At Home, But Homeless:
Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine Search for Home

Lidia Kuzemska, Lancaster University
lidia.kuzemska@gmail.com

Paper Presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021
Do No Cite Without the Permission of the Author.

Abstract

With more than 1.7 mln IDPs registered since the annexation of Crimea in March 2014 and the outbreak of the military conflict in Donbas shortly afterwards, Ukrainian state is facing an enormous challenge of solving the IDPs crisis. On the one hand, the displaced Ukrainians left the non-Government controlled areas of Donbas (NGCA) to remain in their Homeland Ukraine. On the other hand, almost all of them lost access to owned property, making them effectively homeless within their country. The housing of IDPs remains the most pressing issue as only 11% of IDPs (as of June 2020) reportedly lived in owned accommodation.
The aim of this paper is to show how the displaced Ukrainians from Donbas link Ukrainian institutional HOME to their homes in the non-government controlled areas. I argue that IDPs claim that they have lost and left their homes in Donbas (dwellings) in order to remain within the institutional HOME in Ukraine. This argument helps IDPs to claim being rightfully at home in Ukraine and demand state support in providing alternative housing.The paper is based on ethnographic material collected during 2015-2016 fieldwork in an IDP-hub in Kyiv and on secondary data (Government and media reports, IDP interviews) related to the topic.

Introduction

On a sunny cold February day of 2016, the first Parliamentary hearings regarding the situation of IDPs in Ukraine began in the Ukrainian Parliament. It was an opportunity for IDPs' activists to communicate their most pressing problems to the Members of the Parliament. The Centre of Active Citizen, IDPs' NGO from Dnipropetrovsk, organised a flash mob «Нам нужен дом» ('Nam nuzhen dom' - ru, 'We need a home') in front of the Verkhovna Rada. Around 50 people gathered with the self-made posters:

'*Ukraine is our country*'

'*Ukraine is our common home, why did I become homeless?*'

'*Mum, dad and me – a homeless family*'

IDPs demanded the Members of Parliaments and wider public to pay attention to the pressing issue of housing.[1] Furthermore, they demanded state compensation for their lost houses and the punishment for those responsible for its destruction. These posters reflected that for many IDPs Ukraine as a common 'Homeland' entailed more than a 'feeling', but also very real expectations about the state obligation to look after its citizens, to make them feel 'at home' by providing accommodation &/or by compensating its loss.[2] If a home is usually imagined as a place inhabited by a family, Homeland is considered a shared safe space for its citizens, who constitute a wider family through the myth of common roots and ancestors. The Homeland is also a place for common future, especially communicated by IDP-children on behalf of their family (Огаркова, 2015).

Finding decent and affordable housing remains a challenge for IDPs. According to the latest IOM National Monitoring System Report (IOM, 2020: 21), 60% of IDPs lived in rented accommodation, 17% was hosted by family/relatives, 7% lived in state-provided accommodation (dormitories and collective centers), whereas only 11% of IDPs lived in their own housing. Less than half of IDPs (42%) were aware of state housing programs for IDPs, out of them half (45%) could afford to pay no more than UAH 5000 ($180) as monthly mortgage installments. The state housing programs

[1] The video from the protest can be seen here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OOC0qy2h_yM&feature=youtu.be&list=PLN_x1Bv97O596nLfg7nHAPVsFSDN90pUF (Last accessed April 18, 2021).

[2] As of February 2019, around 50 thousand civilian houses (including multifamily ones) have been destroyed or damaged since 2014 from both sides of the contact line. In addition, a lot of civilian property and land has been used by the Ukrainian army and separatist forces. There is no compensation for the unregulated military use of civilian property so far (Науменко, 2020).

require the IDPs either have sufficient savings to co-purchase their new housing together with the state (Affordable Housing Program with 50/50 payments between the state and IDPs) or enough monthly earnings to cover the commercial mortgage payments for the next 30 years.[3] This option is only available for young IDPs younger than 35. Considering the level of state funding, even the qualifying IDPs would be waiting for years until they purchase new homes.[4] However, to put things into perspective, the access of IDPs to state housing programs was only guaranteed in 2017. Before that IDPs had to make their claim for being included into subsidized programs together with other Ukrainians. I will cover some of the steps and struggles IDPs took to increase their chances for decent housing in Ukraine.

Without permanent housing, IDPs have an abberant status. They are citizens, but in a refugee-like situation. They resettle within their country, but loose their permanent dwellings in the occupied territories. IDPs remain within the institutional HOME of their state, but are displaced away from their property. **The aim of this paper is to show how the displaced Ukrainians from Donbas link Ukrainian institutional HOME to their homes in the non-government controlled areas. I argue that IDPs claim they have lost and left their homes in Donbas (dwellings) in order to remain HOME in Ukraine. This argument helps IDPs to claim being rightfully at home in Ukraine and demand state support in providing alternative housing.**

There is a growing literature on experiences of IDPs in Ukraine since 2014 that discusses various aspects of IDPs' struggles with finding accommodation after displacement, state responses to displacement, and IDPs strategies to make themselves at home in Ukraine (Bulakh, 2018, 2020; Charron, 2020; Ferris, Mamutov, Moroz, & Vynogradova, 2015; Ivashchenko-Stadnik, 2015; Klinova, 2014; Krakhmalova, 2019; Kuznetsova, 2020; Kuznetsova & Mikheieva, 2018; Kuznetsova, Mikheieva, Gulyieva, Dragneva, & Mykhnenko, 2018; McNeil, 2020; Mikheieva, 2019; Mikheieva & Sereda, 2015; Mooney, 2016; Nidzvetska et al., 2017; Quintanilla, Parafeniuk, & Moroz, 2015; Rimpiläinen, 2017, 2020; Sasse & Lackner, 2019; Sasse,

[3] The socioeconomic profile of first 60 IDPs families who benefited from the Affordable Housing Program in 2018 demonstrates that they have comparatively high income, high level of economic activity and a high level of education. They also had previous savings. More details available at https://www.unhcr.org/ua/wp-content/uploads/sites/38/2019/02/2019-UNHCR-Evaluation-of-State-Youth-Fund-Housing-Programme-Final-Report.UKR_.pdf (Last accessed April 18, 2021).

[4] For instance, in 2020, there was no funding provided in the state budget for the Affordable Housing program. See more at https://www.molod-kredit.gov.ua/zhytlovi-prohramy/dostupne-zhytlo/statystyka (Last accessed April 18, 2021).

2017, 2020; Sereda, 2015, 2016, 2020; Soroka, 2016; Uehling, 2017; 2020; Zavadovska, 2016).

This paper contributes to the debate by analyzing why IDPs feel homeless in Ukraine in a double way – as loosing their dwellings ('small homes') and as being abandoned by their Ukrainian institutional HOME that cannot provide them with decent housing. The paper is structured as follows. After a brief note on methodology, the first section of the paper discusses how IDPs claim that Ukraine is their Homeland. In the second section, I explore the difficult choice for IDPs between leaving their houses behind in the occupied Donbas and moving to the government-controlled areas. The third section provides a discussion on how IDPs claim that they are homeless in their country without state provision of housing support. In the fourth section, I look at why IDPs were 'homing' public space during 'Party in the house' protest before concluding that claims to Ukrainian institutional HOME give IDPs the right to seek compensation for their lost dwellings in occupied Donbas.

