

Anastasia Fomitchova  
PhD candidate in Political Science  
Paris 1 Panthéon Sorbonne University  
anastasia.fomitchova@gmail.com

**War, oligarchs and state formation  
Modes of governance in post-Maidan Ukraine (2014-2019)**

**Paper presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention**

**5-8 May 2021**

**Do No Cite Without the Permission of the Author**

**ASN Convention  
Panel U13 – Reform Actors and Dynamics  
5<sup>th</sup> of May 2021**

## Abstract

*In 2013, the "Euromaidan" mobilizations led to the departure of President Yanukovich, then part of Donetsk's "oligarchic clan", and, more generally, to a change in the political elites. This change of power is most often analyzed as the result of a mobilization of the civil society in the context of a democratic transition process. However, as in 2004, some of the economic elites in favor of a pro-European orientation played a decisive role in this context where civil society has not been the main bottom-up force in Ukraine. Petro Poroshenko's rise to power after the revolutionary moment of 2014 is therefore part of a renewed competition between oligarchic clans for the access to the center's administrative resources. For some oligarchs, the pro-European orientation leads to the preservation of their economic interests by securing their property rights and access to world markets within the framework of an oligopoly economy whose main sectors have been monopolized since the semi-privatizations of the 1990s.*

*President Yanukovich's departure from power leaves the country drained and almost at bankruptcy. The signing of the Association Agreement with the EU and the change in power led to a stronger presence of international organizations, particularly international donors who condition their loans on the implementation of reforms for the "democratization" of the political system and the "liberalization" of the economy in this former Soviet republic. Systemic corruption in this post-Soviet republic is the result of the lack of strict partition between the political and the economic spheres since the introduction of reforms aimed at liberalizing the economy after the fall of the USSR. After the introduction of schemes for the capture of national resources through the effect of semi-privatization of state industries by regional economic networks, a rentier economy was established, operating through the subordination of the political class to the economic interests of a group of actors designated as "oligarchs".*

*The war and the support of Western actors led the national political elites to develop new mechanisms articulating the discourse of "democratization", strategy for the construction of the historicity of the state, and adaptation of political and economic practices, the reforms of the state apparatus inducing a repositioning of the elites in new economic networks and reinforcing rent-seeking practices. Constituting the cornerstone of the Ukrainian post-Soviet system, the oligarchs form an elite system whose individual strategies for the defense of their private interests constrain a process of reform of the state apparatus that has been underway with the support of international actors since 2014. Indeed, despite the "revolutionary moment" and the war, the logic of the rent-seeking system in place since the 1990s has been maintained.*

*In the light of the theories on the construction of the state in war (Tilly: 1990) and on 'civil wars' defined as the coexistence on the same national territory of different social orders maintaining a violent relationship (Baczkó, Dorronsoro : 2017), we propose to analyze the relationship between the trajectory of the Ukrainian state and the place of "civil war" in it through a reflection on the one hand on the exogenous factors, and in particular the effects of this internationalization of the governance, which enable the restructuring of state apparatus in this context of armed conflict, and, on the other hand, the configurations of this elite system interfering with the reform agenda because of the maintenance of the "néopatrimonial" logics in the post-Maidan period.*

## Introduction

In November 2013, the refusal of the president in power, Viktor Yanukovich, to sign an association agreement with the European Union in favour of a Union agreement with Russia led to mobilizations in the Ukrainian capital. Named "*Euromaidan*", these mobilizations in the winter of 2013-2014 led to the resignation of the government in power, which no longer enjoyed its political support. In February 2014, the departure of President Yanukovich left the country bereft and almost bankrupt. According to the former Prosecutor General of Ukraine, the three years of Viktor Yanukovich cost the Ukrainian state nearly 100 billion dollars<sup>1</sup>, and the embezzlement of Yanukovich's relatives, particularly in the field of infrastructure, is estimated at 10 billion dollars per year<sup>2</sup>. According to these estimates, the plundering of resources by the former president's "clan" is equivalent to Ukraine's GDP in 2014, which was \$133.5 billion. To quote the First Deputy Chairman of the Special Control Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on privatization issues from 2014 to 2019 "*The state treasury after Yanukovich was completely plundered. In the country's budget, after Yanukovich fled, there were 108,000 hryvnia left. About \$10,000. In a country with 42 million inhabitants.* »<sup>3</sup>

In 2014, the change of power, the signing of the association agreement with the European Union by the new regime, the entry into armed conflict and the economic recession led to a stronger presence of foreign actors, particularly international donors. These donors condition their loans on the implementation of reforms for the 'democratization' of the political system, and privatization reforms through the introduction of neo-liberal reforms in the key sectors of the economy of this former Soviet republic. These reforms correspond to the political orientation taken by the new authorities who are developing a reformist discourse after the revolutionary moment.

The plundering of national resources by Viktor Yanukovich's clan from 2010 to 2013 is illustrative of the system in place since the mid-1990s, based on the interdependence of the economic and political system, which allows the maintenance of a rentier economy at the center of which are the oligarchs. While several authors have classified Ukrainian oligarchs according to a list of criteria<sup>4</sup>, I choose to define oligarchs as economic actors at the head of the country's main economic structures, who have taken advantage of the transition to a market economy to develop models for capturing national resources within the framework of the rentier economy that emerges after entry into a capitalist system; through ratchet effects, they have then invested directly and indirectly in the political sphere in order to preserve their private interests.

Since the early 1990s Ukraine has developed an 'oligarchic-patrimonial' regime (Fisun: 2007) and has been confronted with a 'capture of the state' (Hellman, Jones and Kaufmann: 2000), by the logics of private accumulation of economic elites, in alliance with the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy. Indeed, as Alexander Fisun points out, the political systems of post-Soviet states can be classified into two types, 'sultanistic' and 'oligarchic-patrimonial'<sup>5</sup>, depending on the balance of

---

<sup>1</sup> Anastasia Zanuda, "Yanukovich's money: will we have to pay it back? " 5 mars 2017, (online) <https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-russian-39815420>

<sup>2</sup> Anders Aslund, "Oligarchs, Corruption and European Integration ", Journal of Democracy vol 25, 2014.

<sup>3</sup> Interview with the First Deputy Chairman of the Special Control Commission of the Verkhovna Rada of Ukraine on privatization issues from 2014 to 2019, Kyiv, September 2018.

<sup>4</sup> In particular, several authors have categorized them, based on their mode of organization as clans (Kuzio, 2016), business clans (Kowall, 2002; Shukan, 2007; Avioutskii, 2011), or business-administrative groups (BAG) (Balmaceda, 2008). Other authors have proposed definitions by making a distinction between economic and political elites, defining oligarchs as 'powerful economic actors interacting with political institutions to defend and preserve their own interests' (Puglisi, 2003) or by proposing a list of criteria, for example based on the economic and political capital of these actors. Heiko Pleines, for example, selects a total of 29 oligarchs for the period from 2000 to 2015, defining them as political entrepreneurs whose motives are exclusively oriented towards the protection of their economic interests, and excluding economic actors who have become fully political actors (Pleines, 2016).

