

# A crosscutting cleavage? Investigating the association between popular nationalism and political attitudes

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## Abstract

Nationalism can place constitutional arrangements under strain, particularly if those on either side of the centre-periphery cleavage are divided on other issue dimensions. Conventionally, centre-periphery issues are seen to crosscut other ideological cleavages (Lipset & Rokkan 1967), yet nationalist movements are often associated with broader ideological positions (Alonso et al 2015). Currently, popular nationalist sentiment is often linked with exclusionary social attitudes (Satherley et al 2019), but this work focuses predominantly on the state-level. Existing party-level research has suggested there is no inherent connection between sub-state nationalism and political attitudes (Erk 2010), but little research explores whether this holds on an individual-level. To address this, I explore whether there is a link between popular nationalism and political attitudes within sub-state territories. I focus on six cases (Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales), and test a new method of measuring centre-periphery position within sub-state territories, which I establish has substantive and methodological advantages over existing relative identity approaches. Using a mixture of existing and original survey data, I split the analysis into two sections: economic and social attitudes. Overall, I find that nationalist sentiment associates strongly with left-right self-placement, but the link is far weaker for specific economic and social attitudes. Thus, it appears that such a link represents a marker of identity rather than a reflection of specific political attitudes.

## 1. Introduction

When looking at sub-state territories, the association of nationalism and political attitudes has long been a focus of scholarly research. Conventionally, researchers argue that centre-periphery issues are independent of other ideological cleavages within a territory (Lipset & Rokkan 1967). Yet, in practice, sub-state nationalist movements often take positions on issues that extend beyond their territorial ambitions (Dinas 2012, Alonso et al 2015). Understanding the relationship between nationalism and political attitudes is important because it may exacerbate the strain that sub-state movements place on existing constitutional settlements. The perception of distinct 'national' values and political culture can strengthen the ties between members of the nation, who use this to distinguish themselves from others (Henderson & McEwen 2005). Within some sub-state territories (like Scotland), sub-state advocates claim that members of their territory hold distinct values to those in the centre, which they use to attract support and fuel their push for constitutional change (Massetti 2018, Sobolewska & Ford 2020). Consequently, exploring how nationalist sentiment and political attitudes relate with one another may improve our understanding of how those in peripheral territories interact with the centre.

Thus, I explore whether there is a link between nationalism and political attitudes within sub-state territories. Contemporary accounts of nationalism in Europe and North America often connect it with exclusionary social attitudes (e.g. Satherley et al 2019) and support for the radical-right (e.g. Lubbers & Coenders 2017). However, this analysis has focused predominantly on the state-level,<sup>1</sup> and tends to rely on a particular (ethnic) form of nationalism (Bonikowski 2017). Such focus is problematic as not all forms of nationalism conform to this characterisation (Bonikowski & DiMaggio 2016), and the link between nationalist sentiment and political attitudes does not appear so clear-cut when looking at sub-state territories. Here, sub-state movements take both left-wing and right-wing economic positions (e.g. Massetti & Schakel 2015) and inclusive and exclusive social positions (e.g. Jeram 2014). However, much of this research only focuses on the party-level, which is problematic for understanding nationalism more broadly because the influence that political elites have on popular nationalism is contested (Hjerm & Schnabel 2010, Boonen & Hooghe 2014). To address these issues, I focus on individual-level nationalism across sub-state nations.

When looking at the individual-level, existing research of sub-state territories tends to focus on the link between national identity and left-right self-placement (e.g. Dinas 2012, Strijbis &

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<sup>1</sup> Both Dunn (2015) & Lubbers & Coenders (2017) do include results from one sub-state territory (Flanders). However, the rest of their cases (four and nineteen respectively) concern state-level nationalism.

Leonisio 2012, Galais & Serrano 2019). However, three key issues discourage extrapolating these results to both nationalism and broader political attitudes.<sup>2</sup> First, national identity alone is not sufficient for someone to be a ‘nationalist.’ The importance of an identity may change depending on where an individual finds themselves (Chandra 2012), with many then taking national identities for granted until they are challenged (Billig 1995). Nationalism requires more than just strong national identity; it requires the prioritisation of both national identity and political representation (Bieber 2018). Second, research of national identity tends to treat dual identity as one homogeneous category, which fails to recognise that there may be important differences between those with strong and weak dual identities (Onuch & Hale 2018). Third, the link between left-right self-position and political attitudes is limited. Conventionally, left-right is a measure of economic policy preferences, but existing research has found it often conflates with social policy positions (Huber & Inglehart 1995, Whitefield et al 2007). The importance of these economic and social positions for self-placement is then inconsistent over time (De Vries et al 2013). The link between left-right and decentralisation preferences in sub-state territories like Catalonia and the Basque Country (Dinas 2012, Strijbis & Leonisio 2012) further complicates these issues. Due to these issues, I argue that understanding the political implications of nationalism requires a comparative examination of both nationalism and specific political attitudes.

In this paper, I test a new method of looking at nationalism within multi-nation states, which I label the Centre-Periphery Position (CPP) measure. Using this approach, I divide individuals into five categories based on their state identity, sub-state identity, and constitutional preference: secessionist (prioritise sub-state, support independence), autonomist (prioritise sub-state, oppose independence), dual identifiers (strong dual identity), indifferent identity (weak state and sub-state identity), and statist (prioritise state, oppose independence). Based on their relative identity and constitutional preference, I designate three of these categories as ‘nationalist’ (secessionist, autonomist, and statist). Taking a comparative approach, I use this method to investigate nationalist sentiment within six sub-state territories: Catalonia, Flanders, Quebec, England, Scotland, and Wales. I split my analysis of these territories into two sections, first exploring economic positions and then social attitudes. For economic attitudes, I analyse left-right self-placement and redistribution preferences. For social attitudes, I examine civic-ethnic markers of state and sub-state identity and immigration preferences. Exploring these each of these factors

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<sup>2</sup> I am not claiming that these authors make such extrapolations.

within both dimensions is important as it allows me to explore whether nationalist sentiment associates with specific or general (heuristic) positions.

Overall, I find that secessionist positions associate with left-wing self-placements and inclusive social attitudes within territories that contain a higher degree of polarisation around territorial identity, but right-wing self-positions and exclusive social positions when this polarisation is low. However, the connection between centre-periphery position and specific attitudes (both economic and social) is weaker than what is present for left-right self-placement consistently over all six territories, which suggests that these associations tend to represent markers of identity rather than represent specific economic or social preferences. In contrast, civic-ethnic markers do not appear to be a useful measure of distinguishing between nationalist groups. Through this, I show that my approach is an improvement on existing approaches, both substantively and methodologically.

