

# Death and taxes: Assessing the link between dictator death and economic reform

Brent Hierman  
Department of International Studies and Political Science  
Virginia Military Institute

*Paper prepared for ASN, May 2021*

*Please do not cite without permission*

## Abstract:

Recent work has revealed that authoritarian economic policymaking is shaped by institutional constraints and structural power dynamics; however, there has been little effort to understand dynamism in authoritarian economic policy. That is what spurs an autocracy to change its economic policies? This paper represents an initial foray into whether the death of a dictator spurs economic reform. It advances two propositions: 1) in general, an autocrat's death is unlikely to provoke economic liberalization, and in fact may lead to economic restrictions; and 2) in specific cases, the reshuffling of elites following a succession will encourage reform as a tool by insiders to target rival elites. Some initial empirical exploration of 16 cases lends general support for the first proposition. As of yet, the second proposition has not been explored. This paper concludes with a discussion of some potential steps forward, which includes broadening the scope of the study to expand the cases considered and deepening the study through controlled paired comparisons.

## Introduction

What happens after autocrats die in office? Recent studies have shown that following the death of a dictator, insider elites are often able to coordinate around new leadership, and thus reduce the opportunity for democratization and political liberalization. Does this mean that the status quo is preserved? Does economic reform or liberalization follow an autocrat's death? This paper represents an initial foray into that question. In the theoretical overview below, I propose that not only are there reasons to be skeptical in the promise of economic liberalization following the death of a dictator but that in many cases we could anticipate retrenchment in the years following death as elite insiders seek to reassert their capture of key rents. However, I also propose that when the post-succession coalition cuts out elites who dominate particular sectors, economic reform can be used as a weapon by regime insiders to undermine the resource base of the new rivals.

In the sections below, 16 cases of autocratic leadership death between 1995-2016 are considered. As expected, in the majority of cases economic liberalization does not follow in the five years after a leader's death. Furthermore, following a death there were more cases of clear economic retrenchment (4) than liberalization (2). However, this project is very much in its early stages, and thus the empirical investigation of these propositions is underdeveloped. Following a discussion of the empirical analysis that has been conducted, I address some potential next steps for this project.

## Dilemma of Succession

A minimal definition of autocracy classifies it as a regime "in which rulers acquire power by means other than competitive elections" (Gandhi 2010, 7). Without the formal process of elections, succession emerges as a fundamental dilemma for autocratic regimes (Helms 2020; Kurrild-Klitgaard 2000; Tullock 2012). Given the fact that an autocratic ruler's primary threat to continued rule is deposition from fellow

regime insiders rather than mass uprisings, managing expectations surrounding leadership exit is a tricky dilemma (Svolik 2012). On the one hand, an aging or sick autocrat could lead regime elites to view the sitting leader as a “lame duck”, and thus spur regime defection (De Mesquita et al. 2005; Hale 2015, 84). On the other, simply naming a successor entails certain risks, as it could increase the probability that the newly appointed successor could launch a coup immediately rather than wait around for the current leader to move out of the way (Herz 1952). Furthermore, there is no guarantee that the named successor will successfully enjoy the loyalty of regime insiders (Hale 2015, 85).

According to Brownlee (2007), in non-monarchies, whether or not regime insiders accept a designated successor is largely predicated on two factors: 1) the history of party rule before the entrenchment of the incumbent and 2) the filial status of the designated successor. Specifically, he finds that if there is no history of successful succession in a given regime (in other words, when the regime originated with the incumbent), “ruling elites tend to favor hereditary succession over a tumultuous free-for-all” (628). Empirically, there is evidence that hereditary succession can be an efficient solution to the succession dilemma (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014). However, when party institutions precede the incumbent, prior experience with succession can be referenced. Under these conditions, dynastic succession is likely to be resisted, and regime insiders will seek to follow existing precedent in selecting a new leader (Brownlee 2007).

Even without meaningfully free and fair elections, some autocratic regimes have established formal or informal rules limiting the tenure of autocrats. For instance, the *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* (PRI) which ruled Mexico for 71 years, limited a president to a single six-year term but established that a sitting president could handpick his successor through the practice of “dedazo” (Sanderson 1983). When these limitations on tenure are absent, however, out of strategic considerations, elites often prefer that a new heir is older than the average age of the population. According to Berton and Panel, when insider elites lack the means to easily remove a new leader should

they disapprove of his/her policies, elites will favor older leaders since their term in office is biologically limited. In other words, autocracies are biased towards older, gerontocratic leaders since they are more likely to die than younger leaders (2017).