<sup>5</sup> Alexandre Fisun, *Post-soviet neopatrimonial regimes: The Genesis, Characteristics, Typology*, Domestic notes, 2007.

power between the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy, the profit-seeking economic and political actors, and the political power controlling the means of coercion through the use of military forces. He argues that "when a head of state establishes personal control over power and the economy using both semi-traditional and contemporary incentives and rewards we can speak of the formation of 'sultanic' regimes (Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, Belarus) and that in countries where rent-seeking economic actors have taken over the state in alliance with the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy, "oligarchic" and "neo-patrimonial" regimes have been formed (Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia). The common acceptance of the concept of oligarchy refers to a type of regime and neo-patrimonialism (Eisenstadt, 1973) to a distinction between public and private property that is not respected in practice, unlike the patrimonialism described by Max Weber (1971), for whom certain forms of 'traditional' legitimacy that predate 'rational-bureaucratic' legitimacy, such as sultanism, show a lack of distinction between the property of the state and the property of the prince, thus establishing as a norm the indistinction, as far as political authorities are concerned, between public and private property (and between public and private office, public and private interest).

In the mid-1990s, regionally based informal networks took over state-owned industries in key sectors of the Ukrainian economy. During the Soviet Union, Ukraine had a centralized system characterized by state control of the means of production. After the introduction of the first economic liberalization reforms at the time of perestroika in the late 1980s, the 'red directors' seized political power to control the economic affairs of the state apparatus<sup>6</sup>. Under the presidency of Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) these actors became the managers of the economic structures and constituted his power base<sup>7</sup>. With their administrative and managerial skills and social capital inherited from their membership of nomenklatura networks, they formed the first Ukrainian economic elite, which was formed thanks to their position in the state apparatus in the early years of the post-communist transition, before being challenged by groups of entrepreneurs who emerged locally under the presidency of Leonid Kuchma (2004-2014), giving rise to the oligarchs, who developed monopolies in the main sectors of the Ukrainian economy. Referred to as business clans<sup>8</sup>, or oligarchic clans<sup>9</sup>, these networks, which were formed at a local scale during the 1990s, draw their strength from their territorial presence by subordinating local and then national authorities to their interests through the existence of clientelist networks. From the mid-1990s onwards, these regional networks, headed by oligarchs, sought to extend their control over state bodies on a national scale, or to place actors loyal to them within the central apparatus because of the discretion of the executive power over fiscal policies and the control of political power over the judiciary. During the presidency of Leonid Kuchma, there were no less than five members of the 'Dnipropetrovsk clan' in the presidential administration and about twenty in the government apparatus<sup>10</sup>. With the presidential election of Viktor Yanukovich, a member of the "Donetsk clan" in 2010, many political and economic actors from the Donetsk network also took up key positions in the central administration. This network, nicknamed "the family", used access to the administrative resources of the political center to take over the industries of their competitors and engage in opaque privatizations, as well as to set up schemes to divert funds from public projects<sup>11</sup>.

After the departure of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014, the post-revolutionary power develops a reformist discourse focused on the "good governance" of institutions, as well as on the establishment of a rule of law and the fight against corruption. This discourse stigmatizes the

---

<sup>6</sup> Margarita Balmaceda, *Energy dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia's power, Oligarch's Profits and Ukraine's Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006*, London, Routledge, 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Heiko Pleines, "Manipulating politics: Domestic investors in Ukrainian privatization auctions 2000-2004", *Europe-Asia studies*, vol. 60, 2008.

<sup>8</sup> Vyacheslav Aviutskii, "Les clans d'affaires en Ukraine (1991-2007)", *Revue d'Etude comparative Est-Ouest*, 2011/1 (No. 42).

<sup>9</sup> Ioulia Shukan, "Ukraine. Les principaux enjeux de la vie politique depuis la Révolution orange", Les études du CERI, n°134, 2007.

<sup>10</sup> Puglisi Rosaria, "The rise of the Ukrainian oligarchs" *Democratization*, 10(3), 2003.

<sup>11</sup> Anders Aslund, "Oligarchs, Corruption and European Integration", *Journal of Democracy*, op.cit.

practices of the previous elites and advocates the 'desoligarchisation' (*дезолигархізація*) of the system, as well as the 'lustration' (*люстрація*) of 'corrupt' political actors. After the flight of Viktor Yanukovich, the former president's party, the 'Party of Regions', was dissolved, and early elections in May and October 2014 led to a reconfiguration of political struggles through the formation of new coalitions. Much of the literature has described the 'Maidan' mobilizations as a 'revolution' (which would imply a profound change in the political structures of the state), a terminology that we prefer to substitute here with that of 'revolutionary moment' defined, in the words of Charles Tilly, as 'any situation of multiple sovereignty in which state power is the object of competing claims supported by a significant fraction of the population and without said power being able or willing to repress the oppositional coalition'<sup>12</sup>. The 'revolutionary moments' (Tilly, 1978) in the post-Soviet space have often been analyzed as moments of 'democratic transition'<sup>13</sup>. As such, some literature identifies the Ukrainian 'Revolution of Dignity' as a process of democratic transition, due to the change of power, and the introduction of reforms in the state apparatus after 2014. However, as several authors have already pointed out (e.g. Burawoy, Verdery 1999; Carothers, 2002; Gel'man, 2003), contrary to the analyses of the first generation of work on 'transitology'<sup>14</sup>, neoliberal reforms and the opening up to capitalism do not lead in a linear way to a process of 'democratization'. Indeed, these moments also need to be understood through the lens of the historical trajectory of states, practices and power struggles of various groups and factions within the state, and thus the oligarchs<sup>15</sup>.

The rise to power of Petro Poroshenko after the revolutionary moment of 2014 is part of a renewed competition between oligarchic clans for access to administrative and economic resources in the political center of Kyiv, and to position themselves vis-à-vis international subsidies, which constitute a new source of rent in the context of the arrival of international actors. Since the early 2000s, the oligarchs have been divided on issues of economic integration, with some of them supporting integration into global markets through closer ties with the European Union, as this is more favorable to their economic interests than economic and political dependence on Russia, Unlike those whose sectors of activity are favored by the maintenance of this rentier economy, (notably heavy industry and energy), and linked to the Russian economy<sup>16</sup>, the oligarchs of the industrial and energy sector are much more dependent on this economy of capture than those of the agrarian or food sector<sup>17</sup>. Nevertheless, those who have assets in Europe also support the process of rapprochement with the European markets to enter the stock market, secure their property rights or invest in money laundering networks<sup>18</sup>. Thus, behind a discourse on democratic transition and cooperation with civil society, the revolutionary moment and the war allowed the arrival of new resources and the establishment of new circuits of personal enrichment for actors benefiting from social capital convertible into economic capital, in the post-revolutionary administrative and political system. Indeed, although there was a change of power at the end of the

---

<sup>12</sup> Charles Tilly, *From Mobilization to Revolution*, Reading, Addison-Wesley, 1978, pp. 189-222. Definition taken up by Bennani-Chraïba Mounia, Filleule Olivier, "Pour une sociologie des situations révolutionnaires. Retour sur les révoltes arabes" *Revue Française de science politique*, 2012/5, Vol 62.

