

A Romanian Political Story: The Nationalism of Nicolae Iorga Revisited (1899-1914)

Georgiana Țăranu, PhD¹

Paper Presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021

- Do No Cite Without the Permission of the Author -

This is a study in nationalist politics and deals with Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940), an iconic figure of 20th century Romanian culture, nationalism and historiography. He was his country's best-known historian and public intellectual between the two world wars, both at home and abroad. Interestingly, he still ranks well in surveys on the country's most important historical figures (Digi24, 2018). Iorga typifies the historian-politician acting as nation-builder up to the First World War. His popularity reached a climax during wartime, which brought closer the establishment (the Liberal party leader and the monarchy) closer to him. After the national project was accomplished in the form of Greater Romania, he became the main provider of historical continuity and legitimacy for the new territorial state, while failing to establish himself as a prominent political leader or statesman. His assassination, in 1940, by members of the Romanian fascist Legionary Movement (best known as the Iron Guard) has gone down in history as one of the most shameful crimes: "the Apostle of the Nation" or "the father of Romanian nationalism" was murdered by those whom he had schooled into nationalist ideology. No wonder this crime was interpreted by some scholars as a "parricide" (Armon, 1976 cited by Ioanid, 1992, 481, Adam 2018, 215).

My aim is to argue that Iorga's nationalism has been a political story from the very beginning. It was a politically motivated commitment toward reshaping society, through culture. Iorga developed an influential narrative about how Romanians had exclusive ethnic and historic right to control their territory and shape the society of their own state (Oldson 1973, 85). This political reading contradicts the standard narrative that interprets Iorga as a cultural nationalist who only helped raise national consciousness in the wake and during the First World War. Instead, I emphasize that Iorga's cultural goals, namely the moral regeneration of his people, can also be interpreted as a means for political ends. I will make my case by using two different approaches to nationalism: cultural and political nationalism. For the first type I referred to John Hutchinson's

¹ Faculty of History and Political Science, Ovidius University of Constanța, georgiana.taranu@365.univ-ovidius.ro

take on cultural nationalism and his inclusion of Iorga among European revivalists, such as the Czech František Palacký, the French Jules Michelet and the Ukrainian Mykhailo Hrushevsky who became an “avatar of the[ir] nation” (Hutchinson, 1987, 1994, 2013). Since most of Iorga’s revivalist actions that could represent arguments for his cultural nationalism started in his early public career, I discussed some key moments from the pre-1914 period. For the second type, I took inspiration from John Breuilly’s view of nationalism as a form of politics and political behaviour (1993 [1982]), to argue in favour of ascribing Iorga to political nationalism. My reading of his political career depicts an intellectual who sought not only to cultivate the nation, but to advance his own political platform and to contribute to the establishment of a single strong territorial state reuniting all Romanians around the Old Kingdom². In fact, I will point out that Hutchinson’s own reframing (2013) of his earlier distinction between cultural and political nationalists provided the space for such a reinterpretation.

In the first part of this article, I will first provide the conceptual distinction between cultural and political nationalism as define by Hutchinson, and then offer some political context for the late 19th and early 20th Romania. Afterwards, I will reassess Iorga’s nationalism by reconsidering some of his pre-war revivalist activities. I argue that these engagements, while in a cultural shape, expressed very clear political goals, which can be classified as follows: the rejection of modernity, politics of language, antisemitism, and irredentism. All of these thinking and practices prepared the ground for Iorga’s own pursuit of power and the advancement of the radical nationalists’ dearest dream: political unity for all Romanians living across the borders in neighboring Austria-Hungary and Tsarist Russia.

The second part of the paper will evaluate the state of the existing literature related to Iorga’s nationalism and explore some possible explanations for the success the cultural paradigm had in his case. The underlying question in this context is the following: When describing Iorga’s nationalism as cultural, does one downplay his overall politics as well? And if so, was this a strategy to condone some of his political actions and beliefs? In reviewing the literature I will move from a short survey of the communist historiography to a post-1989 discussion of some strategies behind Iorga’s understanding as a cultural nationalist.

