

*From Democratization to Populism:
Explaining the rise and resilience of illiberal populism in Central Europe*

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Abstract: How does voter support for populist parties change from the time they are in opposition to the time they govern their country? We test three explanations – based on three perceptions of insecurity – 1) ontological, 2) economic, and 3) cultural insecurity. We focus on two major governing populist parties in Europe – Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice in Poland and use data from the European Social Survey from 2004 to 2018. We contribute to the literature on global populism by examining the evolution of populist voter support. We find that economic insecurity is the most significant driver of voter support for populists but the relationship reverses its sign once such parties are in power. While cultural insecurity also fuels support for populists, its significance diminishes when populists are in office. Lastly, ontological insecurity begins to matter primarily after populists have assumed power.

Introduction

“In 2010 Hungary pulled itself together and carried out a revolution,” reflected the country’s current populist Prime Minister Viktor Orban on his coming to power in 2010.¹ Orban has indeed reshaped the Hungarian state and economy, earning him the reputation of the “most dangerous man in the European Union”.² Why did voters choose to bring about this revolution? And why did they then continue to support it? Did voter support change from the time Orban was in opposition to the time he has governing Hungary?

While there is much research explaining why voters bring populists into power, there are fewer answers about why citizens choose to keep them in power or whether those motivations differ. Since the literature on global populism has yet to adequately address this question, we examine cases in which populists seized and then retained power to examine the evolution of their voter support. We focus on two major populist parties in Europe – Fidesz in Hungary and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland. We use data from the European Social Survey (ESS) from 2004 to 2018 and a common three-factor structure that fits the data in both countries.

We test three explanations – three perceptions of insecurity – often put forward in the literature on global populism to account for the electoral success of such parties and most commonly used to explain this phenomenon post-communist Europe: 1) ontological insecurity, or the triggering of so-called authoritarian personality; 2) economic insecurity, related to the socio-economic profiles and experiences of voters; and 3) cultural insecurity, namely the individual-level experiences of socio-cultural changes (usually ideology and religiosity) in a polity.

We find that voters who support populists primarily reject the post-communist transition process to market democracy and European integration because of the economic performance of the former and the perceived normative coerciveness of the latter. Voters concerned about the general state of the economy and democracy in their country and about the spread of the liberal values represented by the EU, helped elect Fidesz and PiS into power and kept them in office.

¹ Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban, Interview with Zsolt Bayer, March 28, 2014.

² Lendvai, Paul, “The Most Dangerous Man in the European Union,” The Atlantic, April 7, 2018.

Seeing these parties in power, however, changed these voters' satisfaction with their country's transition to market democracy but not their concern about the cultural hegemony of liberalism represented by the EU. Fidesz and PiS further took advantage of their incumbency to create a sense of emergency and mobilize voters who favor stability.

These findings contribute to the literature on global populism by examining how support for populists changes from the time they are in opposition to the time they are in office in a pair of crucial cases. We document that in Poland and Hungary, economic insecurity is the most significant and robust driver of voter support for populists but the relationship reverses its sign once such parties are in power. Further, while cultural insecurity fuels support for populists whether they are in opposition or in power, its significance diminishes in some cases when populists are in office. Lastly, we find that ontological insecurity begins to matter primarily after populists have assumed power as they leverage power to heighten citizen's threat perceptions.

Theoretical framework

Approaches to explaining populism

There have been three main, broad groups of accounts of why voters cast their ballots for populists and/or extreme parties. What has perhaps been the most-widespread explanation emphasizes *economic insecurity* as the most proximate driver of support for populism. Authors in this group point out that despite substantial economic growth in part thanks to accelerating globalization over the past few decades, its gains have not evenly translated into a better standard of living for most voters. Rising income inequality, the loss of manufacturing jobs, and stagnant wages have been exacerbated by automation and outsourcing, the growing mobility of capital and labor, the weakening of labor unions, and a strong consensus among international financial institutions on austerity policies as a response to economic crises among others. According to this school of thought, those who perceive themselves as "left behind", vote for populists.³

These types of accounts thus suggest that even the relatively affluent and educated could become part of the populists' base, if their subjective socio-economic experiences are negative.⁴ Such economic insecurity while conducive to in-group solidarity, could also breed out-group distrust – with the agents of globalization (big companies and capital) or with outsiders (migrants or minorities) seen as threatening jobs, benefits, or economic status. Individuals experiencing or receptive to arguments based on economic insecurity could be mobilized in reactionary movements that seek protection and a renegotiation of who belong to "the people" and thus deserves such protection.

³ For example, Esping-Andersen, Gøsta. *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1990 and Ignazi, Piero. *Extreme Right Parties in Western Europe*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003. Rodrik 2019. Snegovaya, Maria (2021) How ex-Communist left parties reformed and lost, *West European Politics* doi: 10.1080/01402382.2020.1869447

⁴ Studies of fascist parties and extremist movements, for instance, have similarly found that fears of downward economic mobility and loss of social status among those who lost out to industrialization created a reservoir of fascist support for populists among the petite bourgeoisie. Balibar, Etienne, and Immanuel Maurice Wallerstein. *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*. London: Verso, 1991.

Second, at the psychological level, the focus has been on *ontological insecurity*⁵ and the so-called authoritarian personality. Some recent studies that look at the rise of Donald Trump to the US presidency in 2016, for instance, find that inclination toward authoritarianism (rather than race, income, or education levels) supported his rise. In one such account, activated authoritarians from across the partisan spectrum, the growing cadre of threatened non-authoritarians, as well as the base of right-wing general-election voters paved the way to a Trump presidency.⁶

Authoritarianism is assessed in this tradition through questions designed to capture an individual's prioritization of social order and hierarchy.⁷ People who hold such latent authoritarian tendencies can be activated by the perception of physical threats or destabilizing demographic or socio-economic change. This perception leads those individuals to desire authoritarian policies and leaders, including populists, who are expected to bring a sense of control to a chaotic world and to restore the status-quo order these individuals equate with basic security. Even non-authoritarians, however, can respond to the perception of threat by behaving more like authoritarians, making them susceptible to populist messages about protecting their country from chaos and social disorder.⁸

Yet a third body of research emphasizes the role of changing *cultural values* in fueling the rise of populism, understood as a reactionary movement uniting segments of the electorate who hold traditional values and as a result seek a bulwark against long-term processes of progressive, world-wide value change.⁹ These authors build on a substantial body of survey-based research that had documented increased tolerance among the younger cohorts for the expression of diverse forms of sexuality, gender, and LGBT rights, more secular values, open-mindedness towards multicultural diversity, and cosmopolitan support for international cooperation, humanitarian assistance, and multilateral agencies.¹⁰ According to these authors, over time, traditional values often held most strongly by (the older generation, less educated sectors, and men) that have gradually become out of step with the changing cultures of contemporary societies. These groups have seen their socio-cultural predominance eroded and their core values threatened – a displacement that is argued to generate resentment. In their rejection of “political correctness,” populist movements provide a mechanism for channeling this resentment into active (electoral) resistance.