<sup>13</sup> Richard Banégas, "Les transitions démocratiques : mobilisations collectives et fluidité politique", *Cultures & Conflits* n°12, winter 1993.

<sup>14</sup> Notably embodied in the work of Samuel Huntington, *The third wave: Democratization in the late Twentieth Century*. Norman, University of Oklahoma Press, 1991, and the project that led to three books published in 1986: Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, vol.1: *Prospects for Democracy*; Guillermo A. O'Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (eds.), *Transitions from Authoritarian Rule*, vols.3 & 4, *Baltimore, John Hopkins University Press*, 1986.

<sup>15</sup> François Bafoil, *Capitalismes émergents. Economies politiques comparées. Europe de l'Est et Asie du Sud-Est*, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2012.

<sup>16</sup> Antoneta Dimitrova and Rilka Dragneva, 2013 "Shaping convergence with the EU in foreign policy and state aid in post-Orange Ukraine. Weak external incentives, powerful veto players" *Europe-Asia Studies*, vol 65.

<sup>17</sup> Rosaria Puglisi (2008), A window to the world? Oligarchs and foreign policy in Ukraine, dans *Ukraine: Quo Vadis?* Edited by S. Fischer, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies (Chaillot Paper No. 108).

<sup>18</sup> Heiko Pleines "The international links of Ukrainian oligarchs. Business expansion and transnational offshore networks" in Timm Beichelt and Susann Worschech (eds.): *Transnational Ukraine? Networks and Ties that influence(d) Contemporary Ukraine*, Stuttgart Ibidem, 2017.

'revolutionary moment' (Tilly, 1993) of 2014, a 'republic of clans' (Minakov, 2018) based on the same logic of the economic and political system in place since the 1990s and on the capture of resources by groups of economic actors, the oligarchs, who have access to the political scene, was maintained. After 2014, the armed intervention of the Russian Federation in the south and east of Ukraine enabled the actors who came to power as a result of the mobilizations to legitimize their arrival and their continued presence on the political scene by reusing nationalist arguments about national identity and state-building, as was the case for the members of the Communist Party who came to power after the break-up of the USSR<sup>19</sup>. Although there is little renewal on the political scene, this orientation developed by the new authorities is supported and encouraged by international actors. This undertaking to restructure the institutional architecture and the state apparatus became a major challenge to 'strengthen' the Ukrainian state after the annexation of Crimea and the support of the Russian Federation to separatist movements in the South and East of Ukraine, which resulted in the creation of two secessionist republics on Ukrainian territory, the 'Luhansk People's Republic' and the 'Donetsk People's Republic'. These extraversion mechanisms condition the production of discourses and practices of legitimization by the elites, while repositioning them in new economic networks.

This paper is based on data collected during field surveys conducted between September 2018 and July 2019 in Kiev, with interviews conducted with international organizations (EBRD, European Union), political actors (national deputies and parliamentary assistants, political opponents) and civil society actors involved in the process of reforming the state apparatus in several sectors (human rights, justice, police, defence, anti-corruption), observers (think tanks and journalists), and is part of a research study on the effects of the Donbass war on state-building conducted since 2016. I am interested here in how internationalization has reformatted the game of competition for resources for economic elites, the oligarchs, in the context of the Donbass war. I hypothesize here that the mechanisms of internationalization of governance have led to the entrenchment of a predatory economy that has been in place since Ukraine's independence, while at the same time contributing to the legitimization of the oligarchs in the Ukrainian post-Soviet system through its mechanisms, by securing property rights on the one hand, and because of blockages in the reform process, particularly in the economic sphere. In resituating the revolutionary moment of 2014 in its historicity, I will analyze its effects through the mechanisms that are being put in place linked to the internationalization of the field of power to accompany the country's 'democratic transition'.

I will therefore look at the effects produced by the internationalization of governance on the field of power between 2014 and 2019 in the context of the war in Donbass through a reflection on the one hand, on the exogenous factors, which allow a restructuring of the state apparatus in this context of armed conflict, and on the other hand, the configurations of this elite system, interfering with the reform program due to the maintenance of neo-patrimonial logics and the 'clan republic' (Minakov, 2019) in place since the early 1990s.

---

<sup>19</sup> As Gilles Lepessant points out with regard to the fall of the USSR, like Belarus and Moldova, Ukraine obtained independence by default in the context of the disintegration of the USSR, having not provoked a real change in the elites and having resulted from a desire on the part of the leaders to retain power and a hold on economic resources and the means of production despite the decomposition of the Soviet Union. Lepessant G., "Entre européanisation et fragmentation, quel modèle de développement pour le territoire ukrainien ? ", Les études du CERI, n°212, Juin 2015.

## 1. The revolutionary process and the war in the Donbass: a moment of strong internationalization allowing a restructuring of the state apparatus

Since the early 1990s, the Ukrainian political system has been dominated by economic networks that took shape at the regional level and then extended their influence to the national level from the mid-1990s. After a phase of primary resource capture, proximity to the political center is necessary for them to secure their capital, acquired by fraudulent means in a context of institutional weakness, notably due to the discretion of the executive on fiscal policies and the control it exercises over the judiciary. Since 2004, these informal power networks have been competing to extend their influence over the executive, which must maintain a balance with them because of their local roots and their influence in the political and media fields. As Mikhail Minakov points out, 'systemic corruption in Ukraine is a victory effect of these regional clans as a major form of governance, a self-organization of elites in Ukraine'<sup>20</sup>. In 2014, some oligarchs therefore openly positioned themselves against Viktor Yanukovich, as the pro-European orientation should lead to a securing of their property rights, and guarantee access to European financial markets, as well as to money laundering networks.

