2021. <https://novostipmr.com/en/news/21-03-16/industrial-tourism-pridnestrovie-interesting-places-see>.
- . 2021b. “Плацдарм, монастырь, дом-музей - туристические указатели в Слободзейском районе (видео).” *Новости Приднестровья*. 2021. <https://novostipmr.com/ru/content/placdarm-monastyr-dom-muzey-turisticheskie-ukazateli-v-slobodzeyskom>.
- O’Loughlin, John, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal. 2011. “Inside Abkhazia: Survey of Attitudes in a De Facto State.” *Post-Soviet Affairs* 27 (1): 1–36. <https://doi.org/10.2747/1060-586X.27.1.1>.
- O’Loughlin, John, Vladimir Kolossov, and Gerard Toal. 2015. “Inside the Post-Soviet de Facto States: A Comparison of Attitudes in Abkhazia, Nagorny Karabakh, South Ossetia, and Transnistria.” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 55 (5): 423–56. <https://doi.org/10.1080/15387216.2015.1012644>.
- Osipov, Alexander, and Hanna Vasilevich. 2019. “Transnistria Nation-Building: A Case of Effective Diversity Policies?” *Nationalities Papers*, 1–17. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2018.26>.
- Paasi, Anssi. 1996. “Inclusion Exclusion and Territorial Identities: The Meanings of Boundaries in The Globalizing Geopolitical Landscape.” *Nordisk Samhallsgeografisk Tidskrift* 23 (October): 6–23.
- Pegg, Scott. 1998. *International Society and the de Facto State*. Burlington: Ashgate.
- Popescu, Nicu. 2006. “Democracy and Secessionism: Transnistria and Abkhazia’s Domestic Policies.” Brussels: Center for Policy Studies. <http://core.kmi.open.ac.uk/download/pdf/11871437.pdf>.
- Posch, Eva. 2015. “Negotiating the Nation in Tourist Historiography from the Republic of Moldova.” *Revue d’études Comparatives Est-Ouest* 1 (46): 161–84. <https://doi.org/10.4074/S0338059915001072>.
- . 2018. “Public History, Tourism and Nation Formation in the Republic of Moldova.” In , 1–34. University of Graz.

- Pretes, Michael. 2003. "Tourism and Nationalism." *Annals of Tourism Research* 30 (1): 125–42. [https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-7383\(02\)00035-X](https://doi.org/10.1016/S0160-7383(02)00035-X).
- Ryngaert, Cedric, and Sven Sobrie. 2011. "Recognition of States: International Law or Realpolitik: The Practice of Recognition in the Wake of Kosovo, South Ossetia, and Abkhazia Current Legal Developments." *Leiden Journal of International Law* 24 (2): 467–90.
- Schöpflin, György. 2000. *Nations, Identity, Power*. New York: New York University Press.
- Sears, J. F. 1989. *Sacred Places: American Tourist Attractions in the Nineteenth Century*. New York: Oxford University Press. <https://www.cabdirect.org/cabdirect/abstract/19911895418>.
- Smith, Anthony D. 2010. *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History*. Second edition. Key Concepts. Cambridge, UK ; Malden, MA: Polity.
- Smith, M. Estellie. 1997. "Hegemony and Elite Capital: The Tools of Tourism." In *Tourism and Culture: An Applied Perspective*. Albany: SUNY Press.
- Soest, Christian, and Julia Grauvogel. 2016. "Comparing Legitimation Strategies in Post-Soviet Countries." In *Politics and Legitimacy in Post-Soviet Eurasia*, edited by Martin Brusis, Joachim Ahrens, and Martin Schulze Wessel, 18–46. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Soifer, Hillel. 2008. "State Infrastructural Power: Approaches to Conceptualization and Measurement." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43 (3–4): 231–51.
- Soifer, Hillel, and Matthias vom Hau. 2008. "Unpacking the Strength of the State: The Utility of State Infrastructural Power." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 43 (3): 219–30. <https://doi.org/10.1007/s12116-008-9030-z>.
- Storm, Eric. 2014. "Overcoming Methodological Nationalism in Nationalism Studies: The Impact of Tourism on the Construction and Diffusion of National and Regional Identities." *History Compass* 12 (4): 361–73. <https://doi.org/10.1111/hic3.12141>.
- Tansey, Oisín. 2007. "Democratization without a State: Democratic Regime-Building in Kosovo." *Democratization* 14 (1): 129–50. <https://doi.org/10.1080/13510340601024355>.
- Toal, Gerard, and John O'Loughlin. 2013a. "Inside South Ossetia: A Survey of Attitudes in a de Facto State." *Post-Soviet Affairs* 29 (2): 136–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2013.780417>.
- . 2013b. "Land for Peace in Nagorny Karabakh? Political Geographies and Public Attitudes Inside a Contested De Facto State." *Territory, Politics, Governance* 1 (2): 158–82. <https://doi.org/10.1080/21622671.2013.842184>.
- UNDP Moldova. 2019. "The Bender Fortress (Citadel) and Chisinau Circus Will Be Restored According to International Standards with European Union's Assistance." UNDP. 2019. <https://www.md.undp.org/content/moldova/en/home/presscenter/pressreleases/2019/cetat-ea-bender-si-circul-din-chisinau-vor-fi-renovate.html>.
- Walls, Michael, and Steve Kibble. 2011. "What Makes Somaliland's Case for Recognition So Different?" In *Yorkshire African Studies Network*. University of Leeds.
- Walters, Williams. 2002. "Mapping Schengenland: Denaturalizing the Border." *Environment and Planning: Society and Space* 20 (5): 561–80.
- Weber, Max. 1919. *Le Savant et Le Politique*. Paris: Union Générale d'Éditions.
- Неудобный, Фёдор. 2019. "Добро не пожаловать!" *Aif.md* (blog). May 29, 2019. <http://aif.md/dobro-ne-pozhalovat/>.
- Первый Приднестровский. 2021. *Татьяна Яськова об иностранцах, туризме и ТОП-местах Приднестровья. Специальный разговор*. Tiraspol: Первый Приднестровский. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=r0U1Ac_RC-E.
- TCB. 2021. *Путешествие На Красном Троллейбусе*. https://www.youtube.com/watch?app=desktop&v=gpixaY_Sqko&feature=youtu.be.