⁵ Giddens, Anthony. *Modernity and Self-Identity: Self and Society in the Late Modern Age*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1991.

⁶ MacWilliams, Matthew. “Who Decides When the Party Doesn’t?” *PS: Political Science & Politics*, 48.4 (2015): 579 and Dunn, K. “Preference for radical right-wing populist parties among exclusive-nationalists and authoritarians.” *Party Politics*, 21.3 (2015): 367–380.

⁷ The set of four survey questions about child-rearing ask whether it is more important for the voter to have a child who is respectful or independent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or considerate; and well-mannered or curious. Respondents who pick the first option in each of these questions are more strongly authoritarian.

⁸ Hetherington, Marc J., and Jonathan Weiler. *Authoritarianism and Polarization in American Politics*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

⁹ Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Cultural Backlash: Trump, Brexit, and the Rise of Authoritarian-Populism*. United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019 and Sides, John, Michael Tesler, and Lynn Vavreck. *Identity Crisis: the 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2018.

¹⁰ Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. *Cosmopolitan Communications: Cultural Diversity in a Globalized World*. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009.

Finally, some authors have sought to explain populism by bridging and integrating the three different insecurity arguments. For example, some study the realignment between socio-demographic groups and political parties from a bi-polar to a tri-polar competition with voters choosing between the radical right (including right-wing populist parties)¹¹ and the left on redistributive economic policy and between the extreme/populist and center/mainstream right parties on cultural policy.¹² And another example, others examine how economic and cultural developments interact to generate support for populism and argue that status anxiety is a proximate factor inducing support for populism, while economic and cultural developments combine to precipitate such anxiety.¹³

Explaining Populism in Central Europe

We revisit the debate about the demand-side of the electoral resilience of populists by focusing empirically on two Central European countries – Poland and Hungary. While in Western Europe (Italy, Austria, the Netherlands, Sweden, Britain, France, and even Germany) populist parties have become increasingly competitive in key elections, in Central and Eastern Europe, Hungary and Poland in particular, populist parties have not only come to power but also remained in power in consecutive elections.

Some of the early work on the post-communist transitions in Eastern Europe anticipated that the short-term costs of economic reform would lead to a populist backlash in the early 1990s. Some authors expected erosion of democratic support (and sabotage by frustrated reform elites or by reactionary authoritarians);¹⁴ others forecasted that the “marginalized” would become “receptive to demagogues” and nationalism.¹⁵ By the end of the 1990s, however, neither a turn to the populist left¹⁶ or right¹⁷ materialized and concerns of democratic reversal were mostly replaced by concerns of inchoate democratization¹⁸ despite the positive impact of European Union’s accession political conditionality.¹⁹ Given the shallowness of the resultant democratic socialization, however, by the mid-2000s many started warning about a democratic erosion in the

¹¹ Rydgren, Jens., ed. *Class Politics and the Radical Right*. London: Routledge, 2013; Oesch, Daniel. “The Changing Shape of Class Voting.” *European Societies*, 10.3 (2008): 329; Snegovaya, Maria. *Ex-Communist Party Choices and the Electoral Success of the Radical Right in Central and Eastern Europe*. PhD Dissertation, Columbia University, 2018.

¹² Daniel Oesch and Line Rencwald, “Electoral competition in Europe’s new tripolar political space: Class voting for the left, centre-right and radical right,” *European Journal of Political Research*, 57.4 (2018): 783.

¹³ Noam Gidron and Peter Hall. “The politics of social status: economic and cultural roots of the populist right.” *British Journal of Sociology*, 68.1 (2017): 57 and Gest, Justin. *The New Minority: White Working Class Politics in an Age of Immigration and Inequality*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2016. Swank and Betz 2003; Eichengreen 2018.

¹⁴ Przeworski, Adam. *Democracy and the Market: Political and Economic Reforms in Eastern Europe and Latin America*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.

¹⁵ Ost, David. “Shock Therapy and Its Discontents” *Telos* (Summer 1992).

¹⁶ Sachs 1995

¹⁷ Hausner 1992

¹⁸ Hellman, Joel. “Winners Take All: The Politics of Partial Reform in Postcommunist Transitions.” *World Politics*, 50.2 (1998): 203.

¹⁹ Greskovits, Béla. *The Political Economy of Protest and Patience: East European and Latin American Transformations Compared*. New York: Central European University Press, 1998 and Vachudová, Milada Anna. *Europe Undivided: Democracy, Leverage, and Integration after Communism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005.

post-accession period and a surge of extreme/nationalist parties.²⁰ The mid-2000s indeed began a period of democratic regression across the region, including the short-lived ascension to power of the populist Law and Justice (PiS) party in Poland and the 2010s – the electoral success and resilience of the increasingly populist Fidesz party in Hungary.

Recent scholarship on the region has tended to look to its distinctive political history²¹ for explanations. Perhaps “the most widespread [...one] tells of societies split between the winners and losers of the post-1989 era [— a template that easily translates into the politics of “the people versus the elites” contextualized as a polarization between national conservatives versus pro-European liberals].”²²

As with some of the broader debate on global populism, some emphasize the *economic* impact of the transition. The assumption is that the “winners are big-city dwellers, the better educated, and the young. These are the main beneficiaries of a quarter-century of economic growth, and the stalwarts of the market-liberal course that has predominated during most of that time. The losers tend to be voters from more rural areas, less educated, and older; to them, liberal democracy has not brought prosperity.”²³ Another popular claim is that economic reforms have led to a steady erosion of the state that precludes it from acting to benefit society and instead makes it porous to private financial interests, affording populists the opportunity to promise delivery of what used to be public goods by narrowly defining the people who would receive them.²⁴ Other authors go further and argue that after the global financial crisis, populist parties began to break from the (neo)liberal consensus and converging around an economic program based on a conservative developmental statism that draws from both conservative and socialist roots.²⁵

Another body of research explaining the rise of populism as an effort to renegotiate the post-communist transition focuses on the resultant *cultural insecurity* and maintains that the right-versus-left divide has been replaced by a split between national conservatives and pro-European

²⁰ Bustikova, Lenka. (2009). The Extreme Right in Eastern Europe: EU Accession and the Quality of Governance. *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*. 17. 223-239 and Vachudova, M.A. (2008). Tempered by the EU? Political Parties and Party Systems Before and after Accession. *Journal of European Public Policy* 15(6): 861-879.

