

Illiberal Populism: A Synergy of Xenophobic nationalism, Identitarian Religion and Anti-Gender Mobilization?

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Abstract:

Although Hungarian PM Viktor Orbán had declared that he does not deal with ‘women issues’ (he did so recalling Hungary’s female ambassador to the US), he just put women in the centre of his government program after his 2018 electoral victory. In exchange for extra government funds, a preferential credit and a life-long tax exemption, Orbán wants women to bear enough children to ensure the hegemony of the Carpathian Basin, to avoid economic decline, and to prevent the Islamization of Europe. The re-politicization of gender relations has been on the political agenda ever since Orbán came to power in 2010 with a radical right-wing populist and nationalist narrative. This paper examines how the discursive construction of the supremacy of the nation and national interest not only favours the adoption of majoritarian rules at the expense of minorities but also influences gendered norms and practices in politics and society. Scrutinizing the populist discourse and policy of the prime minister, the paper illustrates how nativist conceptions, conservative preferences for traditional values, religious moralism and ethnicised nationalism all point towards anti-feminism and opposition to sexual equality. In Orbán’s illiberal democracy – later renamed Christian democracy – while individual liberties suffer, supremacy of the traditional family – defined as union of a man and a woman – is promoted to the extent that advocates for women movements or equal LGBTQ rights become labelled traitors of the nation and a threat to national interest, often invoking “gender conspiracies” that aim at subverting traditional society. The populist rejection of liberal democracy thus creates a political discourse that stands for a synergy of xenophobic nationalism, identitarian religion and anti-gender and anti-LGBTQ mobilization that is sponsored by the state.

In his first interview on national radio following his third consecutive electoral victory in April 2018, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán declared he wants to have a “comprehensive deal” with women for the next thirty years. Putting women in the centre of his government programme came as a surprise. After all, Orbán had repeatedly declared previously that he does not deal with “women’s issues”. What is less surprising is the deal offered to women that only reconfirms denial of their equality and autonomy: Orbán wants Hungarian women to bear more children in exchange for extra government funds, a preferential credit and a life-long personal tax exemption for women with four children or more. Yet, the deal is only for women below forty, and couples must be married to qualify for family loans of more than \$30,000, which are written off should they have three children, or use the cash incentive to buy large seven-seat family vehicles.¹ For Orbán, childrearing, although it should be a personal choice, is simultaneously the most important issue for the national community and the only way to ensure Hungarian hegemony of the Carpathian Basin, to avoid economic decline and to prevent the Islamization of Europe.

The repoliticisation of gender politics has been on the political agenda ever since Orbán came to power in 2010. Leading the wave of anti-democratic and anti-EU developments in Europe, Hungary is also at the forefront of attacks on feminism and gender equality due to the radical, populist and nationalist shift² in the political discourse of Orbán’s “illiberal democracy,” later renamed Christian democracy.³ Using a systematic discourse analysis of Orbán’s speeches from 2010 to 2018, this paper argues Orbán has appropriated the concept of gender and integrated into his populist anti-establishment discourse. Using the populist claim that there is a “gender agenda” to be imposed on “the people”,⁴ the counter-term to gender and sexual equality is the “family”, which pursues secularizing trajectory⁵ since family is seen as “providing continuity with the past”

¹ Viktória Serdült, “Challenging Orbán’s Echo Chamber: Against the Odds a New Mayor from an Opposition Party Has Come to Power in Budapest. We Report on His Promises to Push Back against Orbán,” *Index on Censorship* 48, no. 4 (2019): 12–14.

² See, for example, “Hungary’s ‘Illiberalism’ should not go unchallenged,” *Washington Post*, August 16, 2014; Honor Mahony, “Orbán wants to build ‘illiberal state’,” *EUObserver*, July 28, 2014; “Orbán the Unstoppable,” *The Economist*, September 27, 2014.

³ Csaba Tóth, “Full Text of Viktor Orbán’s Speech at Băile Tuşnad (Tusnádfürdő) of 26 July 2014,” *The Budapest Beacon* 29 (2014).

⁴ Agnieszka Graff, Ratna Kapur, and Suzanna Danuta Walters, “Introduction: Gender and the Rise of the Global Right,” *Signs: Journal of Women in Culture and Society* 44, no. 3 (2019): 541–60.

⁵ Isabelle Engeli, Christoffer Green-Pedersen, and Lars Thorup Larsen, *Morality Politics in Western Europe: Parties, Agendas and Policy Choices*, ed. L. Thorup Larsen, Comparative Studies of Political Agendas (Palgrave

that nationalism demands.⁶ As a result, Orbán’s discourse is not only right-wing populist in being anti-establishment, anti-elite or anti-Europe⁷ but also ethnocentric in being anti-migrant and uses Christian religion to define traditional family models, conservative values and pro-natalist preferences that only strengthen opposition to gender and sexual equality. In this way, Orbán’s illiberal populism relies on a political discourse of xenophobic nationalism combined with identitarian religion and anti-gender mobilization to ensure the supremacy of the nation and national interest above all others.

Let us now proceed and examine how the dismantling of democratic institutions in a country that used to be a forerunner of post-communist democratization⁸ went hand in hand with the dismantling of liberal equality. The first part of the paper examines how discursive processes of *othering* are key not only for nationalism but for understanding how populist can construct crises and identity fears to justify radical change (to solve these crises). This is followed by a brief background on Hungarian politics to contextualize the discourse of the prime minister that is examined in the following sections. Orbán’s speeches during his second government (he was first in office from 1998 to 2002), reveal that the 2010–14 period has been dominated by the discourse of economic crisis, evoking Christian morals so as to enable Hungary’s righteous fight against immoral foreign capital. The same Christian morality in turn prescribes women a secondary role in society. Turning to Orbán’s third government in 2014–18, instead of a normalization in the discourse of the incumbent PM, we see the discourse shifts suddenly to the topic of fighting migration, portrayed as a cultural, religious and civilizational existential threat. This results in a more radical right-wing populist and xenophobic nationalist discursive strategy that attacks all Others, portrayed in a two-fold opposition (vertical and horizontal) of “the people” against “those on top” (and those on bottom) and against an alien or threatening “outside”.⁹ A brief concluding section outlines how Orbán’s populist discourse has at its core nationalism, religion and gender

Macmillan UK, 2012), <https://doi.org/10.1057/9781137016690>.

⁶ Gail Kligman and Susan Gal, *Reproducing Gender: Politics, Publics, and Everyday Life after Socialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), 68.