Note on Methodology

This conference paper is based on data collected during 2015-2016 ethnographic fieldwork in Ukrainian capital Kyiv. I worked as a volunteer in an IDP-hub, conducted interviews with the IDPs, who visited the hub and participated in IDP-related events that took place in Kyiv at the time of my fieldwork. In this paper, I also use secondary data (Governmental and IOM reports, media reportages and IDPs' interviews) relevant for the topic of the paper.

At HOME in Ukraine

> *We are children of Ukraine, children of this land. (We are) Ordinary people, who became hostages of the conflict we did not choose. We left our homes because our lives were in danger. We saw with our own eyes our friends dying, and our towns and villages being destroyed… We are internally displaced people, who left our homes, but this does not make us different. We were, and are, citizens of Ukraine. We do not ask the state for anything more than our right to live and to be treated the same as others.* (Photo exhibition of IDPs in Kyiv, November 2015 at St. Sofia square).

This quote is framed as a collective plea from IDPs for recognition as rightful citizens of Ukraine not demanding 'anything more' than equal treatment, and asking for being accepted into the safety of Homeland Ukraine, when their 'small' homes – 'towns and

villages' – were ruined by the conflict. In addition, this excerpt constructs Donbasians as part of the national family – 'we are children of Ukraine', albeit vulnerable and powerless 'hostages' of political developments they 'did not choose'. This reference to the lack of choice tries to subtly answer a common reproach people from Donbas experience for 'inviting President Putin and Russian troops'[5] to their home in Donbas through 'referenda' in May 2014, which led to the establishment of the self-proclaimed 'DNR/LNR'. Another important emphasis here is the claim that displacement from their 'small homeland' does not affect IDPs belonging to 'big Homeland' Ukraine. This claim is not only about the equality of the displaced to other Ukrainians, but a political claim about Donbas – known for its comparatively strong regional identity (Mikheieva in Klinova, 2014) – being part of 'this land' Ukraine. The quote above is an illustration of how the construction of 'home', 'Homeland', and belonging enables IDPs to make not only personal but also political claims.

Stefansson distinguishes between 'small' and 'big' home taking the example of Bosnians returning to their houses – 'small home' – that they had been forced to flee during the Balkan war with the Serbs (Stefansson, 2006). Despite the restoration of their property rights and return of their 'small homes', the wider social context in Bosnia changed dramatically. The ethnic composition of the population, gender roles, urbanisation, and other important elements of the 'big home' transformed the place into a new country. This discrepancy between the apparent desire to come back to old dwelling as an ideal solution to the displacement trauma, and the actual situation in a wider social milieu surrounding it, demonstrated that much anticipated homecomings were impossible for the displaced. The social context of 'big home' changed beyond minor changes in 'small home' (Stefansson, 2004). I use Stefansson's distinction between the 'small' and the 'big' homes in a slightly modified way to show that 'big' home in the case of Ukrainian IDPs is the presence of Ukrainian state institutions. In the now occupied areas of Donbas, the lack of Ukrainian institutional HOME – familiar legal framework; well-known, albeit not always efficient, state institutes on the ground – was one of the reasons to resettle to other regions of Ukraine.

Easthope defines home as a '*particularly significant kind of place with which and within which we experience strong social, psychological, and emotive*

[5] Heated debates about the level of responsibility of the Donbasians for the beginning of the armed conflict are visible in commentaries in social media, public discussions, and are one of the polarising topics for contemporary Ukraine. (See for example discussions here Возьняк, 2014; Дроздов, 2014; Сич, 2016; Стецьків, 2015).

attachment' (Easthope cited in Brun & Fábos, 2015: 6). The research on various aspects of 'home' in relation to the displaced people across the globe is rich, covering various aspects of home-making idea(l)s, practices, policies of homing, material, spatial and temporal dimensions of home.[6] Home is often associated with such attributes as familiarity, security, control; and optionally privacy, freedom, creativity, and stability (Mallett, 2004). The emotional dimension of the feeling *of* home and *at* home is important for the IDPs from Donbas. Legal citizenship does not imply one feels at home in the country, but it is central for IDPs' claims for belonging to Ukraine (Sereda, 2020). The public expression and negotiation of feelings that Ukraine is their home and they can rightfully feel at home anywhere in Ukraine, add to the claims of recognition as rightful Ukrainians citizens. Why is feeling at home in Ukraine is significant?

The 'feeling of being Ukrainian' is the most important feature defining a citizen for Ukrainians. It ranks higher than legal, residential or ethnolinguistic markers of Ukrainianness, such as having Ukrainian citizenship, living in Ukraine for most of one's life, speaking Ukrainian, having Ukrainian origins or being born in Ukraine.[7] IDPs' claims for recognition at home in Ukraine are well-grounded in public opinion. According to the national representative survey conducted in 2018 by the Institute of Sociology of Ukraine, 71.3% of Ukrainians agreed that IDPs from Donbas consider themselves citizens of Ukraine with the same rights and obligations as other Ukrainians (*Ставлення населення України*, 2018). The Euromaidan and armed conflict in Donbas contributed to the growing awareness and attachment of resettled Donbasians to Ukraine as their Homeland. Sasse & Lackner (2018: 145) documented that in 2016, 32.1% of IDPs reported 'feeling more Ukrainian' as a result of the events

[6] The importance of home in migration and for migratnts have generated a broad range of studies (Boccagni, 2014; Boccagni & Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2021; Boccagni & Kusenbach, 2020; Boccagni & Vargas-silva, 2021; Brun & Fábos, 2015; Jansen, 2007; Kabachnik, Regulska, & Mitchneck, 2010; Ray, 2000; Selimovic & Strömbom, 2015; Seshadri, 2008; Stefanovic, Loizides, & Parsons, 2014; Stefansson, 2004, 2006; Stepputat, 2008).

[7] These are the results of the representative survey of 6000 participants, conducted in 2015 by two influential sociological centers 'Sotsioinform' and 'Rating'. Researchers have also analysed citizenship practices considered as the most important for 'being Ukrainian'. Again, everyday enactment of being Ukrainian citizen (respecting political institutions and defending Ukraine, solidarity, mutual help and respect to other Ukrainians) were ranked higher than any ethnolinguistic Ukrainian origins. These results show that the emotional component of citizenship and horizontal relations between citizens are essential in a comprehensive view on belonging, which the notion of 'home' captures by emphasising 'familiality' within national space. Region, nation, and beyond: comparative results of 2013 and 2015 survey. Survey infographics derives from the project by the University of St. Gallen. Available at https://drive.google.com/file/d/0B5LMB-RQh_SUM1VHSXd2dWVBMm8/view (Last accessed April 18, 2021).

