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**The making and the portrayal of Scottish distinctiveness:**

**How does the narrative create its audience?**

Abstract

How do states present themselves as inclusive towards migrants and their citizens? This article traces the discourse-to-audience framework through an analysis of the Scottish government's rhetoric on Scottish distinctiveness and its effect on how young migrants see Scotland. In order, we examine how the discourse of Scottish distinctiveness is constructed and conveyed through a close examination of Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's public speeches. Through the examples given we see how an image of Scotland as open, inclusive and outward-looking is invoked. We then examine how the discourse fosters its audiences through narrative interviews conducted with young adult migrants living in Scotland. We operationalise Foucault's theory of governmentality to this extent and argue that the macro narrative of distinctiveness directs the 'conduct of conduct' of young migrants in Scottish society.

Keywords: discursive; governance; governmentality; Scotland; immigration; nationalism; migration

## **Introduction**

How do states present themselves as inclusive towards migrants and their citizens? What kind of identity-making is at play when states portray themselves to newcomers as inclusive and welcoming? Departing from these general questions, this article explores the Scottish context, built around the narrative of an 'open, inclusive and outward looking' Scotland. To this extent, we follow first how this narrative is constructed in political discourse, how it is conveyed, and how it fosters its audiences.

Theoretically, this paper is stimulated by seeking to understand the relationship between the macro-narrative and its micro-(re)interpretations. This is what we follow as the discourse-to-audience framework.

The Scottish government has long emphasised the nation's qualities as open, inclusive and outward looking (Davidson et. al. 2018). This has also entered into their political and policy discourse (Arnott and Ozga 2010, 2016; Moskal 2016). These discourses have gained traction within the wider public, particularly during the Scottish independence campaign in 2014. There has also been an element of presenting Scotland as more egalitarian with a greater concern for social welfarism than the rest of the United Kingdom – particularly England (McCrone 2017; Davidson and Virdee 2018). One of the key elements of this image is a pro-immigration discursive stance that is also presented as distinct from the rest of the UK (Phipps and Fassetta 2015). This article highlights the contact between the macro-narrative of an inclusive Scotland and the experiences of newcomer migrant groups at the micro-level. Recent research has identified a “disjunction between pro-migration rhetoric and anti-immigration sentiments at population level” in Scotland (Sime 2020, 337). Despite the Scottish National Party (SNP) persistently describing Scotland as an open and welcoming place for migrants, there is evidence that Scotland is not as welcoming as the rhetoric would have us believe (McCrone and Bechoffer 2015; Bond 2017).

Survey findings have shown that a large proportion of the Scottish public do not support further immigration to Scotland. 37% of respondents to a YouGov poll taken in 2017 believed there were too many immigrants in Scotland, with another 40% saying immigration was about right (Fraser 2019). This is further supported by a 2018 YouGov survey which asked Scottish respondents if immigration to Britain over the past ten years has been too high, too low, or about right. 55% of Scottish respondents stated that

immigration has been too high (YouGov 2018). The same statistic, 55% was found for those respondents from the London area, which suggests that the general public opinion on immigration is relatively similar both north and south of the border. This is an important finding not only considering the similarity between the Scottish and the English publics in terms of where they stand on diversities and migration, but also has consequences for how newcomer migrants experience Scotland. For this article our focus is on how the SNP government follows a pro-migration discursive line in order to construct a Scottish distinctiveness within its audiences, thereby *talking-up* Scotland, and positioning Scotland as a more egalitarian nation vis-a-vis the rest of the UK. This is operationalised through specific mechanisms which are employed to emphasize Scotland's self-defined favourable characteristics. Meanwhile, individuals who criticize Scotland's reputation are seen to be *talking-down* the country which can result in their exclusion from the mainstream socio-political vision of Scotland. One manner in which we trace this construction is through exploring the migrants' economic contribution narrative which SNP politicians have often foregrounded in discussions surrounding migration.

When the UK went to the polls in the Brexit referendum in 2016, a majority of Scottish voters (62%) voted for the country to remain in the European Union. However, the majority British public voted to leave the EU and as such the UK is now in the final stages of negotiating its exit from the EU at the time of writing. The SNP have adopted a strong anti-Brexit stance, which has also been used as a mechanism to portray Scotland's distinctiveness from England and other parts of the United Kingdom. In our analysis, we provide evidence of how the SNP's discursive strategies on Brexit have been used to support the 'open, welcoming and outward-looking' Scotland narrative. In particular, the Scottish Brexit result has been used to support the view that Scotland is a

country which prioritises international relations and values the contribution of migrant groups.