The divisions between the oligarchs are particularly visible at the time of presidential elections. These elections are a window of opportunity for the oligarchs to make their interests prevail, during which they support candidates whose political orientation corresponds to their economic interests. In this respect, due to the fact that the political scene is locked up by these actors, the presence of the oligarchs in politics has allowed a certain political pluralism in post-Soviet Ukraine, with the alternations taking place according to the economic interests of these private actors<sup>21</sup>. In 2004, tensions between the oligarchs crystallized around the presidential election of Leonid Kuchma's successor. Former allies of Leonid Kuchma had become pillars in the organization of the "Orange Revolution" which had taken shape around the candidacy of Viktor Yushchenko (2005-2010) by financing the transport of demonstrators to the capital, and by helping to organize collective action by providing kitchens and tents for the occupation of the public square, or by making their media available to the movement. Petro Poroshenko became one of the main supporters of the revolutionary moment<sup>22</sup>. During the Orange Revolution, his channel, "Kanal5", broadcasted information on electoral fraud, thus helping to mobilize during the crisis. Viktor Yushchenko's victory then led to a policy of liberalization of certain sectors of the economy, and reprivatization of certain industries fraudulently acquired in the 1990s, to the detriment of the interests of certain oligarchs. For example, a metallurgical factory that had been acquired at the end of Leonid Kuchma's mandate by two oligarchs, Viktor Pinchuk and Rinat Akhmetov, for the sum of 800 million dollars, was nationalized, before being sold to a foreign investor for the sum of 4.8 million dollars<sup>23</sup>. When Viktor Yanukovich came to power in 2010, he strengthened monopolies and the privatization of companies for the benefit of private actors close to his "clan" and the party of the regions. In November 2013, his refusal to sign an association agreement with the European Union in favor of the Eurasian Customs Union agreement providing for a zone of commercial exclusivity between several former Soviet republics under the aegis of the Russian Federation had once again divided the oligarchs, as this orientation ran counter to the internationalization strategies of a part of these economic elites.

---

<sup>20</sup> Mikhail Minakov, " Republic of clans: the evolution of the Ukrainian Political System" in Balint Magyar (ed) *a stubborn structures, reconceptualizing post-communist regimes*, Budapest, CEU Press, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> Heiko Pleines (2016): *Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine*, in: *Demokratizatsiya* 24:1.

<sup>22</sup> Heiko Pleines, " From competitive authoritarianism to Defective Democracy: Political Regimes in Ukraine before and after the orange revolution" in Margarete Klein, Hans-Henning Schröder, *Presidents, Oligarchs and Bureaucrats, Form of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space*, New York, Routledge, 2016.

<sup>23</sup> Sophie Lambroschini, Genèse, apogée et métamorphoses du présidentielisme clientéliste en Ukraine, *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 2008.

At the end of 2013, President Yanukovich's choice to turn to the Eurasian Union project proposed by Moscow was justified in the political discourse by the conditions demanded by Western donors (International Monetary Fund, European Union), and in particular the question of the increase in the price of gas, while Moscow proposed a reduction in the price of gas supplied to Ukraine and the granting of credits if it joined this common economic space with Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan. Thus, on 17 September, a series of agreements was signed between the government of Mykola Azarov, adopting a program of cooperation of Ukraine with the countries of the Union until 2020. Under the agreements with Russia, gas purchased by Ukraine from Gazprom was resold at below-market prices. The interim government that came to power after the departure of Viktor Yanukovich in February 2014 relaunched negotiations with the IMF for a four-year, \$17.5 billion rescue plan<sup>24,25</sup>.

After the change of power, agreements were signed with several financial institutions, including the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the European Union, and foreign governments to deal with the country's economic recession, after a 7.5% drop in GDP in 2014. The World Bank, of which Ukraine has been a member since 1992, proposed a \$4.19 billion loan to restructure the banking system, and the European Union made a \$1.6 billion loan conditional on the signing of an agreement with the IMF. The Association Agreement with the European Union, which conditions macro-financial assistance on reforms in institutional architecture to bring the Ukrainian model closer to European standards of good governance, and measures to guarantee individual freedoms and reform the judiciary, as well as anti-corruption mechanisms, led to the establishment of anti-corruption mechanisms at the local and national level, and with the creation of a National Anti-Corruption Bureau (NABU, Національне антикорупційне бюро України) in April 2015. Finally other financial institutions such as the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) invested funds in Ukraine to restructure some key sectors of the economy, such as the energy sector, monopolized by oligarchs. In the context of the conflict, bilateral agreements were also signed with several NATO member countries to restructure the army. In this context, the support of international actors allowed Ukraine to acquire a military apparatus, which had not been reformed since the fall of the Soviet Union.

International organizations have been present in Ukraine since the early 1990s, but the change in power and the outbreak of war in the industrial region of Donbass after the annexation of Crimea led to a strengthening of their presence. They conditioned their financial assistance on the implementation of reforms in the state apparatus. The implementation of a package of reforms thus conditioned the discourse of the Ukrainian leaders who come to power after the revolutionary moment of 2014. The new authorities developed a nationalist and "pro-European" discourse, focused on the democratization of institutions and the "modernization" of the state, also developing an argument on the role of "civil society". As Françoise Daucé reports, 'few concepts have captured the imagination of those who study democratization as much as that of "civil society" in the post-Soviet space.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the literature on democratic transitions, particularly in Eastern European countries, insists on the place to be given to the actors of "civil society" in the decision-making process, defined as a set of actors and institutions distinct from the State. In the case of Ukraine, since 2014 the political elites have developed a discourse focused on a "modernization" of the state, aiming to come closer to European standards of governance and a greater insertion of civil society actors within state institutions. This voluntarist policy of building a civil society from above can be explained in part by the terms of the association agreement signed with the European

---

<sup>24</sup> IMF survey: Ukraine Unveils Reform Program with IMF Support - April 30, 2014, (online) <https://www.imf.org/en/News/Articles/2015/09/28/04/53/sonew043014a>

<sup>25</sup> Beyram Balci, « Union économique eurasiennne : vers un retour de Moscou en Asie centrale ? », *Les Etudes du CERI*, 6 janvier 2015.

<sup>26</sup> Françoise Daucé, *Une paradoxale oppression. Le pouvoir et les associations en Russie: Le pouvoir et les associations en Russie*, CNRS editions, Paris, 2013.

Union. Indeed, after the revolutionary moment of 2014, the new authorities are developing a discourse in line with that expected by international donors.

Thus, in parallel with these impulses to carry out structural transformations of the state apparatus that are being implemented "from above", international organizations also fund "civil society" projects aimed at accompanying the implementation of reforms. For example, a Ukrainian NGO, OZON, which was set up in 2014, monitors the attitude of the police during demonstrations as part of the police reform.<sup>27</sup> In particular, associations are being set up to help refugees and victims of the war (aid for displaced persons, psychological support and social reintegration of veterans, restructuring of the local economy in the Donbass) in the absence of an equivalent initiative taken by the public authorities<sup>28</sup>. However, contrary to classic 'discharge' mechanisms<sup>29</sup>, there is no evidence of the Ukrainian state's willingness to privatize or delegate certain aspects of governance (particularly in the social or humanitarian field) despite the institutionalization of these associations thanks to international funding. Thus, despite a stronger political anchoring of actors from the civil society field, they retain an observer role in relation to the political decision-making process. Associations also developed to monitor the progress of reforms, such as the *Reanimation Package of Reforms*, which brings together a coalition of around 100 Ukrainian NGOs to monitor the progress of reforms in several sectors, such as judicial sector reform, anti-corruption, public administration reform, reform of the electoral system, the tax system and the banking system, as well as the pension reform. These NGOs report on the progress of reforms to the government and sit on parliamentary committees, but their role in the policy-making process remains minor. As Inna Melnykovska and Rainer Schweickert<sup>30</sup> point out for the Orange Revolution of 2004, while a 'civil society' does emerge in 2014, its role remains marginal during and after the revolution, and the - economic - elites remain the only category of decision-making actors in Ukraine.