2013-2016 (Euromaidan, war, and displacement).[8] Similarly, 35.9% of IDPs felt more like Ukrainian citizens, 7.3% felt less like Ukrainian citizens and 56.8% said they did not feel any change in their self-identification as Ukrainian citizens (Sasse & Lackner, 2018: 150).[9] So, Euromaidan, armed conflict in Donbas, and the experience of forced relocation significantly influenced the Homeland and citizenship claims of Donbasians.

The effects of displacement journeys are profoundly formative and transformative (Benezer & Zetter, 2014: 303), and the (unexpectedly long) experience of displacement influences self-understanding and self-positioning of displaced persons. IDPs construct themselves either as still belonging or no longer belonging to their place of displacement or as having multiple belongings. For IDPs in Ukraine, the notion of home gained a wider perspective and encompasses the national level. Ukraine as a national home is increasingly relevant for IDPs as it allows them to reconcile their abandoned places of origin and current residence through the increased attachment to citizenship and to feeling of Ukraine being their Homeland.

Leaving home to remain HOME

Ukraine as an institutional and legal order has been perceived by IDPs as a more predictable, familiar environment. Even though the armed conflict in Ukraine had no substantial ethnic, linguistic or religious background, for some IDP groups Ukraine as HOME and a destination of displacement was the only viable option. I am referring here to ethnic (Roma, Jews) and religious minorities (Protestants, Catholics, eastern religions), LGBTQ persons, HIV-positive people, or those who were dependent on state provision of life-saving therapies for i.e. drug addiction, kidney dialysis, families with children (Nidzvetska et al., 2017; Quinn, 2015). Some of them had to flee for the fear of potential (albeit very real) danger of persecution in the self-proclaimed republics (Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, 2015a, 2015b), where

[8] 14.5% reported ‘feeling more both Ukrainian and Russian’, and only 3% ‘feeling more Russian’. Over half of the respondents did not report any change in their personal identity between 2014 and 2016. Having Ukrainian as their native language or a language spoken at home contributed to the higher chance of positive change towards feeling more Ukrainian comparing to those, who have mixed Russian and Ukrainian as their native or spoken at home languages. Native Russophones or people with Russian being the main language spoken at home were the least likely to report start feeling more Ukrainian in 2016. (Sasse & Lackner, 2018: 145-146).

[9] The lack of change should not be misleading as in 2016, out of every 10 IDPs-respondents, who chose ‘Ukrainian citizen’ as their primary identity, approximately 8 reported they would have chosen the same in 2011. For the remaining 2 out of 10 in 2011, their local and regional identity, and less so the ethnic origin, were primary (Sasse & Lackner, 2018: 151-152).

the new legal order was a mixture of anti-Western, anti-liberal and anti-Semitic ideology based on Russian orthodoxy, conservatism, and violent repressions of 'traitors' (Laruelle, 2015). Some had to flee the quickly degrading economic and security situations with a practically non-existent rule of law or social policies' provisions, especially families with children (Nidzvetska et al., 2017; Quinn, 2015). Some individuals under the state care in orphanages, hospices, and prisons were also transferred (and sometimes they asked to do so) to the GCA of Ukraine (Печончик, 2015).

The maintenance of ties to the Ukrainian institutional HOME remained important for the Donbasians who had to stay at the NGCA as well. For instance, the issuance of Ukrainian official documentation was a topic of a long advocacy campaign and a source of frustration for the Donbasians (Mikheieva, 2019). The absence of Ukrainian legal order had been felt in Donbas even on the level of availability of banking operation, access to some medicine, and even food supply. During my fieldwork in the hub, we often received phone calls from people in NGCA asking for specific medicines to be bought by the volunteers that would be later smuggled to the NGCA, because there was nowhere to buy them in the occupied Donbas, and the medicine, previously provided by the state, would be too costly for individuals to purchase on a regular basis. Leaving or staying in Donbas for some Donbasians became a question of life and death. The lack of Ukrainian institutional HOME left a void that affected 'small homes' of Ukrainians, it often led to the dissolution of families.

Valia, an IDP from Luhansk, shared with me that her mother was supposed to start her cancer treatment in summer 2014. Her doctors left the city soon after that, and she had to decide where to go for the treatment – to Kyiv or to Russia. She chose going to Russia where her doctors moved and hoped to be included in the subsidised treatment program. Despite the fact that her pro-Ukrainian daughter left to Kyiv and started working in an IDP organisation, the choice for the mother and father was directed by entirely different reasoning. Because of Valia's low public profile (she didn't publish much of her volunteer activity online, otherwise, the Russian authorities might have stopped her at the border), she was still able to visit her parents in Saint Petersburg once every year, with no talks about politics.

For those who could not adapt to life in the self-proclaimed 'republics' – many IDPs described them as 'the return of 1990s with elements of 1930s' with the deficit

of produce, lawlessness and political represssions[10] – they had to leave their 'small' homes and move to their 'big' HOME Ukraine. This forceful choice is represented by a banner at the entrance to the IDP hub I was working with. The banner reads "*Залишити дім, щоб залишитись вдома*" ('*Zalyshyty dim, shchob zalyshytys vdoma'* – ua, 'To leave [one's] home/house[11] [in order] to remain home' When I asked a voluntter about the meaning of this banner, a 24-year-old Kira from the now occupied city of Toretsk - former teacher of Russian language and literature at school – told me her story of displacement that illustrates the tranformative role of displacement journey from 'small home' to 'big HOME'.

After the beginning of fighting between the Ukrainian army and pro-Russian separatists in late spring 2014, Kira was vocal about her stand in favor of Ukraine. She was arguing with her colleagues at work, with her neighbors and even her parents. Her name became known to the separatists and one day she was warned by a friend that they might come to take her from her house. Fortunately, her divorced parents have previously moved to Russia for work (long before 2014), so she had no fear for their lives. After the warning, Kira packed a few essentials into a small bag and left Toretsk by bus to Russia. She thought separatists would not expect her to go in that direction. In a couple of hours, she reached Novorossijsk – a big city in southern Russia, where her father – former *Markscheider*[12] was living after escaping Donbas in late 1990 because of mafia wars.[13] She couldn't stop herself from arguing with the locals about what was happening in her native Donbas. Kira was adamant that there was no civil war, whereas local Russians were convinced that the nationalist government in Kyiv

---

[10] Fieldnotes, March 17,18, 21 2016. The 1990s in Donbas (and overall in Ukraine) were a time of rapid rise of criminality, dispossession and impoverishment of working people, and a period of political instability. Journalist Denis Kazansky describes the 1990s as the time when Donbas became a place of criminal neofeudalism (Казанський, 2013), sociologist Georgii Korzhov has similar opinion describing power relations in Donbas in 1990s as a feudal rule of force, not rule of law (Коржов, 2006). The late 1930s in the USSR, including Donbas, were a time of mass purges and deportations by the Soviet regime against suspected 'traitors.