### ***Macro-Narratives and Micro (Re)Interpretations***

Oksala (2013: 40) argues that any analysis of power relations must recognize how power has to be understood as constituting the subjects themselves. Governmentality is not a mere hegemonic state discourse, but rather an elaboration of subtler forms of power (Allen, 2011; Larner, 2003: 512). Said (1994) believed that state discourse can be thought of as epistemological enforcers, which guide the population to specific mentalities. Scotland offers a “state in the making” context which provides a context more amenable to the enforcement of epistemologies. Lawler (2014, 72) has described governmentality as *techniques of normalization*, which have become the predominant means of government in Western countries. We elaborate on the open, inclusive and outward looking Scotland narrative to trace how the Scottish government affects the conduct of being a member of the Scottish public. This involves a process of ‘responsibilization’ aligned with experiencing and embodying the narrative of open, inclusive, and outward-looking Scotland among its subjects. We follow this “responsibilization’ looking at the way in which young adult migrants recount their experiences of the most mundane situations when living in Scotland.

The Scottish distinctiveness narrative encourages self-management among the Scottish public to remain as modalities of governmentality. Reflecting on author (2017), we argue that these modalities represent politically and socially condoned compartmentalized roles within wider Scottish society. These modalities can include support for the Scottish independence campaign (Botterill et al. 2016), endorsement of SNP policies (Botterill, Sanghera and Hopkins 2017; Finlay, Hopkins and Sanghera

2017), using Scottish signifiers in everyday appearance (Hopkins 2014), and adoption of a distinctive Scottish accent (Ryan 2018). These modalities also inform roles allocated to being a Scottish citizen, urging them to follow the macro-narrative of Scottish distinctiveness, not leave the Scottish independence camp that the SNP has entrenched, and endorse the general SNP party line. However, as the aforementioned survey results showed, this does not mean that the Scottish public endorse the SNP's macro-narrative of inclusivity. We argue that in order to make up for the disparity between the SNP's presentation of open Scotland as an element of Scottish distinctiveness and the general anti-migrant stance of the public not too different from the public opinion in the rest of UK, the SNP insists on migrants' economic benefit to Scotland. This presents a responsabilization for the young migrants in order to conduct their own conduct in most mundane situations. Hence, as we will depict below, young adult migrants in our study perform their politically condoned roles and identities in order to fulfil the SNP's vision for an independent Scotland. To contribute to Foucauldian research, we focus on a rationality of governance that produces new kinds of political subjects under the domination of a political narrative affecting all social practices (Oksala, 2013: 34). We follow how epistemologies of Scottishness distinctiveness foster the rationality around which migrants are welcome and how they should behave.

In order, we examine 'open, inclusive and outward-looking' as terms that are embedded in the Scottish political narrative, and their effect on how individuals should conduct themselves within the Scottish government's vision of an independent Scotland. This discourse implies an element of self-transformation, and virtuous acts to express a sense of a proper Scottish citizenship. It is designed to create a form of effective self-management by making people interpret the narrative in a way that being Scottish and living in Scotland require. Eventually, this discourse encourages the idea of an active

citizenship whereby people – including migrants – ‘talk-up’ Scotland in order to fit into the SNP-defined narrative of Scottish distinctiveness.

Foucault suggested that the ‘conduct of conduct’ focuses on the internal capacities of individuals, and accompanies a form of societal governance (2008 [1979] in author 2020). In a way, by circulating narratives of Scotland’s ‘distinctive inclusiveness’, politicians aim to bolster nationalism and steer ‘conduct of conduct’ among those living in Scotland. It appears as if young migrants feel the need to order how they conduct themselves and subsequently become subjects that are eminently governable, and correlate of governmentality (Foucault, 2008 [1979]: 270–271). In the following sections, we will now trace how governmentality operates through first tracing the open, inclusive and outward-looking Scotland as a political narrative, and then how it is constructed, conveyed, and it fosters its audiences. To this extent, we recognise that discursive practice as truth-producing practice is not always at the forefront of politics, but mostly in the background. Discursive frames and public narratives bear a fundamental role in this process. Moreover, discourses construct the object of knowledge in such a way that they make only certain forthcoming interpretations and modes of reasoning possible. While political agents can construct discourses, discourses also speak through us, through our human agency, and thereby privilege and shape certain ways of apprehending the world (author 2018). This is what we follow as discourse-to-audience framework throughout this article.