### Differentiating between Autocracies

But if selecting leaders who are likely to die is rational, what happens once they do die in office? The literature generally expects that the effect of leadership death will vary based on either the type of authoritarian regime in place and the length of time that a particular dictator has ruled.

In her canonical work, Geddes (1999) argued that the effect of leader death is determined by the institutions of power-sharing in place; specifically, “personalist regimes rarely survive long after the death of their leader” (132). Unlike single-party regimes, personalist regimes lack institutionalized mechanisms to stabilize transitional moments (Geddes 1999; Magaloni 2008; Magaloni and Kricheli 2010; Zeng 2021). For instance, Ezrow and Frantz demonstrate that especially when paired with legislatures, ruling parties regulate and normalize a process of leadership succession (2011). Similarly, military regimes possess institutionalized mechanisms to ensure coordination and at least minimal power-sharing between elites during a succession (Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Hummel 2020). Monarchies likewise have regularly instituted rules such as primogeniture to reduce the risk perceived by elites approaching a leadership transition (Kokkonen and Sundell 2014; Tullock 2012). Analyses of historic data have revealed that the absence of hereditary succession arrangements, such as primogeniture, significantly increased the risk of post succession civil war (Kokkonen and Sundell 2020).

Geddes’ categorization has been critiqued for underestimating the tendency for personalization to capture and dominate institutions within all types of authoritarian regimes (Slater 2003, 2010). Svobik finds that regardless of formal autocratic institutions in place, the length of time that a particular dictator rules is positively correlated with the degree of personalization. While new leaders generally

preside over contested autocracies in which they face pressure to acquiesce to regime insiders lest disgruntled members of the inner circle launch a coup, leaders who have ruled for a length of time preside over established autocracies. In other words, rulers in place for many years will feel less threatened by inner elites (Svolik 2012, 197). However, as a dictator approaches the end of life, uncertainty over the near future increases. Recent studies have found that aging dictators are more likely to introduce elections and generally pursue power-sharing arrangements than are younger dictators as means to manage that uncertainty (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2017; Helms 2020; Tanaka 2018).

In addition to differences in the institutionalization of power, regime types vary in their legitimation claims. Kailitz and Stockemer have found that regimes in which a relatively small group of elites share values and beliefs are more durable than others (2017). Specifically, they find that monarchies and ideologically unified regimes both feature a high degree of elite unity and narrow elite differentiation (capturing the relative autonomy of elite members from one another and from the state). Even though they rely upon traditional claims to authority, ruling monarchs typically rely upon the support of a well-defined aristocratic core who jostle amongst one another but are generally expected to protect aristocratic privilege and gatekeep new entrants (Herb 1999; Kailitz and Stockemer 2017; Lust-Okar and Jamal 2002). Similarly, a shared ideological commitment can reinforce the cohesion of regime insiders, especially when these elites can reference a shared revolutionary struggle during the founding period (Hanson 2010; Kailitz and Stockemer 2017; Lachapelle et al. 2020; Levitsky and Way 2013). It is plausible that shared values and beliefs amongst elite insiders increases the probability of a smooth succession following death.

Despite these theoretical reasons for expecting regime type and duration of rule to cause variation in the political impact of leadership death, recent empirical studies have found that in most cases of dictator death the outcome is political continuity. In their analysis of every dictator who died in office over a 66-year time period, Kendall-Taylor and Frantz find that not only is political liberalization rare in the immediate aftermath but that “[i]n 76 percent of cases, the same regime was still in power five years after a leader’s death” (Kendall-Taylor and Frantz 2016, 160). Hummel (2020) finds that somewhat in contrast to Geddes’ expectation regarding the instability of personalist regimes, the death of a personalist dictator is unlikely to lead to political liberalization. A controlled comparative study of the immediate aftermath of the deaths of long-ruling autocrats in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan reveals that even in the absence of formally robust single parties, the preference for elites to ensure stability provides the potential for collective decision making in a transitional context (Anceschi 2020).