[11] Дім – ua (*dim*), can be translated as both 'a house' and 'home'.

[12] *Markscheider* – mine surveyor. The German original name of the profession is used in Russian and Ukrainian languages. It dates back to Tsarist Russia times when engineers were predominantly foreign nationals invited to develop new industries. The term is familiar to Donbas region dwellers; it was unknown to me before talking to Kira.

[13] In Ukraine, Donbas has been considered as a region with a complicated criminal situation throughout its history (Васін, 2015; Коржов, 2006). It did have the highest per capita prisons and prisoners in Ukraine, and the lowest level of the HDI among its regions. Due to specific migration patterns, the nature of industrial work and culture, and because of 'wild privatisation' in the 1990s when mafia clans has been competing for control over resources in the region, Donbas gained its infamous reputation reinforced by President Viktor Yanukovych – himself convicted twice for criminal offenses and his abusive rule (Iakovlenko, 2017).

was trying to punish the Russian-speaking population in Donbas for failing to Ukrainianise. Kira was not a supporter of Ukrainian nationalists at all. Yet, she said '*I felt so offended for Ukraine that became this f...ing Novorossiya*'. Her pro-Russian father sent her to Kira's mother in Moscow. Kira argued with the landlady for watching the Russian TV with pro-Putin propaganda. They had to vacate the place very soon. Kira argued in the metro, on the streets with people who were collecting help and money for pro-Russian soldiers in Donbas. Finally, Kira's mother sent her back to Ukraine telling her that '*you don't know how to keep her mouth shut, we will be in trouble with you here*'. Laughingly, she admitted: *'It was at this moment that I understood that I am a patriot, even though the majority told me that I am an idiot'*.

Kira's need to freely speak out her mind, to defend her stand, to oppose opinions she didn't support, forced her to leave her house, her city, her family. She came back to Ukraine making a detour in Russia understanding that her home was in Ukraine. Kira decided she belongs *to* Ukraine *with* other Ukrainians despite her family and friends remaining in the NGCA or in Russia. The displacement experience highlighted to Kira her political stance and her identity as Ukrainian. Similarly, Regulska et al. (2010), describing the case of IDPs in Georgia, stress that IDPs' identity is grounded in places of displacement. The loss of that place plays an important role in the construction of displaced people's identities. For Kira, her national belonging became more prominent, whereas her family, regional belonging became secondary.

People facing their belonging being questioned, especially by the powerful institutional actors, have to articulate their stance on who they are and where do they feel they belong. Belonging is, therefore, politicised and contested even though in its core it is the emotional attachment, feeling safe and 'at home' (Yuval-Davis, 2006: 197). Apparent simplicity and privacy of belonging are inherently connected to the politics of belonging. Its dynamic nature emanating from the continuous interplay between self-identification and identification by others, its' simultaneously lack of concrete and measurable criteria, and yet a very real, practical implications of its enactments by individuals, provide us with an analytical concept that is potentially immensely productive but challenging to study.

Kira's laughter that being Ukrainian patriot meant being 'an idiot' in the eyes of her parents allowed her to lessen the emotional burden of choice between 'small home' and 'big HOME', to downplay the fear and shame of being rejected by her family. Further, it demonstrated that the discrepancy between self-identification and

identification by the others might feel inexplicable. Being perceived as 'an idiot' by the pro-Russian parents mitigated their fear and shame of having pro-Ukrainian 'patriot' daughter. Kira's invalidated feeling of Ukrainian patriotism in the NGCA and in Russia became 'legitimate' and desirable once she moved to Kyiv. Within the framework of Ukrainian HOME, her personal emotions were considered an expression of her political stance, they were encouraged to be publicly expressed, shared, and embodied. Apart from few studies about the mental health of IDPs (Kuznestsova, Mikheieva, Catling, Round, & Babenko, 2019; McNeil, 2020), IDPs emotions are understudied. If we think about home as a safe place, where people can freely express their emotions, including 'undesirable' ones, then Ukrainian institutional HOME expected from IDPs' to show 'legitimate' emotions (gratitude, hope, optimism, patriotism). It preferred to ignore the undesirable IDPs' emotions (disappointment, frustration, anxiety) and would punish those considered threatening (betrayal, revenge, separation), this is why IDPs did not publicly express these emotions. The state is policing the emotions of its citizens, especially considering that the intimate became geopolitical (Barabantseva, Mhurchú, & Peterson, 2021), when some Ukrainian citizens in Donbas felt emotionally closer to Russia, resulting in external aggression and instigated separatism. Emotional disunity of Ukrainian nation played a significant role in undermining its safety (Mhurchú, 2021: 412).

Between HOME and homelessness

Kira' example of emotional loss and choice between 'small' and 'big' home is tightly connected to painful material choices. Ukraine as a legal and institutional HOME, aimed to guarantee citizenship rights, is also a framework for the protection of citizens' private property. IDPs, who lost their 'small homes' – houses, apartments, allotments, possessions – became homeless, so they were expecting that Ukrainian institutional HOME will compensate them the losses. There was a mountain of dissapointment and another cause for political mobilisation.

'*I became homeless. No belongings, no house, no job, no chance to see my family […] The first time, these were Russian bandits that took our home [Donbas]. The second time, it was our state that took our hope to return home*', said Bogdan Chaban, a young IDP from Donetsk (Чабан, 2015). Chaban's anger towards the Ukrainian state, which did not protect his home and abandoned it, is the foundation for his comparison to be literally homelessness in his home country. Chaban feels

homeless because he lost his house and lost his feeling of being at home in Ukrainian Donbas. It is now an unsafe place occupied by the 'Russian bandits'. However, he doesn't' feel at home in Ukraine either, he feels hopeless and unsupported by the state before and after displacement. The feeling of homelessness was widespread among my research participants, who felt they lost not only their dwellings, but also their stability and familiarity with their native place; Donbas became unrecognisable. This loss of home in Donbas was one of the factors that mobillised IDPs to voice their rightful presence on Ukrainian territory as any other Ukrainian citizens.

One day a 50-year-old Yuriy came to the Hub for a legal consultation. He owned two houses in the NGCA, one next to Donetsk airport and another one in Horlivka. Both burned down due to heavy fighting. Yuriy said he had already written to Ukrainian top officials, including the Prime Minister, the Ombudsman, Ministers, he reached the Human Rights Watch and initiated a lawsuit in the European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) for the lost property compensation. He was complaining that in Ukraine there is 'zero possibility' that something will change:

> *'Nobody needs anything; the only hope is the ECHR. What kind of state is this? We have laws, but no implementation mechanisms. Why don't Ukraine put a lawsuit against Russia for compensation, they should pay us a contribution! There is a war going between the West and Russia, so we can claim any sum of money. But even if they (the West) give it (to Ukraine), they will steal it (referring to corruption in Ukrainian institutions)' (Fieldnotes, November 17, 2015).*

Yuriy was confident about his rightfulness as a citizen who lost his property due to the state's inability to protect his possessions and fulfill its part of the social contract between the state and its citizens. He was determined to contribute his share to the improvement of Ukraine's legal order by bringing it to international justice, which otherwise is deadlocked by internal corruption and international geopolitics. Furthermore, Yuriy expressed his view on how IDPs should be rightfully treated by the state while describing how his friend left for Croatia, received asylum and was given a 3-bedroom apartment, EU passport, and all the benefits, whereas here, in Ukraine, Yuriy cannot even receive an assessment from the police about his lost property. *'Does this kind of country has the right to exist? It is a madhouse ("дурдом")'*. This emotional comparison expressed Yuriy's anger and despair about

the apparent 'chaos' in Ukrainian institutional HOME, which undermined the very reason for the country to exist.

