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***International Networking as the Key to Understand Ukrainian Nationalism from the Inside during the Interwar Period***

**1. Introduction**

As a result of the defeat of the Ukrainians to create an independent state after World War I, the lands where they were in the majority were within the borders of four others: the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic (USSR), the Second Polish Republic, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Two paths of development of the Ukrainian national movement emerged soon: legal, based on the development of socio-cultural, economic and political life within the framework of the law, and illegal, whose supporters decided to continue the struggle for independence and reunification of lands considered Ukrainian by all available means. The Ukrainian nationalist movement, following the second path, came a long way, from the establishment of the Ukrainian Military Organisation (UMO) in 1920 to its consolidation with other nationalist groups, to the establishment of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN) in 1929 with Yevhen Konovalets at the head<sup>1</sup>. Although the aim of the Organisation was to fight against all the “occupants” of the Ukrainian lands, its activities were primarily directed towards the Second Polish Republic. This was determined both by the specific international situation, the nationalists’ consideration of their chances and limitations, and the fact that they considered Eastern Galicia to be the nucleus of the future Ukrainian state. This area was home to the so-called national OUN structures, which in practice pursued their goal through the use of terror and incitement of the local population, creating an atmosphere of revolutionary ferment. Over the course of several years, they undertook a number of terrorist actions, including attacks (not always successful) on the most important people in the Second Polish Republic, such as marshal Józef Piłsudski or ministry of internal affairs Bronisław Pieracki. Their target were often people for whom Polish-Ukrainian cooperation was particularly important. Thus, Ukrainian nationalists did not want to allow any kind of agreement and calming the situation in Eastern Galicia. However, it was the emigre activists, located outside the lands considered to be

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<sup>1</sup> R. Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939*, Lublin 2003.

indigenously Ukrainian, who directed the entire nationalist movement, not only in terms of decision-making, but above all in the moral, ideological and financial dimensions. Not only did they prepare for an armed uprising in the future, but they also carried out extensive political and lobbying activities in the international arena. The core of the nationalistic movement, especially in the case of the Ukrainians who did not have sufficient resources at their disposal, was the creation of a network of contacts. Such networks were created between people, groups of people, organizations, companies, political parties, nations, etc. They were mainly oriented towards cooperation, but numerous conflicts and rivalry may also be traced. Mutual connections between such groups of people helped them to succeed or caused them to fail.

The aim of this paper is to show the mechanisms of functioning of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists on the territory of European countries on few examples. I will pay special attention to the operation of the organization through the prism of mutual relations that they have managed to establish within the Organisation and with the outside world. In fact, different sorts of networks quickly became particularly important to OUN, as its performance often relied on the capabilities of individual activists and their social skills. It is particularly interesting to show what were the goals to maintain such relations. I will also attempt to answer the question of how the OUN exploited events in the international arena, and vice versa, when it was Ukrainian nationalists who became an instrument in the politics of these countries. It is worth noticing that there is a number of publications that have raised issues of interest to me. Particularly noteworthy are studies by Andrzej A. Zięba<sup>2</sup>, Frank Golczewski<sup>3</sup>, Ryszard Torzecki<sup>4</sup> and Władysław Żeleński<sup>5</sup>. However, we still know relatively little about the details of the activities of individual branches abroad (except from Germany). One of the reasons for this is the considerable dispersion of sources in several countries in Europe as well as in the United States and Canada. Another problem is, contrary to appearances, the poverty of the source material, not about the ideology of OUN, but about practical dimension of its actions. Most of the documents were destroyed by the chiefs of these branches themselves, which is why a detailed archival and library search is so important, which will make it possible to combine many seemingly independent details into a full-scale analysis of this phenomenon. This paper does

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<sup>2</sup> A.A. Zięba, *Lobbing dla Ukrainy w Europie międzywojennej: Ukraińskie Biuro Prasowe w Londynie oraz jego konkurenci polityczni (do roku 1932)*, Cracow 2010.

<sup>3</sup> F. Golczewski, *Deutsche und Ukrainer, 1918–1939*, Schoningh 2010.

<sup>4</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce III Rzeszy 1933–1945*, Warsaw 1972.

<sup>5</sup> W. Żeleński, *Zabójstwo ministra Pierackiego*, Warsaw 1995.

not pretend to exhaust the subject; on the contrary, it is only an introduction to further in-depth research.

## **2. Activity of OUN among Poland's neighbors**

After World War I Poland found itself geopolitically in a very difficult position. It was surrounded by its neighbours, with whom it fought fiercely for the borders after regaining independence (only with Romania it remained in friendly relations). The conflict between Poland and Lithuania was mainly about Vilnius' belonging, which eventually, as a result of a trickery (the so-called Żeligowski rebellion), became part of the Second Polish Republic in 1922. Formally, both countries were at war until 1926, and it was only in 1938 that diplomatic relations were established. Relations with Czechoslovakia were also hostile for the entire interwar period, and the resolution of the issue of Silesian Cieszyn and Zaolzie after the First World War did not satisfy either side. The situation was similar with Germany, with whom Poland fought for control over Wielkopolska (Greater Poland) and Silesia. As a result, Poland had a very large German minority, a fact consistently exploited by the Germans in the international arena, who, unlike Poland and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, were not obliged to sign commitments towards national minorities. However, despite hostile relations, both countries managed to sign a non-aggression agreement in 1934. The establishment of the Free City of Danzig was to be a kind of consensus, which would provide Poland with free access to the sea, but Danzig quickly found itself in the German sphere of influence.

Following the proverb "the enemy of my enemy is my friend", the Ukrainian Military Organisation of Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists decided to take advantage of Poland's disputes with its neighbours by offering them their services, expecting financial or military help and political contacts instead. Below I would like to show on few examples how successful was cooperation of OUN with Germany, Free City of Danzig, Czechoslovakia and Lithuania (which enabled them to conduct terrorist actions) but also how deep was the dependence of Ukrainian nationalists on these countries.

### **2.1. Germany**

The relations of Ukrainian nationalists with the German authorities constituted the most elaborate network of connections of all the countries where they were stationed. It should be stressed that the attitude of particular circles of power towards the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists was not uniform. The Reichswehr worked closest with it, which was more

interested in the nationalists' intelligence and diversionary usefulness on the territory of the Polish state than their political programme<sup>6</sup>. From the perspective of German authorities the Ukrainian question was primarily an instrument directed against Poland to help break it up from within and lead to a revision of its western borders in the future<sup>7</sup>. As early as 1921, the Ukrainian Military Organisation cooperated with the Reichswehr, and from 1924 it received substantial subsidies. Two years later, the UMO branch was created in Berlin, which came under the leadership of the newly established Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929. Its main representative was Riko Jaryj, who, thanks to his contacts with German politicians, successfully lobbied for the Ukrainian issue<sup>8</sup>. In fact, many Germans considered him "one of them", and not a Ukrainian, hence the accusations that Jaryj was an agent of the Reichswehr<sup>9</sup>. In return for its cooperation, the OUN received financial resources (for example, in 1933 it was \$250 a month, which was about ¼ of the OUN's total donations from foreign countries)<sup>10</sup> and a kind of protective umbrella, and also had the opportunity to train OUN members in Germany, especially young people, recruited mainly from the Eastern Galicia, who were to be the nucleus of the armed forces of the future Ukrainian state. Military training took place on a regular basis, including a radiotelegraphy course in Berlin in August 1933<sup>11</sup>.