### **Nationalism and political attitudes**

Conceptualisations of nationalism vary greatly across existing research. Contemporary accounts of nationalism tend to be divided along two axes: individuals/elites and practice/ideology (Bonikowski 2016). For non-elites, research often characterises nationalism as either a chauvinistic sense of national superiority (Kosterman & Feshbach 1989) or a set of everyday (banal) idioms and interactions, such as national anthems and flags (Billig 1995). I take a different approach and follow Bieber's (2018) designation of nationalism as a narrow ideology, which entails the identification with the nation, a prioritisation of membership of the nation over other social groups, a desire to preserve the nation, and the preference for specifically 'national' political representation.

For Freedman (1998), correlations between nationalism and political attitudes emerge because nationalism represents an extension of more comprehensive 'host' ideologies (like conservatism). However, the nation represents the primary motivator for nationalists (Rokkan & Urwin 1983, Bieber 2018), rather than these so-called 'host' ideologies. Thus, I argue nationalist sentiment may overlap broader political attitudes as these individuals tie their perceptions of the nation to different values. Values reflect general "underlying orientations" about how the world ought to be, which then relate to specific attitudes that are consistent with these perceptions (van Deth & Scarbrough 1998 p32). However, these orientations are not consistent across society. Instead, individuals claim (or are assigned) membership of identity groups, which relate to some characteristic that they possess (i.e. race, social class, parenthood, political party support, Chandra 2012). Over time, these identity categories may also correlate (or be perceived to

correlate) with things that are beyond what is intrinsic to the identity itself, such as particular behaviour patterns, principles, or socioeconomic positions (Hale 2008, Onuch & Hale 2018). For example, Flemish identity overlaps with speaking Dutch, while residence in the territory has also associated with rural Catholicism and monarchism historically (Erk 2005, Blommaerts 2011). Similarly, industrial changes in Wales led to the connection of Welsh identity with a working class consciousness (Mann & Fenton 2017).

Perceptions of similarity and shared fate within a group may then encourage individuals to develop a sense of solidarity with other members of said group (Hechter 1975, Onuch & Hale 2018). Consequently, members of these identity categories may take positions that they feel are consistent with membership of this group. When this occurs, these characteristics may become markers of an identity category. Members of these identity groups may emphasise the shared values of their members and use this to distinguish their group from others (Henderson & McEwen 2005). The relationship between the identity category and characteristic may then reinforce from the opposite direction. For example, Scottish identifiers may see being left-wing as a marker of Scottishness, but it is also possible that left-wing individuals (who feel alienated by the presence of a right-wing Conservative government in Westminster) may identify increasingly with Scotland (Sobolewska & Ford 2020). The purpose of this paper is not to establish the direction of any association, which is an avenue for future research, but to explore how nationalist sentiment relates to broader political issues across sub-state territories.

However, individuals belong to multiple different social identity groups (Tajfel 1981). A person may identify with multiple distinct groups, with varying degrees of intensity (Chandra 2012), and the preferences tied to these groups may compete (Chandra 2001). Consequently, individuals may take different positions depending on how they prioritise each of their different identities (Onuch & Hale 2018), which makes it impossible to achieve full convergence across multiple issues within any group (Chandra 2001). Yet, some identities are more important to an individual than others, which means they are more likely to frame their thoughts over time (Chandra 2012). In such cases, it is plausible that individuals will tend to prioritise the positions that correlate with the identities that are consistently important to them. If this were the case, then nationalists (who prioritise their national group by definition, Bieber 2018) would tend to prioritise the positions that correlate with perceptions of how the nation ought to be. Perceptions of how the nation ought to be may not be consistent across a territory, as different groups may have distinct views of what 'the nation' means (Haesly 2005). The centre-periphery cleavage is one such dimension that separates individuals, with individuals differing in how they see the position of the sub-state territory within the state. If these perceptions of the nation correlate with particular political

attitudes, then distinct positions along the centre-periphery cleavage may also differ in their broader political attitudes.

So, what political attitudes may associate with nationalist sentiment, and why would different positions on the centre-periphery cleavage associate with distinct positions on these issues? The first possible dimension is one's position on the economic cleavage, reflected in their position on the left-right scale. Traditionally rooted in an individual's socioeconomic position, left-right is conventionally a measure of economic preferences, separating support for income equality and state intervention (left) versus deregulation and the free market (right, Whitefield et al 2007). These self-positions also associate with support for equality and self-direction (left) or tradition and security (right), respectively (Bobbio 1996). Consequently, researchers often consider left-right self-placement to be a central dimension separating societies (e.g. Dinas 2012, Strijbis & Leonisio 2012, Galais & Serrano 2019).

Within existing research, there are two main arguments for how left-right position and centre-periphery position intertwine. First, Massetti & Schakel (2015) argue that the left-right positions of sub-state movements depends on the level of prosperity within a region. Here, those who identify with poorer territories will favour left-wing policies like redistribution from the state in order to improve the wellbeing of their citizens, whereas those who identify with richer territories will resent the state for extracting their wealth to subsidise poorer territories (so will take right-wing positions like anti-redistribution). Should this be the case, we would expect secessionists to take right-wing positions in relatively rich territories like England, Catalonia, Flanders, but take left-wing positions in relatively poorer territories like Scotland and Wales.<sup>3</sup>

Alternatively, left-right self-placement may not represent specific economic attitudes within a territorial context. For example, researchers (Dinas 2012, Strijbis & Leonisio 2012) have found that left-right reflects how an individual positions themselves with respect to both centre-periphery and traditional party positions in Catalonia and the Basque Country. Under this interpretation, left-right self-placement may serve as a marker for one's decentralisation preferences rather than their economic attitudes. Galais & Serrano (2019) extend this to argue that, when the territorial cleavage is salient, those who identify with the periphery will take left-wing positions due to their desire for change and affiliation with derogated groups. In contrast, they posit that those who identify with the centre will be more to the right due to their preference for retaining the status quo.

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<sup>3</sup> Relatively rich territories are those with a higher GDP per capita than the state, whereas relatively poor territories are those whose GDP is lower (table in the appendix).

Yet, left-right is not the only cleavage separating contemporary societies. Sociodemographic shifts, such as the expansion of higher education, increased immigration, ageing populations, and metropolitan/non-metropolitan geographic divides, have increased the salience of cultural issues (Ford & Jennings 2020, Sobolewska & Ford 2020). Kriesi et al (2006) argue that these cultural issues represent a new globalisation cleavage, with citizens split between those who benefit (the ‘winners’ – the young, educated, and metropolitan) and those who do not (the ‘losers’ – the elderly, less educated, non-metropolitan). Such cultural issues have dominated traditional economic class-based voting (van der Waal et al 2007), with the globalisation cleavage manifesting in positions towards immigration and European integration in Europe (Kriesi et al 2006).