## 2. The continuation of a capture economy after the revolutionary moment of 2014

The characteristics of the Ukrainian oligarchic system are based on the centrality of the executive system, and the control of the Verkhovna Rada (parliament), which constitutes a site of interaction for actors between the political and economic spheres. Until the ban on combining economic and political activity introduced by the 2004 constitutional reform, oligarchs were directly elected to parliament, in particular to obtain parliamentary immunity<sup>31</sup>. After 2004, they are represented by their business associates, sometimes members of their families, or political actors who are loyal to them, financed from their electoral campaign and elected by majority vote. Some retain their seats, however, by appointing their relatives to head their industrial group, or by delegating its management to a partner<sup>32</sup>.

---

<sup>27</sup> Interview with the President of OZON, Kiev, August 2016.

<sup>28</sup> Interview with a representative of Vostok SOS, Kiev, August 2018.

<sup>29</sup> The concept of discharge used by Max Weber to characterize "a dominant mode of government in contexts characterized by low bureaucratization and a poorly developed managerial apparatus" is used by Béatrice Hibou to qualify "the use of private channel as a dominant mode of governmentality" in a contemporary context (Hibou, 1998) and refers to the use of private intermediaries for functions previously devolved to the state, such as taxation, public services, or security, defence and policing, through the use of mercenaries or private security companies.

<sup>30</sup> Inna Melnykovska et Rainer Schweickert: Who you gonna call? *Oligarchic clans as a bottom-up Force of Neighborhood Europeanization in Ukraine*, Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin, No. 67/2008.

<sup>31</sup> Paul D'Anieri, Robert Kravchuk, Taras Kuzio, *Politics and society in Ukraine*, Boulder, Westview Press, 1999.

<sup>32</sup> Pawel Wolowski (2008) " Ukrainian politics after the Orange Revolution - How far from democratic consolidation?" dans S. Fischer, R. Puglisi, K. Wolczuk et P. Wolowski "Ukraine, Quo Vadis?" Chaillot Paper, n°108, February 2008.

To defend their economic interests on the political scene, the oligarchs formed political parties in the mid-1990s. The Donetsk clan formed the "Party of the Regions", mainly financed by Rinat Akhmetov, which supported Viktor Yanukovich in the 2004 and 2010 presidential elections. Petro Poroshenko, Ukraine's 6th richest man and head of a capital of 1.253 billion dollars in 2019<sup>33</sup>, founded the *Solidarnost* (Solidarity) party in 2000, which, merging with other political parties, gave birth to the "party of the regions", which he left in 2001 before joining the *Nasha Ukraina* (Our Ukraine) party of the candidate Viktor Yushchenko, who won the 2004 presidential election against the candidate of the "party of the regions", Viktor Yanukovich. After his victory in the 2014 presidential elections, he renamed the *Solidarnost* party to the "Petro Poroshenko Bloc".

As a parliamentary assistant of a member of parliament who entered parliament in 2014 points out, *'in each political party there are deputies who represent the interests of an oligarch, who vote as they are told to vote. So the oligarchs have people who work for them in every party'*<sup>34</sup>. The inclusion in the political sphere of oligarchs or actors loyal to them does not follow an ideological logic, with political actors forming or joining party lists on which they have the best chance of filling a mandate according to developments on the political scene<sup>35</sup>. Political actors loyal to the oligarchs therefore adapt to changes in power and by changing their political affiliation, finding themselves alternately in the majority and in the opposition, depending on their economic interests. This strategy is facilitated by the opacity of the electoral system, a mixed one-round system combining majority and list voting. This system is based on an informal election economy: After the 1998 parliamentary elections, and until the reform of the electoral code in July 2019, the electoral law is a mixed system, with 50% of the deputies elected by the majority system, and 50% by the proportional system, where seats in parliament are allocated according to the percentage of votes received by each party. The majority system allows for patronage schemes at the local level, with candidates' campaigns being financed by local businessmen or national oligarchs, regardless of which party they join. Furthermore, the funding system excludes parties with less than 4% of the vote, preventing a renewal of the political scene and allowing the lock-in of the political scene by the oligarchs. After 2014, of the six main political forces that win elections, four are projects funded by oligarchs to represent their interests<sup>36</sup>.

Despite a discourse geared towards the Europeanisation of the system, after 2014 the logic of the system in place since the early 1990s was maintained. Russia's intervention had the effect of producing a national narrative by the post-revolutionary elites and led to the crystallization of national myths, which became a new foundation on which to build a discourse of national identity, enshrined in laws and public policies. For example, four memorial laws voted in 2015 establish a continuum between the actors who fought for independence, the dissidents of the Soviet period and the meaning of the current war or the laws on "decommunization". At the same time, in this context, the authorities put in place a 'democratizing façade' through the messages conveyed in the political discourse, in particular by taking up the terms and concepts imported by international organizations of 'good governance' and 'the fight against corruption' and concerning the democratization of the country. The context of the war in the Donbass reinforces the 'pro-European' discourse, and the democratization of the country is put forward as a guarantee of stability and security. Until 2014, the power networks were strongly connected to Russia, notably via Viktor Yanukovich's "clan". However, despite a discourse on the democratization of the country, the fight against corruption, and the criminalization of the practices of previous elites, we can see the continuation of the patterns of resource capture, in this context where the arrival of international donors constitutes a new source of income, as reported by a member of the European

---

<sup>33</sup> *Novoe Vremia*, "Золотая сотня. Топ-100 самых богатых украинцев - рейтинг НВ и Dragon Capital," October 31, 2019 (online) <https://nv.ua/biz/markets/top-100-samyh-bogatyh-ukraincev-reyting-nv-i-dragon-capital-novosti-ukrainy-50050784.html>

<sup>34</sup> Interview with a parliamentary assistant, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>35</sup> Oleksandr Fisun, *Electoral Laws and Patronage Politics in Ukraine*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No 229, September 2012.

<sup>36</sup> Taras Kuzio, *Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine*, *Politics*, vol. 34, 2014.