The OUN also received partial support from the Auswärtiges Amt (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, AA), but here it did not present itself uniformly and depended on international developments. The AA protested against too close cooperation with the Ukrainian community, as the disclosure of this could have a negative impact on its foreign policy<sup>12</sup>. When, for example, there were accusations from the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic and Poland that the AA was supporting OUN nationalists, Julius Curtius warned in September 1931 to stop supporting the organisation<sup>13</sup>. Officially, he maintained that there was no possibility of financing the OUN by

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<sup>6</sup> W. Skóra, *Niemiecki aspekt sprawy zabójstwa ministra Bronisława Pierackiego*, „Słupskie Studia Historyczne” 1997, no. 5, p. 123.

<sup>7</sup> M. Wojciechowski, *Stosunki polsko-niemieckie 1933–1938*, Poznań 1965, p. 228.

<sup>8</sup> О. Кучерук, *Ріко Ярвій – загадка ОУН*, Львів 2005, p. 83–91.

<sup>9</sup> ЦДАУЛ (Центральний державний історичний архів України, Львів), ф. 493, оп. 1, спр. 32, Charakterystyka Rika Jarego przesłana przez Ministerstwo Spraw Zagranicznych, 31 I 1939, apk. 38; R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska...*, p. 115.

<sup>10</sup> ЦДАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], Zał. 18, List od Jewhena Konowalca do Profesora, 16 I 1932, арк. 235.

<sup>11</sup> *Indictment against Stefan Bandera, Mikołaj Lebed, Darja Hnatkiwska, Jarosław Karpyniec, Bohdan Pidhajny, Iwan Maluca, Jakób Czornij, Eugeniusz Kaczmariski, Roman Myhalow, Katarzyna Zarycka and Jarosław Rak. Warsaw 1935*, p. 57.

<sup>12</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska...*, p. 111.

<sup>13</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 115.

Germany<sup>14</sup>. On the other hand, however, there were actions taken in the international arena supporting the complaints of the Ukrainian minority against the League of Nations after the so-called pacification of Eastern Galicia in 1930<sup>15</sup>. The “pacification” was followed by sabotage actions carried out by the OUN during the summer of 1930. They mainly consisted in setting fire to private and state property, especially farm buildings and haystacks, not only of Polish settlers, but also of Ukrainians loyal to the Second Polish Republic. Another target of the attacks were administrative buildings, mail cars, as well as bridges, roads, railroads and cutting telephone and telegraph wires<sup>16</sup>. Even though only legally acted representatives of Ukrainian minority sent petitions to the League of Nations, it was largely OUN who stood behind it, supporting them with money, preparing propaganda materials and conducting lobbying actions<sup>17</sup>.

One of the key institutions for the Ukrainian minority in Germany was the Ukrainian Scientific Institute (Ukrainisches Wissenschaftliches Institut), founded in 1926 and financed by the German Ministry of Foreign Affairs<sup>18</sup>. Although it was under the influence of an emigration group competing with the OUN, the so-called Hetman camp of conservatives connected with Pavlo Skoropadskyj, this group was increasingly diminishing in importance in relation to the OUN, which was reflected in the demand of the German authorities for some scholarships to be awarded explicitly to nationalists<sup>19</sup>. These scholarships were necessary for the OUN activists to stay legally in Germany<sup>20</sup>. In 1933, for example, Ivan Gabrusewycz, a former OUN leader in Eastern Galicia who fled Poland for fear of being arrested again, as he was responsible for unsuccessful attack on post office in Gródek Jagielloński in 1932, received a scholarship of 500 marks<sup>21</sup>. The activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists was secret, but the OUN also had in its hands institutions allowing for contacts at the official level. These were, among

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<sup>14</sup> National Archives (United Kingdom), FO 371 – Foreign Office: Political Departments: General Correspondence from 1906–1966, Northern: Poland 1931, Files 39–74, Letter from H. Rumboldt to A. Henderson, 5 I 1931, p. 183.

<sup>15</sup> R. Wysocki, *Liga Narodów wobec pacyfikacji Galicji Wschodniej w 1930 roku a polsko-ukraińska konfrontacja na arenie międzynarodowej*, [in:] *Ukraińcy w najnowszych dziejach Polski (1918–1939)*, ed. R. Drozd, Słupsk–Warsaw 2000.

<sup>16</sup> R. Wysocki, *Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów w Polsce w latach 1929–1939*, Lublin 2003, p. 128.

<sup>17</sup> For example they financed Milena Rudnytska's, member of Polish Parliament, travels across the Europe to support protests in League of Nations; ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 50436, [Archiwum Senyka], Zał. 17, List od Jewhena Konowalca [niepodpisany] do Doktora, 5 I 1932, p. 152.

<sup>18</sup> NA, Foreign Office, Serial 6191/H (microfilm), „Вісті Українського Наукового Інституту в Берліні”, ч. 1, 5 VI 1933.

<sup>19</sup> National Archives (United Kingdom), Foreign Office, Serial 6191/H (microfilm), Letter to reichsminister Göring, Berlin, 22 VI 1933.

<sup>20</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], Zał. 18, List od Jewhena Konowalca do Profesora, 16 I 1932, p. 166.

<sup>21</sup> National Archives (United Kingdom), Foreign Office, Serial 6191/H (microfilm), Letter to reichsminister Göring, Berlin, 22 VI 1933.

others, press offices: in Berlin: “Osteuropäische Korespondenz”<sup>22</sup>, existing until 1934, run by Riko Jaryj, and the Ukrainian Press Service (“Ukrainischer Pressedienst”)<sup>23</sup>.

The situation of Ukrainians in Germany, although not immediately, was changed by the assumption of power by Adolf Hitler in early 1933, who never made promises to the Ukrainians to help create an independent state. His desire to gain a “living space” for the Germans in the East was therefore in conflict with the actions taken by the Reichswehr and Auswärtiges Amt, which tempted the OUN with vague promises. Throughout 1933 a transitional phase in relations with the Ukrainians continued, as the Reichswehr and the AA used the protective umbrella of Paul von Hindenburg, President of the Third Reich<sup>24</sup>. However, German policy towards the Ukrainian nationalists was soon reevaluated in the context of the Polish ministry of internal affairs Bronisław Pieracki’s murder in 1934. The assassination had taken place on the last day of Joseph Goebbels’ visit to Poland, who was greeted by no one else but Bronisław Pieracki. Naturally, Polish public opinion linked the murder with the Germans, who wanted to avoid a scandal and tried not to endanger their relations with Poland, declared their full readiness to help. It gave Poland the opportunity to examine how the agreement between Poland and the Third Reich worked in practice and how it changed the configuration of the Polish-German-OUN triangle<sup>25</sup>.

## 2.2. Czechoslovakia

The Ukrainian issue was a permanent element of Polish-Czechoslovakian relations in the interwar period. As a result of lost fights for an independent state on all fronts, Ukrainian political and military activists went to Czechoslovakia, where they were interned. After the camps were dissolved in 1923, a significant number of them decided to stay in the country. The Ukrainians emigrants were given a relative opportunity to develop, having the chance to study at the Free University in Prague or the Ukrainian Mining Academy in Podiebrady, among others. For tactical reasons, Ukrainian nationalists decided not to take action against Czechoslovakia, which also included lands considered to be Ukrainian (Zakarpattia). They believed, though not unanimously, that it was impossible to fight on four fronts and that it was temporarily more important to take advantage of Czechoslovakia’s aversion to Poland, which

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<sup>22</sup> S. Blavatsky, *The Ukrainian German-Language Press in the Weimar Republic (1918–1933s)*, „Zbirnyk Prats’ Naukovo-doslidnogo Instytutu presoznavstva” 2018, no. 8, p. 32.