When exploring the social positions tied to nationalism, conventional research often focuses on whether they are ‘civic’ or ‘ethnic’ (Kohn 1944, Larsen 2017). Civic conceptions of nationhood entail the prioritisation of voluntarist markers like respect for institutions or attachment, whereas ethnic nationhood prioritises inherited markers like birth or ancestry (Shulman 2002, Wright 2011). The less restrictive nature of civic markers means that they are often perceived to denote a more inclusive conception of nationhood, which contrasts with the association of ethnic markers with exclusionary social positions and xenophobia (Kunovich 2009, Wright 2011). Existing research has often discussed the shifting ethnic and civic characteristics of sub-state movements in territories like Catalonia, Quebec, and Scotland, which have been tied to the relative importance of the Church and industrialisation/urbanisation within each respective nationalist movement (Keating 1997, Calzada 2018).<sup>4</sup>

Despite the prevalence of this dichotomy, the distinction between the two is often artificial. In practice, many individuals prioritise both ethnic and civic markers (Reeskens & Hooghe 2010, Bechhofer & McCrone 2015, Ariely 2020), and the “inclusive” nature of civic markers is questionable as they can hide exclusionary social attitudes (Fozdar & Low 2015, Simonson & Bonikowski 2020). Given these limitations with civic-ethnic approaches, I propose that researchers should focus on specific policy positions when aiming to capture the inclusive-exclusive positions tied to nationalism. At a state-level, existing research often associates nationalism with exclusive social positions (Satherley et al 2019). Similarly, sub-state nationalist movements have been characterised historically as conservative and exclusive in nature (e.g. Hobsbawm 1990). The prevalence of this connection leads to the perception that nationalism is

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<sup>4</sup> Erk (2005, 2010) associates such structural circumstances within Flanders and Quebec with the left-right positions of the sub-state nationalist movements in these territories.

an inherently exclusive phenomenon. Such conflation is compounded by methods used to measure nationalism, exemplified by the Chapel Hill Expert Survey (Bakker et al 2020) which pits 'nationalism' as the direct opposite to both 'cosmopolitanism' and 'green, alternative, libertarian.'

However, nationalism should not be associated with exclusionary social positions inherently. Indeed, while there is little individual-level research available, party-level research suggests that sub-state nationalist movements can take both inclusive and exclusive positions. For example, Jeram (2014) discusses that while some contemporary sub-state parties have taken inclusive positions towards immigration and multiculturalism (e.g. the Partido Nacionalist Vasco in the Basque Country), some are hostile (e.g. Christlich-Soziale Union in Bavaria and Vlaams Belang in Flanders), and others have been ambivalent (e.g. Convergència i Unió in Catalonia). Other parties have made deliberate liberalisation efforts, adopting policies that will include women and those with disabilities (e.g. Plaid Cymru, Bradbury & Andrews 2010). Consequently, researchers should differentiate between inclusive and exclusive forms of nationalism (Bieber 2018). Calzada (2018) suggests that exclusive-inclusive positions split along the centre-periphery cleavage, with statist nationalists taking more exclusive positions than sub-state nationalists do. If this is the case, then we may expect to find the pattern between centre-periphery position and social attitudes to be consistent across territories.

Alternatively, the link between nationalism and social attitudes may depend on the position of the sub-state culture within the territory. Posner (2005) argues that ethnic groups are willing to cooperate and compromise in order to be on the winning side. In national terms, such compromise entails the acceptance of external groups, whose integration into the nation has an influence on the domestic culture as people interact (Hechter 1975). However, people wish to limit the number of partners in their alliance in order to avoid diluting the position or ideals of their group. Dupré (2018) argues some groups are more powerful than others because they have the ability to control discussion and direct politics onto ground favourable to them, which means they face less of an incentive to compromise with others (and thus risk undermining their position). Under these circumstances, how sub-state advocates react to outsiders will depend on whether their culture (often measured as language) is dominant within their territory. In some territories, a demographic majority conform to the sub-state culture, like in England (Mann & Fenton 2017) and Quebec (Dupré 2018). In others, the sub-state culture is protected institutionally, such as in the monolingual Flanders (Blommaerts 2011). Under Posner's (2005) and Dupré's (2018) framework, one may expect sub-state advocates in these territories to oppose



accepting those that deviate from the sub-state culture in order to protect both the nature and dominant position of their culture.

In contrast, some sub-state territories contain a culture that is not held by a dominant group or demographic majority, such as Catalonia (Dupré 2018) or Wales (Mann & Fenton 2017). Conventionally, it is in the interests of those who identify with the sub-state nation to defend their distinctive national culture in order to protect their existence as a separate nation (Laitin 1992). However, within territories where the sub-state culture is vulnerable, the Posner (2005) and Dupré (2018) framework suggests that these sub-state advocates must be careful to avoid alienating those who do not conform because they need their support in order to achieve their goals. As a result, they may be more inclined to take inclusionary positions. For example, Plaid Cymru have adopted a more inclusive conception of Welshness in order to broaden their appeal (Bradbury and Andrews 2010). Similarly, Catalan nationalists are aware they require the support of Spanish speakers within the region so must be cautious not to promote policies that exclude them (Dupré 2018). Thus, under this framework, we may expect sub-state advocates in majority/dominant contexts to take exclusionary positions, with those in minority contexts taking inclusionary positions.

## **Data**

Currently, large-scale comparative data is not available for sub-state territories. Instead, researchers need to focus on specific national election studies, which is the approach I take here. First, I use national election studies compiled by Making Electoral Democracy Work (displayed in Table 1), who collected information on 27 territories across five states between 2010 and 2015, alongside a number of 'special' standalone studies of sub-state territories within Belgium, France, Germany, Spain, and Sweden (Bol et al 2017, Cross et al 2017, Lago et al 2017). From this selection, I analyse data from Catalonia, Flanders, and Quebec as they are their datasets contain all the required information. In addition, I use data from wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel (BESIP) for England, Scotland, and Wales. The British Election Study (Fieldhouse et al 2020) has conducted surveys of political attitudes since 1964, with each wave of the internet panel (starting February 2014) surveying around 30,000 British respondents.<sup>5</sup> Wave 20 was collected in June 2020, and I select it as it includes an original set of instruments to capture constitutional preferences in all three nations (a subset of England and the whole Scottish and Welsh samples), which is the only wave to include this information.

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<sup>5</sup> Northern Ireland is not included in the British Election Study.