1. So close to cultural nationalism

² The Old Kingdom refers to Romania between 1881 and 1918, comprised of the former Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova, to which Northern Dobruja was added in 1878 and Southern Dobruja in 1913.

It is easy to trace Iorga's nationalism to cultural nationalism and it seems to come to one's mind somehow naturally since he was an exceptional figure in Romanian culture. Iorga recorded numerous achievements in history, and in what we would now call cultural studies, but also in public life. He acted as politician, public educator, university professor, journalist, literary critic, writer, playwright, poet and so on (Nagy-Talavera, 1996). He was compared, apart from those already mentioned in Hutchinson's study, to a great gallery of intellectual figures, historians, statesman or politicians: the Italian Carducci (Ortiz 1927), the Spanish Claudio Sánchez-Albornoz (Veiga), the French Ernest Renan and even Charles de Gaulle (Nagy-Talavera 1996), the Greek Spyridon Lambros (Gazi 2010), the Serbian Stojan Novaković (Turda 2011, 353), the Turkish Mehmed Fuad Köprülü (Țăranu 2019), and recently the Catalan Josep Puig i Cadafalch (Mallart 2021). Perhaps the best way to describe him to a non-Romanian audience is to say that the distinguished historian of culture Peter Burke included Iorga's name in his latest work, *The Polymath* (2020). Iorga thus figures on Burke's list of 500 Western polymaths, that is "monsters of erudition" who contributed to different disciplines and had been active in the West (understood as Europe and the Americas) in the last six centuries. Iorga's output between 1890 and 1940 is estimated around 1200 volumes and 25 000 articles. Yet much of this output was a means to bridge the gap between knowledge production and the general public. With this in mind, no wonder Iorga's monopolization of Romania's cultural scene for many decades led many scholars to be tempted to categorize also his nationalism as cultural. He seemed to fall perfectly into the category put forward by John Hutchinson, composed of those important historians (Eoin MacNeill, František Palacký, Jules Michelet, Mykhailo Hrushevsky) who were "no mere scholars but rather 'myth-making' intellectuals who combine[d] a 'romantic' search for meaning with a scientific zeal to establish this on authoritative foundations" (1987, 14). As practitioners of a profession that enjoyed, in the nineteenth and early twentieth century, "a towering intellectual prestige eclipsing that enjoyed in previous centuries by mathematics and astronomy" (Pearson 1988, 160), historians were in a privileged position. In Central and Eastern Europe, where nation-building and statehood were on the agenda in the decades leading up to the First World War, the historian became, in the eyes of his contemporaries, "a political force" (Seton-Watson 1922).

Iorga was such a historical scholar. He played a major role in winning popular support for the Romanian nation-building project in the years prior to the First World War and during the conflagration. He engaged, as all revivalists throughout Europe, in all sorts of activities and

initiatives directed towards the moral regeneration of his people: a summer school, a publishing house, a newspaper and different literary magazines, lending libraries, research institutes at home and abroad, a dramatic group, a women's school, a political party etc. Moreover, as a historian, he did share with cultural nationalists an essentially organicist view of the nation and rewrote the past in order to create a new narrative for the national destiny, one meant to ensure historical continuity and cultural unity (Turda, 2011, 352, Gazi, 2010). In this respect, his historical writing seems very close to what Hutchinson (1987, 16) ascribed to be the main characteristic of the work of cultural nationalists: "to inspire a spontaneous love of community in its different members by educating them to their common heritage of splendor and suffering." And yet I will point to the fact that a whole different reading can also be applied to Iorga's national agenda. My take is influenced by John Breuilly's understanding of nationalism as a form of politics, namely opposition politics (1993) and uses a recontextualisation of Iorga's early revivalist career. Although Breuilly focuses on nationalist movements and their relation to the state, I will try to adapt it to the study of a single individual, who played a significant part in Romanian nationalism. I will look into how Iorga became a central figure in Romanian nationalism (the father of the Nation, the apostle of the Nation) because he operated in a political situation in which nationalist politics became effective. In doing so, Iorga combined nationalist ideas with political actions in his own pursuit of power and his hope that the Romanians would manage to create a strong territorial state.