⁷ Rogers Brubaker, “Between Nationalism and Civilizationism: The European Populist Moment in Comparative Perspective,” *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 40, no. 8 (2017): 1191–1226.

⁸ Zsolt Enyedi, “Populist Polarization and Party System Institutionalization: The Role of Party Politics in de-Democratization,” *Problems of Post-Communism* 63, no. 4 (2016): 210–20.

⁹ Rogers Brubaker, “Populism and Nationalism,” *Nations and Nationalism* 26, no. 1 (January 1, 2020): 44–66, <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12522>.

roles, where nativist conceptions, conservative preferences, religious moralism and ethicised nationalism all point towards portraying the nation and national interest as absolute.

Discursive Othering: Constructing “Our” Fear of “Them”

Collective identity rests upon definitions of “Us” and “Them” that are often the result of discursive processes of othering that define both the group and its enemies. In this sense, collective identity is the outcome of social contestation between and within the groups.¹⁰ This process of how Us vs. Them are defined and conceptualized is crucial because othering serves to justify the legitimacy of political action and consequently conditions the identity formation for both Us and Them.¹¹ If the Other is portrayed as posing threats (e.g. socioeconomic, cultural, religious or criminal threats), this will result in clear blame attribution.¹² Blame attribution can justify exclusionist policies, extreme measures or the denial of rights that are at the centre of illiberal politics, challenging liberal equality for the sake of protecting the community. Following this logic, the denial of recognition for minorities is coupled with radicalized inclusionary and exclusionary criteria that oppose liberal and pluralistic democracy.¹³

At the same time, categories of “the people” or “the others” can be constructed with such great flexibility that some call these terms “empty vessels”.¹⁴ Since political discourses present a constant struggle between competing notions of identity, values, issues and society overall,¹⁵ they reflect a particular representation of social and political structures and practices.¹⁶ In this sense, discourses shape common understandings in a process that can be characterized as the

¹⁰ Rawi Abdelal et al., “Treating Identity as a Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity, and Contestation of Identity” (APSA, San Francisco, 2001).

¹¹ Sune Qvortrup Jensen, “Othering, Identity Formation and Agency,” *Qualitative Studies* 2, no. 2 (2011): 63–78.

¹² Cecil Meeusen and Laura Jacobs, “Television News Content of Minority Groups as an Intergroup Context Indicator of Differences between Target-Specific Prejudices,” *Mass Communication and Society* 20, no. 2 (2017): 213–40.

¹³ Péter Krekó and Gregor Mayer, “Transforming Hungary–Together? An Analysis of the Fidesz–Jobbik Relationship,” in *Transforming the Transformation? The East European Radical Right in the Political Process*, ed. Michael Minkenberg (London: Routledge, 2015), 183–205.

¹⁴ Cas Mudde and Cristóbal Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism: Comparing Contemporary Europe and Latin America,” *Government and Opposition* 48, no. 2 (2013): 151.

¹⁵ John S. Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (OUP Oxford, 2013).

¹⁶ Ruth Wodak, *Gender and Discourse* (London: Sage, 1997), <https://doi.org/10.4135/9781446250204>; Ruth Wodak and Gilbert Weiss, “Analyzing European Union Discourses: Theories and Applications,” in *A New Agenda in (Critical) Discourse Analysis: Theory, Methodology and Interdisciplinarity*, ed. Ruth Wodak and Paul Anthony Chilton (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2005), 121–35.

intersubjective construction of meaning.¹⁷ Political discourse is thus the discursive construction of reality,¹⁸ where ideational interpretations are more important than empirical facts.¹⁹

The radical right understands democracy as a principle that has, as its central feature, “a myth of a homogeneous nation, a romantic and populist ultra-nationalism, which is directed against the concept of liberal and pluralistic democracy and its underlying principles of individualism and universalism”.²⁰ Others have identified the radical right as standing for nativism and authoritarianism in ideology.²¹ In turn, right-wing populism “pits a virtuous and homogeneous people against a set of elites and dangerous ‘others’ who are together depicted as depriving (or attempting to deprive) the sovereign people of their rights, values, prosperity, identity and voice”.²² Right-wing populism often combines “the revolutionary impulse of populism” with nationalism,²³ an ideology that values membership in the nation (an imagined community) above all other groups²⁴ and claims that national and political borders should coincide.²⁵ In this sense, nationalism, at its core, is about othering since issues of inclusion and exclusion are central to the formation of the nation. Similarly, for right-wing populism, othering is the way “We” is defined – by excluding Them.²⁶

¹⁷ Thomas Christiansen, Knud Erik Jorgensen, and Antje Wiener, “The Social Construction of Europe,” *Journal of European Public Policy* 6, no. 4 (1999): 528–44.

¹⁸ Michelle M. Lazar, ed., *Feminist Critical Discourse Analysis: Gender, Power and Ideology in Discourse* (Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2005), <https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230599901>.

¹⁹ Michelle M. Lazar, “Gender, Discourse and Semiotics: The Politics of Parenthood Representations,” *Discourse & Society* 11, no. 3 (2000): 373–400.

²⁰ Michael Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker? The Radical Right in Europe, West and East: Between Margin and Mainstream,” *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 21, no. 1 (2013): 337.

²¹ Cas Mudde, *Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), <https://doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511492037>.

²² Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell, “Introduction: The Sceptre and the Spectre,” in *Twenty-First Century Populism*, by Daniele Albertazzi and Duncan McDonnell (Basingstoke: Springer, 2008), 11; Mudde and Rovira Kaltwasser, “Exclusionary vs. Inclusionary Populism.”

²³ Erin K. Jenne, “Is Nationalism or Ethnopolitics on the Rise Today?,” *Ethnopolitics* 17, no. 5 (2018): 546.

²⁴ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (London: Verso books, 2006).

²⁵ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983).

²⁶ Ruth Wodak, “‘Doing Europe’: The Discursive Construction of European Identities,” in *Discursive Constructions of Identity in European Politics*, ed. Richard C. M. Mole, Language and Globalization (London: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2007), 70–94, https://doi.org/10.1057/9780230591301_4; Ruth Wodak, “Discourses in European Union Organizations: Aspects of Access, Participation, and Exclusion,” *Text & Talk* 27, no. 5–6 (2007): 655–80; Nira Yuval-Davis, “Gender and Nation,” in *Women, Ethnicity and Nationalism: The Politics of Transition*, ed. Rick Wilford and Robert L. Miller (London and New York: Routledge, 1998), 23–35; Andreas Wimmer, “Dominant Ethnicity and Dominant Nationhood,” *Rethinking Ethnicity: Majority Groups and Dominant Minorities*, 2004, 40–58.