**Table 1: Sub-State Territory Data Sources**

Sub-state territory	Data source	Dataset	Year	N
Catalonia	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Spanish European Election Study	2014	985
Flanders	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Belgian National Election Study	2014	1,017
Quebec	Making Electoral Democracy Work	Canadian Federal Election Study	2015	1,849
England	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	6,637
Scotland	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	2,730
Wales	British Election Study	Internet Panel (Wave 20)	2020	1,804

### Capturing centre-periphery position in multi-national states

When looking at sub-state territories, conventional researchers often focus on relative state/sub-state identity, which they often capture via the Linz-Moreno scale (Moreno 2006). This measure has been criticised for overstating the presence of dual identity by underestimating the number of people who prioritise their state identity (Guinjoan & Rodon 2015). Contemporary researchers have now shifted towards a measure of relative territorial identity (RTI, e.g. Henderson et al 2014, Galais & Serrano 2019, Henderson et al 2020). Here, state and sub-state identity are measured on separate scales, and state identity is then subtracted from sub-state identity to create a scale that ranges from entirely state to entirely sub-state (with dual identifiers located in the middle). However, RTI also has issues with dual identity because it combines those with ‘strong’ dual identities together with those with ‘weak’ dual identities, which is an issue because the association between national identity and political attitudes can differ depending on its intensity (Miller & Ali 2014). Consequently, RTI approaches may both inflate the dual identity category and misrepresent its connection with other political attitudes.

**Table 2: Centre-Periphery Position Measure**

Category	National Identity	Independence	Nationalist
Secessionists	Prioritise Sub-State	Support	Yes
Autonomists	Prioritise Sub-State	Oppose	Yes
Dual Identifiers	Equal State & Sub-State	Most Oppose	No
Indifferent	Low State & Sub-State	Divided	No
Statists	Prioritise State	Oppose	Yes

I propose an alternative, which I label as the Centre-Periphery Position (CPP) measure. Using RTI and support for sub-state independence (excluding non-responses like don’t know), I separate individuals into five categories (displayed in Table 2). I designate the first three as ‘nationalist’ according to Bieber’s (2018) definition as they exhibit strong national identity,


prioritise one national identity over the other, and favour political representation for the nation as they conceive it. The first group are **secessionists**, who are those who prioritise their sub-state identity and support sub-state independence. These individuals conform to conventional descriptions of sub-state nationalism. The second group are **autonomists**, who prioritise their sub-state identity but oppose independence. Conventionally, ‘nationalism’ is tied to a desire for sovereignty (Gellner 1983). However, the emergence of devolved authority has complicated the relationship between these two concepts, and groups can meet the ‘representation’ criteria of nationalism without advocating for full independence (Keating 2017). As these individuals exhibit very strong support for devolved authority (see appendix), I designate them as a variant of sub-state nationalism.

On the other side of the centre-periphery cleavage are **statists**, who prioritise their state identity and oppose sub-state independence. While conventional state nationalists may push for greater centralisation, many contemporary state nationalists are open to the presence of devolved authority (Cetrà & Swenden 2021) and that is the case here (see appendix). Previous chapters of my PhD (in development) have established that these categories are stable over time, present across multiple sub-state territories, and correlate with support for nationalist parties accordingly. Finally, there are two non-nationalist groups in the middle of the centre-periphery cleavage. The first are **dual identifiers**, who are those who report equal (and strong) state and sub-state identity. Given their dual identity, these individuals fail the ‘prioritisation’ criteria of Bieber’s (2018) definition of nationalism. In terms of constitutional preference, the vast majority oppose sub-state independence (see appendix). The last group are **indifferent identifiers**, who report both weak or moderate state and sub-state identity. The low identity of this group precludes them from being nationalist, and they are somewhat divided across territories when it comes to sub-state independence. To allow comparisons across different identity scales, moderate/weak identity is defined as the midpoint on the scale or less, whereas strong is above the midpoint.<sup>6</sup>

The distribution of these categories is not consistent across sub-state territories (Figure 1). Secessionist sentiment is most prominent within Catalonia and Scotland, while it is particularly low within England. In contrast, dual identification is very common within England, which is a reflection of how close many individuals see Britishness and Englishness (Mann & Fenton 2017). In addition, the statist category is largest in Wales, and the indifferent category occupies around 10 percent of each territory.

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<sup>6</sup> Other chapters of my PhD go into the designation of individuals as ‘nationalist’ in greater detail.

**Figure 1: Distribution of Centre-Periphery Position across Sub-State Territories**


Unfortunately, the measures of identity and constitutional preference are not consistent across these datasets (full question wording in the appendix). The BESIP includes measures of ‘identity’ for all three sub-state territories, whereas the MEDW datasets only include measures of ‘identity’ for Flanders. Instead, MEDW include measures of ‘attachment’ in all three nations. While often treated as interchangeable, these two measures capture different things (Mendelsohn 2002). Similarly, the constitutional preference questions are multiple-choice in the BESIP, with MEDW only including a similar measure in Catalonia. Instead, MEDW includes three territory-specific questions that ask respondents whether they support independence or not. As the association between national identity and political attitudes may differ depending on the indicators used (Miller & Ali 2014), these differences are problematic. To address this, I ran models for each of the available combinations of measures in the MEDW datasets. Overall, the same patterns appeared regardless of the indicators used across each territory (see appendix). For consistency and brevity, I only present the results for the attachment and binary questions as these measures were present in every MEDW dataset.

### **Nationalism and economic attitudes in sub-state territories**

Is there a link between nationalist sentiment and economic attitudes in sub-state territories? I explore this via two linear regression models. First, I use left-right self-placement as my dependent variable, which is measured on a scale from 0 (left) to 10 (right). Second, I use redistribution preferences, which range from 0 (support) to 10 (oppose), to explore the link between centre-periphery position and a specific economic policy. I control for age (interval variable), education (university degree or not), gender (male or female), and income (low,

medium, high, no answer).<sup>7</sup> I exclude non-responses for each variable, except for income as non-response is high and excluding them would limit the power of my analysis dramatically. All models are weighted by the most comprehensive sociodemographic weight variable available in the respective dataset.<sup>8</sup> Unfortunately, other important factors like urban-rural residence (Calzada 2018), ethnicity (Sobolewska & Ford 2020), language (Cetrà 2019), and parentage (Rico & Jennings 2016) are not present in every dataset, so I exclude them in order to keep the models consistent.

**Figure 2: Mean Predicted Left-Right Self-Positions Associated with Centre-Periphery Position**



Overall, the association between centre-periphery and left-right self-placement is not consistent across sub-state territories. These results are displayed in Figure 2. In Catalonia, Scotland, Quebec, and Wales, secessionists report the left-wing self-positions and are similar to indifferent identifiers, with right-wing self-placements then increasing as individuals become closer to the state. These results are in line with existing research on the connection between these two dimensions within these territories (Erk 2010, Dinas 2012, Galais & Serrano 2019, Sobolewska & Ford 2020). However, the opposite patterns are present within Flanders and England, where right-wing self-placements increase as individuals move away from the state, and are particularly strong among secessionists. Initially, these results appear to support Erk's (2010) party-level claim that there is no inherent link between sub-state nationalism and left-right self-position. Yet, these results provide support for Galais & Serrano's (2019) claim that peripheral identity will

<sup>7</sup> The specific values differ for each sub-state territory, with the full information present in the appendix.