<sup>23</sup> AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, sygn. 3677, Geneza i rozwój ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego /UWO i OUN/, Warszawa 1933, p. 27–28.

<sup>24</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska...*, p. 124.

<sup>25</sup> W. Skóra, *Niemiecki aspekt...*, p. 119–138.

would give it a favourable position and a basis for its own development. The Ukrainian nationalists realized that support from Prague was dictated by its attitude towards its neighbours. The main architects of Czechoslovak foreign policy, including the Ukrainian question, Foreign Minister Edvard Beneš and President Tomáš Masaryk, said that in order to maintain balance in Europe it was necessary to have a strong Russia that would counterbalance German expansion<sup>26</sup>. Ultimately, they saw the future Ukrainian state, which would be created at the expense of Poland, in the Russian sphere of influence.

Czechoslovakia was the main centre of the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists. The authorities there did not make it difficult, and in some cases facilitated its activities. Prague was the seat of the editorial office of the most important magazine of Ukrainian nationalists “Rozbudowa Naciji”, as well as the distribution of “Surma”, which was published in Lithuania and from there sent to Czechoslovakia. The smuggling of materials from the Czechoslovakia to Polish territory took place without major obstacles: arms, ammunition, propaganda materials<sup>27</sup>. According to information from Polish intelligence, fighting courses were also held there – every two weeks<sup>28</sup>.

The Czechoslovak authorities did not grant OUN permanent financial subsidies like Germany and Lithuania, but they provided them with shelter (not always consciously), not only for people residing there permanently, but also for activists fleeing Poland after terrorist actions. For example, brothers Osyp i Roman Kucak managed to escape to Czechoslovakia after they attacked mail car and killed police officer near town Bircza in 1931. Even more striking example is that Maciejko could stay in Czechoslovakia after Pieracki’s murder until he went to the United States and finally to Argentina. Oleksandr Boykiv recalled: “When the ground was burning under the feet of a member of the Ukrainian Military Organisation, he fled to Czechoslovakia, being sure that the Czech government would not turn him over to the Poles”<sup>29</sup>. In Prague, meetings of the OUN Board of Directors were held on a regular basis, while mostly in border towns, such as in Český Těšín or in smaller mountain towns, meetings with national OUN members were held<sup>30</sup>. The mountainous terrain and support of the Czech authorities were

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<sup>26</sup> A. Stec, *Polityka Czechosłowacji wobec zagadnienia ukraińskiego w kontekście stosunków czechosłowacko-polskich w latach 1918–1938. Zarys problematyki*, “Przegląd Geopolityczny” 2014, no. 8, p. 69–70.

<sup>27</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 204, оп. 1, спр. 713, 17 I 1935, p. 1.

<sup>28</sup> P. Kołakowski, *Działalność placówki wywiadowczej Oddziału II Sztabu Głównego WP “Olaf” w Pradze w latach 1930–1934*, „Przegląd Wschodni” 2006, no. 4, p. 764.

<sup>29</sup> *Євген Коновалець та його доба*, Мюнхен 1974, p. 634.

<sup>30</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], Zał. 101, List od Szczasn[ego] [Wolodymyra Zabawskiego] do Redaktora [Wolodymyra Martyńca], арк. 421–422.

influential. It was common to apply for passes granted to the Tatra Society, which allowed holders to cross the border freely.

However, given the volatility of Czechoslovakia's policy towards the Ukrainians, the concentration of the most important OUN activists in Prague was not entirely safe. Despite the savings that this solution offered<sup>31</sup>, Yevhen Konovalec was aware of the problem, and wrote: "Coming back to the issue of the Orgański crossing and the concentration of everything in Volodivka [Czechoslovakia] in general, despite the fact that I agreed to it, I have great doubts as to the advisability of such a concentration. It is very dangerous, because we are placing ourselves completely in the hands of Volodivka. They will be able to liquidate us completely at any moment. That's why, contemporaneously with such concentration, we will have to use appropriate procedures so that a similar situation does not arise"<sup>32</sup>.

In mid-1932 a meeting was to take place between one of the closest associates of Konovalets, Mykola Sciborski, and Kamil Krofta, head of the presidium of the Czechoslovak Ministry of Foreign Affairs and close advisor to Edvard Beneš, who stated that the government could not continue to support the OUN "not because of pressure from Poland, but because of the position of French military circles, although he is sympathetic to the liberation struggle of the Ukrainians". It was also suggested that the Ukrainians move the press release to Vienna to prevent diplomatic interventions from Warsaw<sup>33</sup>. Although Czechoslovakia's support for the OUN did not cease completely, it showed the Ukrainian nationalists how unstable their position in Prague was, as revealed by events that took place the following year.

### **2.3. Lithuania**

The tense situation between Poland and Lithuania contributed to the almost immediate establishment of relations between Kaunas and the Ukrainian nationalists. Apart from the common interest in destabilising Poland, both internally and externally, Lithuanians were the only ones among the neighbours of the Second Polish Republic who actually seemed to support the creation of an independent Ukrainian state. Lithuania also supported their activities in the international arena in the struggle for their rights as a national minority, among other things by upholding Ukrainian complaints in the League of Nations at the beginning of the 1930s, during

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<sup>31</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], заł. 68, List od Jewhena Konowalca [niepodpisany] do Orgańskiego [Wołodymyra Sciborskiego], 11 X 1933, p. 288–292.

<sup>32</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 50436, [Archiwum Senyka], Poz. 33, dopływ 1–418, Niepodpisany list od Jewhena Konowalca do Hrybiwskiego [Omeliana Senyka], 26 X 1932, p. 256–257.

<sup>33</sup> P. Kołakowski, *Między Warszawą a Pragą...*, p. 194–195.



the so-called post-pacification anti-polish campaign on the international area<sup>34</sup>. The Ukrainian Military Organisation, and later the Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists, carried out intelligence activities for the benefit of Lithuania, undertaking to provide information about Poland's military and political plans, as well as about the movements of Polish troops on the border with Lithuania<sup>35</sup>.

The first contacts between Ukrainians and the Lithuanian government were established shortly after the Ukrainian Military Organisation was established, in 1922, and were initiated by Juozas Purickis, then Lithuanian Foreign Minister. In 1925, Yevhen Konoalec personally went to Lithuania to prepare the ground for further cooperation<sup>36</sup>. The following year, the former sotnyk of the Ukrainian army, Osyp Rewjuk (pseudonym "Ponas"), who from then headed the Lithuanian UVD exposition, and the OUN from 1929, went there. The facility was located in Kaunas; it consisted of a dozen or so people and functioned under the pseudonym "Leniwka", while Lithuania was called "Kazan" in the internal documentation. Rewjuk lived there thanks to a fake Lithuanian passport in the name of Jonas Bartowicjus<sup>37</sup>.