²¹ For a notable exception, Sheri Berman and Maria Snegovaya. “Populism and the Decline of Social Democracy.” *Journal of Democracy*, 30.3 (July 2019): 5-191 who argue that the left’s shift to the center on economic issues and especially its acceptance of “neoliberal” reforms, pushed its traditional constituencies towards the populist right. Also, more recently in Maria Snegovaya (2021) How ex-Communist left parties reformed and lost, West European Politics, DOI: 10.1080/01402382.2020.1869447

²² Jacques Rupnik, “Surging Illiberalism in the East,” *Journal of Democracy* 27.4 (2016): 77-87 and Orenstein, Mitchell and Bojan Bugarič. “Economic Causes (and Policies) of Populism in Central and East European Countries.” Paper presented at the European Union Studies Association, Denver, May 9-11, 2019

²³ Quote from Rupnik, “Surging Illiberalism in the East”; argument in Kucharczyk, Jacek and Fomina, Joanna. “Populism and Protest in Poland.” *Journal of Democracy*, 27.4 (2016): 58; McDonnell, Duncan, and Annika Werner. *International Populism: the Radical Right in the European Parliament*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019; and Stockemer, Daniel, Stockemer, and Glaeser. *Populism Around the World*: Springer International Publishing, 2019. Ost 2018, and Epstein 2020.

²⁴ Innes, Abby. “Draining the Swamp: Understanding the Crisis in Mainstream Politics as a Crisis of the State” *Slavic Review* 76.1 (2017): 30 and Neundorf, A. and S. Pardos-Prado. “The long shadow of Communism: Explaining the threat to democracy in Central-Eastern Europe.” Paper presented at APSA 2018.

²⁵ Mitchell A. Orenstein and Bojan Bugarič, *Work, Family, Fatherland: The Political Economy of Populism in Central and Eastern Europe*.

liberals [...and it is this] culture war—rather than the economy—that has weakened liberalism and facilitated the slide toward “illiberal democracy.”²⁶ Other cultural-insecurity explanations go beyond ideology and look instead “at the pent-up animosity engendered by the centrality of mimesis in the reform processes launched in the East after 1989. [...] It is not entirely mysterious, therefore, why the “imitation of the West” voluntarily chosen by East Europeans three decades ago eventually resulted in a political backlash” given that the mimics looked up to their models while the models looked down on their mimics.²⁷

A final strand of work on Central European populism resembles the research on ontological insecurity and authoritarian personality as the main driver of support for populism. Some find “a combination of Manichean worldviews and authoritarianism” that puts trust in a strong leader that allows populists to mobilize voters to “rally around the leader of the tribe and reject the other tribe”.²⁸

These three types of accounts, however, have yet to be systematically tested with voter cross-country data. We do exactly that in the remainder of this paper. There are, of course, other demand-side explanations of the rise of populism, for example - ideological proximity voting and prevalence of populist dispositions; systematically and rigorously testing those, however, is beyond the scope of this paper. In that, we follow previous research on the region²⁹ and do not seek to disentangle populism from its host (center-right) ideology, nor to test the prevalence of specific populist altitudes (such as anti-elitism, demand for popular sovereignty, or belief in the homogeneity of the people).³⁰ In the post-communist context, the concept of ideological proximity is less relevant because voters have weaker party identification and attachments³¹ and often relocate to parties on the opposite side of the political spectrum to punish or reward incumbent party behavior³². Instead, we bridge the theoretical literatures on post-communist and global populisms by testing the three insecurity-related explanations with ESS data for Central Europe for the years 2004-2018.

Research design

Identifying populists in Central Europe

²⁶ Rupnik, “Surging Illiberalism in the East”. Krastev 2017, Verovšek 2020

²⁷ Ivan Krastev and Stephen Holmes, “Imitation and Its Discontents,” *Journal of Democracy* 29.3 (2018): 117-128.

²⁸ Krekó, P., Molnár, Cs., Juhász, A., Kucharczyk, J. & Pazderski, F. (2018). *Beyond populism. Tribalism in Poland and Hungary*. Political Capital, Hungary.

²⁹ For example, some document the cultural (Kotwas and Kubik 2019) and economic (Orenstein and Bugarič 2020) thickening of populism over time, merging with nationalist and religious discourses. Others (Jenne 2018 and Vachudova 2020), similarly accept and theorize the intertwining of the defense of “the people” with the defense of ethnicity, culture, nation, religion and/or race.

³⁰ Wettstein, M., Schulz, A., Steenbergen, M., Schemer, C., Müller, P., Wirz, D. S., & Wirth, W. (2020). Measuring populism across nations: testing for measurement invariance of an inventory of populist attitudes.

³¹ Kopecký, Petr. (2006) Political Parties and The State in Postcommunist Europe: The Nature of Symbiosis. *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 22:3, 251-273. Beyens, S., Lucardie, P., & Deschouwer, K. (2016). The life and death of new political parties in the low countries. *West European Politics*, 39(2), 257-277.

³² Gherghina, S. (2014). *Party organization and electoral volatility in Central and Eastern Europe: Enhancing voter loyalty*. Routledge. Millard, F. (2004). Political Parties and Party Systems. In *Elections, Parties and Representation in Post-Communist Europe* (pp. 129-155). Palgrave Macmillan, London

We define of populism as an ideology that has anti-establishment but also moralist and monist elements (and that can be combined with other ideologies, such as nativism on the right and socialism on the left). We accept that populists depict society as divided into two homogenous and antagonistic groups: people vs elites. Such populist mobilization, however is not only anti-establishment but also moralist as the implied or explicit opposition is that of “the corrupt elite” vs “the pure people”. Populists also insist that they, and only they, represent “the people”.³³ This claim to exclusive representation and the denial the existence of divisions of interests and opinions within “the people” (that is, populism’s monist elements) allow such movements to reject the legitimacy of political opponents, sometimes even suppress civic and political opposition, and eventually lead to a polarized, anti-pluralist political culture.