<sup>8</sup> These were POST\_WEIGHT3B in the MEDW datasets and wt in the BESIP.


associate with left-wing self-placements within territories that contain high degrees of polarisation in relative territorial identity.<sup>9</sup> For instance, variation in relative identity is much higher in Catalonia, Quebec, Scotland, and Wales than it is within England and Quebec (Table 3). However, further research is required in order to explore why the opposite pattern may emerge within sub-state territories where there is comparatively less variation in relative territorial identity.

**Table 3: Standard Deviation of Relative Territorial Identity in Each Sub-State Territory**

England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
0.131	0.250	0.255	0.211	0.138	0.181

RTI normalised onto 0-1 scale to account for the different scales in each dataset (1-7 in BESIP, 0-10 in MEDW)

**Figure 3: Mean Predicted Redistribution Positions Associated with Centre-Periphery Position**



In contrast, the link between centre-periphery position and specific economic positions is far weaker (Figure 3). The inclusion of centre-periphery position to the model explains far less variance in redistribution attitudes than it does for left-right self-placement in all six territories (this is measured as the increase in model  $R^2$  when adding CPP to the control-only model). In addition, there are very few differences between the categories when comparing them to the left-right self-position. Scotland and Wales appear slight outliers, where there does appear to be some connection between the two cleavages with secessionists and indifferent identifiers notably more in favour of redistribution. However, the explained variance is still far lower than what is present

<sup>9</sup> Such polarisation is measured via the standard deviation of the relative territorial identity scale, standardised between 0 and 1.

for left-right self-position. Thus, these results appear to support Dinas (2012) and Strijbis & Leonisio (2012) who argue that the connection between left-right and centre-periphery is more of a heuristic than a reflection of economic preferences. Furthermore, the lack of a connection between centre-periphery position and economic preferences, plus the prevalence of left-wing self-placements within secessionists in relatively rich territories like Catalonia,<sup>10</sup> does challenge the viability of extending party-led economic nationalism (e.g. Massetti & Schakel 2015) arguments to the individual-level.

### **Nationalism and social attitudes in sub-state territories**

Is there a link between nationalism and social attitudes in sub-state territories? I explore this via two steps, using the same explanatory models as those present for economic positions. Given their importance within conventional literature on nationalism, I first explore whether centre-periphery position is linked to the prioritisation of ethnic or civic markers of national identity in England, Scotland, and Wales.<sup>11</sup> Given that the United Kingdom is a multi-nation state, I look at the markers of state (British) and sub-state identity in each territory. I use two original survey instruments included within wave 20 of the British Election Study Internet Panel, where respondents indicate the two most important markers of both British and sub-state identity separately. Based on previous research (Reeskens & Hooghe 2010, Wright et al 2012, Ariely 2020), I treat ‘respect for laws and institutions’ as the ‘civic’ marker and ‘ancestry’ as the ‘ethnic’ marker. I recode this variable into a binary variable, which indicates whether someone selected this marker (1) or not (0) and then run two separate logistic regression models (one for British identity and one for sub-state identity) in all three territories. After this, I move to explore the association between centre-periphery position and specific social attitudes within all six territories. To do this, I produce a linear regression in each territory, with attitudes towards immigration as the dependent variable (measured on a scale from ‘allow many more’ (0) to ‘allow far fewer (10)),<sup>12</sup> excluding non-responses.

First, the predicted probability of selecting the ethnic marker is low consistently across all three nations (Figure 4). English secessionists are slightly more likely to select the ethnic marker, but their prioritisation of ancestry is still low. In contrast, centre-periphery position does associate with the prioritisation of civic markers of state (British) identity. In each nation, the predicted probability of selecting ‘respect’ increases as one moves closer to the state. Statists exhibit the

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<sup>10</sup> A table with the GDP per capita of the sub-state territory relative to the state is located within the appendix.


<sup>11</sup> There are no equivalent questions for Catalonia, Flanders, or Quebec, hence their exclusion.

<sup>12</sup> The British Election Study is measured in the opposite direction, but I reverse code this.


highest predicted probability of selecting the civic marker in all three territories (with dual identifiers not far behind). On the other side, secessionists and indifferent identifiers are very unlikely to select the civic marker. However, there are very few significant differences between the categories when looking at markers of sub-state identity in all three nations. In England, secessionists are slightly more likely to select the ethnic marker, but their endorsement remains low again. In Scotland and Wales, there are no significant differences between the categories on the ethnic axis, but there is also very little variation in terms of the prioritisation of the civic marker as well. Consequently, these results suggest that focusing on ethnic and civic markers may not be the most useful method of distinguishing between forms of nationalist sentiment at an individual-level.

**Figure 4: Mean Predicted Probability of Selecting Ethnic and Civic Markers of National Identity Associated with Centre-Periphery Position**

**British Identity Markers**



**Sub-State Identity Markers**



0 = 0% predicted probability of selecting marker  
 1 = 100% predicted probability of selecting marker


Source: British Election Study Internet Panel  
 England (4471), Scotland (2258), Wales (1436)

In contrast, there are significant differences when looking at the association between nationalist sentiment and immigration preferences. First, individuals appear to become more opposed to immigration as peripheral sentiment increases in England and Flanders (Figure 5). Here, secessionists have the highest (most anti-immigration) mean predicted position in both



territories, followed by autonomists, dual identifiers, and statist. These results are in line with existing research on peripheral nationalism within these two territories (Mann & Fenton 2017, Cammaerts 2018), and are in line with perceptions of British identity as an inclusive to the supposedly xenophobic Englishness (Mann & Fenton 2017). One connection between these territories is that they are majority-centred. England represents a political, cultural, and demographic majority within Britain (Mann & Fenton 2017), whereas Dutch is the protected primary language within the monolingual Flanders (Blommaerts 2011). Yet, there is no association between Quebec, a territory that Dupré (2018) characterises as majority-centred, which suggests that further research is required in order to establish how these connections emerge.

**Figure 5: Mean Predicted Immigration Attitudes Associated with Centre-Periphery Position**



The opposite is true in Scotland, and Wales. Here, secessionists are similar to indifferent identifiers in that they take far more moderate immigration positions than statist do, which supports Henderson et al's (2020) claim that Britishness has different implications in England to Scotland and Wales. Yet, as with left-right self-placement, this approach highlights that the connection between CPP and immigration is not linear. In both nations, autonomists and dual identifiers are closer to statist in their perceptions of immigration, which suggest that there is something particular about 'secessionist' (rather than just 'peripheral') sentiment that connects it with left-wing self-placements and inclusionary positions. These differences are present despite the fact that statist are the most likely to prioritise civic markers in all three nations. Thus, even if statist think of Britishness in the same terms, this incongruence between these nations

emphasises that researchers should not rely on ethnic or civic markers when attempting to understand the inclusive or exclusive connotations of nationalist sentiment.