Right-wing populists often combine ethnicity with religion in defining the Self and the Other,²⁷ grounding their view of the family or gender roles to a conservative interpretation of the Christian message. Religious symbols, ideals or feelings of belonging are purposefully selected to legitimize claims to political authority; yet, most analysts agree that, while churches speak of faith, right-wing populists are interested in identity – their understanding of Christian identity promotes a romanticized ideal of the national community in some golden age, uncorrupted by elites or Others.²⁸

Methods and Data

This paper looks at Orbán’s speeches delivered during his second and third government²⁹ and compares the two periods to see if staying in office induced any substantial change – based on claims that populists consolidate their discourse once they become the new elite. The reason for selecting the PM’s speeches is the absolute power Orbán enjoys over his party, Fidesz – he has an ultimate say in any policy matter, which makes him the primary author of Hungarian political discourse. All speeches are available and have been translated into English on the government website.³⁰ While the texts contain all types of speeches, statements and interviews, I treat all texts the same for the purposes of analysis. While for the 2010–14 government cycle there are a total of 142 speeches and interviews, for 2014–18 there are 423. The speeches are numbered chronologically, starting with the 2010 election victory speech.

Democratic Backsliding in Hungary

The 2010 victory of Orbán’s Fidesz was the start of a major turn in Hungarian politics, breaking down the institutions of the post-communist status quo. Hungary used to be a model case for accommodating cultural diversity through minority protection and group-specific rights,³¹

²⁷ Daniel Nilsson DeHanas and Marat Shterin, “Religion and the Rise of Populism,” *Religion, State and Society* 46, no. 3 (July 3, 2018): 182, <https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2018.1502911>.

²⁸ Mieke Verloo and David Paternotte, “The Feminist Project under Threat in Europe,” *Politics and Governance* 6, no. 3 (2018): 1–5; Isabelle Engeli, “Gender and Sexuality Research in the Age of Populism: Lessons for Political Science,” *European Political Science*, 2019, 1–10.

²⁹ Orbán was first in power from 1998 to 2002.

³⁰ However, it seems the English translation is toned down, as the Hungarian version on occasion uses more radical expressions. See <http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/the-prime-minister-s-speeches>

³¹ Multicultural minority accommodation was a conscious liberal policy to serve as a model for neighbouring countries, host states of co-ethnic Hungarians as a result of World War I Hungary having lost two-thirds of its

although public opinion polls have shown that chauvinism and xenophobia among ordinary Hungarians have been common,³² and radical right parties also have support.³³ Orbán opposes multiculturalism and is in favour of an ethnic nation. Similarly, though post-regime change Hungary is largely secular, the guarantees of religious freedom and state neutrality³⁴ are now challenged by Fidesz, which uses religious symbols in an eclectic way to serve a romantic myth of a homogeneous nation in a golden age, making religion instrumental to the party strategy.

Gender equality or domestic violence against women have been problems that have plagued post-regime change Hungary, characterized by essentialised gender and sexual norms. Hungary's patriarchal society was left unchallenged even during socialism as men's superior position within the spheres of politics, work and the family was preserved.³⁵ While feminism or gender equality have never been on top of the political agenda, positive developments in gender equality took place within the EU accession, but gender mainstreaming was weakly institutionalized. Since 2010, although the anti-gender discourse regained momentum only later – following the debate in the wake of the EU Estrela and Lunacek reports in 2014³⁶ – there has been a setback in all areas of gender equality, and the only consultative body dealing with gender issues (the Council for Social

territory and a third of its people to its neighbours (Nándor Bárdi, “Magyarország És a Kisebbségi Magyar Közösségek 1989 Után,” *A Múlt Jelene–a Jelen Múltja. Folytonosság És Megszakítottóság a Politikai Magatartásformákban Az Ezredforduló Magyarországon*, 2013, 40.)

³² E.g. Bori Simonovits et al., *The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary*, vol. 155 (Budapest: Társki Social Research Institute, 2016), 41.

³³ The first such party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (MIÉP Magyar Igazság és Élet Pártja), passed the 5% parliamentary threshold with a pan-Hungarian agenda open to racism and anti-Semitism (see Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker?” Minkenberg, “From Pariah to Policy-Maker?”). Jobbik (the name in Hungarian implies both “better” and “more to the right”) became popular with an agenda of fighting “gypsy crime” (Gergely Karácsony and Dániel Róna, “The Secret of Jobbik. Reasons behind the Rise of the Hungarian Radical Right.,” *Journal of East European & Asian Studies* 2, no. 1 (2011)) and the founding of a paramilitary wing, the Hungarian Guard Movement (András Bíró Nagy, Tamás Boros, and Zoltán Vasali, “More Radical than the Radicals: The Jobbik Party in International Comparison,” in *Right-Wing Extremism In Europe: Country Analyses, Counter Strategies and Labor Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, by Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013), 229–53. András Bíró Nagy, Tamás Boros, and Zoltán Vasali, “More Radical than the Radicals: The Jobbik Party in International Comparison,” in *Right-Wing Extremism In Europe: Country Analyses, Counter Strategies and Labor Market Oriented Exit Strategies*, by Ralf Melzer and Sebastian Serafin (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2013), 229–53.).

³⁴ Zsolt Enyedi, “The Contested Politics of Positive Neutrality in Hungary,” *West European Politics* 26, no. 1 (2003): 161.

³⁵ Éva Fodor, *Working Difference: Women's Working Lives in Hungary and Austria, 1945–1995* (Duke University Press, 2003). Éva Fodor, *Working Difference: Women's Working Lives in Hungary and Austria, 1945–1995* (Duke University Press, 2003).

³⁶ Eszter Kováts and Andrea Pető, “Anti-Gender Discourse in Hungary: A Discourse without a Movement,” in *Anti-Gender Campaigns in Europe: Mobilizing against Equality*, ed. Roman Kuhar and David Paternotte (London–New York: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2017), 117–31.

Equality among Women and Men, set up in 2000) has been disbanded.³⁷

Following its electoral victory, to signal a break with the past, Fidesz adopted a new constitution (called the Fundamental Law) that defines Christianity as a force that preserves “nationhood”³⁸ and includes a passage on the protection of life from conception. It also defines the family as the marriage of a man and a woman (heterosexual) and/or as the relationship between parents and children (reproductive), with families being the basic unit of the nation. The new constitution also divides the political community into Us and Them – those who do not belong to Christianity or the ethnic nation or who refuse to vow fidelity to the will of the majority see their rights infringed.³⁹ These all suggest that the foundations upon which Orbán built his illiberal politics had been long present before 2010.⁴⁰ The following pages show how Orbán has built his discourse on these foundations using right-wing populist strategies combined with nationalism and religion as well as a masculine worldview to rally support for his illiberal regime.