Lithuanian government supported the OUN by granting it permanent financial subsidies. According to internal documentation, the OUN received 1,500-2,000 dollars per quarter from Lithuania, of which about 200 dollars per month were spent on the printing of "Surma" and the general activities of the OUN's branch in Lithuania. For example, according to reports for 1930, the net amount of \$6,476.63 remained after these costs were deducted<sup>38</sup>. In the financially critical year of 1932, when contributions from other sources significantly decreased, according to Konoalets' calculations, Lithuanian money accounted for about 50% of the total receipts<sup>39</sup>. It was therefore a significant amount. The rest was supplemented by funds from Germany and collections in the United States and Canada. The money was transferred by the Lithuanian government through Rewjuk directly to Konoalets even though there were people responsible for the budget working in the OUN Provid (Management Board). The money was also sent by

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<sup>34</sup> S. Dyroff, *Minority Rights and Humanitarianism: The International Campaign for the Ukrainians in Poland, 1930–1931*, "Journal of Modern European History" 2014, vol. 12, no. 2, p. 216.

<sup>35</sup> Д. Веденєєв, Г. Биструхін, *Меч і тризуб. Розвідка і контррозвідка руху українських націоналістів та УПА. 1920-1945*, Київ 2006, p. 104–105.

<sup>36</sup> O. Dumin, *Prawda o Ukraińskiej Organizacji Wojskowej*, „Zeszyty Historyczne” 1974, no. 30, p. 108–109.

<sup>37</sup> П. Мірчук, *Нарис історії Організації Українських Націоналістів: 1920–1939*, Мюнхен–Лондон–Нью-Йорк 1968, p. 465–466.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 466.

<sup>39</sup> *Akt oskarżenia...*, p. 61.

the Lithuanian embassy in Paris, as Oleksandr Boykiv, a representative of the French OUN branch, recalls, who collected 2,500 dollars there in 1937<sup>40</sup>.

Another extremely important form of Lithuanian assistance was to allow OUN members to travel to the United States on fake Lithuanian passports. A condition for the success of Ukrainian nationalists was, among other things, support for its activities by the numerous and influential Ukrainian diaspora overseas, from which irregular funds flowed, depending on the frequency and effectiveness of the collections. The arrival of a trusted OUN delegate from the closest circle of power strengthened the organisation's prestige among Ukrainian diaspora in USA and contributed to greater financial success. It was very important to correlate the arrival of the delegate with the ongoing acts of terror directed against the Polish state. Initially, Konovalts and Senyk came to America (also on Lithuanian passports), but they both held key positions in the OUN that required their constant attention, so they decided to send a new delegate, Roman Sushko. This trip, however, was not successful as it ended at the border; what is more, it could have jeopardised Ukrainian-Lithuanian cooperation and damaged Lithuania's international reputation. As it turned out, although Roman Sushko (who appeared in his passport under the name Melnyczuk) had information in his passport that he was an official of the Lithuanian Ministry of the Interior, he was not admitted to the United States at the border in Winnipeg in 1932<sup>41</sup>. Even the intervention of the Lithuanian consul in New York did not help.<sup>42</sup> On top of that, there was a problem with legalizing Konovalts' stay in Geneva, who left there in 1930 to be closer to events taking place in Western Europe and the League of Nations, and the influential people to be found there. Konovalts also lived in Switzerland on a Lithuanian passport<sup>43</sup>. However, soon there was an opportunity to clarify these issues with Lithuania. Rewjuk informed Konovalts that in October 1932 the meeting of the League of Nations would be attended by Dovas Zaunius, Lithuanian Foreign Minister from 1929 to 1934. He was the most important link between Ukrainian nationalists and the Lithuanian government. A detailed account of this conversation can be found in the Senyk Archive, in Konovalts' letter sent to Rewjuk. Konovalts had already contacted Zaunius through the Lithuanian consulate in Zurich, but it was the first time that a face-to-face live meeting took place<sup>44</sup>. During the

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<sup>40</sup> О. Бойків, *Моя співпраця з Полковником*, [in:] *Євген Коновалець та його доба*, Мюнхен 1974, р. 647–648.

<sup>41</sup> *Akt oskarżenia...*, р. 59.

<sup>42</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], Zał. 58, List od Jewhena Konowalca [niepodpisany] do Hrybiwskiego [Omeliana Senyka], 29 IX 1932, апк. 258.

<sup>43</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043б, [Archiwum Senyka], Poz. 20, dopływ 1–44, List od Jewhena Konowalca [niepodpisany] do Kaszczuka [Omeliana Senyka], 15 V 1933, апк. 169–170.

<sup>44</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043б, [Archiwum Senyka], Poz. 42, dopływ 1–418, List od Swistuna do Andrija Fedyny, 12 IV 1932, апк. 273.

conversation Konovalts raised many issues. The most important of these was the issue of further financing of the OUN. He asked Lithuania not to reduce the amounts transferred due to the huge financial crisis in the OUN, which was linked with much smaller than expected revenues from the United States and Canada. He promised to do his best, but the final decision belonged to Juozas Tūbelis, the Prime Minister of Lithuania, and also the Minister of Finance. He stressed that the economic crisis had also affected his country and complained that he did not even have his own secretary because of the cuts he had made. He said that he had already added the right amount to the next year's budget. The meeting also included a request for a new passport for another Ukrainian delegate to the USA. The Minister of Foreign Affairs promised to order the issuance of the passport, but special care should be taken, because Poles were certainly following the case, and if they provided the Americans with evidence that Lithuania was issuing such passports, they would become worthless. Konovalts explained that so far there had been no problems at the border, and he promised to be very cautious. Following an earlier suggestion, Rewjuk concealed the matter of Melnyczuk's last unsuccessful trip. During the interview, the issue of tense Lithuanian-German relations was also raised. Zaunius asked Konovalts to try to soften the German course towards Lithuania. The OUN leader promised to talk to Riko Jaryj about this<sup>45</sup>. It is interesting how Lithuania overestimated the capacities of Ukrainian nationalists in this field.

#### **2.4. Free City of Danzig**

The Free City of Danzig was created as a result of the Treaty of Versailles on June 28<sup>th</sup>, 1919 and was an autonomous city-state under the auspices of the League of Nations. The aforementioned solution was a compromise between the Germans being the majority in the area and Poland which was to have access to the sea<sup>46</sup>. Nevertheless, in reality, actions performed within the borders of Danzig were coordinated with authorities in Berlin, which systematically strengthened their power there<sup>47</sup>. In 1924, about 200 Ukrainians were permanently residing in Danzig<sup>48</sup>. One should add several hundred students coming to the city to study, mainly at the Technical University of the Free City of Danzig (Technische Hochschule der Freien Stadt

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<sup>45</sup> ЦДІАУЛ, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, [Archiwum Senyka], zał. 57, List od Osypa Rewjuka [niepodpisany] do Pułkownika [Jewhena Konowalca], 26 IX 1932, p. 257.

<sup>46</sup> Archiwum Akt Nowych (AAN), Ministerstwo Spraw Wewnętrznych (MSW), sygn. 1285, Gdańsk jako ogniwo w zagadnieniu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w państwie polskim, 31 V 1932, p. 2.

<sup>47</sup> K. Purzycki, *Ustrój i status prawnomiędzynarodowy Wolnego Miasta Gdańska (1920–1939)*, „Internetowy Przegląd Prawniczy” 2015, no. 4, p. 230; Traktat wersalski z dn. 28 VI 1919 r., Dz.U. 1920, art. 102, nr 35, poz. 200.

<sup>48</sup> S. Miklos, *Struktura społeczna i problem narodowościowy w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku*, „Zeszyty Naukowe Wydziału Humanistycznego Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego” 1975, no 4, p. 72.