However, it is important to acknowledge that these connections are far weaker than what is present for left-right self-placement. Alongside Quebec, the comparative lack of association is very noticeable within Catalonia (see Table 4). While secessionists and autonomists may be slightly more moderate than statistas are, there is very little association centre-periphery positions and immigration attitudes overall within this territory. In terms of variance explained, centre-periphery positions explains 12.9 percent more variance in left-right self-placement than it does in redistributive attitudes, and 13.5 percent more than immigration attitudes. Similar sized gaps are present in Flanders for redistribution and (albeit less so) for immigration. There are also consistent, but slightly smaller, gaps present within England, Scotland, and Wales. Consequently, despite the presence of some ties between centre-periphery position and specific social attitudes, these results suggest that the connection between centre-periphery position and left-right self-placement appears to be an expression of identity, rather than a reflection of specific political attitudes.

**Table 4: Percentage Of Additional Variance In Left-Right Self-Position That CPP Explains Compared To Redistribution and Immigration**

<b>Territory</b>	<b>LR Minus Redistribution (%)</b>	<b>LR Minus Immigration (%)</b>
England	4.82	1.04
Scotland	7.57	9.53
Wales	5.47	6.97
Catalonia	12.87	13.54
Flanders	13.89	5.36
Quebec	4.80	6.43


Note: The value here represents the increase in  $R^2$  that comes from adding CPP to the demographics-only model for left-right self-placement, minus the corresponding value for adding CPP to the demographics-only models for redistribution and immigration (x100).

### **Advantages of the CPP approach**

Overall, these results highlight the CPP approach has clear advantages over existing RTI approaches. First, the CPP approach emphasises that the relationship between centre-periphery sentiment and left-right self-placement is not as linear as existing RTI approaches suggest. To highlight this, I compare the results for left-right self-placement in Wales when using CPP and RTI (Figure 5). Similar trends are present across each of the sub-state territories, with this representing just one example.

According to RTI, the association between centre-periphery position and left-right self-position is linear, with individuals becoming more left-wing as they become more singularly Welsh. However, there are important differences when looking at the CPP approach on the left. First, those with weak national identity (indifferent identifiers) are significantly more left-wing than those with strong dual identity. Second, there is a stark difference between secessionists (who are very left-wing) and autonomists (who are closer to statist and dual identifiers). Indeed, in all six of the sub-state territories covered here, autonomists who prioritise their sub-state identity, but oppose independence, are closer to both dual identifiers and statist (albeit by narrower margins) in their left-right self-placements than they are to secessionists (who also prioritise their sub-state identity). Thus, the CPP approach is able to highlight some of the more nuanced associations present between centre-periphery sentiment and political attitudes, which RTI does not capture.

**Figure 5: Mean Predicted Positions of Left-Right Self-Position in Wales Using Both the CPP and RTI Approaches**



**Table 5: Amount of Additional Variance in Dependent Variable That The CPP Approach Explains When Compared To The RTI Approach**

Territory	Left-Right %	Redistribution %	Immigration %
England	7.69	3.48	4.73
Scotland	5.57	4.05	5.52
Wales	6.46	2.08	2.31
Catalonia	2.34	1.63	2.68
Flanders	3.12	0	3.72
Quebec	1.67	-0.86	-1.03

Note: The value for each dependent variable represents the increase in  $R^2$  that comes from adding CPP to the demographics-only model minus the increase in  $R^2$  that comes from adding RTI to the demographic-only model (x100).

Furthermore, the CPP approach often tends to produce a higher degree of explained variance in the dependent variables than the RTI approach (Table 5). For example, the addition of CPP to the model explains 7.69 percent more variance in left-right self-placement in England than is achieved by adding RTI. The additional explained variance is highest across England, Scotland, and Wales, particularly for left-right self-placement, with the models for redistribution and immigration in Quebec being the only that return a slightly worse model fit. Thus, I propose that these results demonstrate the substantive and empirical advantages of the CPP approach over existing RTI measures.

### **Conclusion**

Overall, centre-periphery position does associate with left-right self-placement across sub-state territories. The connection between these two dimensions is strong in sub-state territories that exhibit higher levels of polarisation in their relative territorial identity. The connection moves in the opposite direction within Flanders and England, where the variation in relative identity is far lower. Consequently, these results support Galais & Serrano's (2019) argument that a peripheral-left, state-right, association will emerge when territorial polarisation is high. Such positions may align with centre-periphery positions within polarised territories, as 'the right' is perceived to oppose devolution and prioritise the status quo, with 'the left' representing an opportunity to distance oneself from the state (Dinas 2012, Galais & Serrano 2019). Such interpretations may help make sense of why secessionists are significantly more left-wing than autonomists, with latter group's preference for remaining within the state not providing them with the same encouragement for developing this sense of collective differentiation from the state. Indeed, autonomists are closer to dual identifiers and statist in their left-right self-placements, despite being closer to secessionists in their relative identity. Thus, these results are further evidence of Onuch & Hale's (2018) argument that researchers need to explore how identity categories interact because it appears this connection relies on both relative identity and constitutional preferences.

However, while political actors (and individuals) may claim that the values of their territory are different to the centre, these differences appear to mainly be a matter of identity. In particular, the connection between centre-periphery position and redistribution attitudes is far weaker than what is present for left-right self-placement across all six territories. These results are contrary to existing party-level research (Masseti & Schakel 2015), which stress the importance of economic issues for sub-state nationalist movements. Thus, researchers should not rely on accounts of political elites alone if they wish to understand nationalist sentiment within multi-nation states

more broadly. Instead, these results are in line with Strijbis & Leonisio (2012) who argue that left-right self-placements may not reflect specific policy attitudes (and thus may not shift with structural changes like deindustrialisation), but are instead reflections of how individuals position themselves in general terms. Given my interest in associations, I do not explore the direction of these effects in this paper, which future accounts could capture by looking at their relationship over time.

While often weaker than that of left-right self-placement, it is still important to highlight that the connection between centre-periphery position and social attitudes is not consistent across sub-state territories. In England and Flanders, sub-state nationalism (both autonomists and secessionists) report some of the strongest anti-immigration positions in their territories. These results are in line with conventional accounts of sub-state nationalism that characterise it as exclusionary (e.g. Hobsbawm 1990). However, secessionists in Scotland and Wales take far more moderate positions on immigration than other nationalist categories, and are in fact closer to those with weak national identities. As with left-right self-placements, secessionists are notably distinct to autonomists and statist, despite the latter two groups' separation on the centre-periphery cleavage. Further research is required to explore how these differential positions connect to sub-state nationalist sentiment across different territories. However, these results do emphasise that researchers need to avoid conflating nationalism within exclusionary social positions, which is often the case for measurement at a party-level (e.g. Bakker et al 2020).