Why not cultural nationalism?

So why does cultural nationalism not cover the case of Nicolae Iorga?

I will start my answer by pointing to John Hutchinson's (2013) own revision of his earlier distinction between cultural and political nationalism. Initially, he had described two contrasting types of nationalism: an organic and romantic view of the nation as a moral and historical community in opposition to a voluntary, civic, Enlightenment-inspired conception of a political community. In 2013, Hutchinson added a useful clarification: while these two competing visions of the nation can become entangled and often use each other's strategies, one should look at their main concern in order to differentiate between cultural and political nationalism. Cultural nationalists will always be interested in creating a strong moral community as the basis of the nation, while a strong territorial state will always be the ultimate aim for political nationalism. This is an important addition and a starting point for providing an answer to this section's research question. Iorga used, indeed, all of the cultural nationalists' tools, he engaged in many types of

cultivation of the nation (as categorised by Leersen 2006, 571-2). He constantly underlined the importance of a regenerated moral community, which had to escape from Western imitation, estranged elites and corrupt practices. But a closer examination should go further and see that Iorga's primary concern was always political (Pearson, 1988, 158). This had to do, of course, with the political context in which Romania and Iorga found themselves, in international affairs and domestic politics, respectively.

The political context: Romanians neighboring Romania

Pre-war Romania³ had gained independence from the Ottoman Empire in 1878, but at a high territorial cost: the ceding of three districts of Southern Bessarabia to the Russian Empire. In exchange it received Northern Dobruja and hence access to the Black Sea. One additional cause of frustration post-1878 events was increasing external pressure for Jewish emancipation (Iordachi 2019). For the next three decades, Tsarist Russia would represent the new state's most feared neighbor in the eyes of the elites. In 1881, Carol, a former prince of Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen, proclaimed himself King and remained committed to an alliance with Germany until the end of his life, in 1914. As such, in 1883 Romania secretly became part of the Triple Alliance, but distrusted Austria-Hungary both on political and economic grounds (Hitchins 2013 [1994], 151-156). And the time of Iorga's birth, in 1871, his borderland district of Botoșani, the northernmost on the map, was caught between the two competing empires. By 1900, across the borders, over four million Romanians were living under foreign rule without enjoying equal political or cultural rights: over 3 million in Austro-Hungarian Transylvania and Bukovina, and over one million in Russian Bessarabia (Hitchins 2013 [1994], 207). The Transylvanian Romanians were the most vocal promoters of their national identity and of their rights. The formation of the Dual Monarchy in 1867 led to the loss of Transylvania's autonomy through union with Hungary, which further strained relations between the government in Budapest and the Romanians in the following decades. If for many Transylvanian Romanians the initial quest was full equality within the imperial polity their aim ultimately developed into full political autonomy.

Meanwhile, at the turn of the nineteenth century, the primary goal of a small and rather marginal nationalist movement⁴ within the Old Kingdom, composed of local patriots and

³ Comprised of the former Principalities of Wallachia and Moldova, to which Northern Dobruja was added in 1878 and Southern Dobruja in 1913.

⁴ I here refer to the nationalist movement as comprised of diverse groups of activists advocating the so-called "national question" independent of and often in opposition to the government's official foreign policy.