Union delegation in Kiev: *"The deputies have no interest in voting for certain laws, since they are paid to have a representative role in parliament and to vote the way they are told to vote. It's quite crazy this feeling of being a cash cow, and that they don't give a damn about what you're going to tell them, they're really just trying to get money out of us. You really get the impression that they don't care what you tell them, they're just waiting for you to give them money and the worst thing is that they don't hide it. Here, private property and public property are the same thing. There are few countries where corruption is a whole system, here the country runs on corruption, whether it's to get your medicine at the pharmacy or to set up a bill."*<sup>37</sup>

Progress on sectoral reforms and the fight against endemic corruption in the economic system is blocked by the oligarchs themselves. As one parliamentary assistant report, *'After Yanukovich left, the country was almost bankrupt. They talked about implementing a major reprivatization policy, but Akhmetov, Firtash, started blocking with bribes so this wave of reprivatization did not happen.'*<sup>38</sup> In some sectors there is a blockage of the reforms demanded by the parliamentary game. The presence of actors loyal to the oligarchs on the political scene, through the political parties, coalitions and parliamentary factions that they form, as well as in the appointments of actors at the head of parliamentary committees directly negotiated with the government, gives them a real foothold to obtain state subsidies for their sector and to block reforms that are unfavorable to them. Thus, this influence on the political scene blocks the progress of certain reforms, in particular in the energy sector, 1/4 of the market being held by Rinat Akhmetov, as an EBRD representative reports: *"We grant loans for the electricity market. To get new structures, laws have to be passed. These laws must then be discussed by business groups and the rada. In such a situation, the members of parliament are under the control of the oligarchs and their logic is: "If you have a power plant, and I want a low fixed tariff, and they offer a high tariff, why should I care? I want more money. In the energy sector, we have some resistance. In Ukraine, many companies are state-owned: Ukrenergia, Naftogaz, Ukrzhalizatsia, UkrPoshta..."*<sup>39</sup>

The anti-corruption tools put in place by international actors, notably NABU, are circumvented or politically instrumentalized to attack opponents of the government. Indeed, while NABU can launch investigations, only the public prosecutor, appointed by the president, can indict them<sup>40</sup>. Thus, the government uses international mechanisms to attack its opponents, such as the Minister of the Interior, Arsen Avakov, with an indictment for a case of embezzlement in the context of a contract for backpacks for the army for a few hundred thousand dollars set up by his son, and an oligarch, Ihor Kholomoïsky, who is in direct competition with the post-revolutionary Ukrainian political power. Thus, in 2015 investigations had revealed serious problems with the solvency of PrivatBank, the country's leading bank, as well as in the management of the loan portfolio, headed by I. Kholomoysky and G. Bogolyuov. According to the findings of Kroll, a US firm that investigated PrivatBank, *"the secret structure had the following functions: to create and/or control a network of companies in order to financially support these companies; to organize transactions between clients in order to conceal the true purpose of the funds, in particular to prepare documents on behalf of these clients; to coordinate and maintain a cyclical on-lending program; to control and ensure the circumvention of the requirements of the parties' legislation; and to maintain a false picture of the bank's financial situation."*<sup>41</sup> This management allowed the diversion of more than USD 5.5 billion through offshore company accounts domiciled in the bank's Cypriot subsidiary, with almost 97% of the companies' portfolios constituting loans to individuals related to the company's shareholders. In the context of the post-2014 banking sector clean-up, several investigations were opened into the bank's fraudulent actions by government anti-corruption bodies, and the bank was nationalized in late 2016. At the same time, the president favors certain oligarchs with whom he chooses to ally himself, notably actors with links to Russia despite the war

---

<sup>37</sup> Interview with a representative of the EU delegation, Kiev, April 2019.

<sup>38</sup> Interview with a parliamentary assistant, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>39</sup> Interview with an associate of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>40</sup> Interview with Transparency International representative, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>41</sup> Hromadske, 23 février 2021, "The NABU has detained banker Vladimir Yatsenko. What we know about him from the book about PrivatBank (online) <https://hromadske.ua/ru/posts/nabu-zaderzhalo-bankira-vladimira-yacenko-chto-my-znaem-o-nem-iz-knigi-pro-privatbank>

and the official political discourse, including Rinat Akhmetov, whose assets are in the Donbass region and who was the main supporter of President Yanukovich and the Party of Regions. Despite an economic blockade by Kiev, he benefited from a confidential agreement that allowed him to continue trading goods between the separatist and government zones. Therefore, this repositioning towards the new political power allowed him to compensate for the loss of his assets through embezzlement schemes with the help of the public authorities<sup>42</sup>.

### 3. A system that interferes with the international donors' agenda

Between 2014 and 2019, it can be seen that behind a discourse of transition to democracy there is a blockage of certain reforms, and an instrumentalization of the tools of public action for private ends. Moreover, the reforms demanded by donors contribute to strengthening the political center, the executive, on which actors remain dependent to protect their economic capital and establish new patterns of resource capture. These public-private configurations in the post-Maidan period interfere with the political reform agenda due to neo-patrimonial logics and contribute to the reinforcement of a capture economy in place since the early 1990s.

In this context, international subsidies represent a new source of rent in the context of setting up schemes of misappropriation of public funds through the state budget and the private banking system, as reported by a representative of Transparency International: *"The bankruptcy law allows many schemes of corruption to be set up - if the private bank makes a deposit in the Central Bank, in case of bankruptcy the bank is auctioned off and the clients can recover their investment. But this allows many new schemes of embezzlement through the banking system"*<sup>43</sup>. This system therefore also allows the perpetuation of schemes to divert funds from international actors directly from the state budget, as reported by a former deputy of the party of the regions: *"Today, the new business is to steal money from the budget. This generation of politicians is sold out, the previous generation was more honest. Yes, they embezzled money, but they built roads and airports! Now they don't do anything! It's like the UkrAeroRukh case. They stole 437 million of Brussels' money. This money was dedicated to the modernization of the airline, and instead of putting the money in a state bank, they put it in a private bank. The funds were withdrawn after three days, and the bank went under."*<sup>44</sup>

Since 2014, anti-corruption programs have been put in place, but these measures are more like "cosmetic" measures. For example, in public transport, especially trains, hospitals or the administration, posters specify that corrupt practices are penalized. But to use the typology developed by Giorgio Blundo and Jean Pierre Olivier de Sardan<sup>45</sup>, these anti-corruption programs address everyday corruption, embedded in a social, cultural and administrative context, stemming from the post-Soviet period, which are more about forms of transactions (being able to buy a train ticket on board when the train is full, being able to get a medical appointment more quickly in the context of paying an undue fee) and inscribed in the survival strategies of ordinary social actors. In the context of the fight against corruption, programs that address ordinary corruption and are supported by political power are funded by oligarchs.

Mechanisms to combat corruption in public administration, including a *ProZorro* tool introduced to secure public procurement transactions, do not prevent corrupt practices that usually take place outside the legal framework of the transaction, and at the time of contracting, which may take the form of paying a percentage of the profits collected for contracting, or an

---

<sup>42</sup> Money, 08.08.2019 How and who made money from the Rotterdam+ scheme. NABU showed the scheme of illicit enrichment Read more here "(online) <https://tsn.ua/ru/groshi/kak-i-kto-zarabatyval-na-sheme-roterdam-nabu-pokazala-shemu-nezakonnogo-obogascheniya-1391538.html>

<sup>43</sup> Interview with Transparency International representative, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>44</sup> Interview with a former deputy of the Party of Regions, Kiev, January 2019.

<sup>45</sup> Blundo, Giorgio, and Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan. "Everyday Corruption in West Africa," *Politique africaine*, vol. 83, no. 3, 2001.