### ***Constructing an Open, Inclusive and Outward-Looking Scotland***

Both unionist (Scottish Labour, Scottish Liberal Democrats and the Scottish Conservative and Unionist Party) and nationalist political parties (SNP and Scottish Greens) in Scotland have long emphasised that Scotland is a welcoming and ‘outward

looking nation' and promoted a narrative of an inclusive civic nationalism (Leith and Soule 2011). The main voice of civic nationalism in Scotland, however, has been the Scottish National Party (SNP) (Mycock 2012). The SNP has been the dominant party in Scottish politics for over a decade. It is a party that has increased its vote from one election to the next. It is the governing party in Scotland supported by the Scottish Greens in the Scottish Parliament. In the UK Parliament, the party holds 48 out of the 59 Scottish constituency seats. It has received the largest percentage of votes with 45% at the 2019 general election (Harvey 2020). The SNP has long pursued its goal of Scottish independence from the United Kingdom. However, when the country went to the polls in 2014 the campaign failed to secure Scottish independence. Since the 2014 referendum, support for the SNP has increased significantly and the party has been campaigning further for a second independence referendum. Opinion polls reflect that First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's performance during the COVID-19 crisis in 2020 has led to an upsurge in public support for Scottish independence (YouGov 2020).

The Scottish National Party argue in favour of higher levels of immigration for Scotland, an issue currently controlled by the UK government so far. However, in their discourse we also see that immigration is most commonly aligned with the economic contribution that migrants are perceived to offer. This pro-immigration stance is supported by public campaigns to promote a multicultural Scottish citizenship, including the 'We Are Scotland' initiative (Scottish Government 2020). Despite these initiatives and pro-migration politics of the SNP government, we can see that the Scottish public has a different view of the significance of the contribution that migrants of different nationalities make towards the economy. In a 2018 YouGov survey, more Scottish respondents believed that Nigerians, Somalians, and Romanians made a negative economic contribution towards life in Britain than positive (YouGov 2018). Furthermore,

a YouGov survey conducted in February in 2020 found that only 36% Scots think that immigration has made a positive contribution to their local area (YouGov 2020). Survey evidence therefore discredits the Scottish government's larger inclusive narrative and again emphasizes a disparity between the views of political elites and the majority population.

Moreover, behind the SNPs macro-narratives of inclusivity and tolerance, it is unclear what belonging to Scotland entails and to whom a Scottish identity is available (Sime 2020). Since the early 2000s, the SNP has supported civic nationalist interpretations of Scottishness, and formulated both its immigration policies and public discourse around the benefits of immigration accordingly. The Scottish government has led the 'Fresh Talent' (2004 - 2008) and 'One Scotland, Many Cultures' (2002 - present) campaigns to highlight Scotland as a destination country for migrants. As Scotland has a declining birth-rate, a priority for previous Scottish Governments and the current SNP administration has been to attract highly skilled migrants to Scotland to ensure economic prosperity for Scotland (Hepburn and Rosie 2014). However, despite the SNP's civic nationalist rhetoric, it has faced criticism for focusing on the economic contribution of migrants, overlooking other benefits, such as linguistic and cultural richness, which diversity would provide (Phipps and Fassetta 2015).

Research on narratives of Scottish exceptionalism have explored education policy as one arena in which these narratives are perpetuated. Arnott and Ozga (2010) identified two central discourses within the SNP's education policy. These are described as 'smart Scotland' and 'flourishing Scotland', within which the term 'inclusive' plays a key role. SNP discourse on Scotland is simultaneously 'inward' and 'outward' looking. Within the inward strand, an emphasis is placed on Scottish society's qualities of fairness, community and equality, while the outward narrative focuses upon Scotland's Nordic



economic ambitions and desire to remain within the European Union, maintaining an international perspective (Arnott and Ozga 2016). Furthermore, in research with young adult migrants Gawlewitz (2020) identified a Scottish narrative of distinctiveness within which mythmaking about the nation's qualities of openness plays a central role. As we show below, these political discourse substantiate every day narratives making responsabilization compelling for young migrants.