Danzig) to that number. Most Ukrainian students were affiliated with the “Osnowa” corporation, which had existed since 1922 and had been a part of an international organization of Ukrainian students controlled by nationalists – the Central Union of Ukrainian Students (Tsentral’nyy soyuz ukrayyns’koho studentstva) in Prague<sup>49</sup>. The key roles in “Osnowa” were served by members of the UMO, and later on - by the OUN or by the supporters of the organization<sup>50</sup>. The Ukrainians also established the “Ukrainian Hromada”, which was granted permit to issue certificates considered by the German authorities to be passes that could be utilized to cross the Danzig-German border<sup>51</sup>. Due to its location, importance with regard to Polish-Ukrainian relations, ease of communication with both Poland and Germany, as well as the ethnic structure (about 80% of Germans and 9% of Poles<sup>52</sup>), the Free City of Danzig was an attractive place for the foreign activities performed by the OUN. From almost the very beginning of the UMO’s existence, a separate branch operated there. However, it gained vital importance after the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists in 1929 and the appointment of Andriy Fedyna as its head.

The OUN branch in Danzig served several important functions. One of them was the smuggling of weapons and issuing propaganda materials. Among many others, “Surma”, one of the leading press bodies of the UMO and OUN printed in Lithuania passed through Danzig. Fedyna boasted in his memoirs that it was much safer than smuggling the materials through the Carpathians. During his “professional activities” the materials were never intercepted. Military training was also organized in Danzig under the command of Mykola Kapustianski. It was attended by several dozen people<sup>53</sup>. Training groups from East Prussia and those leaving for training with the Ustaša also traveled through Danzig<sup>54</sup>. Fedyna briefly described Ukrainian-Croatian cooperation. Within its framework, Croats, among others, printed the “Hrvatska Država” newspaper in Danzig. Danzig was the second, next to Czechoslovakia, meeting place of the emigration leadership of the OUN and “national” structures operating in Eastern Galicia (co-called “base”). It was that the place where conventions and conferences involving the

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<sup>49</sup> Politische Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts, RAV Krakau 141, Ostgalizien, Band 7, 24 X 1930.

<sup>50</sup> П. Мірчук, *Напус...*, p. 382; AAN, MSW, sygn. 1285, Gdańsk jako ogniwo w zagadnieniu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w państwie polskim, 31 V 1932, p. 15.

<sup>51</sup> P. Fedusio, *Ukraińcy w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku (1920–1939). Działalność organizacji ukraińskich na terenie Wolnego Miasta Gdańska*, [in:] *Między Odrą i Dnieprem – wyznania i narody. Zbiór studiów*, ed. T. Stegner, Gdańsk 1997, p. 138–139; see also: *idem*, *Ukraińscy studenci w Wolnym Mieście Gdańsku*, [in:] *Między Odrą, a Dnieprem. Wyznania i narody*, vol. II, ed. T. Stegner, Gdańsk 2000, p. 232–249

<sup>52</sup> T. Kijeński, *Ilu jest Polaków na terenie Wolnego Miasta Gdańska. Szkic statystyczny z mapką*, Gdańsk 1929, p. 10.

<sup>53</sup> Центральний державний історичний архів України (ЦДІАУЛ), Львів, ф. 151, оп. 1а, спр. 5043а, Поз. 35, Допływ 1–44, Okólnik w sprawie zaplanowanego kursu wyszkolenia wojskowego w Mimoziwce, p. 192–194.

<sup>54</sup> П. Мірчук, *Напус...*, p. 380.

participation of emigrants and the “base” were organized. From Danzig, money for the activities of the OUN flowed to Lviv. Couriers were sent, as well as payments were made to the accounts of “Zemelny Bank” and the “Dnistr” Society<sup>55</sup>. The services of Danzig forwarding companies such as “C. Hartwig” and “Maks Bengs Export und Import”<sup>56</sup> cannot be underestimated as well. Fedyna was appointed by Konovalts - the head of the department for the USA, Canada and South America. Not only did he stay in touch with local representatives, but most of all - he managed the flow of money, which - depending on the disposition - went to emigration activists or to the country, i.e. the “base”. In 1931, the branch of OUN in Danzig received USD 16,516.54 from America, almost half of which was transferred to the “base”. The most important pieces of information about terrorist acts carried out were also provided from Danzig to the United States, so that propaganda in America could be initiated immediately. Said state of affairs was reflected in financial profits. Danzig was also a starting point for members of the OUN who had to leave Poland for various reasons. Fedyna gave them shelter or sent them to Germany, depending on the situation. Fedyna himself mentioned the friendliness of the Danzig authorities towards Ukrainian activity in the city. He listed people with whom he has been in a close cooperation, including Dr. Roehcke, the director of the Eastern Institute in Danzig, the publisher of the “East” magazine and the member of the Danzig parliament, MP Martini, Senator Volkmann, as well as the president of the Senate – Dr. Sahma<sup>57</sup>. What is more, the dean of the Danzig University of Technology, prof. Otto Heuser believed that the Ukrainians would manage to build an independent state with the help of the Germans. The Catholic bishop of Danzig, Edward O’Rourke, the first apostolic administrator of the Free City from 1922, and the bishop of Danzig from 1925, was to be a supporter of the Ukrainian movement<sup>58</sup>. Said connections were confirmed by the Polish authorities, who informed about his meetings with Riko Jaryj and Andriy Fedyna, as well as about providing them with support and offering intermediation in contacts with Polizeipräsidium<sup>59</sup>.

### **3. Activity of OUN on the territory of Western and Southern Europe**

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<sup>55</sup> *Akt oskarżenia...*, p. 63; L. Kulińska, *Działalność terrorystyczna i sabotażowa nacjonalistycznych organizacji ukraińskich w Polsce w latach 1922–1939*, Kraków 2009, p. 120.

<sup>56</sup> P. Fedusio, *Ukraińcy...*, p. 145.

<sup>57</sup> П. Мірчук, *Нарис...*, p. 383.

<sup>58</sup> P. Fedusio, *Ukraińcy...*, p. 148; AAN, MSW, sygn. 1285, Gdańsk jako ogniwo w zagadnieniu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w państwie polskim, 31 V 1932, p. 15.

<sup>59</sup> AAN, MSW, sygn. 1285, Gdańsk jako ogniwo w zagadnieniu bezpieczeństwa publicznego w państwie polskim, 31 V 1932, p. 15.

Despite modest financial and human resources, the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists managed to develop an organizational network in Western Europe, predominantly in France, Switzerland, Belgium, and Great Britain. Activities in the first three countries mentioned were dictated by the proximity to the League of Nations, which - in Konovalets' plans – was an important propaganda tool against Poland and the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic in the international arena. For the sake of its interests, Great Britain turned out to be an ally of Ukrainian emigration, guarding the rights of national minorities in Poland. Yevhen Konovalets, immediately after the end of the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, prepared a plan to deploy PUN (Provid of Ukrainian Nationalists) members to Western Europe. Its implementation was delayed due to his departure to the United States in the spring of 1929. At the beginning of 1930, he went to Geneva together with the judge of the OUN Makar Kushnir. Both organizational (Mykoła Sciborski) and military (Mykoła Kapustianski) representatives went to Paris, whereas political representative Dmytro Andrijewski lived in Brussels. Italy could be seen as a potential ally due to its ideological closeness to nationalism, as well as Italian-German relations.