Transylvanian refugees, became the political unity with the Romanians of Transylvania and Bukovina. To a lesser extent, some also looked towards Bessarabia, a province which had been detached from the Principality of Moldova in 1812 and ceded by the Ottomans to Tsarist Russia. The political scene was dominated by the two main parties - the Liberals and the Conservatives - which King Carol I brought alternatively to power, while retaining for himself the conduct of foreign affairs. For the two mainstream political parties, the Transylvanian question was used as a weapon of political warfare (Hitchins 2013 [1994], 218-219). This policy started to be criticized and labeled as a betrayal of the national cause from the margins by different politicians, activists or intellectuals in their struggle to gain political capital.

Mind the gap: the frustration of a great mind

Iorga was one of these intellectuals. While he was exceptionally skilled and hard working, he became rapidly frustrated by the gap between his results and his own conviction that he was a man of destiny, on the one hand, and the poor institutional and peer recognition he received, on the other hand (Theodorescu 1976, 27-28, Iorga 1899, 1900). He encountered great hostility from the academic environment (Tocilescu, Urechia) as well as from the literary and political establishment (Titu Maiorescu, B. P. Haşdeu, Take Ionescu) (Nagy-Talavera 1996, 60-63, see Iorga's letter of March 23, 1901 in Theodorescu 1972, 605). He was not easily accepted for a permanent position at the Chair for World History at the University of Bucharest in 1895. The same happened before being accepted as a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy in 1897. His massive and laborious edited volumes, gathering documents collected from archives throughout Europe, were published by the Academy, but without receiving royalties as their editor (Theodorescu 1976, 25). He had a few friends and admirers, yet many more enemies and a strong sense of combat. He thus started to build himself a political platform first through journalism and then through literary criticism as early as 1899, years before being elected a member of parliament (1907) or founding a political party (1910).

Of course, Iorga's commitment was formulated, in a typical nationalist fashion, as a double sacred mission. Speaking on behalf of his nation, whose will he felt entitled to represent as a historian, Iorga said that the state had to pursue political unity with all those Romanians living across the borders in Transylvania, Bukovina, Bessarabia. The other mission was as a self-assigned duty: because he was a historian, he felt compelled to enter politics. Like so many other historians who acted as nation-builders (Berger and Lorenz 2010), Iorga argued that history and politics were

not only compatible, but mutually reinforcing (Iorga 1933, Pearton 1988). Write history with no political experience and you shall only produce deplorable and caricatured results, Iorga warned his students in 1940, after more than three decades of both history writing and politics (1940, 26-7).

Rejection of modernity

The most important category to which Iorga's political thought belongs is that of the rejection of modernity and the preference for the premodern, pre-urban medieval countryside. This was something "nostalgically and idyllically invoked throughout the century everywhere in Europe" (Leerssen 2006, 193). Iorga first manifested it coherently during a short-lived leadership of the weekly publication *Sămănătorul* (*The Sower*, hence *Sowerism*) between 1905-1906. It became one of his best known cultural initiatives. However, this was a time when literature and journalism became militant, both engaged in "narrating the national idea" (Pârâianu 63). Thus, Iorga's thought, expressed through articles and literary criticism, would practically embody "Sowerism" and gave it the form of a particular anti-modernist, anti-capitalist and anti-cosmopolitan traditionalist "current", with a strong antisemitic tone. The intellectuals grouped around the literary and political magazine thus proposed a conservative and quasi-agrarian solution to Romania's perceived cultural alienation caused by the country's rapid adoption of Western models. The Romanian national character was truly to be found in its purest form in the past, in a golden era of spirituality between peasants and their traditional rulers, the Romanian boyars (Ornea 1971, Stanomir 2000, Vanhaelemeersch 2006, Hitchens 2013). The "other" was, most often, the Jew, as symbol of the modern society, of the foreignness of the middle class, who dominated the urban landscape in many towns. When applauding a literary work, he searched for a superior ethnic purpose: in 1905, a short story on how Jews were "killing the beauty" in the hard-working Romanians by "poisoning" them through the selling of alcohol was found to be "touching" and the most balanced of an entire volume (Iorga 1916, 86). Thus, Iorga subordinated aesthetics to an ethical and ethnic goal, dismissing the modernist discourse of the main political driving forces, the Liberals and the Conservatives (Alexandrescu 2008, 131). Behind such a supposedly literary or cultural debate the stake was political. As Katherine Verdery (1995, 132) eloquently put it, "cultural notions concerning identity were simultaneously political." This line of thought significantly influenced the debates on "the national character" which would take place in the interwar period (Alexandrescu 2008, Verdery 1995).