Some consequent, though not defining elements, of populism include calls and practice of more direct mobilization and redistribution to the masses. Populists usually seek means to a more direct democracy, rejecting the mediation of individual and societal interests through democratic institutions and endangering both the formal institutions and the informal norms of liberal democracy. Lastly, in order to buy off citizen compliance or cater to “the people”, populists often propose and practice some form of network or “mass clientelism” (rather than group or class-based socio-economic redistribution as usually practiced by traditional left-right parties).³⁴

To understand why voters not only bring populists into power but also choose to then keep them in power, we focus on Hungary and Poland, where populist parties have remained in office in consecutive elections. Fidesz in Hungary, led by Viktor Orban, and Law and Justice (PiS) in Poland, led by Jaroslaw Kaczynski, have become posterchildren for contemporary populism in Europe (and beyond).³⁵ After coming to power in 2010, Orban invalidated the reigning 1949 Communist Constitution still in effect in the early post-communist period and undermined the separation of powers, the independence of the judiciary, and the freedom of the public media; Fidesz also cut energy bills and refunded bank fees to the masses and developed a more Hungarian economy free of foreign and communist influence, arguing it was undoing the perceived wrongdoings of post-communist elites, such as privatization.³⁶ PiS followed a similar conservative economic nationalism agenda after assuming to power in 2015; it also changed the rules for naming judges to the Constitutional Tribunal, ordering a major purge of public radio and television, and abolishing the political neutrality of the civil service. This was an agenda, however, that PiS had already articulated in the mid-2000 but could not implement while in power in 2005-2007 primarily because it was constrained and weakened by its coalition partners. Both times, PiS came to power, set on introducing a “fourth republic” that would eliminate traces of the elite cartel (“uklad”) between former Solidarity and former communist parties, which PiS claimed was a self-serving, anti-Polish, western/liberal-communist-criminal mafia, and which happened to encompass PiS’ political opponents.³⁷ PiS did, however, pass a lustration law in 2006 that made all public officials subject to scrutiny and tried to direct the Institute of National

³³ Müller, Jan-Werner. *What Is Populism?*. Penguin Books, 2017, 69

³⁴ Berman, Sheri. “What Happened to the European Left?” *Dissent*, 57.3 (2010): 23-29. See also, Kitschelt, Herbert, and Anthony J McGann. *The Radical Right in Western Europe: a Comparative Analysis*. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, 1995.

³⁵ Grzymala-Busse, Anna. “Global Populisms” *Slavic Review*. 76.1 (2017):1.

³⁶ Varga, Mihai and Bluhm, Katharina. “Conservative Developmental Statism in East Central Europe and Russia.” *New Political Economy*. 25.4 (2020): 642 define this agenda as came to be known as “economic nationalism”.

³⁷ Grzymala-Busse, “Global Populisms”.

Remembrance to investigate victims of fascist- and communist-era crimes. After falling from power in 2007, PiS moderated this populist agenda, only to quickly step it up after winning the presidency in 2015.

Other regimes in the region have also copied some elements of the PiS-Fidesz populist playbook, especially around anti-elitism, opposition suppression, and redistribution. Consider, for example, Slovakia's former Prime Minister Robert Fico of Smer-SD, whose social programs for the masses (including in energy) and xenophobic/ anti-refugees campaign has some calling him "the Orbán of the left."³⁸ Similarly, Andrej Babis has wooed senior citizens with higher pensions and generous public transport concessions and young parents with free school meals, followed the other Visegrad leaders with his xenophobic rhetoric, ran an anti-establishment campaign yet quickly concentrated power in his own hands.³⁹ While Fico and Babis have both resorted to demagoguery, neither has embraced the monist and moralist ideology that sets PiS and Fidesz apart from other regimes in the region.⁴⁰

Drivers of populism in Central Europe: Factor Analysis

On the explanatory side, we selected the ESS questions most relevant to the three insecurity-related clusters of accounts of populism in the literatures on global and Central European populism.

First, the *economic insecurity* variables were selected using ESS prompts that evoke respondents' (dis)satisfaction with the state of public services (health and education) and the economy on individual and country levels. These questions capture the subjective personal socio-economic experience of voters and thus the reservoir of individuals who might see themselves as left behind, worry about downward mobility, desire state intervention and protection and could be mobilized by populists.

Second, while the ESS does not ask the child-rearing questions commonly used to identify individuals with "authoritarian personality,"⁴¹ there were several questions that more broadly capture the prioritization of social order and hierarchy and thus speak to voters' *ontological (in)security*. We relied on accepted ESS measures of tradition and conformity⁴² and expected that respondents with latent authoritarian tendencies and threatened non-authoritarians prefer policies and leaders who emphasize those values.⁴³

³⁸ Rupnik, "Surging Illiberalism in the East".

³⁹ <https://www.ft.com/content/a4ec7966-b71b-11e7-8c12-5661783e5589>

⁴⁰ Engler, Sarah, Bartek Pytlas & Kevin Deegan-Krause. "Assessing the diversity of anti-establishment and populist politics in Central and Eastern Europe," *West European Politics*, 42.6 (2019): 1310-1336; "ANO lacks a powerful nationalist narrative." Some primarily anti-establishment actors such as KORWiN in Poland, ANO in the Czech Republic and SaS in Slovakia, the usage of other claims related to populist moralist rhetoric in their election campaigns is minimal. Particular actors differed significantly in the extent to which they used and combined the particular elements of populism *within* their 'thin ideological' discourse.

⁴¹ These standard questions ask whether it is more important for the voter to have a child who is respectful or independent; obedient or self-reliant; well-behaved or considerate; and well-mannered or curious. Respondents who pick the first option in each of these questions are more strongly authoritarian.

⁴² Davidov, E., Schmidt, P., & Schwartz, S. H. (2008). Bringing values back in: The adequacy of the European Social Survey to measure values in 20 countries. *Public Opinion Quarterly*, 72, 420-445.

⁴³ Albertazzi, Daniele, and Duncan McDonnell, eds. *Twenty-First Century Populism: the Spectre of Western European Democracy*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008

Third, a set of *cultural insecurity* variables was selected to operationalize the hypothesis that populist supporters may be more reluctant to accept the consequences of long-term social and political progressive value change. In the Central European context those progressive values include among others changing attitudes towards traditional marriage and immigration as well as political liberalization (democratization) and Europeanization (and broader integration and acceptance of the global governance system).


These ESS questions, listed in Table 1, supplied us with primarily ordinal variables that ask respondents to provide their position on a given scale. All variables were recoded such that a larger positive estimate corresponds to support for the respective hypothesis.

Table 1. ESS Explanatory variables

Economic insecurity	Stfhlth	1	State of health services in country nowadays	[0 – extremely bad; 10 – extremely good]
	Stfedu	2	State of education in country nowadays	[0 – extremely bad; 10 – extremely good]
	Gincdif	3	Government should reduce differences in income levels	[1 – disagree strongly; 5 – agree strongly]
	Stfeco	4	How satisfied with present state economy in country	[0 – extremely dissatisfied; 10 –extremely satisfied]
	Hincfel	5	Feeling about household's income nowadays	[1 – very difficult on present income; 4 – living comfortably]
Ontological Insecurity	Ipfrule	6	important to do what is told and follow rules	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
	Ipstrgv	7	Important that government is strong and ensures safety	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
	ipbhprp	8	Important to behave properly	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
	Impsafe	9	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
	Iprspot	10	Important to get respect from others	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
	Imptrad	11	Important to follow traditions and customs	[1 - Not like me at all; 6 - Very much like me]
Cultural insecurity	Trstun	12	Trust in the United Nations	[0 – no trust at all; 10 – complete trust]
	Trstep	13	Trust in the European Parliament	[0 – no trust at all; 10 – complete trust]
	Trstprl	14	Trust in country's parliament	[0 – no trust at all; 10 – complete trust]
	stfdem	15	How satisfied with the way democracy works in country	[0 – extremely dissatisfied; 10 –extremely satisfied]
	freehms	16	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish	[1- disagree strongly; 5 – agree strongly]
	imueclt	17	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants	[0 – cultural life undermined; 10 – cultural life enriched]