How can we make sense of this apparent stability of regimes following the death of dictators regardless of regime type? Both Hummel and Kendall-Taylor and Frantz maintain that we should not assume that leadership death in autocracies is a random occurrence. Rather, both sets of authors suggest it is endogenous: only particular regimes enable a leader to survive until he/she can die in office. In other words, regimes where a leader dies are likely to be regimes in which elites are confident that they will be able to manage the risk surrounding succession, and therefore preserve status quo political arrangements. This could be due to the existence of informal arrangements surrounding a successor (Hummel 2020) or because of the precedence of prior cases of collective decision-making which could serve as a model following a dictator’s death (Anceschi 2020). If elites lack the confidence that post-death succession will be relatively smooth, they have an incentive to launch a pre-emptive elite coup against an aging dictator (Hummel 2020).

## Economic policy following leadership death

The recent literature on authoritarian leadership succession has overwhelmingly focused on assessing the effect on political liberalization and/or regime stability. Correspondingly, there has been limited attention paid to the effect of succession on economic policy. This should not be overly surprising as the general literature on authoritarianism has not often focused on variations in economic policies between authoritarian regimes (see Thomson 2017). The research that has been conducted has predominately identified institutional factors, such as authoritarian regime type or the presence of effective legislative bodies, as drivers of policy differences (Hankla and Kuthy 2013; Kono 2015; Steinberg and Malhotra 2014; Wright 2008).

In recent years, there has been a revival of interest in the occurrence of urban-biased agricultural policies in non-democratic regimes, in which rural producers are made to subsidize the urban population through artificially deflated agricultural products (Bates 1981). Wallace maintains that in highly urbanized contexts, authoritarian regimes are compelled to follow urban-biased policies out of fear of mass unrest (2013; see also Pierskalla 2016). Thomson develops this further by emphasizing that not only does urbanization raise the threat of mass unrest, it also increases the lobbying power of important industrial and commercial elites who benefit from cheaper rural inputs. However, Thomson also demonstrates that under conditions of significant land inequality, authoritarian regimes advance rural-biased agricultural policies which entail the subsidization of rural products at the expense of the urban population (Thomson 2017, 2019; see also Ziblatt 2008). Overall, Thomson's work reveals that authoritarian agricultural policy is developed in response to the location of relative threat; when urban threat is greater, urban-biased policies are expected, whereas when rural threat is greater, rural biased policies are expected.

While the aforementioned literature has helpfully revealed that authoritarian policymaking is shaped by institutional constraints and structural power dynamics, there has been little effort to

understand dynamism in authoritarian economic policy. To understand how economic policies may change within a regime we need to turn to an older literature on policy cycles. Although not exclusively focused on succession caused by leadership death, a series of works by Bunce (1979, 1980, 2014; see also Story 1985) have demonstrated that leadership change in both autocratic and democratic contexts can spur predictable policy cycles. Specifically, upon taking office, new leaders will have the opportunity and incentive to innovate with regard to policy-making. However, this period of policy innovation tends to only last as long as the succession moment. As a new leader settles into a role, and the “honeymoon period” subsides, pre-succession priorities reestablish themselves, and policy innovation recedes. For instance, while new leadership in the Soviet Union was correlated with economic policy changes, including adjustments to budgetary and investment priorities associated with increasing public consumption, older leadership was not (V. J. Bunce 1980).

Bunce identifies the cause for economic policy innovation in the need to gain the support, or at least acquiescence, of the public, even in non-democratic contexts. In essence, the new leader offers goods to the citizenry to stave off mass discontent, and thus reduce the possibility of public contention. However, given the aforementioned probabilities regarding the endogenous threats faced by leaders, it would seem as least as likely that policy innovation during a succession moment would be aimed at elite audiences as they would mass audiences since it is the former rather than the latter which is more likely to cause a unplanned leadership exit. Thus, at the very least it is likely that economic changes implemented by a new leader would be certain not to contravene elite interests; for instance, it is unlikely that any economic reforms would undermine the rents gathered by key elite insiders.

*First proposition:* Given the aforementioned literature and the recent empirical work which has demonstrated the continuity of elite coalitions following leadership deaths, we should expect in general, the death of a dictator will not be associated with liberalizing economic reforms. In fact, often leadership death may promote retrenchment as the successor rewards loyal insiders through enabling the capture of economic rents.