Yuriy's understanding of how IDPs could have been welcomed in Ukraine, in *their own* country – with state provision of accommodation and financial support – contrasted with the reality the majority of IDPs faced. Even though at that moment his claims sounded like a 'state of fantasy' (Rose, 1996) of the 'ideal' homecoming for IDPs from the state (Stefansson, 2004), he as a citizen had reasonable expectations about his rights being safeguarded by the state. He legally resided and owned property in Ukraine, paid taxes to support the state apparatus. Yuriy was forced to resettled within the borders of his country and expected his social contract with the state would be honored. His profound disappointment expressed in his 'madhouse' comparison reflected how the absence or the break of 'rule of the game', expected from the state, might make it irrelevant for the citizens, and result in open or hidden desire to find another legal order (i.e. Croatia) where the social contract between citizens (or immigrants) and the state holds.

For example, on another occasion, during a meeting with one foreign Minister for IDPs from a Caucasian country, one Ukrainian IDP – a middle age woman - expressed her exasperation with the housing situation for IDPs in Ukraine. *'Everybody want to live like humans ("як люди"), even if in a (dog) kennel, but in your own!'*; and then she added frustrated: '*whereas, I have two apartments left at home'* (in Donbas). Her emotions of bitterness and anger over the lack of appropriate accommodation, expressed in contrasting that even dogs have their own kennel, whereas IDPs don't have a place to live, powerfully show the centrality of home for IDPs' claims for recognition. These claims are reinforced by the reference to property left 'at home'. She then asked the foreign Minister: '*would you take me to your (country) as a refugee («примите меня беженцем к себе» - ru)?*' implying that she will be better protected in that foreign country than she is treated as a citizen of Ukraine.

Disappointment with the state's inaction in making IDPs feel 'at home' in Ukraine raised a question (albeit predominantly rhetorical[14]) about the choice of alternative HOME - emigration. If spoken, as in the case of Yuriy, it might have

[14] In 2014-2015, UNHCR estimated 1mln Ukrainians were seeking asylum in neighboring countries https://www.unrefugees.org/emergencies/ukraine/ During 2017-2019, only 1-2% of IDPs were planning to actually seek asylum abroad (IOM, 2019).

sparked accusations of unpatriotic feelings. After he left the office, one of the IDP-volunteers, herself owner of three apartments left in Luhansk, who was hardly holding her anger about his accusations towards Ukraine, commented: '*So why didn't you leave for Croatia yourself*?' In her eyes, despite being grounded, Yuriy's feelings of anger, despise, and harsh criticism towards Ukraine, were interpreted as unpatriotic, treacherous, and selfish.

Yuriy's fight for material 'homes' and compensation at the expense of criticising 'Homeland' was to a certain extent incomprehensible to volunteers, who had to flee Donbas predominantly for political reasons – their expressed pro-Ukrainian stand in 2014. In the Hub, many volunteers considered the loss of their physical 'homes' a lesser price to pay for being able to support their 'Homeland' with their activity. This included the provision of help and support to IDPs with different political opinions, where their personal political activist identity had to give precedence to their human rights and humanitarian worker's identity. The phrase I have heard numerous times from various officials, volunteers, and activists: '*IDPs are different*.' Different were their perceptions of home and its loss, where they belong, and why. It is yet important to note that despite his anger and disbelief, Yuriy decided that legal order of Ukraine was a more familiar space for him to navigate his way and provided better chances for rebuilding and reclaiming his lost property in Donbas taking into account Ukraine's international obligations. In his case, 'Homeland' provided him with a legal pathway to (international) justice. However, his case is illustrative that even within IDPs' community the views on who rightfully belongs (legally and affectively) or does not belong to Ukraine with other Ukrainians are not homogenous. Ukraine's legal limbo for IDPs in their first year of displacement regarding their future and the future of their region, their 'homes', and 'Homeland' put them in a situation of 'in-between-ness'. Many thus focused on the everyday objectives of securing their right to lawfully reside in Ukraine and secure the accommodation – the basis for integration into local communities.

The majority of IDPs traded off their houses in Donbas for staying in Ukraine, but the same trade off undermined their rightful membership in Ukrainian community. The feeling Ukraine being their 'Homeland' did not compensate for the lack of owned dwelling. Five years after displacement, 73% of IDPs continued to live in their new place of residence for more than three years, so the majority of IDPs moved once and stayed (*National Monitoring System: Report on the situation of Internally Displaced*

Persons, 2019: 32). Time and continuity of residence in safe, familiar and orderly place significantly strengthen the feeling of being at home (Boccagni & Vargas-silva, 2021: 12). Between 2017-2019, around half of IDP's, surveyed in the IOM Monitoring, answered positively about their self-assessment on being integrated into their new local community; and a third said they are partly integrated.[15] The length of residence is also contributing to the growing sense of local belonging of IDPs. Almost two-thirds of IDPs (61%) reported that they trust locals in their new local community, and the trend is positive over the last years. Similarly, the self-reported sense of belonging to a community in the current place of residence is slowly increasing with simultaneous slow, but steady decrease in the sense of belonging to the former place of residence in Donbas (*National Monitoring System: Report on the situation of Internally Displaced Persons*, 2019: 44**)**. Local belonging as a growing feeling of being a recognised member of the local community is an important indication for IDPs' feeling at home. This trend might facilitate them to take the next step, namely, to become owners of property and participants with a political voice on the local and national levels.

Searching for home in public

Finding home, however, was not easy for the IDPs. Housing was one of the major spheres of perceived discrimination by the IDPs (*National Monitoring System: Report on the situation of Internally Displaced Persons*, 2019: 45). Numerous reports of human rights NGOs describe hesitant attitudes of landlords about renting places to IDPs (Виртосу, 2015; Гайворонська, 2015). These renting challenges arose due to the complex mixture of suspicions about the insufficient financial means of IDPs, their mobility plans, fears of property requisition, and sometimes open discrimination towards people from Donbas. The gradual shift from compassion to fatigue regarding the IDPs, negative stereotypes about them and the growing marginalization of war-affected Ukrainians resulted in dwindling support; which, in turn, led to the phenomenon of 'shuttling IDPs' and returnees to the non-government controlled areas (Pikulicka-Wilczewska & Uehling, 2017). To counteract open or hidden discrimination from the state and fellow citizens, some IDPs chose to engage in

[15] Only one in ten IDPs did not feel integrated. The highest levels of self-reported integration were in Kyiv and Central and Southern regions of Ukraine, whereas the lowest in Easter region and the GCA of Donbas in particular (Ibid: 41). Assumingly, IDPs residing in the proximity to their places of origin were still hoping for a return soon or had more possibilities to visit their homes in the NGCA frequently.

creative citizenship practices, that would allow them to publicly claim their membership in Ukrainian 'home' through staged ownership of public places. As Uehling (2017: 267) noted, war-affected Ukrainians are reclaiming their freedom of choice by holding onto the little agency that is left for them. What if, they twist their 'home routine' and transform it into political action?