We expected voters to exhibit similar patterns of responses to the questions within each of the three clusters related to the constructs of *economic, ontological, and cultural insecurity*. Many of these individual variables were indeed correlated with each other, so regressing them on electoral support for populism would lead to biased estimates. Including such a large number of variables in the analysis would also increase the probability of Type I error. Therefore, we used factor analysis to combine selected variables into factors that capture the interrelationships among the explanatory variables and help us capture the underlying drivers of populism. Factor analysis further allows to use few (uncorrelated) factors instead of many variables, significantly reducing the analysis's complexity.

Figure 1. Selecting the Explanatory Factors: The Scree Plot



We used the principal-component factor method to analyze the correlation matrix. The optimal number of components designed to reduce the total number of explanatory variables was selected based on the distribution of eigenvalues presented in Figure 1. The scree plot (a line plot of the eigenvalues of factors in an analysis) above shows that the largest drop in total variance explained (the “elbow” in the graph) is between the third and the fourth component, suggesting that further component extraction after the third factor is not beneficial (eigenvalue above 1.3). The best aggregation for the explanatory variables of interest is thus represented by three factors. Table 2 displays the factor-loading matrix for the three factors after the varimax orthogonal rotation with only strongest factor loadings (that is, those which exceed a value of 0.25).

Table 2. Interpreting the Explanatory Factors: Factor Loadings (Pattern Matrix) and Unique Variances

Variable	Factor1	Factor2	Factor3	Uniqueness
zipfrule1		0.4960		0.7378
zipstrgv1		0.6611		0.5435
zipbhprp1		0.7255		0.4736
ziprspot1		0.5039		0.7287
zimpsafe1		0.6541		0.5512
zimptrad1		0.6521		0.5639
zimueclt1			0.4411	0.7990
zfreehms1			0.4310	0.7928
zhincfel1				0.9143
zstfhlth1	0.6966			0.5119
zstfedu1	0.6958			0.5137
zgincdif1				0.8849
zstfeco1	0.7829			0.3856
zstfdem1	0.7773			0.3720
ztrstun1			0.8044	0.2638
ztrstep1	0.3258		0.7980	0.2559
ztrstpr11	0.6037		0.3345	0.5176

The results of our factor analysis corroborate our original theoretical expectations – the three factors correspond relatively closely to the three explanatory clusters identified in the literatures on global and Central European populism (see Table 3). There are a few but important revisions that speak to the distinctive post-communist political history of Hungary and Poland and the broader region. We interpret these three factors as follows:

1. The first factor is composed of the variables most closely linked to respondents’ sense of *economic insecurity*: their satisfaction with the state of economy and public services. This factor is thus close to what the literature on voting preferences has identified as retrospective voting or general satisfaction with the way things are going in the country. However, satisfaction with the state of democracy and trust in the national and European parliaments also load into this factor. This suggests that, as expected in the literature on Central European populism, respondents’ perceptions of economic insecurity in these two countries are linked to their experience with the transition away from communism as both an economic and a political system. As a result, we have labeled this factor as “*Domestic-Transition Referendum*”.
2. The second factor captures respondents’ sense of *ontological insecurity*. It is composed of the six “Authoritarian Values” variables that emphasize respondents’ desire for more personal and social stability, order, and hierarchy. These include the importance of rules, traditions, proper conduct, and leaders who ensure those as well as safety and security more broadly. As a result, we have labeled this factor “*Post-communist Order Referendum*.”
3. The third factor defines the *cultural insecurity* construct. The variables that load into this factor speak to respondents’ embrace of socially progressive values, including international institutions such as the EU and UN, national and supranational democracy personified by domestic and EU parliaments, and rights and liberties even for embattled minorities, such as immigrants and homosexuals. The third factor thus speaks to respondents’ experience with the opening of the communist bloc countries to the hegemonic normative and institutional

influences of the international system. As a result, we have labeled this factor “*International-Transition Referendum.*”

Table 3. Explanatory factors and their underlying variables

Factor 1: Domestic-transition referendum	State of health services in country nowadays
	State of education in country nowadays
	How satisfied with present state economy in country
	How satisfied with present state democracy in country
	Trust in country's parliament
	Trust in the European Parliament
Factor 2: Post-communist order referendum	Important to do what is told and follow rules
	Important that government is strong and ensures safety
	Important to behave properly
	Important to live in secure and safe surroundings
	Important to get respect from others
	Important to follow traditions and customs
Factor 3: International-transition referendum	Trust in the United Nations
	Trust in the European Parliament
	Trust in country's parliament
	Gays and lesbians free to live life as they wish
	Country's cultural life undermined or enriched by immigrants

Insecurity and Populism: Model

To capture the level of electoral support for the Law and Justice party in Poland and the Fidesz party in Hungary in the 2004-2018 period, we used the actual/reported votes for these parties in ESS. Our dummy dependent variable (“PopulistVote”) was coded based on the answer respondents gave to the question asking “*Which party did you vote for in the last election?*” Per the discussion above, in the Polish case, a vote for the Law and Justice party was coded as “1”/populist in 2004-2018 and in the Hungarian case, a vote for the Fidesz party was coded as “1”/populist in 2004-2018.⁴⁴ The rest of the dependent variable observations, including votes for other parties in these countries, were coded as “0”.

We tested how the three explanatory factors capturing economic, ontological, and cultural insecurity correlate with electoral support for populist parties in Hungary and Poland. Because of the binary nature of the dependent variable, we ran *probit models* with robust standard errors controlling for fixed year effects and time effects that influence support for populist parties. To account for different sampling strategies affecting individuals’ probability to be included in the survey, we used the design weights recommended by the ESS. We also included a set of standard individual-level controls (age, gender, education, religion, employment status and work contract

⁴⁴ Mesežnikov, Grigorij, Oľga Gyárfášová, and Daniel Smilov, *Populist Politics and Liberal Democracy in Central and Eastern Europe*, Institute for public Affairs, Slovakia.

quality). Given the nonlinear nature of the dependent variable and the probit model chosen, we use average marginal effects to interpret the magnitude of the effects (see Appendix I).

Insecurity and Populism: Findings

Our results are presented in Tables 4 and 5. We ran separate models for Hungary and Poland to determine the commonality of factors explaining populist support in the two countries.