'arrangement' so that costs and profits do not coincide. The Ministry of Defence is the first state institution to introduce this system of secure transactions for public procurement, and in the arms sector, in 2015, only 30% of state contracts are fulfilled, with the remainder feeding the informal war economy<sup>46</sup>. Corrupt practices are facilitated by the bureaucratization of this institution and the confidentiality linked to the defence secret label. Thus, corrupt practices persist thanks to the maintenance of coalitions of actors behind the diversion schemes, who are connected to power<sup>47</sup>.

As soon as he came to power, Petro Poroshenko reinstated a verticality of power and a form of "clan" by promoting businessmen from his region, who have become rich thanks to the liberalization of certain sectors. Yuriy Kosiuk, one of the main owners of one of the largest agri-food industries, is deputy chief of the administration in charge of security and defence. He was dismissed in December 2014, but thanks to this social capital, he benefits from European subsidies to the point of becoming the holder of a quarter of the agri-food export market. Furthermore, several businessmen close to the president use this social capital as a vector of economic accumulation: Igor Kononenko, a former business partner who had done his military service in the 1980s, acquired Centrengo, a company holding 14% of the electricity market in Ukraine<sup>48</sup>. Igor Kononenko then set up embezzlement schemes in the energy sector, with losses to the state estimated at over 50 million hryvnias according to NABU<sup>49</sup>.

Finally, in the context of the war in Donbass, diversion schemes have been set up in the defence sector. At the end of 2014, *Ukrboronprom* announced that it was producing 70% of the equipment and buying the remaining 30% from European countries. Intermediary companies are created by actors benefiting from access to the political center through their social capital, by being close to the president. For example, since 2015 the company *Optimumspetsdetal* has been importing parts produced in Russia through a system of front companies to supply the military equipment manufacturing plants belonging to the *Ukrboronprom* group - in particular tanks - while inflating prices and diverting part of the profits, and therefore funds directly from the defence budget<sup>50</sup>. The actor behind this scheme is Oleg Gladovsky, First Deputy Secretary of the National Security and Defence Council of Ukraine. Following revelations in the press about these corrupt practices, he was removed from his post. These examples illustrate that anti-corruption programs targeted 'ordinary' corruption but do not systematically attack forms of resource appropriation, which take the form of misappropriation, allowing the enrichment of those close to the presidential clan. Thus, the arrival in power of the new authorities did not coincide with a change in the configuration of the political system in place since the early 1990s. Proximity to the political center allows businessmen to guarantee their access to international resources, and access to administrative resources to set up capture schemes directly within the state apparatus.

---

<sup>46</sup> Interview with the CEO of a military equipment restructuring company, Kiev, March 2017.

<sup>47</sup> Interview with the CEO of a military equipment restructuring company, Kiev, March 2017.

<sup>48</sup> Sergii Leshchenko, "Poroshenko creates his own 'family' clan." Kyiv Post, July 24, 2016, <http://www.kyivpost.com/article/opinion/op-ed/sergii-leshchenko-weverturned-to-the-family-poroshenko-creates-his-clan-419429.html>;

<sup>49</sup> НАБУ, 09.08.2017, " НАБУ в суді домоглося повернення 57 млн грн ДП "Енергоринок" (online) <https://nabu.gov.ua/novyny/nabu-v-sudi-domoglosya-povernennya-57-mln-grn-dp-energorynok>

<sup>50</sup> Ivanovna L. "Army. Friends. Dough. Part 1" <https://bihus.info/army-friends-dough-part-1/>

## Conclusion

As several authors have already pointed out<sup>51</sup>, certain actors can participate in state authority and its construction or consolidation, in the territorialization of power and in the accumulation of resources without appearing by name as the state. As Béatrice Hibou writes, '*the analysis of concrete situations teaches us that in order to apprehend and understand the state, it is impossible to separate the state and power, the state and the ruling elite: in order to understand the state, one must understand the people in power and their games, their strategies, and their historical practices*<sup>52</sup>.

Wars are moments of strong internationalization, which produce effects on the field of power. In the context of the war in the Donbass, in Ukraine the war transforms the modes of resource accumulation and the internationalization strategies of private actors located in the state.

The resource capture strategies of the oligarchic actors turned the state into an 'arena and stake'<sup>53</sup> for negotiations and transactions between economic elites and political circles, through systems of patronage and clientelism, enabling the maintenance of resource predation networks in alliance with the neo-patrimonial bureaucracy<sup>54</sup>. Their power struggles helped to shape the functioning of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state, in alliance with the state administrative apparatus through patronage and clientelism. These relationships have served to set up patterns of national resource capture, which lock the political and economic system into this oligopoly economy.

In this context, the war and the support of Western actors has led national political elites to adapt their political and economic practices to the arrival of mechanisms linked to the internationalization of governance. Reforms of the state apparatus have thus led to a repositioning of elites in new economic networks, while maintaining practices of resource capture, of which international subsidies constitute a new source of rent, while blocking reforms in certain sectors that run counter to their interests. As the cornerstones of the Ukrainian post-Soviet system, the oligarchs form an elite system whose individual strategies to defend their private interests therefore limit a process of state reform and development underway since 2014.

---

<sup>51</sup> See in particular Jacobo Grajales and Romain Lecour Grandmaison, *L'État malgré tout*, Paris, Karthala, 2018.

<sup>52</sup> Hibou Béatrice (ed.), *La privatisation des Etats*, Paris, Karthala, 2000.

<sup>53</sup> As Steffen Jensen writes in his article, "The battlefield and the prize. ANC's bid to reform the South African state" in T.B. Hansen et F. Stepputat (dir.), *State of imagination: ethnographic exploration of the postcolonial state*, Durham, Duke University Press Books, 2001.

<sup>54</sup> We refer here to the work of Jean-Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel-Garrigues, eds. "*Organized crime and States. The hidden face of Politics*. The Sciences Po Series in International Relations and Political Economy, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010.

## Bibliography

Aslund Anders " oligarchs, Corruption and European Integration ", *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3) : 65-73, 2014.

Aslund, Anders, *Comparative Oligarchy: Russia, Ukraine and the United States* (2005). CASE Network Studies and Analyses No. 296.

Vyacheslav Aviutskii, "Les clans d'affaires en Ukraine (1991-2007)", *Revue d'Etude comparative Est-Ouest*, 2011/1 (No. 42).

Balmaceda Margarita M., *Energy dependency, Politics and Corruption in the Former Soviet Union: Russia's power, Oligarch's Profits and Ukraine's Missing Energy Policy, 1995-2006*, London, Routledge, 2008.

Blundo, Giorgio, and Olivier de Sardan Jean-Pierre "Everyday corruption in West Africa", *African Politics*, vol. 83, no. 3, 2001.

Carothers, T. « The end of the Transition Paradigm » *Journal of Democracy*, vol 13, n°1, 2002.

Darden Keith A., (2001), Blackmail as a tool of state domination: Ukraine under Kuchma, *East European Constitutional Review*, 2.