2010–14: Traditionalist Families to Fight Economic Crisis

A quick overview of the discourse of the second Orbán government (2010–14) shows that the main theme of PM’s talk is the economic crisis that hit Hungary particularly hard. The most often used references are crisis, the Hungarian economy, markets and the need to protect Hungary and Hungarians (see Appendix for keywords). All speeches focus solely on Hungary and the Hungarians; foreigners, aliens, migration or immigration as terms are barely mentioned at all. In contrast, the European Union and other European countries are mentioned as often as Hungary since, according to Orbán, Hungary must fight the EU and Western countries in its quest to overcome its crisis. In portraying the EU as siding with foreign capital, the EU becomes identified with the Other, a traitor using double standards against Hungary despite the country being part of Europe: “We accept the common moral standards of European cultural nations, but we will not accept double standards.”⁴¹

³⁷ Dorottya Szikra, “Democracy and Welfare in Hard Times: The Social Policy of the Orbán Government in Hungary between 2010 and 2014,” *Journal of European Social Policy* 24, no. 5 (2014): 486–500.

³⁸ Note that the 2012 Church Act allows government to pick and choose among churches to officially recognize, see Zsolt Enyedi, “Paternalist Populism and Illiberal Elitism in Central Europe,” *Journal of Political Ideologies* 21, no. 1 (2016): 16–17.

³⁹ Balázs Majtényi, Ákos Kopper, and Pál Susánszky, “Constitutional Othering, Ambiguity and Subjective Risks of Mobilization in Hungary: Examples from the Migration Crisis,” *Democratization* 26, no. 2 (2019): 173–89.

⁴⁰ Krekó and Mayer, “Transforming Hungary–Together?,” 201.

⁴¹ Orbán, Speech, 9.

Economic Grievance-based Populism

Orbán's discourse deals with Hungarian identity solely in economic terms and the economic crisis is a threat to this economic Self. Despite posing as a saviour of Hungarians, ethno-cultural references are largely missing from the discourse, Orbán barely mentions Hungarian ethnicity, culture and tradition. This fits well with claims that not all populism has to be nationalistic or use reference to cultural nationhood or ethnicity, the community can be construed in economic terms.⁴² Similarly, there is no talk about religion except for the speeches addressed to specific church authorities, although references to Christianity abound. Similarly, while women are barely mentioned, talk on the family and the need to protect families is often at the centre of the speeches. In this economic identity-based politics, the Others are also conceived of in financial terms: banks and bankers (106 mentions) and multinationals (30 mentions) represent "multinational capital" positioned against the Hungarian economy. Foreign capital together with the European Union are to be blamed alongside the former socialist governments for the crisis people must face. In turn, Hungary is to stand on its own to fight this challenge by relying on its people and its resources. Hungary's new constitution is portrayed as one of the means of this solitary fight (143 mentions) – a source of trust (96 mentions) and unity (36 mentions). Emphasizing the value of nationalism, religion and traditional family values, the constitution becomes a primary means of Hungary's response to the crisis.

When it comes to other discursive strategies, Orbán's narrative relies heavily on common themes of populist discourse, such as the perception of crisis (398 mentions), threat (29 times) or lack of security (48 times). The discursive othering is best seen in the frequency of his references to "us" and "our", by far the most frequently occurring keywords in the speeches. The discourse focuses on societal identity fears to justify decisive and immediate action to protect against these fears. And while the crisis is economic, Orbán calls for action that affects every aspect of life: "the total renewal of our homeland, Hungary; total renewal and as a result, radical reorganization within every dimension: intellectual, moral, spiritual, economic and social".⁴³

Other populist discursive strategies such as constant appeals to the people or identification with

⁴² Brubaker, "Populism and Nationalism."

⁴³ Orbán, Speech, 15.

the “true people” are also present, and Orbán claims “because I am familiar with our kind, I also know that Hungarians dislike ‘spoon-fed talk’”.⁴⁴ This way he speaks in the name of or for the nation, expressing popular will and claiming ultimate legitimacy as the “national voice” who knows: “What is good for the Hungarians? What is good for the Hungarian nation? What is good for the Hungarian people?”⁴⁵ Like other populists, Orbán often makes anti-elite and anti-establishment claims that grant him the possibility to distance himself from his predecessors and the establishment, to claim he is not part of the political elite but instead speaks in the name of the people, addressing their grievances: “We felt that we had been cheated, that the Hungarian people were being cheated, and through them the Hungarian Government, and then we said, let’s start using a different tone of voice.”⁴⁶

Christian Morality and Traditional Families to Fight Crisis

Religion is the only exception to the non-presence of cultural markers in this economy-based conception of Hungarian self-identity. Orbán refers more often to Christianity and Christian roots (175 mentions) than any other aspect of identity – even language, which Orbán thinks is the clearest distinctive sign of Hungarian-ness. Nevertheless, religion is not portrayed as a belief system but rather a source of legitimacy or morality when Orbán talks about the political and institutional changes envisioned or enacted. As for many other populists,⁴⁷ for Orbán, Christianity is thus a source of moral values, traditional norms and directives, which are much needed to renew Hungary and fend off the crisis. Orbán claims the economic crisis is due to a moral crisis, caused in turn by the diminishing role of Christianity in Europe and blamed on Brussels: “When constructing Europe we began to be ashamed of our Christian roots and to neglect them along with our moral and cultural traditions.”⁴⁸ This way, the entire capitalist system is not only unjust, but the credit system (that led to the crisis) is considered immoral too: “The loans which our countries are suffering from no longer have any relation to any kind of moral principle.”⁴⁹ This way, Hungary

⁴⁴ Orbán, Speech, 26.

⁴⁵ Orbán, Speech, 14.

⁴⁶ Orbán, Speech, 129.

⁴⁷ Olivier Roy, ed., *Rethinking the Place of Religion in European Secularized Societies: The Need for More Open Societies* (Florence: EUI RSCAS, 2016), <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/40305>.

⁴⁸ Orbán, Speech, 33.

⁴⁹ Orbán, Speech, 15.

with its “Christian moral principles” not only has a “strong moral identity”⁵⁰ but a duty to oppose immoral multinational capital and its supporters.