Moreover, to understand the evolving drivers of this support, we studied separately the periods when Fidesz and PiS were in opposition and the periods when Fidesz and PiS were incumbents.

Voting populists into power

In the first set of models, we included the data for the years in which Fidesz and PiS were in opposition in order to explore what drives citizens to vote populist into power. Because not all of the explanatory variables of interest are available in all of the ESS waves in the time period of interest in this study, our analysis is limited to 2006-2008 for the Hungary model (Model 1) and to 2004, 2008-2014 for the Poland model (Model 3); moreover, the Hungary model is based on a smaller sample than the Poland one.

Table 4. Electoral Support for Central European Populists While in Opposition

	(1) Hungary	(2) Marginal Effects	(3) Poland	(4) Marginal Effects
Economic insecurity/ Domestic transition	-0.272*** (0.094)	-0.097*** (0.032)	-0.253*** (0.032)	-0.085*** (0.010)
Ontological insecurity/Post-communist Order	-0.014 (0.095)	-0.005 (0.034)	0.107*** (0.032)	0.036*** (0.011)
Cultural insecurity/ International Transition	-0.187** (0.078)	-0.067** (0.027)	-0.311*** (0.034)	-0.105*** (0.011)
Unemployed	0.082 (0.352)	0.029 (0.125)	-0.030 (0.162)	-0.010 (0.055)
Retired	0.371 (0.270)	0.132 (0.095)	-0.037 (0.095)	-0.012 (0.032)
Age	0.002 (0.035)	-0.006** (0.003)	-0.016 (0.010)	0.001 (0.001)
Age^2	-0.000 (0.000)		0.000 (0.000)	
Male	-0.077 (0.167)	-0.027 (0.060)	0.020 (0.060)	0.007 (0.020)
Lower secondary education	-0.534 (0.397)	-0.190 (0.141)	-0.355 (0.302)	-0.127 (0.110)
Upper secondary education	-0.478 (0.384)	-0.170 (0.136)	-0.436 (0.303)	-0.155 (0.110)
Post-secondary non-tertiary education	-0.338 (0.506)	-0.121 (0.180)	-0.491 (0.324)	-0.174 (0.117)
Tertiary education	-0.538 (0.443)	-0.192 (0.157)	-0.530* (0.309)	-0.186* (0.112)
Catholic	-0.031	-0.011	0.776**	0.261**

	(0.190)	(0.068)	(0.355)	(0.119)
Medium income	-0.016	-0.006	0.044	0.015
	(0.216)	(0.077)	(0.079)	(0.027)
High income	-0.157	-0.056	-0.119	-0.040
	(0.252)	(0.090)	(0.084)	(0.028)
2010			0.055	0.019
			(0.082)	(0.028)
2012			-0.179**	-0.059**
			(0.081)	(0.027)
2014			-0.097	-0.033
			(0.087)	(0.029)
Constant	0.959		-0.342	
	(0.932)		(0.514)	
Observations	280	280	2,203	2,203
r ² _p	0.0752	.	0.0909	.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 4 presents the regression results for the socio-demographic variables and insecurity factors associated with electoral support for populist parties in Hungary and Poland for years when these parties were in opposition. The first important finding is that with the inclusion of the insecurity factors, few socio-demographic variables have significant effect on populist support. In Hungary, none of the individual-level controls are significant. In Poland, only religious affiliation (being Catholic) is significantly positively associated and higher education levels – weakly negatively associated with voting for the populist PiS party. This is consistent with earlier studies on this topic that found no consistent effect of individual-level controls on populist vote.⁴⁵

Most importantly, when it comes to the three explanatory factors of interest, the two defining the domestic and international transition referenda are robust and statistically significant in both models. In both regressions, the coefficients to these factors are also meaningfully larger in magnitude than the coefficients to the “ontological security/post-communist order referendum” factor as documented by the size of marginal effects. The average marginal effects further suggest that the magnitude of the effect of the “economic insecurity/domestic transition referendum” is the largest among the three factors of interest. More specifically, a one-unit increase in satisfaction with the political and economic state of the country generates a 0.097 unit decrease in support for Fidesz and a 0.085 unit decrease in support for PiS respectively. Similarly, a one-unit increase in the support for liberal Euro-Atlantic values decreases support for Fidesz by 0.067 and support for PiS by 0.105 respectively. These results lend support to the argument that voters who believe that the double domestic and international post-communist transition was not beneficial to their country either economically and/or culturally are more likely to vote for populist parties, which have campaigned to mobilize and exploit resentment against the domestic and international winners of this transition. The marginally stronger impact of economic insecurity in Hungary, expressed as a rejection of the domestic transition, is

⁴⁵ Mayer, Danielle, Stockemer, Daniel and Lentz, Tobias, “Individual Predictors of the Radical Right-Wing Vote in Europe: A Meta- Analysis of Articles in Peer-Reviewed Journals (1995–2016)” *Government and Opposition*, 53.3 (2018): 569 and Arzheimer, Kai. “Protest, Neo-Liberalism or Anti-Immigrant Sentiment: What Motivates the Voters of the Extreme Right in Western Europe?.” *Comparative Governance and Politics* 2 (2009).

consistent with the fact that whereas Poland has been the only European country whose economy has grown every year since 2000, Fidesz was elected in the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis which affected Hungary quite negatively.

For populist parties in opposition the effects of the “ontological insecurity/post-communist order referendum” factor are not uniform: while its coefficient is significant in Poland, it loses significance and appears with the opposite sign in Hungary. This is in line with the studies that demonstrate that while PiS actively mobilized its supporters using appeals to security threats facing the country, Fidesz adopted a more radical rhetoric only over time, constructing multiple threats facing Hungarians primarily while in power.⁴⁶ Given the average marginal effects for both countries, the coefficients to the “ontological insecurity/post-communist order referendum” factor are meaningfully smaller in size than the coefficients to the other two factors (-0.005 in case of Hungary and 0.036 in case of Poland respectively). This suggests that at least during the periods when both parties were in the opposition this factor played a smaller role for their supporters, as compared to the other two insecurity factors.

Keeping populists in power

To understand the resilience of populist parties in Poland and Hungary in power, we ran another set of generic probit models with robust standard errors, again looking at Hungary (model 1) and Poland (model 3) separately and with the same year-fixed effects, individual-level controls. In this case, the analysis focused on the years 2010-2018 for Fidesz and on the years 2006 and 2016–2018 for of PiS. In addition, for robustness check and given good data availability, we included regional-level controls to factor in subnational differences (see Appendix I).⁴⁷

⁴⁶ Salek, Paulina and Sztajdel, Agnieszka Luiza, “Poland: ‘modern’ versus ‘normal’: the increasing importance of the cultural divide,” in Hutter, Swen, and Hanspeter Kriesi, eds. *European Party Politics in Times of Crisis*. Cambridge, United Kingdom: Cambridge University Press, 2019, 189-213; Bocskor, Á. “Anti-Immigration Discourses in Hungary during the ‘Crisis’ Year: The Orbán Government’s ‘National Consultation’ Campaign of 2015.” *Sociology*, 52.3 (2018): 551–568; and Hegedüs, Daniel. “Rethinking the incumbency effect. Radicalization of governing populist parties in East-Central-Europe. A case study of Hungary, European Politics and Society.” *European Politics and Society: Multifaceted Nationalism and Illiberal Momentum at Europe's Eastern Margins*, 20.4 (2019): 406-430.