In contrast, civic and ethnic markers of state and (particularly) sub-state identity are not a useful method of distinguishing between those separated along the centre-periphery cleavage. In England, Scotland, and Wales the differences between the categories are marginal. Moreover, and despite the supposedly 'inclusive' connotations of civic markers, the prioritisation of these markers is not reflective of the inclusive-exclusive attitudes present within these groups. For example, when describing British identity, statist in all three nations are the most likely to prioritise the civic marker of respecting Britain's laws and institutions. However, statist were then the most exclusive (anti-immigrant) category in Scotland and Wales. Thus, these results support existing research that questions the 'inclusive' character of those who prioritise civic markers (e.g. Fozdar & Low 2015, Simonsen & Bonikowski 2020). In addition, despite their similar understanding of British identity (indicated by their similar likelihoods of selecting the civic markers), statist took far more inclusive positions within England. Similar differences were present for left-right self-placement and thus support Henderson et al's (2020) argument that Britishness has different political connotations in England to Scotland and Wales. Researchers

need to account for these different associations when exploring national identity in Britain in the future.

The primary limitations with this paper are that it only covers six cases and the indicators present for national identity/attachment and constitutional preference differ over each dataset. These differences do not appear to have a large effect on the association between CPP and political attitudes, but future researchers should be careful when attempting to capture both national identity and nationalist sentiment. However, the lack of multiple-choice constitutional preference questions in each dataset prohibit the possibility of looking at different varieties of state nationalism across these territories. Existing party-level research has established that there can be a great deal of difference in constitutional attitudes within a single category like 'statist' (Cetrà & Swenden 2021). The CPP approach does not preclude this variation, but it cannot capture it without these multiple-choice questions. In many cases, data limitations (such as binary independence questions) prevent this exploration, and researchers require the collection of more detailed comparative data to explore this in more detail.

Yet, despite these limitations, this paper has two main contributions. First, I have tested a new approach for capturing centre-periphery position within multi-nation states. The CPP approach is able to capture that the connection between centre-periphery sentiment and political attitudes is not as linear as existing RTI measures suggest. In addition, the CPP approach is able to capture the clear differences between those with low national identities and those with strong dual identities, which RTI measures cannot capture. Thus, I posit that, when compared to existing RTI approaches, the CPP approach has substantive and (slight) empirical advantages. Second, this investigation has important implications for understanding how nationalist sentiment ties to broader political positions within multi-nation states, which appear to be more of a matter of identity than of specific economic or social attitudes. However, this is not to say that these differences are unimportant. Perceptions of difference may be a useful tool for mobilising support for nationalist parties and causes, even if these perceptions do not tie to specific positions. Furthermore, the centre-periphery cleavage may associate with other particular issues at certain key junctures, as it did with vote in the 2016 EU referendum in Britain (Henderson et al 2020). Thus, these results emphasise that researchers need to examine the link between nationalist sentiment and political attitudes carefully, in order to separate the real from the rhetoric.

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**Appendix****Table A1: Constitutional Preference Questions and Recoding**

State	Organisation	Question	Responses	Recoding Note: Values not mentioned coded as missing
Belgium	Independence	Many people talk about the future of Belgium. Please rank the following four scenarios in order of preference (1 to 4)	1: A united Belgium 2: An independent Wallonia, an independent Flanders, and an independent Brussels-capital region 3: An independent Wallonia and an independent Flanders including the Brussels-capital region 4: An independent Wallonia including the Brussels-capital region, and an independent Flanders 9: Don't know	1: Ranked any independence option first. 0: Ranked 'A united Belgium' first
Canada	Independence	If a referendum was held today that would ask if you want Québec to become independent, would you vote 'Yes' or would you vote 'No'?	1: Yes 2: No 9: Don't know	1: Yes 0: No
Spain	Multiple-Choice	As far as relations between Catalonia and Spain are concerned, do you think Catalonia should be a region of Spain, an autonomous community of Spain, a state within a federal Spain, or an independent state?	1: A region of Spain 2: An autonomous community in Spain 3: A state within a federal Spain 4: An independent state 9: Don't know	1: An independent state 0: Responses 1-3
	Independence	And if a referendum was held today asking about Catalonia's independence, what would you do?	1: I'd vote for it 2: I'd vote against it 3: I wouldn't vote 9: I don't know	1: Vote for it 0: I'd vote against it
United Kingdom	Multiple-Choice	Which of these statements comes closest to your view?	1: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK and the European Union 2: [Nation] should become independent, separate from the rest of the UK but party of the European Union 3: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has some taxation powers 4: [Nation] should remain part of the UK, with its own elected parliament which has no taxation powers 5: [Nation] should remain part of the UK without an elected parliament 9999: Don't know	1: Responses 1 and 2 0: Responses 3-5
	Independence (Scotland Only)	If there were another referendum on Scottish independence, how do you think you would vote?	<0> I would vote "No" (stay in the UK) <1> I would vote "Yes" (leave the UK) <2> Would not vote <9999> Don't know	1: Yes 0: No

**Table A2: National Identity Questions**

State	Question	Question	Lower Value	Upper Value
Belgium	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
	Identity	Please indicate on a scale of 0 to 10, where 0 means very weakly and 10 very strongly, how the following identities apply to you?	0: Very weakly	10: Very strongly
Canada	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
Spain	Attachment	On a scale from 0 to 10, where 0 means 'not attached at all' and 10 means 'very strongly attached', how attached do you feel to the following?	0: Not attached at all	10: Very strongly attached
United Kingdom	Identity	Where would you place yourself on these scales?	1: Not at all	7: Very strongly

**Table A3: Level of Support for Independence based on Centre-Periphery Position Using Attachment Approach in MEDW Datasets**

	Secessionist	Autonomist	Dual	Indifferent	Statist
	%	%	%	%	%
England	100	0	17.70	18.35	0
Scotland	100	0	20.15	61.00	0
Wales	100	0	20.05	34.19	0
Catalonia	100	0	23.87	31.53	0
	85.94	0.83	17.47	27.48	0
Flanders	100	0	15.60	33.71	0
Quebec	100	0	10.97	29.75	0

First value in Catalonia is the percentage who select independence in the binary question, whereas the second value is the percentage who select independence in the multiple-choice question.

All values exclude don't knows.

**Table A4: Level of Support for Devolution based on Centre-Periphery Position Using Attachment Approach in MEDW Datasets**

	Secessionist	Autonomist	Dual	Indifferent	Statist
	%	%	%	%	%
England	0	84.09	61.70	46.71	61.41
Scotland	0	88.24	57.17	30.50	63.44
Wales	0	82.16	48.82	49.63	54.34
Catalonia	14.06	88.29	69.12	52.97	78.06
Flanders	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Quebec	0	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A

Results for England, Scotland, and Wales refer to those who say their nation should have a sub-state parliament, but not those who say it should be independent or that power should be centralised.