Scotland is personified in political discourse as a 'small, proud, welcoming, open and tolerant country', which has furthered civic nationalist sentiment (Bechhofer and McCrone 2009). This image is often contrasted with that of England, in a manner which emphasises the view that Scottish society is more egalitarian, more collectivist in nature, and places a higher value on social welfare (Davidson and Virdee 2018). However, despite politicians' best efforts to promote an inclusive civic nationalism, non-civic and exclusive criteria continue to influence public perceptions of national belonging and Scottishness (Leith and Soule 2011; McCollum, Nowok and Tindal 2014). Birthplace and ancestry have been identified as the most important 'identity markers' in an individual's claim to Scottish identity (Kiely et al. 2005). Liinpää (2018) found that when migrants arrive in Scotland, they are more likely to accept positive narratives about Scotland's inclusiveness before later challenging these narratives. Gawlewitz (2020) and Sime (2020) have emphasised that European and non-European migrants in Scotland today are in an increasingly vulnerable situation in relation to their legal rights as well as their identity constructions.

To make up for their visual distinctiveness, Hopkins (2014) has discovered that Young Sikhs living in urban areas in Scotland adhere to fixed markers of Scottish nationalism, including the wearing of the kilt and tartan clothing. This has become their way to emphasise their feelings of belonging to a nation state in the making, alongside

their expressed political claims of belonging. Hopkins's findings reflect the importance of cultural markers and physically portraying one's national affiliations in Scotland. Furthermore, the carrying of national identity markers directly relates to Billig's (1995) banal 'national flaggings' and highlights the understated importance of everyday references to the nation state, which are all-too-often overlooked.

In contrast to existing research quoted above, our research follows micro-narratives around lived-experiences in order to trace how the open, inclusive and outward-looking Scotland tropes affect how young migrants negotiate their identities in everyday Scotland. Therefore, we delineate identity negotiations of young migrants in mundane situations when they try to balance the demands of responsabilization and every day environments where they face hostilities. Their deliberations in micro-spheres for us present the real stories of social inclusion. Between 2019 and 2020, we interviewed 6 migrants with either residency or citizenship status in the UK living in Glasgow. The study participants were born in Czech Republic, Ghana, Nigeria and Somalia, and arrived in the UK as adolescents. There were two female participants and three males in the sample group. Participants were aged between 18 and 26 years old at the time of interview. Interviews were conducted in a 2-wave approach whereby participants were given the opportunity to revisit their earlier narrative with a year between. The interviews asked participants for their experiences of life in Scotland and what made them feel included. Furthermore, we explored whether they had felt discriminated and how they coped with instances of hostility. We also questioned what their experiences had been in other parts of the UK. Finally, we asked what characteristics one needs to call oneself Scottish. In order to understand the macro-narrative foundations that inform participant depictions of life in Scotland we also read Nicola Sturgeon's speeches to assess how open, inclusive, and outward looking Scotland is discursively constructed. Below, we will

discuss first how the macro-narrative of Scottish distinctiveness is constructed and conveyed and, second, how it fosters its audiences conducting their own conduct facing responsabilization that the macro-narrative demands.

### ***How is Discourse of Scottish Distinctiveness Constructed and Conveyed?***

Below, we take examples of how the First Minister Nicola Sturgeon follows the ‘open, inclusive, outward-looking Scotland’ narrative in her speeches surrounding immigration and Brexit. These examples, first, highlight how migrants are portrayed in light of their economic contribution and, second, present Scottish society as distinctively inclusive in comparison to the rest of the UK. At a rally in November 2019 at Glasgow’s George Square, Sturgeon stated that “the Scotland we seek is open, welcoming, diverse and inclusive and no Tory is ever going to be allowed to change that” (<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Q1V-ty8gAuw> at 15:00). The SNP portrays Scotland as a welcoming country, but once we look further into her discourse this open country also needs migrants’ contribution showing the economic advantage that migrants can bring to Scotland in Sturgeon’s speeches.