The discourse stresses the religious foundation of morality-based politics since “important things – work, credit, family, nation – have become dissolved from the moral foundations that Christianity provided to us”.⁵¹ Using this logic, the Fidesz government has not only enshrined “the family” as a marriage between a man and a woman into the constitution but it also clearly defines the role of women – they should stay at home to rear enough children to form a strong Hungarian nation.⁵² This is because, for Orbán, the demographic downturn in Hungary is as important as fighting the economic crisis, because it threatens the future of the community, making Hungarians “an endangered species”⁵³. The family is central to fighting this challenge, making it solely responsible for demographic change. “As for families: here we should say a straightforward sentence. A community, that is unable to sustain itself biologically will not survive and does not deserve it either.”⁵⁴ Moreover, parents are responsible for the success of their children – mainly mothers, who are seen as the caretakers of the family.⁵⁵

Orbán blames the former Hungarian governments together with the EU for both the economic crisis and the country’s demographic downturn. First, his political opponents are charged with taking away “one year of maternity benefit”,⁵⁶ and adopting policies that made “more and more people live not for their children, but off their children and off the benefits received because of their children”.⁵⁷ Secular and liberal EU and its gender equality norms are blamed second “because the family is under constant attack, and many view raising a family as something that is in the way of self-fulfilment”.⁵⁸ Although Orbán himself admits that Hungary is among “those European countries in which the willingness to have children is lowest”, he blames modern lifestyles challenging traditional values because “the reduction of family communities based on stable

⁵⁰ Orbán, Speech, 38.

⁵¹ Orbán, Speech, 15.

⁵² Nicole VT Lugosi, “Radical Right Framing of Social Policy in Hungary: Between Nationalism and Populism,” *Journal of International and Comparative Social Policy* 34, no. 3 (September 2, 2018): 226, <https://doi.org/10.1080/21699763.2018.1483256>.

⁵³ Orbán, Speech, 90.

⁵⁴ Orbán, Speech, 63.

⁵⁵ Orbán, Speech, 42.

⁵⁶ Orbán, Speech, 39.

⁵⁷ Orbán, Speech, 110.

⁵⁸ Orbán, Speech, 15.

commitments” in turn results in a society where “the proportion of children born outside wedlock is 42 percent, and the age of women at the birth of their first child is 30”.⁵⁹ Although the sanctity of marriage and family understood as “a man and a woman, and one of each”, annuls the rights of LGBT+ people, Orbán claims “this is not directed against anybody”⁶⁰ because Hungarians are “a people with a very family-centric and child-centric way of thinking”.⁶¹ In contrast to secular, gender-equal or sexually non-discriminating Europe, Orbán claims “studies show that young people would like to have more children”⁶² but economic difficulties prevent this from happening, so “demographically motivated family policies are essential and legitimate”.⁶³

Although the Fidesz government introduced family taxation, extended parental leave and promised support for working mothers, such as “community childcare and possible community child raising, such as nurseries and kindergartens”,⁶⁴ it would be wrong to assume Orbán supports the emancipation of women by promoting their return to the labour force. His sexism comes to light when he recalls that “the Creator was aware of the fact that it was not good for man on his own, and so he created man and woman, and as such practically speaking he created the family”.⁶⁵ Yet, women are not only supposed to ensure what is “good for a man” but they should also focus on the family, which is mainly their responsibility. As such, even Fidesz’s preferential retirement programme for women, in fact, only reinforces gender inequality since women gain this benefit only to work more as “family caretakers”: “Women can now retire after 40 years of registered employment. This, in addition to the fact that they obviously deserve it, is also an opportunity for them to spend more time with their families, and especially with their children and grandchildren. And so I think that this enables an important opportunity to strengthen family ties.”⁶⁶

All the above suggests a right-wing, populist reconceptualization of the (true) people of the nation. The discourse is anti-elite, anti-establishment and anti-European, and it predicates that no critics of this approach can be considered part of the “true people”. Supporters of the European Union or liberal values, critics of Christian values or traditional lifeforms, supporters of gender equality or sexual non-discrimination do not belong to this group anymore. While the discourse is abundant

⁵⁹ Orbán, Speech, 15.

⁶⁰ Orbán, Speech, 50.

⁶¹ Orbán, Speech, 90.

⁶² Orbán, Speech, 87.

⁶³ Orbán, Speech, 63.

⁶⁴ Orbán, Speech, 90.

⁶⁵ Orbán, Speech, 97.

⁶⁶ Orbán, Speech, 129.

in right-wing, populist themes, nationalism frames are less present as the discourse is solely focused on an economic understanding of the world. Nevertheless, identitarian Christianity figures as a cultural marker of Hungarian-ness. The same Christian roots and support for traditional values give Hungary a strong moral identity and legitimacy in its economic fight and its attempt to reverse the demographic decline by strengthening the family – at the expense of opportunities for women, who are relegated to care for children and the family.

2014–18: Migration as Nemesis of the Nation and the Family

Turning to the 2014–18 period and the third Orbán government, we notice a major turn in Orbán’s political discourse, starting in 2015, that is solely focused on migration. This is a sudden change as issues of migration, refugees, asylum seekers or immigration had been absolutely ignored in the previous cycle. While Hungary has never been a target of migration, since 2015, these issues become the main topic – 180 of the 422 speeches talk about these. Moreover, Orbán first spoke against migration in February 2015, well in advance of the European refugee crisis in the summer of the same year, when 350,000 refugees passed through the country on their way to Western Europe. Migration becomes Orbán’s new nemesis as it brings “people, many of whom are unwilling to accept European culture, or who come here with the intent of destroying European culture”.⁶⁷ The primacy of the anti-migration topic is still preserved in 2018, even though Hungary had built a fence three years prior, keeping refugees out of the country. Moreover, Orbán’s discourse only radicalizes further over the years, to the extent that he is willing to break taboos – yet another populist discursive strategy⁶⁸ – claiming that although it is forbidden to talk about it openly “immigration brings crime and terrorism to our countries”⁶⁹.

Ethnocultural Nation vs Migrants and Refugee Quotas

More importantly, in this new discourse, the Other is reconceptualised: Instead of neoliberal international capital, it is now portrayed either as the image of “the migrant” or the European Union and the shared European refugee system. Domestic organizations that help migrants are also

⁶⁷ Orbán’s State of the Nation Address, 27 February 2015, Budapest.