⁴⁷ We could not include regional effects for control for regressions with Fidesz and PiS in opposition for the lack of regional variables in respective years in the ESS dataset.

Table 5. Electoral Support for Central European Populists While in Power

	(1) Hungary	(2) Marginal Effects	(3) Poland	(4) Marginal Effects
Economic insecurity/ Domestic transition	0.443*** (0.041)	0.143*** (0.011)	0.588*** (0.072)	0.181*** (0.018)
Ontological insecurity/Post-communist Order	0.157*** (0.044)	0.051*** (0.014)	0.307*** (0.076)	0.095*** (0.022)
Cultural insecurity/ International Transition	-0.048 (0.043)	-0.015 (0.014)	-0.326*** (0.065)	-0.100*** (0.019)
Unemployed	0.072 (0.235)	0.023 (0.076)	0.498 (0.483)	0.153 (0.148)
Retired	-0.099 (0.137)	-0.032 (0.044)	-0.038 (0.192)	-0.012 (0.059)
Age	0.001 (0.016)	-0.004*** (0.001)	0.033 (0.023)	0.000 (0.002)
Age^2	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	
Male	0.022 (0.085)	0.007 (0.027)	-0.052 (0.122)	-0.016 (0.037)
Lower secondary education	0.130 (0.302)	0.038 (0.091)	0.301* (0.169)	0.093* (0.052)
Upper secondary education	-0.208 (0.291)	-0.066 (0.089)	0.057 (0.157)	0.018 (0.048)
Post-secondary non-tertiary education	-0.404 (0.329)	-0.131 (0.103)	-0.371 (0.283)	-0.114 (0.087)
Tertiary education	-0.378 (0.302)	-0.122 (0.093)		
Catholic	0.220** (0.089)	0.071** (0.028)	0.641 (0.588)	0.197 (0.181)
Medium income	0.103 (0.113)	0.033 (0.036)	-0.066 (0.160)	-0.020 (0.049)
High income	-0.163 (0.119)	-0.054 (0.039)	-0.246 (0.170)	-0.076 (0.052)
2012	-0.150 (0.114)	-0.048 (0.036)		
2014	-0.557*** (0.116)	-0.186*** (0.039)		
2016	-0.112 (0.123)	-0.035 (0.039)		
Constant	0.887* (0.476)		-1.819** (0.872)	
Observations	1,112	1,112	559	559
r ² p	0.142	.	0.212	.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001

Table 5 presents the results of our regression of votes in support of populist incumbents on socio-demographic variables and insecurity factors. Again, in both countries, socio-demographic variables, except for religious affiliation, do not have a significant effect on support for populist incumbents. Catholic voters are significantly more likely to back Fidesz remaining in power (and in the Polish case, belonging to Catholics predicts vote for PiS perfectly and is hence dropped from the analysis). This is consistent with Fidesz and PiS mobilization rhetoric that emphasizes these parties as the saviors of Christian civilization in Europe.

The “economic insecurity/domestic transition referendum” construct is again most significant in both Hungary and Poland but it now has a positive sign. In other words, once populists are governing, citizens who voted them into power are generally not only happy with these parties but also become satisfied with the political and economic state of their country now governed by their preferred party. Voters are even satisfied with democracy at home, despite the illiberal and anti-pluralist tendencies of both incumbents. Although it might appear paradoxical, such behavior is consistent with rational retrospective voting.⁴⁸ It is consistent with the instrumental legitimacy of democracy in the region historically constructed in the double transition to market democracy as paternalistic and majoritarian representation of citizen interests rather than as embrace of right and freedoms or separation of powers.⁴⁹

Based on our results for average marginal effects, the “economic insecurity/domestic transition referendum” factor again has the largest coefficient among our three factors of interest. For example, a one-unit increase in satisfaction with the political and economic state of the country generates a 0.143 unit increase in support for Fidesz, and a 0.181 unit increase in support for PiS respectively. The inclusion of regional effects for robustness check (Appendix I) does not change the results. The signs and magnitude of the effects remain almost the same.

The “ontological security/post-communist order referendum” factor is also significant in both countries, if substantially smaller in magnitude. This suggests that populist parties in power rely on supporters who prioritize the values of hierarchical order and stability. The significance of this factor further documents that populist in power have been successful in using their incumbency to create a sense of looming threats, emergency, and destabilizing demographic or socio-economic changes, amid which the populist authorities brings a sense of control and order. However, the marginal effects analysis show that the coefficient to this factor is meaningfully smaller than the coefficient to the “economic insecurity/domestic transition” factor in both countries. For example, a one-unit increase in “ontological security/post-communist order referendum” generates a 0.051 unit change in support for Fidesz, and about 0.095 unit increase in support for PiS respectively. Again, the inclusion of regional effects (Appendix I) does not alternate the results and preserves the size and significance of the coefficients almost intact.

Lastly, the coefficients to the “cultural insecurity/international transition referendum” factor are still negative in both country cases, which is in line with both PiS and Fidesz harshly criticizing the EU for its “overreach” and for not giving the post-communist countries much voice in EU governance. The “cultural insecurity/international transition” factor (remains with the same sign but) loses significance in Hungary. This, however, does not necessarily suggest that cultural insecurity does not drive electoral support for keeping Fidesz into power; rather, it suggests that Fidesz supporters do not hold significantly more anti-EU policy stances than the voters of other Hungarian parties – for example, many far-right Jobbik supporters hold comparable views and values. This finding is also consistent with PiS’ more aggressive anti-EU rhetoric and more pragmatic and accommodating Fidesz rhetoric and actions vis-a-vis the EU.

⁴⁸ Stiers, Dieter. “Political information and retrospective voting.” *West European Politics* (2019): 1.

⁴⁹ Bruszt, Laszlo, “ ‘Without Us but For Us’? Political Orientation in Hungary in the Period of Late Paternalism,” *Social Research*, 55.1 (Spring 1988): 43.

Conclusion

Why have Hungarian and Polish citizens voted and kept populists in power? And are the factors underpinning the electoral success of populists different when these movements are in opposition from when they are in government? We found both continuity and change in the drivers of populist support in Hungary and Poland from the mid-2000s to today.