In a speech in January 2020, at the launch of a ‘Scottish Visa’ programme, Sturgeon states that the recently arrived migrants will be vital to sustaining the country’s public services. Sturgeon continues “[...] these new Scots have made Scotland’s population younger – something which is important to the sustainability of public services”. Hereby, the benefit of immigrants paying taxes precedes all other considerations related to migration. Furthermore, what is crucial for our purposes is such that she steers the public’s perception of immigration into Scotland merely along an economic contribution narrative while she is branding Scotland as an open and welcoming place. In return, the conduct of the wider society is conducted along the

distinctive inclusiveness characteristic that she assigned to Scotland to convince the Scottish public to remain within the positively-portrayed SNP political camp. Yet, as we will show in the next section, this also imposes a demand for responsabilization to talk Scotland up for young migrants.

The next quotation taken from Nicola Sturgeon's speech at the SNP party conference in 2016 provides the substance for our claim. She describes inclusivity as a prerequisite for an independent Scotland where migrants contribute.

It begins with an 'I'. No, not that one! Not yet [in reference to independence] The word I want you to remember is this – inclusion. Inclusion is the guiding principle for everything we do. It encapsulates what we stand for as a party and it describes the kind of country, we want Scotland to be. *A country where we value people for the contribution they make. Not one where we will ever judge them on their country of birth or the colour of their passport.* That is the inclusive Scotland we are working to build. And I'm proud of the progress we've made (First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's Address to SNP Party Conference 2016).

In her speech, Sturgeon again references that Scotland is inclusive towards those who make a 'contribution', which follow as an economic contribution to the country. Furthermore, in a letter to EU citizens after the Brexit vote, Sturgeon appealed to EU citizens to remain in Scotland despite the impending exit from the European Union. Sturgeon emphasized this time migrant's contribution to Scotland's culture alongside their contribution to economy and public services.

[...] Scotland is your home, you are welcome here, and you are valued. You play a crucial role in Scotland's economy and public services. You are a vital part of Scotland not just for the skills and talent you bring to our country but also the diversity and richness you bring to our culture and communities. (First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's Letter to EU Citizens, April 5th, 2019)

While we take this as a further evidence of the contribution narrative qualifying migrants, at the same time knowing that this speech would go beyond the EU migrant population and reach the general Scottish public, we can see that this is another instrument of divisive inclusiveness. Moreover, while in her earlier speeches, Sturgeon was taking the Scottish public as her audience speaking about migration, this was the first time she took migrants, that is, the mobile EU citizens, as her audience. This was her acknowledgment that EU migrants could have agency in Scottish politics. Through this interpretation she infers, as quoted below, that it is Scotland that values diversity and inclusiveness whereas England does not. This statement becomes a means through which to consolidate EU migrants in Scotland as possible future supporters of Scottish independence. Sturgeon elaborates further on this same point as below taken from her statement on Brexit and Scotland's future.

In Scotland, we know, we understand that the Westminster approach to migration - as well as being deeply inhumane - poses an existential threat to our future prosperity. (Brexit and Scotland's future: First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's statement April 24<sup>th</sup> 2019)

Again, the First Minister interlinks questions of having an anti-migration policy with economic precarity and the threat that both would impose on Scotland's future. In practice, it remains as the EU migrants' role to carry out the bulk of service industry jobs that support the Scottish economy (Scottish Government 2020). Scotland's qualities of fairness and welcoming characteristics are also invoked to underpin the country's further division from the 'Westminster' administration of UK. The issues of migration and economy are rarely separated in the SNP's discourse as we show above, and these examples illustrate how England's cruelty in the form of inhumanity is holding back Scotland from economic prosperity. These examples attest to Gawlewitz' (2020, 9) finding that "...Brexit is reshaping how Scotland is narrated."

A major discursive mechanism employed by the SNP to highlight Scotland's distinctiveness is through reference to European partnership, which Sturgeon frames to garner support for the independence movement.

One thing I do want to stress, however, is that for the Scottish Government, independence is not about the isolationism that characterises Brexit – instead independence would see us recognizing and embracing our interdependence with other nations. We will always seek to be close allies and partners with our neighbours in Europe. The last two years, to my mind, have underlined the importance of that position [in reference to the Brexit referendum in 2016] (First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's Speech at French National Assembly Feb 19<sup>th</sup> 2019).