### **3.1. France**

France was characterized by the biggest concentration of Ukrainian emigration in the entire interwar Europe. After World War I, not only job seekers came there, but also a significant percentage of political emigrants. It is estimated that around 100,000 Ukrainians<sup>60</sup>, a small percentage of whom were organized in various kinds of societies, lived in France in 1929<sup>61</sup>. Therefore, there was a considerable potential, which the political groups active there tried to use for their own purposes, mainly those associated with the representatives of the government of the Ukrainian People's Republic (UPR), and – from 1929 – Ukrainian nationalists as well. Creating the foundations for Ukrainian lobbying in France was not an easy task due to its conflict with Berlin and, at the same time, cooperation with Warsaw. The French authorities were interested in Ukrainian matters, but mainly in the context of the petition to the League of Nations and the resolution of the issue of national minorities in Poland. At the same time, they were not well acquainted with the specificity of the Ukrainian nationalist activity. Nationalists did not manage to establish relations with political activists. They could only count on the favor of René Martel, a historian, publicist and journalist dealing with Central and Eastern Europe in

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<sup>60</sup> *Ibidem*; *Політична історія України. XX ст. у 6 т.*, т. 5, ред. І. Курас та ін., Київ 2003, р. 83.

<sup>61</sup> Л. Купин, *Українська політична імміграція у Франції міжвоєнного періоду (1919–1939 рр.)*, „Мандрівець. Історія України наукові виклади” 2013, no. 1, р. 31.

his research. Martel sympathized with the Nazis, which brought him closer to the members of the OUN. The historian worked most closely with Eugene Lachowitch, the representative of the OUN in Great Britain, who maintained contacts with him during his visits to Paris<sup>62</sup>.

Between February 18<sup>th</sup> and 19<sup>th</sup> 1932, at the initiative of Ukrainian nationalists, a congress of 13 organizations was held in Paris in order to establish the Ukrainian National Union in France (Ukrayins'kyy Narodnyy Soyuz u Frantsiyi)<sup>63</sup>. Mykola Kapustianski became the first chairman of the Ukrainian National Union. The organization was growing rapidly in the following years, and in 1936 - it included about 50 smaller organizations all over France. By 1939 the number increased to 98<sup>64</sup>. The establishment of the UNS was a part of a much wider plan oriented towards creating an international Ukrainian organization under the banner of all émigré groups. Said organization was to be legitimate and represent Ukrainian interests in the international arena. It was a (late) response to the events taking place within the framework of the League of Nations that were related to the so-called post-pacification action taking place between 1930 and 1932. What seems to be an important element of the establishment of the UNS and other such organizations in Europe is what the OUN itself lacked – legitimacy and transparency allowing for entering into official international contacts. Nationalists tried to prevent the emerging organizations from being directly linked to the OUN as a parent company. Moreover, the OUN, discredited by the reports on Konovalts' cooperation with Berlin disclosed by Poles behind the scenes and in the press, could not be taken seriously by the Western powers. As a part of the activities of the UNS, Ukrainian nationalists made modest attempts to reach the circles of power with their propaganda. Nevertheless, it has to be stated that they played a much grander role in Ukrainian emigration than in external contacts. Among others, on July 22<sup>nd</sup>, 1932, the UNS sent a letter to the then French President, Albert Lebrun, informing him about the difficult situation of the Ukrainian minority<sup>65</sup>. It is not known, however, whether it met with any reaction whatsoever. In France, there were branches of the OUN, which operated not only in Paris, but also in smaller cities, such as Creusot, Quintange, and Homécourt, as well as

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<sup>62</sup> A.A. Zięba, *Lobbing dla Ukrainy...* p. 132; AAN, Polacy na Ziemiach Wschodnich RP i na terenie ZSRR w latach 1918–1939, sygn. 2234, Doniesienia agentów „Ukr” i „St” o działalności organizacji nacjonalistów ukraińskich (OUN), 4 XII 1935, p. 12.

<sup>63</sup> М. Небелюк, *Під чужими прапорами*, [in:] *На зов Києва. Український націоналізм у II світовій війні*, ред. К. Мельник, Торонто–Нью-Йорк 1985, p. 393.

<sup>64</sup> Т. Ніколаєва, *Діяльність „Української національної єдності у Франції” у 1930–1970 рр. (за документами Центрального державного архіву зарубіжної україніки)*, „Архіви України” 2015, no. 5–6, p. 69.

<sup>65</sup> Archives du ministère des Affaires étrangères et du Développement international, Centre des Archives diplomatiques de La Courneuve (AMAEDI), Ministère des Affaires étrangères, Direction des Affaires politiques et commerciales, Pologne 344, Z 698-3: Galicie orientale, p. 136.

several Ukrainian Hromada associations and Prosvita<sup>66</sup>. The Polish authorities noted that “the local OUN organization deliberately eliminated the terror issue from its propaganda campaign. The explanation for this is that the Paris organization of the OUN [...] is under constant surveillance by the French political police”<sup>67</sup>. In the Villa de Longchamp district, there was a military training board supervised by Mykola Kapustianski, who was also responsible for publishing the “Military Knowledge” magazine (“Viys’kove Znannya”)<sup>68</sup>. Paris was the seat of the PUN’s organizational clerk, Mykoła Sciborski, who was also the deputy of Konovalts.

### 3.2. European Federation of Ukrainian Organizations Abroad in Belgium

The activities of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists in Belgium focused primarily on the creation of a center of Ukrainian political life that would unite all émigré organizations under the supervision of nationalists<sup>69</sup>. It was supposed to be a legal organization that would represent Ukrainians internationally. The implementation of this plan was entrusted by Konovalts to Dmytro Andrijewski, a political clerk of the PUN, who already was an employee of diplomatic missions in Switzerland and Belgium between 1919 and 1920, where he gained his initial skills as an international affair specialist. After the creation of the OUN, he became the head of the Ukrainian Press Office. The name seems to be a bit exaggerated, as the office was located in his private apartment at 18 Kindermans Street in Brussels. Moreover, he was his only permanent employee. Dmytro Andrijewski also chaired the Ukrainian National Council in Belgium (Ukrayins’ka natsional’na rada v Bel’hiyi). In addition, in Belgium, there was the National Union of Ukrainian Students which was a part of the Central Union of Ukrainian Students<sup>70</sup>. According to the reports of the Polish authorities, Andrijewski established a branch of the OUN in Belgium that had five members<sup>71</sup>. At the end of 1931, the European Federation of Ukrainian Organizations Abroad in Belgium was established. One of the activities of the Federation was propaganda-oriented, aimed at drawing public opinion to the issue of the Great Famine in Ukraine. On September 26<sup>th</sup>, 1933, the Federation sent, inter alia, a memorandum on

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<sup>66</sup> AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, sygn. 3677, Geneza i rozwój ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego (U.W.O. i O.U.N.), Warszawa 1933, p. 39.

<sup>67</sup> AAN, MSW, sygn. 1039, Komunikat informacyjny nr 48, 27 VIII 1931, p. 75.

<sup>68</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce...*, p. 84.

<sup>69</sup> AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, sygn. 3677, Geneza i rozwój ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego (U.W.O. i O.U.N.), Warszawa 1933, p. 29.

<sup>70</sup> *Ibidem*, k. 42; R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce...*, p. 85.

<sup>71</sup> AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, sygn. 3677, Geneza i rozwój ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego (U.W.O. i O.U.N.), Warszawa 1933, p. 43.



this matter to the French Minister of Foreign Affairs<sup>72</sup>. However, contrary to high-profile declarations, the Federation did not play a significant role in the international arena.