⁶⁸ Benjamin Moffitt and Simon Tormey, “Rethinking Populism: Politics, Mediatisation and Political Style,” *Political Studies* 62, no. 2 (2014): 381–97.

⁶⁹ Orbán’s 15 March 2016 National Day speech, Budapest.

defined as enemies. The image of crisis, threat and danger remains the essence of the discourse, despite the fact that the fence stops all potential migrants at the borders of Hungary. This also demonstrates that “political crises are, by definition, constructed, and populists can have an important role in the framing-process”.⁷⁰ It is Orbán’s discursive strategy that ensures the image of the crisis remains central to the understanding of the Hungarian Self; the only change is that the economic threat is now replaced with threats related to migration and the alien Other, who endanger cultural, religious or civilizational survival.⁷¹

As such, this reconceptualised self-identity becomes more interwoven with language, culture and tradition – a unique civilization built on ethnic particularism: “Being a Hungarian is a mission, a task, a job of work: to maintain, strengthen and carry forward a great, lonely, thousand-year-old civilization, built on the Hungarian language and on the foundations of the Hungarian mentality, and surrounded by dissimilar nations.”⁷² Yet, it is not enough that the nation is conceived on particularistic ethnic and cultural terms but the discourse is clearly chauvinist – Orbán and his government alone have the legitimacy to decide who can belong: “Only those who have permission from our elected parliament, government or some other official state body can enter the territory of Hungary, can settle here and live here with us; and we can say that we shall not obey anybody else’s word and shall not accept orders from anyone else who states that we must admit this person or that person.”⁷³

What remains constant in the post-2015 discourse is Orbán’s continuous use of the same right-wing populist political strategies that were outlined above. He often speaks in the name of the nation, using the term “we” or posturing as one of the people. In the same way, Orbán’s anti-European discourse has only strengthened since 2015. Europe, and more specifically the European Union, continues to be a threatening Other since his understanding of Hungarian identity as based on exclusionist ethnic/cultural/civilizational norms is threatened by migrants and refugees that the EU is ready to force on Hungary: “Brussels must not have the power to forcibly resettle here people

⁷⁰ Zsolt Enyedi, “Plebeians, Citoyens and Aristocrats or Where Is the Bottom of Bottom-up? The Case of Hungary,” in *European Populism in the Shadow of the Great Recession*, ed. Hanspeter Kriesi and Takis Pappas (Colchester: ECPR Press, 2015), 243, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/36489>.

⁷¹ “This change facing Europe – or which, in my opinion, is threatening Europe – can also have an effect at the deeper, civilizational layers. The identity of civilization in Europe could change.” Orbán, Speech, 251.

⁷² Orbán, Speech, 398.

⁷³ Orbán, Speech, 356.

whom we do not want to live together with.”⁷⁴

As a right-wing populist, Orbán’s discourse also remains anti-elite, and he is not only against the European elite that he portrays as unaware of what people want because “it is sitting in a closed, ideological shell, which means it has hardly any connection to reality”⁷⁵, but he is also against the previous ruling elite in Hungary that he continues to attack for betraying people’s will: “You cannot run the life of a country by the elite closing its eyes and ears to a fundamentally important issue and ploughing ahead regardless of what the people are saying.”⁷⁶ For Orbán, political leadership can only be legitimate if it speaks in the name of “the people”, in the service of the national interest. In turn, only Orbán himself can claim to represent this will.

Ethnocentrism and Christian Religion against Gender Equality

The ethnocentric reconfiguration of the Hungarian Self in Orbán’s discourse is also signalled by difference in reference to religion. While in the first cycle, he used identitarian Christianity⁷⁷ as a cultural marker, a source of moral standing and legitimacy, in the post-2015 speeches, he uses references to faith as well in defining the Self. This way, faith or religion becomes an identity marker contrasting Christian religion with Islam and Muslims, portrayed as threatening to both Hungarians and Europe as a whole. “This mass population movement also coincides with an offensive by a major world religion: Islam’s latest global offensive”.⁷⁸ The Other, of a different religion and culture, must be opposed since migration only a cultural threat to Hungary alone but a “clash of civilizations” between Christian Europe and the Muslim migrants.

The reconfigured discourse thus employs an uneasy mix of Christianity understood as faith and Christianity seen as identity. This blurring of Christianity as religion and cultural identity is most noticeable in Orbán’s fears for the fate of freedom of religion, the fight against anti-Semitism or gender equality when confronted with the spread of other religions in Europe.⁷⁹ Ironically, immigration is simultaneously a threat to both “our conventional European values: for families, for national communities, for church communities, for the conventional forms of child-rearing,

⁷⁴ Orbán, Speech, 193.

⁷⁵ Orbán, Speech, 299.

⁷⁶ Orbán, Speech, 356.

⁷⁷ Roy, *Rethinking the Place of Religion in European Secularized Societies*.

⁷⁸ Orbán, Speech, 481.

⁷⁹ Orbán, Speech, 480.

and for the traditional family model”⁸⁰ that are all rooted in Christianity. In this way, Orbán conveys a contradiction in terms: Christianity not only provides all kinds of cultural and traditional values, but it is an open, if not liberal, faith that assures gender equality and freedom of religion as well as fights against anti-Semitism, unlike “barbaric” Islam. Similarly, although he saw earlier no reason to acknowledge LGBT groups or gender equality, he now claims migration would endanger “customs related to sexual relations which have evolved in European culture.”⁸¹ It matters little that true believers oppose gender equality or gay rights in favour of the traditional family and defend the permissiveness of differences in status between men and women, the sanctity of marriage or the pro-life versus pro-choice preference.⁸²

It is not only religious references in the discourse that mobilize against gender equality but Orbán also uses the image of women in danger to substantiate the crisis Hungarians face due to migration; his government alone can ensure there will be “no gangs hunting Hungarian women, our wives and daughters”.⁸³ At the same time, he accuses Western media of relying on the same depiction of vulnerable women, who, unlike men, need protection, saying that migrants are portrayed as “women and children, while seventy percent of the migrants are young men and they look like an army”.⁸⁴ Using these images of vulnerable women on both sides of the conflict, Orbán actually recreates the inequality of the sexes in line with his masculine world view where women are inferior to men.

Nevertheless, other aspects of the discourse suggests that Orbán has changed his mind about the equality of the sexes: While in the 2010–14 period he never talked about gender equality, he now repeatedly equates Europe (Hungary being part of it) with “the equality of men and women”⁸⁵, and he makes statements such as “in today’s modern world women work just as much as men do”⁸⁶ or “in Hungary – as usual – women tend to be the braver sex”.⁸⁷ This is in stark contrast with what he had to say about women in the previous cycle, when women only get mentioned as mothers/grandmothers who should concentrate on the family and raising children to improve

⁸⁰ Orbán, Speech, 441.