We found that what the literature on global populism has defined as economic insecurity is the most significant and robust driver of voter support for populists in both Hungary and Poland. Consistent with previous qualitative work that points to some citizens' rejection of the post-communist political and economic track records in the region, our findings suggest that it is those who feel dissatisfied with their countries' transition to market democracy who have elected populists into government and kept them in office.

We further found evidence of the significance of another type of insecurity – cultural – also socially constructed in the transition process. The simultaneous transition to both market and democracy also happened at the time of the region's international opening and Europeanization. Voters dissatisfied with the normative hegemony of the liberal values, including liberal democracy, social equality, multilateralism, and multi-culturalism, have also tended to embrace populist movements. Such cultural insecurity, however, while statistically significant, has a smaller in magnitude impact on the voting behavior of Poles and Hungarian than economic insecurity.

In addition to such continuity in the drivers of populist support in Poland and Hungary, we found evidence of some change. First, seeing these parties in power has changed these voters' satisfaction with the political economy of their country (namely with democracy, the state of the economy, and the public services provided). Second, we found that ontological insecurity matters to populists' electoral success marginally and primarily when they are already in power. In other words, populist parties in Poland and Hungary have tended to take advantage of their incumbency to create a sense of emergency and mobilize voters who favor stability rather than come to power to instill social order.

These findings contribute to the literatures on global populism and democratization. We document a distinctive post-communist construction of economic and cultural insecurity, which were rooted in the region's transition away from communism and which were significant drivers of electoral support for populism. We also find evidence that just as voters might have different motivations for supporting traditional parties in opposition as opposed to the same parties when they are in power,⁵⁰ voters in post-communist Europe have different motivations for supporting populists when they are in opposition and when they are in government.

⁵⁰ Stiers, Dieter. "Beyond the distinction between incumbency and opposition: Retrospective voting at the level of political parties." *Party Politics*, 25. 6 (2019): 805–816.

Appendix I. Fidesz and PiS in Power (incl. regional controls)

Table 6. Electoral Support for Central European Populists while in Power (incl. regional controls)

	(1) Hungary	(2) Marginal Effects	(3) Poland	(4) Marginal Effects
Economic insecurity/ Domestic transition	0.459*** (0.077)	0.142*** (0.020)	0.601*** (0.086)	0.176*** (0.022)
Ontological insecurity/Post-communist Order	0.166*** (0.050)	0.052*** (0.015)	0.285*** (0.083)	0.084*** (0.023)
Cultural insecurity/ International Transition	-0.058 (0.045)	-0.018 (0.014)	-0.327*** (0.085)	-0.096*** (0.024)
Unemployed	0.049 (0.203)	0.015 (0.063)	0.433 (0.585)	0.127 (0.170)
Retired	-0.118 (0.169)	-0.037 (0.053)	0.007 (0.246)	0.002 (0.072)
Age	0.002 (0.020)	-0.003** (0.001)	0.030 (0.021)	-0.000 (0.001)
Age²	-0.000 (0.000)		-0.000 (0.000)	
Male	-0.011 (0.094)	-0.003 (0.029)	-0.149 (0.124)	-0.044 (0.036)
Lower secondary education	0.059 (0.227)	0.017 (0.066)	0.384** (0.176)	0.112** (0.049)
Upper secondary education	-0.228 (0.228)	-0.069 (0.067)	0.069 (0.163)	0.020 (0.048)
Post-secondary non-tertiary education	-0.418 (0.354)	-0.130 (0.110)	-0.256 (0.302)	-0.075 (0.089)
Tertiary education	-0.373 (0.283)	-0.115 (0.086)		
Catholic	0.234*** (0.090)	0.072*** (0.027)	0.311 (0.349)	0.091 (0.101)
Medium income	0.156 (0.101)	0.048 (0.031)	-0.034 (0.184)	-0.010 (0.054)

High income	-0.046	-0.015	-0.199	-0.058
	(0.109)	(0.034)	(0.220)	(0.064)
2012	-0.152	-0.047		
	(0.176)	(0.054)		
2014	-0.454***	-0.145***		
	(0.143)	(0.049)		
2016	-0.108	-0.033		
	(0.166)	(0.051)		
HU102	-0.148***	-0.051***		
	(0.051)	(0.018)		
HU211	0.552***	0.176***		
	(0.106)	(0.033)		
HU212	-0.016	-0.005		
	(0.105)	(0.036)		
HU213	0.427***	0.139***		
	(0.089)	(0.029)		
HU221	0.315**	0.104**		
	(0.146)	(0.047)		
HU222	1.041***	0.298***		
	(0.093)	(0.025)		
HU223	0.124*	0.042*		
	(0.071)	(0.024)		
HU231	0.577***	0.183***		
	(0.083)	(0.027)		
HU232	0.275**	0.091**		
	(0.126)	(0.042)		
HU233	0.811***	0.246***		
	(0.085)	(0.026)		
HU311	0.297***	0.098***		
	(0.076)	(0.024)		
HU312	0.245***	0.082***		
	(0.083)	(0.027)		
HU313	0.512***	0.165***		
	(0.102)	(0.033)		
HU321	0.651***	0.204***		
	(0.113)	(0.033)		
HU322	0.782***	0.238***		

	(0.069)	(0.021)		
HU323	0.297*** (0.104)	0.098*** (0.034)		
HU331	0.255*** (0.090)	0.085*** (0.030)		
HU332	0.794*** (0.125)	0.241*** (0.035)		
HU333	0.160** (0.076)	0.054** (0.025)		
PL12			0.298*** (0.046)	0.087*** (0.013)
PL21			0.167*** (0.065)	0.049** (0.019)
PL22			-0.366*** (0.038)	-0.107*** (0.009)
PL31			0.157*** (0.039)	0.046*** (0.013)
PL32			0.653*** (0.058)	0.191*** (0.022)
PL33			0.539*** (0.058)	0.158*** (0.016)
PL34			-0.358*** (0.066)	-0.105*** (0.019)
PL41			-0.234*** (0.079)	-0.068*** (0.023)
PL42			-0.668*** (0.117)	-0.196*** (0.036)
PL43			-0.795*** (0.086)	-0.233*** (0.023)
PL51			-0.156** (0.064)	-0.046** (0.019)
PL52			-0.648*** (0.090)	-0.190*** (0.024)
PL61			0.193* (0.112)	0.056* (0.034)
PL62			-0.641*** (0.092)	-0.188*** (0.024)

PL63			-0.078	-0.023
			(0.077)	(0.022)
Constant	0.538		-1.427*	
	(0.497)		(0.817)	
Observations	1,112	1,112	559	559
r2_p	0.174	.	0.251	.

* p<.05; ** p<.01; *** p<.001