While economic policies may be altered to accommodate and placate threats, it should also be noted that targeted reforms can also be used as a weapon used to undermine disfavored members of the elite. Albertus' work on land reform has demonstrated that the composition of an autocracy's elite supporters<sup>1</sup> largely determines whether or not an autocracy pursues land redistribution policies. When the landed elite is within the ruling coalition, land redistribution is unlikely, however when the ruling elite is split from the landed elite, land reform "weakens or even destroys landed elites and the potential threat they pose to political elites and their support group over the longer term" (Albertus 2015, 17). Under these conditions, land redistribution has the additional benefit of providing material support for the rural poor and thus potentially winning over that demographic.

The logic of Albertus' argument could be extended beyond land policy. Given that a succession following a leadership death *may occasionally* result in divisions and restructured coalitions, economic reforms may be a means to target and undermine the resource base of ousted members of the elite class. For instance, although reforms may generally be constrained in extractive patronage systems in which rents are concentrated in specific geographic locations (Boone 2003, 2014; Markowitz 2013) if the elites dominating the capture of these extractive rents are left outside a new ruling elite following a succession, reforms may be more likely. These reforms may or may not benefit non-elites; certain economic reforms may not only isolate rival elites but also enable elite insiders to exploit partial liberalization and thus increase their access to rents (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; cf. Hellman 1998). *Second proposition:* Thus, we should expect that cases in which economic reforms follow leadership death will likely be due to efforts to undermine or isolate the relevance of particular threatening elites following succession.

---

<sup>1</sup> What may be called the selectorate (De Mesquita et al. 2005).

## Analysis

To begin to analyze the effect of leader death on economic reforms, a universe of cases was derived from the Archigos 2.0 dataset (Goemans, Gleditsch, and Chiozza 2009). Although this dataset includes data on leaders dating to 1875, currently my analysis is limited to leader deaths which occurred between 1995 and 2016 by the availability of the measure of my dependent variable (described below). The current universe includes all sixteen incumbent leaders of autocratic regimes who died by any cause over this 21-year period.

Table 1 presents summary information for all 16 cases including the name of the deceased dictator and the year of the leader's death. The table also includes the length of time each leader had ruled at the time of death. Additionally, given the above discussion regarding distinct pathways to succession in different authoritarian regime types, data on the regime type in place at the time of each leader's death is also included (taken from Geddes, Wright, and Frantz 2014).<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>2</sup> One case, Bahrain, was not included in the Geddes et al. dataset. For cases of leader death which occurred outside of the range of years in the Geddes dataset, the regime was classified according to the last year for which data was available.

Table 1: Summary Data for 16 cases of authoritarian leader death, 1995-2016

State	Leader	Year of Death	Years of Rule	Regime Type
Nigeria	Abacha	1998	5	Military Personal
Morocco	Hassan II	1999	38	Monarchy
Bahrain	Al-Khalifah	1999	28	Monarchy
Jordan	Hussein	1999	47	Monarchy
Syria	Al-Assad	2000	29	Party Personal
UAE	al Nahayan	2004	33	Monarchy
Togo	Eyadema	2005	38	Personal
Turkmenistan	Niyazov	2006	15	Party Personal
Kuwait	al-Sabah	2006	15	Monarchy
Guinea	Conte	2008	24	Personal
Gabon	Bongo	2009	42	Party Personal
North Korea	Kim Jong Il	2011	17	Party Personal
Ethiopia	Zenawi	2012	21	Party-Based
Venezuela	Chavez	2013	14	Personal
Saudi Arabia	bin Abdulaziz	2015	10	Monarchy
Uzbekistan	Karimov	2016	25	Party Personal

The dependent variable, economic reforms, was derived from The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom. This index includes multiple factors in four main categories (Rule of Law, Government Size, Regulatory Efficiency, and Market Openness) to provide country-year scores. Each country year receives a score ranging from 0 (indicating no economic freedom) to 100 (total economic freedom). While this dataset allows for general measurement of neoliberal reforms and retrenchment, it is both quite broad and limited in time. Data is only available as far back as 1995 which restricts the universe of cases considered in this analysis. Despite this limitation, it is more inclusive and complete than its chief rival, the Fraser Institute Economic Freedom Survey, which only includes country year data from 2000 on.

To measure economic reform, I compare a state’s economic freedom score in the year immediately before a dictator’s death with the average score in the five years that follow a dictator’s death. The average score over five years is preferred over a single year, as this should provide adequate

time for a new leader to consolidate power and potentially enact new policies. Figure 1 depicts the change in Economic Freedom scores for all 16 cases. Figure 2 is presented to ease interpretation; it drops the extreme outlier case (North Korea) whose very low score on economic freedom may obscure the patterns of the other cases.