Using the binary measure to differentiate individuals in Catalonia (as in the paper), the results for Catalonia indicate how these individuals responded when asked the multiple-choice question. Support for devolved authority is taken as those who say Catalonia should be an autonomous community or state within a federal Spain, but not that it should be a 'region' of Spain or independent.

No results for Flanders and Quebec as their constitutional preference questions pertained to independence only.

All values exclude don't knows.

**Table A5: Income categories in each sub-state territory**

	England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
Low	£0-£19,999 per annum			€0-€1750 per month	€0-€19,999 per annum	0-39,999 CAD per annum
Medium	£20,000 - £39,999 per annum			€1750-€3250 per month	€20,000 - €39,999 per annum	40-69,999 CAD per annum
High	£40,000+ per annum			€3250 + per month	€40,000+ per annum	70,000 CAD+ per annum

Note: Non-response is very high for these variables, so responses like don't know where collected into a fourth category and retained in the model in order to avoid reducing the statistical power of the models drastically.

**Table A6: Sub-State Identity (and Standard Deviation) Across Centre-Periphery Position**

	England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
Secessionists	0.93 (0.1)	0.94 (0.1)	0.95 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)	0.87 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)
Autonomists	0.92 (0.1)	0.93 (0.1)	0.94 (0.1)	0.80 (0.1)	0.84 (0.1)	0.84 (0.1)
Dual	0.91 (0.1)	0.92 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)	0.85 (0.1)	0.83 (0.1)	0.89 (0.1)
Indifferent	0.31 (0.2)	0.25 (0.2)	0.22 (0.2)	0.35 (0.2)	0.34 (0.2)	0.33 (0.2)
Statists	0.45 (0.3)	0.37 (0.3)	0.30 (0.3)	0.56 (0.2)	0.58 (0.2)	0.57 (0.3)

Due to the different scales, sub-state identity was normalised between 0 and 1 to aid comparison.

**Table A7: State Identity (and Standard Deviation) Across Centre-Periphery Position**

	England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
Secessionists	0.55 (0.3)	0.30 (0.3)	0.37 (0.3)	0.26 (0.2)	0.50 (0.3)	0.37 (0.3)
Autonomists	0.62 (0.2)	0.59 (0.2)	0.60 (0.2)	0.62 (0.2)	0.68 (0.2)	0.60 (0.2)
Dual	0.91 (0.1)	0.92 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)	0.85 (0.1)	0.83 (0.1)	0.89 (0.1)
Indifferent	0.38 (0.2)	0.27 (0.2)	0.34 (0.2)	0.35 (0.2)	0.34 (0.2)	0.32 (0.2)
Statists	0.85 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)	0.90 (0.1)	0.89 (0.1)	0.88 (0.1)	0.91 (0.1)

Due to the different scales, state identity was normalised between 0 and 1 to aid comparison.

**Table A8: Mean Position on RTI Scale (and Standard Deviation) Across Centre-Periphery Position**

	England	Scotland	Wales	Catalonia	Flanders	Quebec
Secessionists	0.39 (0.3)	0.65 (0.3)	0.58 (0.3)	0.65 (0.3)	0.37 (0.3)	0.55 (0.3)
Autonomists	0.31 (0.2)	0.35 (0.2)	0.34 (0.2)	0.19 (0.1)	0.16 (0.1)	0.24 (0.2)
Dual	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)	0.00 (0)
Indifferent	-0.07 (0.2)	-0.02 (0.2)	-0.12 (0.2)	-0.00 (0.1)	0.00 (0.1)	0.01 (0.1)
Statists	-0.39 (0.3)	-0.54 (0.3)	-0.60 (0.3)	-0.33 (0.2)	-0.30 (0.2)	-0.33 (0.3)

Due to the different scales, RTI was normalised between -1 and 1 to aid comparison. Positive values indicate prioritisation of sub-state and negative values indicate prioritisation of the state.

**Table A9: Economic Position of Sub-State Territories**

Sub-State Territory	GDP per capita	GDP per capita relative to state	GDP proportion of state
	€ <sup>13</sup>	€	€
England	37,506	1006	85.94
Scotland	33,200	-3300	7.54
Wales	26,300	-10200	3.5
Catalonia	26,400	3800	18.79
Flanders	36,400	500	58.26
Quebec	32,564	-6561	19.06

Sources: Eurostat, Statistics Canada, ONS

<sup>13</sup> GBP converted into Euros for comparability. Values rounded to nearest whole €.

**Table A10: Mean Predicted Position of Each Group In Scotland Using Binary Independence Question**

	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Left-Right Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Redistribution Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Immigration Position	Upper CI
Secessionist	3.21	3.35	3.50	2.79	2.99	3.20	4.20	4.39	4.59
Autonomist	4.45	4.70	4.94	3.75	4.07	4.40	5.62	5.93	6.23
Dual	5.09	5.31	5.52	4.64	4.94	5.24	5.61	5.90	6.18
Indifferent	3.05	5.39	3.73	2.09	2.56	3.04	3.69	4.15	4.61
Statist	5.65	5.86	6.08	5.34	5.65	5.97	6.33	6.63	6.93
Additional R <sup>2</sup> Explained By									
Adding CPP		0.2058		0.1176			0.0923		
N		1638		1812			1883		

**Table A11: Mean Predicted Position of Each Group In Catalonia Using Multiple-Choice Constitutional Preference Question**

	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Left-Right Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Redistribution Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Immigration Position	Upper CI
Secessionist	3.12	3.33	3.53	2.68	2.98	3.29	6.48	6.75	7.02
Autonomist	3.72	4.00	4.29	2.42	2.85	3.27	6.24	6.62	6.99
Dual	4.62	4.92	5.21	3.06	3.48	3.90	6.86	7.23	7.61
Indifferent	3.87	4.21	4.55	2.58	3.06	3.53	5.47	5.89	6.30
Statist	5.03	5.37	5.72	3.70	4.20	4.71	7.29	7.72	8.15
Additional R <sup>2</sup> Explained By									
Adding CPP		0.1396		0.0208			0.0411		
N		830		867			881		

**Table A12: Mean Predicted Position of Each Group In Flanders Using Identity Question**

	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Left-Right Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Redistribution Position	Upper CI	Lower CI	Mean Predicted Immigration Position	Upper CI
Secessionist	6.58	6.86	7.14	3.98	4.66	5.38	8.29	8.63	8.96
Autonomist	5.44	5.82	6.20	4.19	4.79	5.40	7.80	8.23	8.67
Dual	5.57	5.86	6.14	3.91	4.39	4.73	8.01	8.34	8.67
Indifferent	4.08	4.58	5.08	3.83	4.59	5.35	5.90	6.50	7.09
Statist	4.49	4.74	4.99	3.91	4.32	4.82	6.41	6.71	7.01
Additional R <sup>2</sup> Explained By									
Adding CPP		0.1629		0.000			0.1204		
N		731		776			797		