In September 2017, an IDP from Makieievka (Donetsk region) Yulia Driuk-Illiashenko, the head of an NGO "Мой Дом ЮА" ('My Home UA') began a hunger strike in front of the Cabinet of Ministers' building in Kyiv to raise attention to housing problems of IDPs. Joined by other IDPs, she was protesting against the state postponing passing the law #1954 for the state provision of accommodation for IDPs. Her hunger strike lasted for 4 days. However, it did not result in any concrete steps being taken by the Government. Her plea was ignored, but IDPs, mostly women, did not give up and changed the format of the protest. They decided to domesticate the public space in front of the Governmental building by organising 'Party in the house' ("Party на хаті" (- ua) or «Вечеринка на дому» (- ru)).[16] Wearing their home clothes, '*в халатах і тапочках'* (*v khalatach i tapochkakh'* (- ua), 'in their gowns and slippers') lying on *розкладушка (rozkladushka (-ua),* portable camp-cot) women IDPs brought attention to their continuous struggle in establishing homes after resettlement. *'My home is Ukraine! We want to live in own houses in Ukraine!!! It's our dream but not of Government of Ukraine'* (reproduced here as on original English-language banner). It is noteworthy, that this staged appropriation of public space as home was made by women IDPs. 'Feminine' domestic space was recreated with the use of personal attributes of home clothes and accessories to make political claims of recognition as Ukrainians and as owners of the property. In this case, home - a site of struggle for recognition of IDPs as rightful citizens-members and citizens-owners, performed by women-IDPs - is poignant in demonstrating that 'the personal is the political' and vice versa (Gorton, 2007: 335; Yuval-Davis, 1997a). The protestors indicated that Governmental political plans are preventing them from realising their dreams of having a house and feeling at home in Ukraine. Paradoxically, by sitting publicly on their camp-cots, protestors were, in fact, "getting up of the coach" refusing to rely on the status quo of state IDPs policies and making themselves citizens responsible for their own wellbeing (Uehling, 2020: 12).

[16]. Photo and video footage of the protest available at https://www.radiosvoboda.org/a/28747032.html (Last accessed February 2020).

The protest did result in the Government passing the necessary decrees to start the state program to fund the Affordable Housing program for IDPs even with delays of funding until October 2018. In principle, IDPs meeting set criteria are entitled to 50% reimbursement by the state of the cost of housing they buy within the Affordable Housing state program.[17] In practice, state funding is scarce, but the program is considered a framework to attract international donors' funding and even private donors.[18] As of August 2019, 310 families of IDPs (1150 persons) have received a pathway to their hosing with the help of the state programs.[19] To note again, there was zero funding for the program in 2020. 310 families is, however, a fraction of existing demand for personally owned accommodation among IDPs.[20] Even though 'The Party in the House' was a partially successful demonstration of IDPs' agency in reclaiming their 'small homes' from the Ukrainian institutional HOME, very small proportion of financially independent and younger IDPs can, in fact, benefit form the state new housing programs. The most vulnerable IDPs, such as pensioners, people with disabilities, unemployed or with war traumas, predominantly returned to live in the NGCA, forced to leave their HOME to come back to live in their 'small homes' (Kuznetsova & Mikheieva, 2020). The socioeconomic inequalities between IDPs exacerbated how much at home they could feel in Ukrainian institutional HOME. For these war-affected Ukrainians, there is very little chance of owning their own accommodation after displacement.

Conclusion

For IDPs, the construction of 'home' is more than a housing issue. The displaced Ukrainians make themselves rightful citizens by highlighting that Ukraine is their Homeland, they purposefully chose Ukrainian institutional HOME over their lost homes in the NGCA. IDPs' statements - we are at home in Ukraine – allow them to

---

[17]The description of the 'Affordable Housing' program by the Deputy PM of Ukraine available: https://www.kmu.gov.ua/ua/news/gennadij-zubko-mi-kardinalno-zminili-programu-dostupne-zhitlo-zrobili-yiyi-dijsno-dostupnoyu-ta-efektivnoyu (Last accessed February 2020)

[18] For example, in August 2020, Germany allocated EUR 25.5bln for housing credit program for approximately 5000 IDPs in Ukraine. https://www.eurointegration.com.ua/news/2020/06/3/7110687/ (Last accessed August 2020)

[19] This information was reported by Serhii Kimnatnyj – the head of the State Youth Housing Fund. See more at https://gazeta.ua/articles/settlers/_rozpovili-skilki-pereselenciv-zabezpechili-vlasnim-zhitlom/922241 (last accessed February 2020). See also Report of the Ministry for Temporary Occupied Territories and IDPs for 2016-2019. Available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=54&v=_f7QaEhWXf0 (Last accessed August 2020).

[20] According to IOM Monitoring, the number of IDPs reporting to live in personally owned housing in GCA increased from 1% in March 2017 to 14% in March 2019 (IOM, 2019).

claim to obtain ‘home’ (property and residence) in Ukraine (to be given a new or given back a lost one), and to feel at home in Ukraine as rightful citizens. The link between IDPs’ claim for belonging to Ukraine with the notion of ‘home’ provides IDPs with a deeper level of legitimisation. IDPs frame Ukraine as a common HOME appealing to the legal order, where the state is responsible for the protection of its citizens and the protection of the legal order, their right for private property, security and all the other citizenship rights. Ukraine as institutional HOME provides IDPs with a wider notion of home, when Donbas as a place of return is no longer available for many IDPs. Ukraine is not an alternative, but a legitimate explanation and justification why Donbas as their native region and as their property location is lost for them, at least for now.

IDPs seek to achieve a number of objectives by appealing to Ukraine as their home. First, they protect their citizenship rights for lost, present, and potential future homes (in a sense of both accommodation and accompanying material and immaterial rights). Second, IDPs build solidarity with other Ukrainians through the common concept of Homeland.

Considering the growing number of Ukrainians from Donbas who are now the Russian passport holders (Kuznetsova, 2020), the issue where will they feel at home will be more blurred. De jure, belonging to two institutional HOMES with their ‘small homes’ in the non-government controlled Donbas caught in-between, leave the room for policy interventions that can attract more people to resettle to either Ukraine or Russia. However, the reportedly growing distance between Ukraine and its occupied territory of Donbas (O’Loughlin, Sasse, Toal, & Bakke, 2021), exacerbated by the Covid-19 travel restrictions, deepen the abyss in everyday life. IDPs hurdles to leave their ‘small homes’ to remain HOME in Ukraine had mixed results. Socioeconomic inequalities and political affiliations affected how much IDPs felt at home in Ukraine both legally and affectively after displacement.