⁸¹ Orbán, Speech, 264.

⁸² Roy, *Rethinking the Place of Religion in European Secularized Societies*, 3.

⁸³ Orbán, Speech, 324.

⁸⁴ Orbán, Speech, 275.

⁸⁵ Orbán, Speech, 325.

⁸⁶ Orbán, Speech, 336.

⁸⁷ Orbán, Speech, 250.

Hungarian demographics.

Yet it would be wrong to assume that Orbán became a supporter of gender equality; he only considers gender equality as self-evident when he fears it from the Muslim migrants since, in their culture, the “relationship between men and women is seen in terms of a hierarchical order”.⁸⁸ At the same time, the sanctity of the family cannot be challenged in Orbán’s mind, and he is ready to publicly defend the same hierarchical order for Hungarian men and women: “When we started talking about the family, and we said that we were taught in school that the natural order of things is that there is a man and there is a woman who together form a couple, and they will have children, we were branded as sexist and homophobic.”⁸⁹

His continued preoccupation with demographic decline as key to the survival of the ethnic nation, which only seems to have increased with the migration crisis, also translates into Orbán’s absurd policy of “procreation over immigration”.⁹⁰ Though earlier he claimed Hungarians are family-centric, Orbán now warns that migrants – and especially migrant women – are a threat “because they have higher birth rates, are more family-centred, and in some respects lead more spiritual lives than we do”;⁹¹ thus Europe/Hungary cannot enter a demographic race.⁹² While he claimed earlier that economic hardship prevented families from having more children, now that the economic crisis is over, the blame is placed solely on Hungarian women for the decline of the nation: “No policies of any kind can decide whether or not there will be children in a community, whether children are being born into families – and if so, how many. This is because only women can make such decisions.”⁹³

Along these lines, women’s first concern should be the birth of children, and the “duty of the Hungarian government [is] to create conditions in which a family-friendly Hungary greets the birth of children and shows the greatest respect to women who decide to have children”.⁹⁴ This confirms that Orbán has no interest in gender equality and respects mothers only. Once again, the EU is blamed for not being family-friendly enough while also being composed of “family-neutral

⁸⁸ Orbán, Speech, 473.

⁸⁹ Orbán, Speech, 391.

⁹⁰ See Eszter Zimanyi, “Family b/Orders: Hungary’s Campaign for the ‘Family Protection Action Plan,’” *Feminist Media Studies* 20, no. 2 (2020): 305–9.

⁹¹ Orbán, Speech, 264.

⁹² Orbán, Speech, 336.

⁹³ Orbán, Speech, 473.

⁹⁴ Orbán, Speech, 452.

countries, or countries which completely ignore this question”.⁹⁵ Similarly, internal critics of this ethnocentric, religious and anti-feminist portrayal of the Self become enemies of the nation as Orbán claims NGOs, feminist activists, liberal thinkers – the “Soros troops” – are traitors of the national cause because they want to bring about a world that “has no definite points of reference, it is unclear who is a man and who is a woman, what family is, and what it means to be Hungarian and Christian. They are creating a third gender, they are ridiculing faith, and they regard families as redundant, and nations as obsolete.”⁹⁶

The reconceptualization of the Self along ethnocentric and religious lines against (Islamic terrorist) migrants, secular liberals or intellectuals thus equals mobilization against gender or sexual equality all accused of threatening Hungary both from the outside and within.⁹⁷ In this sense, gender has entered the “war of symbols” in the populist discourse against equality.⁹⁸ In fact, some claim that the gendered dimension is not just an element of the autocratic, illiberal transformation but central to understanding the regime.⁹⁹ Instead of feminism, LGBT people or reproductive rights, it is now specifically gender as a concept that is targeted and blamed for all society’s ills, well exemplified by the banning of gender studies programmes by Fidesz in 2018. While Orbán never mentions this, his ministers attack gender studies programmes claiming that “no one wants to employ a genderologist” and “gender studies – similarly to Marxism–Leninism – can be called an ideology rather than a science”.¹⁰⁰

Conclusions and discussion: Xenophobic nationalism, Identitarian Religion and Anti-Gender Mobilization

The analysis shows that Orbán has been using right-wing populist elements in his public discourse ever since he took office in 2010. Most importantly, everything in the discourse is put in the service of creating and maintaining the image of existential crises that Hungary must face. The world is Manichean, divided between the “good people” and its enemies. The only change we see is that,

⁹⁵ Orbán, Speech, 448.

⁹⁶ Orbán, Speech, 515.

⁹⁷ Erzsébet Barát, “Revoking the MA in Gender Studies in Hungary and Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric,” *L’Homme* 30, no. 2 (2019): 135–44.

⁹⁸ Simon Lewis and Magdalena Waligórska, “Introduction: Poland’s Wars of Symbols,” *East European Politics and Societies* 33, no. 2 (April 16, 2019): 423–34, <https://doi.org/10.1177/0888325418821418>. quoted in Engeli, Green-Pedersen, and Larsen, *Morality Politics in Western Europe*, 5.

⁹⁹ Weronika Grzebalska and Andrea Pető, “The Gendered Modus Operandi of the Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland,” in *Women’s Studies International Forum*, vol. 68 (Elsevier, 2018), 164–72.

¹⁰⁰ Engeli, “Gender and Sexuality Research in the Age of Populism,” 3–4.

whereas in 2010-14 the discourse focused solely on the financial crisis, the post-2015 discourse is exclusively focused on the migration crisis. In addition to this, Hungary's demographic crisis is present in the discourse of both periods, always relegating women to the role of rearing more children for the nation – first, to help Hungary have the labour force to fight the economic crisis and, second, to ensure Hungarian hegemony in the Carpathian Basin in the face of migration.