Figure 1: Change in Economic Freedom, 1-Year pre-death to 5 Year-post death average, N=16





Figure 2: Change in Economic Freedom, 1-Year pre-death to 5 Year-post death average, North Korea Excluded



In both figures, the x-axis depicts economic freedom scores in the year before a leader’s death and the y-axis is the average economic freedom score in the following five years. A 45-degree reference line is included for ease of interpretation. Scores on or about the line indicate no real change in the level of economic freedom following a dictator’s death, whereas scores to the right of the line indicate a decline in economic freedom.

For the majority of cases (14 out of 16), there was either limited change or negative change following a leader’s death. The difference between the level of freedom in the five years after death compared to the year prior to death was less than  $\pm 2$  for ten of the sixteen cases: Togo (1.34), North Korea (.042), Ethiopia (0.52), Saudi Arabia (-0.36), Kuwait (1.94), Syria (1.22), Morocco (-0.98), Bahrain

(0.12), Jordan (-0.12) and Nigeria (-1.04). For an additional four cases, the difference between time periods was less than -2: Guinea (-3.2), Turkmenistan (-4.14), Venezuela (-6.8), and United Arab Emirates (-9.94).

Scores to the left of the reference line reveal cases in which economic freedom increased in the five years following a leader's death. There are only two cases in which the increase in freedom scores was above 2: Gabon (2.62) and Uzbekistan (7.52).

The general pattern revealed in these figures and scores matches the expectation of the first proposition developed in the literature review: in the cases considered, leadership death did not generally prompt economic liberalization. In fact, twice as many cases experienced a decline in economic freedom scores as experienced an increase. While these initial findings are intriguing, they are obviously quite limited, and the second proposition regarding the reason for some positive cases is not examined. In the remainder of this paper, I plan to address the next steps for this project.

### Next steps

At this point, my empirical investigation into the effect of leadership death on economic reform has been both narrow and shallow. I plan to broaden the investigation by expanding the number of cases investigated and deepen it by conducting a handful of paired comparative case studies. I address each of these plans in turn, but it should be noted that both would first require significant theoretical development.

### Broadening the study

Currently, this project is limited by data availability for the measure of economic reform. As a result, as it is currently designed, this project only includes 16 cases of leadership death. One relatively straightforward means of moving forward would be to substitute the dependent variable for one that would reach back further in time. The clearest option here would be the Fraser Economic Freedom Survey. Unlike the Heritage Index, this survey includes data on *some* states as far back as 1975.

However, 1) it only provides data in 5-year intervals for cases before the year 2000, and 2) is not as comprehensive in the cases it includes in the years post-2000. Despite these limitations, these data should be analyzed for the available states alongside the Heritage Index.

Potentially, more fruitful, however, would be to treat leadership death as an independent variable rather than a scope condition. Currently, I am doing the latter since I have limited my cases to those in which leadership death occurred. However, if I treat leadership death as an independent variable, economic reform post leadership death can be compared with rates of economic reform in the absence of leadership death. Not only will this allow for a better understanding of the independent effect (or lack thereof) of death on economic reform, through this approach, if I continue to use the Heritage Index to approximate economic reforms, my universe could be expanded to include all authoritarian regimes from 1995-present.

Expanding the universe in this manner would provide enough cases for statistical analyses. Before taking this step, however, the theoretical framework of the paper would need to be refined. For instance, variables related to economic diversification, and oil dependence should be derived before being tested. Furthermore, theoretical expectations for whether non-death-related transitions (for example those that follow a retirement or a coup) will be significantly different from death-related transitions will need to be derived.

#### Deepening the study

To more fully interrogate the resilience of economic policy following leadership death I anticipate conducting paired comparisons of states which experienced leadership death. Ideally, these paired comparisons would control for regime type and geographic region while allowing variation in the dependent variable. Based on the figures above, three paired comparisons stand out as potentially

valuable: 1) Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan; 2) Gabon/Guinea; 3) Bahrain/United Arab Emirates. Each of these pairings is presented in Table 2.