### 3.3. Switzerland

In March 1930, Yevhen Konovalts left his headquarters in Berlin and moved his activities to Switzerland that was neutral for the Ukrainian cause. Geneva was a strategic place on the map of international activities of the OUN, mainly due to the seat of the League of Nations and the cyclical deliberations of national minority congresses. According to some historians, Konovalts' move was to be associated with pressure from Germany, which wanted to seemingly distance itself from ties with Ukrainian nationalists, foreseeing that it might hinder both sides from future action on the international forum against Poland<sup>73</sup>. Makar Kushnir, the chief judge of the OUN, who was to take over the head of the Press Office, left with Yevhen Konovalts. His task was to establish relationships with foreign correspondents in Geneva and to prepare the ground for the publication of both French and English newsletters. The Ukrainian Press Office in Geneva published three newsletters serving informative and propaganda-oriented functions: "Bulletin d'information ukrainienne", "Bulletin Ecclesia" (in French), and "Information Bulletin (in English)"<sup>74</sup>. Even though the Ukrainian emigration to Switzerland was not numerous, there was the Ukrainian Club and the "Ukraine" academic society<sup>75</sup>. In January 1932, a branch of the OUN was established in Switzerland, but it involved a few people only. Konovalts had numerous problems with his stay in Switzerland and finally he was forced to move to Italy in 1935.

### 3.4. United Kingdom

In the first half of the 1930s, Great Britain provided a favorable ground for the Ukrainian cause. Between 1929 and 1931, the government was formed by the Labor Party under the leadership of Ramsay MacDonald. This grouping was not only opposed to the Polish government and its national policy, but also expressed some support for Germany's revisionist claims against the peace treaty, which was also part of the British "appeasement" policy and an attempt to limit France's influence<sup>76</sup>. Moreover, as Dmytro Andrijewski wrote, Great Britain was in favor of limiting the influence of Soviet Russia, and in this context, it showed a considerable interest in

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<sup>72</sup> AMAEDI, Ministère des Affaires étrangères, 2266, Dossiers géographiques, IX USRR, p. 88–91.

<sup>73</sup> AAN, Ambasada RP w Berlinie, sygn. 3677, Geneza i rozwój ukraińskiego ruchu nacjonalistycznego (U.W.O. i O.U.N.), Warszawa 1933, p. 26.

<sup>74</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce...*, p. 85.

<sup>75</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>76</sup> A.A. Zięba, *Ukraińcy w Kanadzie wobec Polaków i Polski (1914–1939)*, Kraków 1998, p. 306.

Ukraine. Ukrainians could therefore enjoy certain favors from London. Nevertheless, due to the lack of financial resources and the availability of right people (who would know English and would be ready to move to London), Konovalts did not send a representative to Great Britain in the initial years after the establishment of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. In addition, the London land had previously been used by his two rivals – Jacob Makohin and Pavlo Skoropadski. Great Britain was the most important entity supporting Ukrainians in the international arena after the pacification carried out by the Polish authorities in 1930. In protest against the pacification action, 65 English parliamentarians signed a petition on December 13<sup>th</sup>, 1930, which was sent to the Secretary General of the League of Nations, James Eric Drummond<sup>77</sup>.

At one point, Ukrainian nationalists began to consider sending their own representative to Britain. Said step was determined by several factors: changes in the international arena, disappointment with the lack of effectiveness of the League of Nations in resolving conflicts, pro-Ukrainian sentiments among a part of British society, as well as not only interest in pacification, but also in the Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine and the issue of Ukrainian prisoners in Polish prisons. Konovalts did not take advantage of the opportunity provided by the pacification action and it was not until 1933 that he decided to send a representative to London. At that time, he stood no chance against his two rivals operating there. Moreover, the OUN was perceived as a German agency. In a letter to Martyniec, Konovalts admitted that the OUN did not have the money or connections like Makohin to establish relations with the British<sup>78</sup>. The aim of the newly arrived representative was primarily, in addition to trying to establish political relations, to explain the activities of the OUN, especially in terms of its relations with Germany, as well as to provide materials about Ukrainian matters to British journalists. Nevertheless, for logistical reasons, it was not done on a scale as large as in the case of Makohin's office. In the absence of candidates among his closest associates, Konovalts invited Yevhen Lachowitch from the United States.

One of the tasks of the OUN representative in Great Britain was to convince politicians that the Ukrainians did not cooperate with the Germans. Already in December 1933, Lachowitch was invited to the Foreign Office (Foreign Office, here: the traditional name of the British Ministry of Foreign Affairs). Konovalts asked him to come to Paris to give him instructions on what to

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<sup>77</sup> П. Мірчук, *Нарис...*, p. 203; M. Szumiło, *Ukraińska Reprezentacja Parlamentarna w Sejmie i Senacie RP (1928–1939)*, Lublin 2007, p. 153.

<sup>78</sup> Narodni Archiv, inv.č. 93, karton 11, Všeobecná korespondence sekretariátu Organizace ukrajinských nacionalistů v ČSR, p. 54.

say<sup>79</sup>. On February 17<sup>th</sup>, 1934, Lachowitch met with Laurence Collier, the head of the Northern Department of the Foreign Office<sup>80</sup>. They talked not only about the most pressing problem, namely – the question of hunger in Soviet Ukraine, but also about the British attitude towards the Ukrainian struggle for independence and towards OUN actions. According to Lachowitch's report, Collier said Britain could not interfere with the hunger issue because it had a "friendly diplomatic relationship" with the USSR<sup>81</sup>. Collier also promised to read out memoranda sent by Lachowitch. As Lachowitch recalled, the politician received him kindly at first, but after a month, during his next visit, he was much colder, asking if he had belonged to a group associated with Nazi plans<sup>82</sup>.

The OUN established contacts with various political and social activists through Ukrainian politicians from Eastern Galicia as well. A significant role in that regard was played by Milena Rudnycka, who, inter alia, informed Yevhen Onacki in a letter of June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 1931 about her impressions after meeting with English politicians and journalists, especially Mrs. Budman – the secretary of the Union of Democratic Control. In December 1930, it issued a petition signed by 65 Members of the British Parliament<sup>83</sup>. Rudnycka also gave an interview to the "Manchester Guardian", in which the aforementioned Voight correspondent worked<sup>84</sup>. Mary Sheepshanks, a friend of Milena Rudnycka from the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom (WILPF), played an important role with regard to providing information. In the OUN, Makar Kusznir was responsible for relations with Sheepshanks, mainly due to his above-average command of the English language. Apart from contacts with politicians, members of the OUN attempted to contact other activists. When it comes to the world of science, they managed to win the sympathy of a historian, Slavist Robert William Seton-Watson. He was the founder of the "Nowa Europa" ("New Europe") magazine and the editor of the "Slavonic Review". Another friend of Lachowitch in London was Lancelot Lawton, a journalist, as well as the editor of the "Contemporary Russia" monthly. In April 1934, he published an article of a remarkable length, namely – "The oppressed Ukraine", in the "Fortnightly Review".

### 3.5. Italy

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<sup>79</sup> С. Онацький, *У вічному місті...*, т. 3, р. 457.

<sup>80</sup> С. Ляхович, *Діяльність ОУН...*, р. 913.

<sup>81</sup> С. Онацький, *У вічному місті...* vol. 4, р. 457.

<sup>82</sup> С. Ляхович, *Діяльність ОУН...*, р. 913.

<sup>83</sup> Narodní Archiv, inv.č. 93, karton 11, Všeobecná korespondence sekretariátu Organizace ukrajinských nacionalistů v ČSR, р. 42.

<sup>84</sup> М. Гавришко, *Місце Великої Британії у політичних планах Організації Українських Націоналістів у 1930-ті роки*, „Україна” 2012, ч. 22, р. 104.