Bibliography

Barabantseva, E., Mhurchú, A. N., & Peterson, V. S. (2021). Introduction : Engaging Geopolitics through the Lens of the Intimate. *Geopolitics*, *26*(2), 343–356. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1636558

Benezer, G., & Zetter, R. (2014). Searching for Directions : Conceptual and Methodological Challenges in Researching Refugee Journeys. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *28*(3), 297–318. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu022

Boccagni, P. (2014). What's in a (Migrant) House? Changing Domestic Spaces, the Negotiation of Belonging and Home-making in Ecuadorian Migration. *Housing, Theory and Society*, *31*(3), 277–293. https://doi.org/10.1080/14036096.2013.867280

Boccagni, P., & Hondagneu-Sotelo, P. (2021). Integration and the struggle to turn space into "our" place: Homemaking as a way beyond the stalemate of assimilationism vs transnationalism. *International Migration*, (678456), 1–14. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12846

Boccagni, P., & Kusenbach, M. (2020). For a comparative sociology of home: Relationships, cultures, structures. *Current Sociology*, *68*(5), 595–606. https://doi.org/10.1177/0011392120927776

Boccagni, P., & Vargas-silva, C. (2021). Feeling at home across time and place : A study of Ecuadorians in three European cities. *Popul Space Place*, *e2431*, 1–13. https://doi.org/10.1002/psp.2431

Brun, C., & Fábos, A. (2015). Making Homes in Limbo? A Conceptual Framework. *Refuge*, *31*(1), 1–17.

Bulakh, T. (2018). Living Between Two Fires'-Sovereignty Gaps in Conflict-Affected Areas in Eastern Ukraine. Ottawa.

Bulakh, T. (2020). Entangled in Social Safety Nets: Administrative Responses to and Lived Experiences of Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine. *Europe - Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 455–480. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1687648

Charron, A. (2020). 'Somehow, We Cannot Accept It': Drivers of Internal Displacement from Crimea and the Forced/Voluntary Migration Binary. *Europe - Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 432–454. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1685649

Ferris, E., Mamutov, S., Moroz, K., & Vynogradova, O. (2015). *Off to a Shaky Start: Ukrainian Government Reponses to Internally Displaced Persons*.

Gorton, K. (2007). Theorizing emotion and affect: Feminist engagements. *Feminist*

Theory, *8*(3), 333–348. https://doi.org/10.1177/1464700107082369

Iakovlenko, K. (2017, June 26). Disconnected society: how the war in the Donbas has affected Ukraine. *Open Democracy*.

IOM. (2019). *National Monitoring System: Report on the situation of Internally Displaced Persons*.

IOM. (2020). *National Monitoring System Report on the SItuation of Internally Displaced Persons*.

Ivashchenko-Stadnik, K. (2015). *The impact of the current military conflict on migration and mobility in Ukraine* (EUI Working Paper RSCAS 2015/15).

Jansen, S. (2007). Troubled locations : Return, the life course , and transformations of ‘ home ’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Focaal-Journal of Global and Historical Anthropology*, *49*, 15–30. https://doi.org/10.3167/foc.2007.490103

Kabachnik, P., Regulska, J., & Mitchneck, B. (2010). Where and When is Home ? The Double Displacement of Georgian IDPs from Abkhazia *. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *23*(3), 315–336. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feq023

Klinova, O. (2014, December 11). “ Если вместо головы снаряд ...”. Як формувалась ідентичність Донбасу. *Ukrajinska Pravda*.

Krakhmalova, K. (2019). Internally Displaced Persons in Pursuit for Access to Justice: Ukraine. *International Migration*, *57*(5), 309–322. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12500

Kuznestsova, I., Mikheieva, O., Catling, J., Round, J., & Babenko, S. (2019). The Mental Health of IDPs and the general population in Ukraine. https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.2585564

Kuznetsova, I. (2020). To Help ‘Brotherly People’? Russian Policy Towards Ukrainian Refugees. *Europe - Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 505–527. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1719044

Kuznetsova, I., & Mikheieva, O. (2018). NGO Representatives ’ View of the Social Consequences of Forced Displacement in Ukraine.

Kuznetsova, I., & Mikheieva, O. (2020). Forced displacement from Ukraine’s war-torn territories: Intersectionality and “power geometry.” *Nationalities Papers*, *48*(4), 690–706.

Kuznetsova, I., Mikheieva, O., Gulyieva, G., Dragneva, R., & Mykhnenko, V. (2018). *THE SOCIAL CONSEQUENCES OF POPULATION DISPLACEMENT IN UKRAINE : THE RISKS OF MARGINALIZATION AND SOCIAL EXCLUSION.*

Policy Brief.

Laruelle, M. (2015). The three colors of Novorossiya , or the Russian nationalist mythmaking of the Ukrainian crisis. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *2855*(October). https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2015.1023004

Mallett, S. (2004). Understanding home : a critical review of the literature. *The Sociological Review*, 62–89.

McNeil, K. (2020, March). Internal Displacement and Mental Health in Ukraine. Interview with Dr Irina Kuznetsova. *PaCCS Blog*. Retrieved from https://www.paccsresearch.org.uk/blog/internal-displacement-and-mental-health-in-ukraine/

Mhurchú, A. N. (2021). Intimately Inhabiting Borders : Walking In-Between Belonging and Otherness through Constructions of Home. *Geopolitics*, *26*(2), 404–424. https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2019.1611560

Mikheieva, O. (2019). *Impact of Ukraine's Non-Recognition on the "Facts of Life" in Uncontrolled Parts of Donetsk and Luhansk Region*.

Mikheieva, O., & Sereda, V. (2015). *Sotsiolohichne doslidzhennia. Suchasni ukrajinski vnutrishnio peremishcheni osoby: osnovni prychyny, stratehiji pereselennia ta problemy adaptatsiji (Соціологічне дослідження. Сучасні українські внутрішньо переміщені особи: основні причини, стратегії пере*. Retrieved from http://www.ostrovok.lg.ua/sociology/nauka/oksana-miheieva-viktoriya-sereda-sociologichne-doslidzhennya-suchasni-ukrayinski-vnutrishno

Mooney, E. (editor). (2016). *Enhancing the National Legal Framework in Ukraine for Protecting the Human Rights of Internally Displaced Persons*.

Nidzvetska, S., Rodriguez-llanes, J. M., Aujoulat, I., Cuesta, J. G., Tappis, H., Loenhout, J. A. F. Van, & Guha-sapir, D. (2017). Maternal and Child Health of Internally Displaced Persons in Ukraine : A Qualitative Study. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health*, *14*(54), 1–13. https://doi.org/10.3390/ijerph14010054

O'Loughlin, B. J. O., Sasse, G., Toal, G., & Bakke, K. M. (2021, February 12). A new survey of the Ukraine-Russia conflict finds deeply divided views in the contested Donbas region. *The Washington Post*.