Table 2: Proposed Paired Comparisons

Cases	Regime Type(s)	Region	Economic Reforms
Uzbekistan/Turkmenistan	party personal	Central Asia	positive in Uzbekistan, negative in Turkmenistan
Gabon/Guinea	party personal/personal	Africa	positive in Gabon, negative in Guinea
Bahrain/United Arab Emirates	Monarchy	Middle East	Neutral in Bahrain, Negative in United Arab Emirates

To ensure that these controlled comparisons are analytically rigorous, as discussed above, additional theoretical work is needed, especially regarding expectations regarding the impact of economic patterns of extraction on reform pathways.

Clearly, there is much left to do.



## Bibliography

- Albertus, Michael. 2015. *Autocracy and Redistribution*. Cambridge University Press.
- Anceschi, Luca. 2020. "After Personalism: Rethinking Power Transfers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan." *Journal of Contemporary Asia*: 1–21.
- Bates, Robert H. 1981. *1 Markets and States in Tropical Africa: The Political Basis of Agricultural Policies*. Univ of California Press.
- Berton, Raul Magni, and Sophie Panel. 2017. "Strategic Gerontocracy: Why Nondemocratic Systems Produce Older Leaders." *Public Choice* 171(3–4): 409–27.
- Boone, Catherine. 2003. *Political Topographies of the African State : Territorial Authority and Institutional Choice*. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press.
- . 2014. *Property and Political Order in Africa : Land Rights and the Structure of Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Brownlee, Jason. 2007. "Hereditary Succession in Modern Autocracies." *World politics* 59(4): 595–628.
- Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce, and Alastair Smith. 2017. "Political Succession: A Model of Coups, Revolution, Purges, and Everyday Politics." *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61(4): 707–43.
- Bunce, Valerie. 1979. "Leadership Succession and Policy Innovation in the Soviet Republics." *Comparative Politics* 11(4): 379–401.
- . 1980. "Changing Leaders and Changing Policies: The Impact of Elite Succession on Budgetary Priorities in Democratic Countries." *American Journal of Political Science*: 373–95.
- . 2014. *Do New Leaders Make a Difference?: Executive Succession and Public Policy under Capitalism and Socialism*. Princeton University Press.
- Bunce, Valerie Jane. 1980. "The Succession Connection: Policy Cycles and Political Change in the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe." *The American Political Science Review*: 966–77.
- Cooley, Alexander A, and John Heathershaw. 2017. *Dictators without Borders: Power and Money in Central Asia*. Yale University Press.
- De Mesquita, Bruce Bueno, Alastair Smith, Randolph M Siverson, and James D Morrow. 2005. *The Logic of Political Survival*. MIT press.
- Ezrow, Natasha M, and Erica Frantz. 2011. "State Institutions and the Survival of Dictatorships." *Journal of International Affairs*: 1–13.
- Gandhi, Jennifer. 2010. *Political Institutions under Dictatorship*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Gandhi, Jennifer, and Adam Przeworski. 2007. "Authoritarian Institutions and the Survival of Autocrats." *Comparative political studies* 40(11): 1279–1301.

- Geddes, Barbara. 1999. "What Do We Know about Democratization after Twenty Years?" *Annual Review of Political Science* 2: 115–44.
- Geddes, Barbara, Joseph Wright, and Erica Frantz. 2014. "Autocratic Breakdown and Regime Transitions: A New Data Set." *Perspectives on Politics*: 313–31.
- Goemans, Henk E, Kristian Skrede Gleditsch, and Giacomo Chiozza. 2009. "Introducing Archigos: A Dataset of Political Leaders." *Journal of Peace research* 46(2): 269–83.
- Hale, Henry E. 2015. *Patronal Politics : Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative Perspective*.
- Hankla, Charles R, and Daniel Kuthy. 2013. "Economic Liberalism in Illiberal Regimes: Authoritarian Variation and the Political Economy of Trade." *International Studies Quarterly* 57(3): 492–504.
- Hanson, Stephen E. 2010. *Post-Imperial Democracies: Ideology and Party Formation in Third Republic France, Weimar Germany, and Post-Soviet Russia*. Cambridge University Press.
- Hellman, Joel S. 1998. "Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions." *World politics*: 203–34.
- Helms, Ludger. 2020. "Leadership Succession in Politics: The Democracy/Autocracy Divide Revisited." *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 22(2): 328–46.
- Herb, Michael. 1999. *All in the Family: Absolutism, Revolution, and Democracy in Middle Eastern Monarchies*. Suny Press.
- Herz, John H. 1952. "The Problem of Successorship in Dictatorial Regimes; A Study in Comparative Law and Institutions." *The journal of Politics* 14(1): 19–40.
- Hummel, Sarah. 2020. "Leader Age, Death, and Political Liberalization in Dictatorships." *The Journal of Politics* 82(3): 981–95.
- Kailitz, Steffen, and Daniel Stockemer. 2017. "Regime Legitimation, Elite Cohesion and the Durability of Autocratic Regime Types." *International Political Science Review* 38(3): 332–48.
- Kendall-Taylor, Andrea, and Erica Frantz. 2016. "When Dictators Die." *Journal of Democracy* 27(4): 159–71.
- Kokkonen, Andrej, and Anders Sundell. 2014. "Delivering Stability—Primogeniture and Autocratic Survival in European Monarchies 1000-1800." *American Political Science Review*: 438–53.
- . 2020. "Leader Succession and Civil War." *Comparative Political Studies* 53(3–4): 434–68.
- Kono, Daniel Yuichi. 2015. "Authoritarian Regimes." *The Oxford Handbook of the Political Economy of International Trade*: 298.
- Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter. 2000. "The Constitutional Economics of Autocratic Succession." *Public Choice* 103(1): 63–84.
- Lachapelle, Jean, Steven Levitsky, Lucan A Way, and Adam E Casey. 2020. "Social Revolution and Authoritarian Durability." *World Politics* 72(4): 557–600.