Scotland is part by tradition and practice an open and outward-looking country. And we're determined to remain an open and outward-looking country. We want to strengthen our international relations not move away from them – and we want to find common ground with other nations. And in that effort, we recognise that cultural exchanges are very important and indeed have a very big role to play (First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's Speech at Made in Scotland Festival, Brussels, 11<sup>th</sup> June 2019).

In the above two examples Sturgeon affirms what Brown et al. (1998) referred to as Scotland's 'modern and progressive outlook', which is represented through a pledge to remain a member of the European Union. Historically, however, SNP has not always been a pro-EU political party. Up until 1988, the party leadership have opposed membership in the European Community "mirroring the public perception that the EC suffered from "euro-sclerosis" and inefficiency" (van der Zwet 2015: 168). Seeing the anti-European voice gaining traction in the conservative party, however, SNP transformed its view on EC in order to achieve its goal of independence in Europe (van der Zwet 2015: 168).

Hence, we can argue that SNP has been a pragmatic party on issues related to Europe, and this pragmatism often formulated against the UK governments' stance. The Brexit and migration debate are firm examples of this. Arnott and Ozga (2010) have asserted that these discursive strategies are used to establish an image of what an

independent Scotland would look like. In this example, the image inferred is one of a modern, progressive, and outward-looking Scotland. Sturgeon has gone further to promote the civic narrative of Scottish national identity in the inclusive vision of an independent Scotland. Moreover, she emphasises a more comprehensive Scottish identity, which is not only at home in Europe but also congruent with Britishness. This was not something we came across in her speeches made in Scotland, and this offers thought for how context can affect her narration of the expanse of Scottish openness.

[...] for many people in Scotland - and I'm sure, across Europe - patriotism can be even more multifaceted. We can be Scottish and British and European. We can be Scottish and Polish – or Italian, or Pakistani, and much else besides – and European. [...] And so it shouldn't be surprising that belief in Scottish independence - which is about self-government, not about ethnicity - goes hand in hand with a strong belief in internationalism and interdependence. National identity is not, and never should be, an exclusive concept (First Minister Nicola Sturgeon's speech at the European Policy Centre, Brussels, 12th June 2019).

Hepburn and Rosie (2017, 242) have highlighted how “elite discourse [...] presents immigrants as key players in an open, inclusive and multicultural Scottish nation”. Kiely et al. (2005) have found that there is a marked divergence between elite political attitudes and those of the general population. The general population are more likely to qualify Scottish citizenship on the ground of ethnocentric criteria, including birthplace and ancestry (McCollum, Nowok and Tindal 2014). The aforementioned YouGov opinion polls further provide further evidence for this inclination (YouGov 2018; 2020). Moving on from this disparity between the political discourse of the SNP governing party, its leader, and the public's sentiment, in the next section we trace how the discourse fosters its audience. We operationalise this process through tracing the narratives of young adult migrants in Glasgow when reflecting on their everyday experiences.

### *How Does the Discourse Foster Its Audiences?*

Butler (2011) stated that only through relating to the ‘other’ we can construct our own identities. Hall and Du Gay (1996) found that the other presents a mirror on which we formulate our own self-identity through a process of abjection and the creation of a group of marginalised subjects. In a study on the integration strategies of Pakistani Muslims in Scotland Hussain and Miller (2006, 198) found that this ethnic group “[...] adopt Scottish identities, Scottish attitudes, Scottish Nationalism and even some degree of Anglophobia [...] as tools of integration”. Anglophobia, therefore, can play a role in the integration strategies of migrant communities in Scotland. Furthermore, the vis-à-vis relationship with England continues to play a significant role in Scottish national identity formations (Emejulu 2013). McCrone and Bechhofer (2015) found that the reasons why people ascribe to a Scottish identity was through justifications constructed on the premise ‘I’m Scottish because I’m not English’. Thus, comparison with England and ‘the English’ appears to carry significant weight in Scottish identity constructions. In order to understand how young migrants in Scotland, that is, the *other*, strive to relate their identity to conform with what the majority expects from them, we look into the self-reflections of five young migrants both with non-UK and UK citizenship. We present excerpts from our interview data to illustrate how the macro-narrative becomes embodied in personal identity constructions which relate closely to feelings of belonging.