Another essential point which illustrates that the literary group had political goals is the manner in which Iorga and the “sowerists” split ways. The two sides held incompatible political views precisely on “the national question” of the Romanians in Transylvania. Iorga wanted to continue the struggle for national liberation until the obtainment of political unity within a Greater Romania, whereas the “sowerists” preferred at that time Aurel C. Popovici’s federalist solution to the problem of nationalities in the form of a Greater Austria (Ornea 1971, 85-86; see also Hitchins 2013, 213-216; for a highly biased contemporary account favouring Iorga’s editorship see Smântânescu 1933). In other words, the divide opposed Iorga’s political nationalism to the cultural nationalism of the “sowerists” around Popovici, who wanted to continue cultivating the nation within the empire instead of figuring how to incorporate Transylvania into Romania. Iorga still recalled, two decades later, how “his nationalism of pride” was outraged by such a “servile” federalist proposal, and so were many more that eventually embraced political nationalism.

Politics of language and nationalism: bloody French

After leaving *Sămănătorul*, Iorga was in search of a new cultural platform through which he could serve his nationalist politics. After failing to join the Conservative Party in March 1906, Iorga embarked on a new political career as a nationalist opposed to the traditional parties and the establishment. Two other initiatives brought him extraordinary popularity: “the struggle for the Romanian language” (Iorga 1906) and the launching of his own newspaper.

On March 13, 1906, students held a protest in front of the National Theater against the staging of a play in French, which ended in violence, arrests and trials. These events came days after Iorga had kept on urging the elites, through his newspaper articles, to stop such common practices. But it was Iorga’s electrifying conference on the very day of the staging that stirred up the students. It was what he immediately published and entitled “the struggle for the Romanian language” (Iorga 1906). He passionately lectured against “an act of spiritual treason against the Fatherland and the nation” on the part of the estranged elites. Iorga was both shocked and amazed by the outcome of the social unrest, which eventually led to the closing of the university and the wounding people. He thus associated his own concept of “defense” of the Romanian culture against estranged elites and foreign models with his nationalist politics. Some already started to call him “Apostle”, while others considered him an instigator (Nagy-Talavera 1996, 122, Țurlea 1991, 23-28). It was indeed “Iorga’s defining moment as a nationalist demagogue.” (Clark 2019, 9) As a result of his capacity to mobilize such popular support, his political career took off. Six

day later, on March 19, 1906 Iorga set up *Frăția bunilor români* (*The Brotherhood of Good Romanians*), which by its very politics of name implied there were good and bad Romanians. Not hard to guess who the latter were: the Brotherhood, wrote Iorga to a close associate while preparing the founding session, was “superior to all political parties and, if necessary, an enemy to anyone” with “no higher goal than the national ideal and the struggle for the good of the peasantry” (letter to A. C. Cuza of March 17, 1906, in Iorga 1984, 383).