Fascist Italy was closely observing the development of the activities of Ukrainian emigrants due to its interest in the anti-communist movement<sup>85</sup>. The Ukrainian nationalists managed to take advantage of said attention, albeit - only to a modest extent, due to the fact that Yevhen Onatskyi, who had lived in Rome for many years, was won over to their cause. On the recommendation of Mussolini, the Ukrainian issue was focused on by a journalist and MP - Insabato, who visited Poland, Germany and England to discuss Ukrainian matters<sup>86</sup>. Insabato was on friendly terms with Yevhen Konovalts and visited him in Switzerland<sup>87</sup>. He received remuneration for his support for nationalists. As Yevhen Konovalts wrote to Onatskyi in 1933: "Personally, I think that we will continue to give him 100 lire a month"<sup>88</sup>. Onatskyi was of the opinion that Insabato perceived the Ukrainian issue only as a "cash cow"<sup>89</sup>. Riccoboni Giovanni, the press clerk of the Italian legation in Prague, also showed interest in Ukrainian nationalists. According to secret information from the Polish Legation in Prague, apart from official functions related to his position, he was responsible for other, rather unofficial missions. After returning from Rome to Prague, he requested the editor of the Prague Ukrainian Bulletin to visit him and informed him, as a representative of Ukrainian nationalists that "Rome is currently watching with great attention the Ukrainians' struggle to gain their own statehood and is kind to it"<sup>90</sup>. Riccoboni further stated that "the comments of the Mussolini pact provide for a solution to the Ukrainian problem"<sup>91</sup>. He also asked whether "Ukrainian emigration is able to organize its own armed force in the event of a war, and how does it imagine that in the event of a coup in Ukraine this armed force will get there"<sup>92</sup>. Onatskyi dealt not only with strictly political matters, but also the with the popularization of knowledge about the history of Ukraine, as well as about the situation in the lands considered to be Ukrainian. One of his most important contacts in that regard was Amadeo Giannini, professor of law at the University of Rome. Among his supporters were also journalists, such as Pietro Sessa, the correspondent of "La Stampa" and fascist "La Tribuna - Idea Nazionale" newspapers in the Soviet Union, as well as Lo Gato, editor of the "L'Europa Orientale" magazine<sup>93</sup>. Onatskyi maintained contacts with the

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<sup>85</sup> В. Ковальчук, *Українське питання у листуванні членів ОУН з італійськими державними діячами у 1930-х роках*, „Український Археографічний Шорічник” 2009, no. 13/14, p. 353.

<sup>86</sup> R. Torzecki, *Kwestia ukraińska w polityce...*, p. 86.

<sup>87</sup> С. Бачина-Бачинський, *С. Коновалець у Женеві*, [in:] *Євген Коновалець та його доба...*, p. 727; В. Ковальчук, *Українське питання...*, p. 358.

<sup>88</sup> С. Онацький, *У вічному місті...*, т. III, p. 152.

<sup>89</sup> *Ibidem*, p. 196, 325.

<sup>90</sup> AAN, Poselstwo RP w Pradze, sygn. 128, List od Posła RP w Pradze do ministra spraw zagranicznych w Warszawie, 13 IV 1933, p. 4.

<sup>91</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>92</sup> *Ibidem*.

<sup>93</sup> M. Wojnar, *Idea imperialna...*, p. 159; A.A. Zięba, *Lobbing dla Ukrainy...*, p. 145–146.

Italian government thanks to the aforementioned Enrico Insabato, as well as thanks to famous Italian activists, including Massimo Pilotti, the Italian representative of the League of Nations and the head of the Eastern Europe Department of the Italian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. When, in 1931, Onatskyi attempted to draw the attention of Italian representatives to the Ukrainian issue in the international arena, he attracted the attention of Pilotti, who saw the gateway to Soviet Ukraine in Eastern Galicia, as well as the source of rich oil deposits<sup>94</sup>. While in Geneva at the session of the League of Nations, on May 15<sup>th</sup>, 1931, Benito Mussolini addressed the Polish government, stating that he would honor its obligations towards the Ukrainian minority<sup>95</sup>. In 1933, Italians' interest in the Ukrainian cause decreased. According to Volodymyr Kovalchuk, it was caused by Hitler's coming to power. The Italians "handed over" all Ukrainian matters to Germany and focused their attention on Asia and Africa<sup>96</sup>.

#### 4. Summary

The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists tried to take advantage of the dynamically changing situation in the international arena and relations between individual countries. Limited financial resources and the lack of educated staff capable of speaking foreign languages allowed for only a modest scope of activity. Despite the fact that certain relationships had been established, briefly bringing benefits to both sides, the OUN was not treated as a significant political force. It does not mean, however, that the lobbying efforts undertaken by Yevhen Konovalets and his associates do not deserve attention. The expansion of the organizational network in a large part of Europe and the support of Ukrainian emigration did not go unnoticed. Carrying out propaganda activities and drawing international attention to the situation of Ukrainians was successful to a certain extent. The OUN aimed to become a nationwide movement taking control of a large, albeit scattered, diaspora.

Cooperation with Lithuania was important for Yevhen Konovalets throughout the entire interwar period. A steady flow of funds, false passports enabling people to travel to the United States and Canada, as well as support in legalizing their stay in Europe, were of no small help. The OUN branch in the Free City of Danzig, due to its location, as well as the favor of local authorities de facto subordinated to Germany, was of great logistical importance for the activities of the OUN. It was not only a meeting point for immigrants and domestic activists,

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<sup>94</sup> Архів ОУН у Києві (АОУН), ф. 1, оп 1, спр. Лист Є. Онацького до Є. Коновальця, 27 II 1931, р. 4.

<sup>95</sup> В. Пехів, *Італійський вектор зовнішньої політики ОУН*, „Вісник Національного університету „Львівська політехніка” 2008, ч. 612, р. 138; Є. Онацький, *У вічному місті...*, т. II, р. 14, 72.

<sup>96</sup> В. Ковальчук, *Українське питання...*, р. 356.

but also provided links with emigrants in the United States and Canada. Czechoslovakia probably did not support the nationalists financially, but it was an important refuge and permanent residence for PUN members. Prague's kindness resulted from its tense relations with Poland, but in the face of the threat from Germany, support for OUN stopped paying off.

Attempts to establish political relations in Western Europe that were more or less successful testify to the undertaking of lobbying activities. The fact that it was not possible on a larger scale was not due to the lack of such aspirations, but rather- due to modest financial or insufficient human resources. Yevhen Konovalets was aware of the important role that the League of Nations could play in publicizing the Ukrainian issue in the international arena, even before the pacification of Eastern Galicia in 1930 and then – the Great Famine in Soviet Ukraine. Nevertheless, he was unable to take advantage of said opportunities, being forced to capitulate to legitimate Ukrainian groups. The OUN as a separate entity could not legally and officially operate in the international arena. The Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists pursued its goals related to international activity on various levels. The basis was the branches of the OUN operating where the Ukrainian diaspora was located. They competed for the support of emigration, mainly economic one, with other Ukrainian groups. Said state of affairs led to conflicts, which in turn weakened both the OUN and other groups. One of the basic activities of the OUN branches abroad was to inform the public about the situation of Ukrainians in the areas considered to be Ukrainian lands. The Ukrainian Press Office was established in Geneva, Brussels, whereas the OUN Office was set up in London. The OUN also pursued its goals through legal organizations, such as the Ukrainian National Union in France.

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