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2015a). Resolution 2028: The humanitarian situation of Ukrainian refugees and displaced persons. Retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-

en.asp?fileid=21480&lang=en

Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe. (2015b). Resolution 2067: Missing persons during the conflict in Ukraine. Retrieved from http://assembly.coe.int/nw/xml/XRef/Xref-XML2HTML-en.asp?fileid=21970&lang=en

Pikulicka-Wilczewska, A., & Uehling, G. (Eds.). (2017). *Migration and the Ukraine Crisis. A Two-Country Perspective*. *E-International Relations*. Bristol: E-International Relations Publishing. Retrieved from http://www.e-ir.info/2017/05/05/migration-to-russia-and-the-current-economic-crisis/

Quinn, J. M. (2015). Notes from the Field: The Humanitarian Crisis in Ukraine. *Journal of Human Security*, *11*(1), 27–33. https://doi.org/10.12924/johs2015.11010027

Quintanilla, J., Parafeniuk, O., & Moroz, V. (2015). *Understanding Information and Communication Needs among IDPs in Eastern Ukraine. Trapped in a Propaganda War. Abandoned. Frustrated. Stigmatized*.

Ray, K. (2000). Repatriation and De-territorialization : Meskhetian Turks' Conception of Home. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *13*(4), 391–414.

Rimpiläinen, E. (2017). *Victims to villains : Internal displacement and nation-building in Ukraine*.

Rimpiläinen, E. (2020). Victims, Villains, or Geopolitical Tools? Representations of Donbas Displacement in Ukrainian and Russian Government Media. *Europe - Asia Studies*, *8136*. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2019.1672622

Sasse, Gwendolyn;, & Lackner, A. (2018). War and identity the case of the Donbas in Ukraine. *Post-Soviet Affairs*, *2855*(2–3), 139–157. https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586X.2018.1452209

Sasse, Gwendolyn;, & Lackner, A. (2019). *ATTITUDES AND IDENTITIES ACROSS THE DONBAS FRONT LINE: WHAT HAS CHANGED FROM 2016 TO 2019?*

Sasse, Gwendolyn. (2017). *The Displaced Ukrainians Who are they, and what do they think?* Berlin.

Sasse, Gwendolyn. (2020). War and Displacement : The Case of Ukraine. *Europe - Asia Studies*, *72*(3), 347–353. https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2020.1728087

Selimovic, J. M., & Strömbom, L. (2015). Whose place?: emplaced narratives and the politics of belonging in East Jerusalem ' s contested neighbourhood of Silwan. *Space and Polity*, 1–15. https://doi.org/10.1080/13562576.2015.1047577

Sereda, V. (2015). Ukraine After Euromaidan : What Difference Does a Revolution Make ?, 2013–2015.

Sereda, V. (2016). Transformation of Identities and Historical Memories in Ukraine after the Euromaidan: National, Regional, Local Dimensions, (November).

Sereda, V. (2020). ‘Social Distancing’ and Hierarchies of Belonging: The Case of Displaced Population from Donbas and Crimea. *Europe-Asia Studies*, *8136*.

Seshadri, K. R. (2008). When Home Is a Camp. Global Sovereignty, Biopolitics, and Internally Displaced Persons. *Social Text*, *26*(1), 29–58. https://doi.org/10.1215/01642472-2007-018

Soroka, I. (2016). Key words: internally displaced people (IDP), hostile perception, discource, cultural mechanisms of power, nomination. *Вісник Харківського Національного Університету Імені В.Н. Каразіна. Серія «Соціологічні Дослідження Сучасного Суспільства: Методологія, Теорія, Методи»*, *37*, 125–128.

Stefanovic, D., Loizides, N., & Parsons, S. (2014). Home is Where the Heart Is ? Forced Migration and Voluntary Return in Turkey ’ s Kurdish Regions. *Journal of Refugee Studies*, *28*(2), 276–296. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/feu029

Stefansson, A. H. (2004). Homecomings to the Future: From Diasporic Mythographies to Social Projects of Return. In *Homecomings to the Future* (pp. 1–20).

Stefansson, A. H. (2006). Homes in the Making: Property Restitution , Refugee Return, and Senses of Belonging in a Post-war Bosnian Town. *International Migration*, *44*(3), 115–139.

Stepputat, F. (2008). Postscript : Home, fragility and irregulation : Reflections on ethnographies of im/mobility.

Stoler, A. L. (2004). Affective States. In *Nugent /A Companion to Anthropology ofPolitics* (pp. 4–20).

Uehling, G. (2017). Everyday life in Ukraine’s war zone. *Current History*, *116*(792), 264–270. https://doi.org/10.1525/curh.2017.116.792.264

Uehling, G. L. (2020). Three rationalities for making sense of internal displacement in Ukraine. *Migration Studies*, *0*(0), 1–24. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnaa005

Yuval-Davis, N. (1997). Gender & Nation. SAGE Publications Ltd.

Zavadovska, Y. (2016). IDP STABILIZATION ASSISTANCE : ROUTES TO

OPTIMIZATION IN UKRAINE. *Baltic Journal of Economic Studies*, *2*(2), 60–66.

Васін, С. (2015, August 8). Ідентичність Донбасу : чи є вона ? *Українська Правда*.

Виртосу, І. (2015, May 24). Рік потому , або Я – не переселенець , я – людина. *Українська Правда*.

Возьняк, Т. (2014). Парадоксальні результати розгрому Путіним Донбасу. *Часопис "Ї."*

Гайворонська, О. (2015). Переселенцям з Донбасу прохання не турбувати. *Українська Правда*.

Дроздов, О. (2014). Західна Україна — на вихід. *Дзеркало Тижня*.

Казанський, Д. (2013, January 25). Історія " понятій ". Як Донбас став " індустріальним середньовіччям ". *Українська Правда*.

Коржов, Г. (2006). Региональная идентичность Донбасса: генезис и тенденции развития в условиях общественной трансформации. *Социология: Теория, Методы, Маркетинг*, *4*, 38–51.

Науменко, Ю. (2020). *Порушення права власності в умовах збройного конфлікту на Сході України та способи захисту*.

Огаркова, Т. (2015, February 24). Життя українців : діти війни. *Українська Правда*.

Печончик, Т. (2015, August 25). Як Україна забирає в' язнів із непідконтрольних територій. *Українська Правда*.

Сич, В. (2016, February 9). Що коли Донбас завтра знову наш? *Новое Время*.

Ставлення населення України до внутрішньо переміщених осіб (результати опитування громадської думки 2015-2018 рр.). (2018).

Стецьків, Т. (2015). Або Донбас іде в Європу з Україною – або Україна піде в Європу без Донбасу.

Чабан, Б. (2015, December 11). Чего хотят донецкие. *Українська Правда*.