Processes of discursive othering are at the centre of Orbán's discourse, constantly redefining both the Self and the Other to justify changes that fundamentally attack rational liberal democracy embodied by minority rights, secularism, freedom of religion or gender equality and acceptance of LGBT+ groups. Orbán's discourse thus promotes right-wing populist values: the defence of national identity as opposed to equality among citizens, the protection of minorities or respect for gender or sexuality rights. He opposes liberalism, claiming it subordinates national interest to "foreign models of multiculturalism, Roma rights, LGBT rights, and refugee protection".¹⁰¹ As follows, his discourse revolves around two notions: the restoration of traditional life centred on family, religion and conservative values and culture, accompanied by the idea of an essential righteous battle to be waged against all Others that are culturally or religiously different (migrants) or reject his traditionalism – feminists, liberal intellectuals, Brussels bureaucrats.¹⁰²

We also see the evolution of the discourse into more and more restrictive conceptions of the Self. While in the first cycle ethnicity and traditional culture was seldom present as Orbán conceived the nation and national interest in solely economic terms, with the migration crisis (that he creates and maintains) ethnicity and traditional culture not only gain prominence but the definition of the Self is increasingly exclusive and fearful of Others that are culturally or religiously different. The portrayal of migrants as criminals, foreign fighters or terrorist clearly exemplify the ethnic chauvinism of the discourse that is coupled with religious favouritism that wants to ban Islamization and considers Christianity above all other religions. Yet, Christianity is not only important as a religion but as a cultural framework that not only stands at the basis of Hungarian identity and morality but it is raised a step higher, it is the foundation of European civilization that no Muslim should be allowed to trespass into. In this way, Orbán rejects multiculturalism and religious diversity—non-Hungarians have no right of inclusion, and non-European cultures,

¹⁰¹ Brubaker, "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism," 1208.

¹⁰² Nadia Marzouki, Duncan McDonnell, and Olivier Roy, eds., *Saving the People: How Populists Hijack Religion* (London: Hurst and Publishers, 2016).

civilizations or non-Christian religions are to be excluded.

While Orbán never talks directly about gender, his talk on the family clearly conveys that he thinks of women only as baby-machines to ensure the survival of the national community. The neoconservative family policies of Orbán's government are justified by a portrayal of the family as providing continuity with the past through the moralizing politics of reproduction, which in turn creates continuity and immortality for the individual as part of the nation.¹⁰³ In other words, Orbán proclaims a form of gender essentialism, and he replaces "gender mainstreaming" with "family mainstreaming".¹⁰⁴ In this way, Orbán's discourse makes possible state-sponsored anti-gender mobilization and anti-feminism since the declared supremacy of the nation and the national interest over the individual not only favours the adoption of majoritarian laws at the expense of minorities but also (re)constructs a "new patriarchy"¹⁰⁵ where reproduction is constructed as a national issue that women must participate in.

It is little surprise that Orbán and his government has increasingly associated gender issues with the populist anti-establishment rhetoric that claims a specific "gender agenda" would be imposed on "the people".¹⁰⁶ As we have seen, gender acts as a "symbolic glue"¹⁰⁷ to express various dissatisfactions and resentments towards globalization, migration, Europeanization, the previous political establishment and its elites and intelligentsia.¹⁰⁸ Orbán's preference is for a traditional, religious ethnic community and opposes liberalism, secularism, gender equality claiming it subordinates national interest to "foreign models of multiculturalism, Roma rights, LGBT rights, and refugee protection."¹⁰⁹ The populist rejection of liberal democracy thus creates a political discourse that stands for a synergy of xenophobic nationalism, identitarian religion and anti-gender and anti-LGBT+ mobilization that is sponsored by the state.

¹⁰³ Kligman and Gal, *Reproducing Gender*, 68.

¹⁰⁴ Valentine M. Moghadam and Gizem Kaftan, "Right-Wing Populisms North and South: Varieties and Gender Dynamics," *Women's Studies International Forum* 75 (July 1, 2019): 102244, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.wsif.2019.102244>.

¹⁰⁵ Katherine Verdery, "From Parent-State to Family Patriarchs: Gender and Nation in Contemporary Eastern Europe," *East European Politics and Societies* 8, no. 2 (1994): 255.

¹⁰⁶ For a similar arguments see Graff, Kapur, and Walters, "Introduction," 544; Engeli, "Gender and Sexuality Research in the Age of Populism," 232.

¹⁰⁷ Kováts and Pető, "Anti-Gender Discourse in Hungary"; Engeli, "Gender and Sexuality Research in the Age of Populism"; Grzebalska and Pető, "The Gendered Modus Operandi of the Illiberal Transformation in Hungary and Poland."

¹⁰⁸ Barát, "Revoking the MA in Gender Studies in Hungary and Right-Wing Populist Rhetoric."

¹⁰⁹ Brubaker, "Between Nationalism and Civilizationism," 1208.

Appendix

Keyword occurrence in Orbán's speeches

Sample keywords/phrases	2010–2014	2014–2018
Against Hungary	10	38
Alien	1	18
Asylum	0	105
Banker	10	8
Banks	96	60
Birth	18	26
Border	90	1281
Boundary	0	42
Breakdown	0	2
Children	137	428
Christianity	175	529
Citizenship	5	24
Civil	3	70
Constitution	118	467
Couples	1	7
Crisis	398	416
Debt crisis/sovereign debt	5	24
Demography	8	152
Diaspora	4	47
Disintegration	15	26
Economic crisis	73	39
Elite	13	127
Ethnic	3	54
EU	71	567
European countries	40	188

European crisis	17	0
European Union	319	1320
Eurozone crisis	1	1
Faith	60	126
Family	148	462
Fence	0	219
Financial crisis	10	47
foreigners	9	65
Fundamental Law	25	65
Gate	14	53
Gender	2	2
George Soros	0	163
God	61	163
Hungarian citizen	7	50
Hungarian culture/trad.	3	69
Hungarian Diaspora Council	0	6
Hungarian economy	160	121
Hungarian family	39	60
Hungarian identity	0	3
Hungarian nation	50	122
Hungarian Standing Conference	1	12
Hungarians	427	1390
Hungarians abroad	4	55
Immigration	2	767
Islam	4	55
Islamic State	0	13

Language	73	79
Market	137	268
Migration	13	1616
Migration/refugee crisis	0	87
Mother	31	44
Multinationals	30	23
Muslim	0	86
National identity	5	42
National unity	3	16
NGO	3	71
Our	1870	6359
Our lives	38	94
People of Hungary	74	27
Pray	9	13
Protect	134	909
Protection of national interest	2	21
Refugee	3	266

Religion	34	100
Security	48	462
Socialist	37	111
<i>Soli Deo gloria</i>	9	9
Soros	0	308
Sovereignty	15	149
Stand on its own	5	12
Terrorism	10	335
Threat	29	288
Trust	96	116
Unity	36	327
Us	648	3043
Woman/women	20	90
<i>Speeches numbered</i>	<i>1-142</i>	<i>143-565</i>

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