D'Anieri Paul, *Understanding Ukrainian Politics. Power, Politics and Institutional Design*, ME Sharp, Incorporated, 2007.

Daucé, Françoise (2013), *Une paradoxale oppression. Le pouvoir et les associations en Russie*, Paris : CNRS éditions.

Dimitrova, Antoneta and Rilka Dragneva, (2013) "Shaping convergence with the EU in foreign policy and state aid in post-Orange Ukraine. Weak external incentives, powerful veto players" *Europe-Asia Studies* 65 (4).

Eisensdadt Shmuel Noah, *traditional patrimonialism and modern neopatrimonialism*, Sage research paper in social sciences, ser. No. 90-003, Beverly Hills, Sage Publications, 1973.

Jean Louis Briquet and Gilles Favarel Garrigues, *Milieus criminels et pouvoirs politiques. Les ressorts illicites de l'État*, coll. Recherches internationales, Paris, Karthala, 2008.

Fisun Alexandre, *Post-soviet neopatrimonial regimes: The Genesis, Characteristics, Typology*, Domestic notes, 2007.

Fisun Oleksandr, *Electoral Laws and Patronage Politics in Ukraine*, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No 229, September 2012.

Fisun Alexandre, Hale Henri, "Ukrainian Constitutional Politics: Neopatrimonialism, Rent-seeking and Regime Change" in *Beyond the Euromaidan: comparative perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*. Henry E. Hale & Robert W. Ortung (Eds.) Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016.

Fisher John, « When it pays to be a 'fragile state': Uganda's use and abuse of a dubious concept », *Third World Quarterly*, février 2014, vol. 35, n° 2.

Gill Graeme, *Bourgeoisie, state and democracy: Russia, Britain, France, Germany and USA*, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008.

Grajales Jacobo, *Lecour Grandmaison Romain* (dir.) *L'État malgré tout*, Paris, Karthala, 2018.

Hale, Henri, "Democracy or autocracy on the march? The colored revolutions as normal dynamics of patronal presidentialism" *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 39(3), 2006.

Hellman Joel S., Geraint Jones and Daniel Kaufmann "Seize the State, Seize the day: State capture and influence in Transition Economies." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 31 (4), 2003.

Hibou Béatrice (dir.), *La privatisation des États*, Paris, Karthala, 2000.

Hibou Béatrice « La 'décharge' nouvel interventionnisme », *politique africaine*, vol.73, n°1, 1999.

Hibou Béatrice, « Le redéploiement ou le retrait de l'Etat? », *Critique internationale*, n° 1, 1998.

Kononczuk Wojciech, *Keystone of the system: old and new oligarchs in Ukraine*, Point of View OSW, Warsaw, August 2016.

Kowall Tina, Zimmer Kerstin *Der politische Einfluß von Wirtschaftseliten in der Ukraine. National and Regional Oligarchs*, Working Papers and Materials of the Eastern Europe Research Centre No.42, 2002.

Kuzio Taras, *Impediments to the Emergence of Political Parties in Ukraine*, *Politics*, vol. 34, issue 4, décembre 2014.

Kuzio Taras, *Oligarchs, Tapes and Oranges: "Kuchmagate" to the Orange Revolution*, *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, vol. 23, 2007.

Kuzio Taras, "Oligarchs, the reform equilibrium and the Euromaidan Revolution" in *Beyond the Euromaidan: comparative perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*. Henry E. Hale & Robert W. Ortung (Eds.) Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2016: 105-123, 2016.

Lambroschini Sophie, *Genèse, apogée et métamorphoses du présidentielisme clientéliste en Ukraine*, *Revue d'études comparatives Est-Ouest*, 2008.

Lepesant Gilles, "Entre européanisation et fragmentation, quel modèle de développement pour le territoire ukrainien ? ", *Les études du CERI*, n°212, Juin 2015.

Melnykovska Inna et Schweickert Rainer: *Who you gonna call? Oligarchic clans as a bottom-up Force of Neighborhood Europeanization in Ukraine*, *Arbeitspapiere des Osteuropa-Instituts der Freien Universität Berlin*, No. 67/2008.

Minakov Mikhail, " Republic of clans: the evolution of the Ukrainian Political System" in Balint Magyar (ed) *a stubborn structure, reconceptualizing post-communist regimes*, Budapest, CEU Press, 2018.

Minakov Mikhail, "A Decisive Turn? Risks for Ukrainian Democracy after the Euromaidan," *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, last modified February 3, 2016.

Olivier de Sardan Jean Pierre, "A la recherche des normes pratiques de la gouvernance réelle en Afrique", *Afrique: pouvoir et politique*, Discussion paper n°5, Decembre 2008.

Pleines Heiko: "Oligarchs and Politics in Ukraine" in *Demokratizatsiya* 24:1, 2016.

Puglisi Rosaria, "The rise of the Ukrainian oligarchs" *Democratization*, 10(3), 2003.

Puglisi Rosaria, "A window to the world? Oligarchs and foreign policy in Ukraine," in *Ukraine: Quo Vadis?* Edited by S. Fischer, Paris: EU Institute for Security Studies (Chaillot Paper No. 108), 2008.

Platon (trans. Auguste Diès, revised edition) *Complete works: Le Politique*, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, coll. "Collection des Universités de France", 1950, 2<sup>nd</sup> edition, 291d.

Pleines, Heiko, "The political role of the oligarchs" in J. Besters-Dilger (Ed.) *Ukraine on its way to Europe. Interim results of the Orange Revolution* Frankfurt: Peter Lang Verlag, 2009.

Raviot Jean Robert, *Qui dirige la Russie ? Lignes de repères*, Paris, 2007.

Rojansky, Matthew 'Corporate Raiding in Ukraine: Causes, Methods and Consequences', *Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization*, 22, 3, 2014.

Reno William, *Corruption and State Politics in Sierra Leone*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Shukan Ioulia, 2007. « Ukraine. Les principaux enjeux de la vie politique depuis la Révolution orange [Ukraine. Main issues of political life since the Orange Revolution] Les etudes du CERI, n°134, April 2007.

Stewart Susan, Klein Margarete, Schmitz Andrea and Schröder Hans-Henning (eds.) *Presidents, Oligarchs and bureaucrats: Forms of Rule in the Post-Soviet Space*, Routledge, New York, 2012.

Ukrainian Institute for the Future "The future of Ukrainian oligarchs", Kiev, 2019.

Weber Max, *Economie et société*, Paris, Plon, 1971.

Weber Max, *Histoire économique. Esquisse d'une histoire universelle de l'économie et de la société*, Paris, Gallimard, 1923.

Winters Jeffrey A., Page Benjamin I., *Oligarchy in the United States?" Perspectives on Politics*, Vol. 7 issue 4, December 2009.

Winters Jeffrey A., *Oligarchy*, Cambridge University Press, 2011.

Wilson Andrew, *Ukraine's Orange Revolution.*, New Heaven, Yale University Press, 2005.