In our interview findings our participants made references to how Scotland differed, in a positive light, to other parts of the UK, including England, in their reception of migrants,

I think Scotland is a lot friendlier than the whole UK, I think that's my opinion. And *from what I've learned from and what I've heard*, Scotland in general, it's more, you know, more friendly than the UK. Yeah, but that's not to say (the) UK is bad, but I feel like Scotland is better [...] In Scotland, especially Glasgow you know, its



welcoming for everyone to come, you know, because *they need more people*, you know, like know what a mean, they're very welcoming (Interview 1).

In the above example we see that the participant has incorporated the Scottish government's aforementioned contribution narrative to justify the claim that migrants are welcome in Scotland. It is also inferred that Scotland is friendlier and inclusive than other parts of the UK in a manner that appears to replicate Nicola Sturgeon's discourse quoted in the above speech examples. At the same time, the interviewee is not basing their claim on their experiences but on what they 'heard' and 'learnt'. Our study interviewees also emphasised a strong sense of belonging to the Glasgow area, which they felt was an exceptionally receptive environment. We find this replicating the "People Make Glasgow" trope that Glasgow City Council has branded to market the city to both internal and external audiences.

Yeah definitely *people make Glasgow* [...] I think just, I've grown up here I've lived here I've lived here for a while, people are genuinely nice, I think. It's more, it's kind of the *Scottish culture to be nice towards other people* (Interview 2).

Paradoxically, the same participant outlined the physical violence and racism he had experienced when attending school in the Southside of the city;

When I used to go to school we used to fight a lot just because I was, you know, with a different colour and I was Roma or they was calling me Gypsy [...] We had fights just because I was a Gypsy, I couldn't walk out on Govanhill on a Vicky Road (Victoria Rd) without getting chased. There used to be boys from Gorbals called GABB, get all the black b\*\*\*\*\*s, and they was coming to Govanhill, ye know, and chasing young boys and picking up fights. They used to come in bigger groups and just fight and stuff (Interview 2).

We interpret this suppression of negative experience as a manner of avoiding stigmatization, responsabilization, and conforming to the wider Scottish narrative of open, inclusive and outward-looking.

Another participant argued that the ‘People Make Glasgow’ signs made him feel included and optimistic about life in the city,

*As you can see on the streets, there's always signs that say People Make Glasgow. So there's a lot of positive things, and all these years (I've lived here), at least I've never got anyone calling me names or telling me I don't belong to this country. So, Glasgow, it is the people are very kind so you won't get any problems even if you (are) from different countries. Yeah, Europeans, Africans. Everyone is welcome, to this country yeah (Interview 3).*

It's like kinda, People Make Glasgow is welcoming for everyone. This is what ah love about Glasgow. Glasgow is not for some people, it's for everyone. Like of course *you get some bad people that don't like, y'know my colour and stuff*, but most people are like absolutely nice, yeah ah love Glasgow, ah love Glasgow. (Interview 3)

In the case of the interviewee 3, this participant had faced racist and discriminatory treatment from a bus driver when traveling around Glasgow.

My travelin', ah'm not gonna lie to you, it could be rough sometimes, y'know...some drivers they give you dislike... Like they give you hassle an' stuff. Like when ah'm tryin' to get a ticket an they're like 'no you have to pay more cos you're an adult'. Even when I was 16, cos I look older, they're like 'no you have to pay extra money'...I used to be on the bus, they called the police, then y'know the policeman verified my age and I would go on the bus. (Interview 3)

[...] ah feel like drivers, they give more hassle to more like, coloured people. That what ah think, that's what ah think. But not all of them, just only some of them. It's good and bad, at the same time y'get nice drivers that won't even look at you sticky. (Interview 3)

Again, in his narrative our participant is quick to assert that his negative experience has not tarnished his overall view of Glasgow, Scotland or perceptions of Scottish people. As Botterill et al. (2016; 128) have highlighted, instances of racism in Scotland are often treated as mere banter. We interpret our interviewees' suppression of discriminatory experiences as a concerted effort to abide by the positive narrative of Scotland in order to live up to the expectations of the macro-narrative that also underpins power. This is what we call the responsabilization when conduct of conduct becomes compelling. Thereafter, governmentality operates in a way that encourages migrants to conduct their conduct in a manner to talk up macro-narratives of Scottish distinctiveness. Conversely, to dwell on the negative aspects of Scottish life would be interpreted as 'talking-down' the country, which Scottish politicians repeatedly discourage and would leave migrants in Scotland outside of the power dynamic and excluded in a highly nationalist society. Their aversion of this also shows that young adult migrants in our research are striving to live up to the expectations that the power, represented by macro-narratives of Scottish distinctiveness, demand.