Levitsky, Steven, and Lucan Way. 2013. "The Durability of Revolutionary Regimes." *Journal of Democracy* 24(3): 5–17.

Lust-Okar, Ellen, and Amaney Ahmad Jamal. 2002. "Rulers and Rules: Reassessing the Influence of Regime Type on Electoral Law Formation." *Comparative Political Studies* 35(3): 337–66.

Magaloni, Beatriz. 2008. "Credible Power-Sharing and the Longevity of Authoritarian Rule." *Comparative Political Studies* 41(4–5): 715–41.

Magaloni, Beatriz, and Ruth Kricheli. 2010. "Political Order and One-Party Rule." *Annual review of political science* 13: 123–43.

Markowitz, Lawrence P. 2013. *State Erosion: Unlootable Resources and Unruly Elites in Central Asia*. Cornell University Press.

Pierskalla, Jan H. 2016. "The Politics of Urban Bias: Rural Threats and the Dual Dilemma of Political Survival." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 51(3): 286–307.

Sanderson, Steven E. 1983. "Presidential Succession and Political Rationality in Mexico." *World Politics: A Quarterly Journal of International Relations*: 315–34.

Slater, Dan. 2003. "Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia." *Comparative Politics*: 81–101.

———. 2010. *Ordering Power: Contentious Politics and Authoritarian Leviathans in Southeast Asia*. Cambridge University Press.

Steinberg, David A, and Krishan Malhotra. 2014. "The Effect of Authoritarian Regime Type on Exchange Rate Policy." *World Pol.* 66: 491.

Story, Dale. 1985. "Policy Cycles in Mexican Presidential Politics." *Latin American Research Review* 20(3): 139–61.

Svolik, Milan W. 2012. *The Politics of Authoritarian Rule*. Cambridge; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Tanaka, Seiki. 2018. "Aging Gracefully? Why Old Autocrats Hold Competitive Elections." *Asian Journal of Comparative Politics* 3(1): 81–102.

Thomson, Henry. 2017. "Food and Power: Agricultural Policy under Democracy and Dictatorship." *Comparative Politics* 49(2): 273–96.

———. 2019. *Food and Power: Regime Type, Agricultural Policy, and Political Stability*. Cambridge University Press.

Tullock, Gordon. 2012. *Autocracy*. Springer Science & Business Media.

Wallace, Jeremy. 2013. "Cities, Redistribution, and Authoritarian Regime Survival." *The Journal of Politics* 75(03): 632–45.

Wright, Joseph. 2008. "Do Authoritarian Institutions Constrain? How Legislatures Affect Economic Growth and Investment." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(2): 322–43.

Zeng, Qingjie. 2021. "All Power to the Party! The Sources of Ruling Party Strength in Authoritarian Regimes." *Canadian Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique* 54(1): 186–208.

Ziblatt, Daniel. 2008. "Does Landholding Inequality Block Democratization?: A Test of the 'Bread and Democracy' Thesis and the Case of Prussia." *World Politics* 60: 610–41.