When discussing the negotiation of their own identities' vis-a-vis Scottishness, our interviewees felt that appearance, including skin colour, and accent, have been substantial barriers to claiming a Scottish identity. One participant said that an unjustified claim to Scottish nationality could result in offending the wider population, as explained in the following extract.

I feel if I tell people I was Scottish, with like a Scottish accent, that's me embarrassing myself because I do not look Scottish or appear Scottish, I cannot claim to be Scottish. People would say 'why are you calling yourself Scottish?', you know, you're black, *that's very offensive!* People might not wanna say that. But I'm that kinda person, I'm very cautious of wherever I am, I wouldn't wanna identify as what I'm not. I have a Scottish passport [in reference to UK passport] but that doesn't

necessarily make me Scottish, that just makes me someone like a resident in Scotland  
(Interview 4)

You can never call yourself Scottish because you are not from this country, and you claiming this country, is going to be too disrespectful to people that were actually born and raised in this country, you know? (Interview 4)

I don't have a Glasgow accent, so I think people think I'm a bit weird as well, they ask me where I'm from (Interview 1).

In the examples above, we see that that young adult migrants are reluctant to call themselves Scottish for a number of reasons. They are, however, bought in to the macro-narrative that depicts power and make attempts to justify the discriminatory behaviour of the wider population. Earlier research has shown that accent is a thick signifier of national identity affiliations (Huysmans 1998). The way the participants cope with not having the accent can be construed as an attempt to conduct their conduct to meet the expectations of the power represented by the macro-narrative of Scottish distinctiveness. Furthermore, our findings in this instance contradict the Scottish government's claim that a Scottish identity is available to all and reaffirm that a Scottish identity is most commonly constructed on ethno-centric criteria (McCrone 2017).

## **Conclusion**

This article has studied the relationship between macro-narratives of Scottish distinctiveness and micro-experiences of young adult migrants. Through tracing the discursive essence of an inclusive, welcoming and outward-looking Scotland, we are able to better understand how the Scottish government formulate their migration discourse. We have presented our argument through a three-part process following how the discourse is *constructed*, *conveyed*, and how it *fosters its audience*. By invoking the audience to recognise key features of Scottish distinctiveness, namely, inclusive,

welcoming and outward-looking, Nicola Sturgeon has depicted Scotland as distinct from the rest of the UK. In order to explain how the discourse waged an impact on her audience, we followed Foucauldian governmentality and the related conduct-of-conduct assumptions.

To understand the macro-narrative, we looked into Nicola Sturgeon's speeches. In particular, we examined how she envisioned the importance of migration to Scotland, impinging on the economic contribution that migrants bring to Scotland. We also explored how she has exploited Brexit and the Remain vote in Scotland vis-à-vis the Leave vote in England in order to show Scotland's openness to outsiders. However, considering the SNP's economic justification for continued migration to Scotland, we believe that this is a pragmatic effort to gain the support of Scottish audiences to emphasise Scottish distinctiveness. Opinion polls, however, do not reflect a large pro-migration sentiment in Scotland and show little variation from similar polls conducted in England. Existing research, therefore, shows that the SNP cannot create a pro-migration audience in Scotland despite its insistence on Scottish distinctiveness.

Nevertheless, this discourse effects the identity deliberations and coping strategies of young adult migrants facing Scottish distinctiveness tropes. This is where we turn to Foucault, and his theory of governmentality. As our research shows, the young adult migrants can be easily bought in to the Scottish distinctiveness narrative. The participants experienced this narrative as a reflection of the host nation's power on them as a newcomer to Scotland. While they continuously deliberated with themselves why they were not good enough to be Scottish, they adopted the Scottish distinctiveness discourse to conceal what made them feel deficient in everyday life. They rationalised their experiences of racial discrimination on the grounds of being the obvious outsider, who did not have a right to call themselves Scottish. The further conduct of their own conduct

has been not to question Scotland's openness but to promote a positive interpretation of their everyday life to live up to the expectations of power.

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