Nationalism and antisemitism

Another key initiative for translating Iorga’s nationalism into a political language came along with the start of his own newspaper, *Neamul Românesc* (*The Romanian Kin* or *The Romanian People*), on May 10, 1906. The newspaper would represent Iorga’s position on current affairs until his retirement from political and public life, in September 1940, two months before his assassination by the Romanian fascist Iron Guard. The publication was used as a political weapon and a personal daily tribune, a sort of institutionalization of Iorga’s sense of mission⁵. His editorials were present every single issue, written in a militant or poignant, timely, all-encompassing, and unmistakable style. In association with A. C. Cuza, Iorga started publishing in his newspaper many antisemitic articles. Jews were perceived as a “national danger,” threatening the nation not only on economic and cultural, but also political grounds. He even accused them of irredentist intentions toward Austria-Hungary (Iorga 1903). Similarly, during the peasant uprisings of 1907, Iorga put the blame for the events on the Jews (Ioanid 1992, 473), while understating the complex causes of the poor economic conditions among peasantry. Even if he was not as radical as Cuza, Iorga was constant in this hostility towards the Jews up until 1940. He underwent a period of desistance in the 1920s, after the Paris Peace Conference and the minorities’ protection treaty Romania was required to sign. Yet, he relapsed into antisemitism by the late 1930s, fueling the already explosive public opinion between 1937 and 1940 (Iorga [1937]). But the period of intense activity aimed at Jews is to be found in the first decades of the twentieth century. As his scholarly reputation was gaining momentum, Iorga became one of the most authoritative voices of the nationalist camp to legitimate exclusion of the Jews from the national community (Bărbulescu

⁵ I here refer to the definition of the verb “to institutionalize” in the following understanding: “to make something become a permanent or respected part of a society, system, or organization.” The Cambridge Advanced Learner's Dictionary & Thesaurus. <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/institutionalize>. (Accessed April 12, 2021).

2020). Consequently, when he “ended up equating ‘true’ nationalism with anti-semitism” he gave it an “irresistible panache” (Oldson 1991, 133).

Irredentist nationalism: the Cultural League and the politics summer school

Two of Iorga’s most revered nationalist undertakings of the pre-war years were his activity within the The League for the Cultural Unity of all Romanians (the Cultural League) and his start of a summer school at Vălenii de Munte. Both had clear political objectives despite their cultural outlook. While the Cultural League, founded in Bucharest on January 24, 1891, by Romanian refugees from Transylvania, and different political and cultural personalities from the Old Kingdom, became irredentist from around 1907 onwards, the summer school launched by Iorga at Vălenii de Munte emerged as irredentist from the outset. I understand irredentism here as “the belief that part of the nation finds itself outside the state borders and needs to be not only ‘freed,’ but ‘redeemed’ from foreign influence” (van Hout 2019, 660).

The Cultural League appeared first as a reaction against the Magyarization policy of the late quarter of the nineteenth century (Santoro 2014). The means were cultural (patriotic lectures and gatherings, lending libraries, celebrations of important historic events), but the intended outcome was political. While recent research has analysed the Culture League’s interwar activity as a case study of John Hutchinson’s cultural nationalism (Mândru 2009), I believe that a more enriching perspective would be to look at the League’s practice of disguising of its political objectives in cultural terms as a way to dispel suspicion both at home as well across the border, in Budapest or Vienna. In fact, irredentism was the main charge brought upon the League’s members by the Austro-Hungarian authorities. From 1907 onwards, when Iorga was first elected in the Central Committee of the Cultural League, and then became Secretary General (1908), the organization received new impetus. No wonder he started to be surveilled, as was the entire League, by the Austro-Hungarian diplomatic agents and by the Romanian secret police (Bodea and Vergatti 2012). He used the Cultural League as a new platform for his political nationalism, while also publicizing that he was about to found a large nationalist and democratic party. By way of the Cultural League Iorga organized libraries, commemorations, conferences, and smuggled Romanian language publications across the borders (Nagy-Talavera 1996, 131-132). He offered scholarships and financial assistance on behalf of the Cultural League to young Romanians émigrés from the neighboring provinces, which led some students closer to a more radical type of nationalism (see Onisifor Ghibu’s case discussed in Santoro 2014, 72-73). Despite the cultural

outlook, Iorga used this organization in a concrete political direction: to challenge Romania's alliance with Austria-Hungary as the main obstacle to political unity with Transylvanian Romanians (Niessen 1995, 283). In only one year of activity within the Cultural League, Iorga's name came up twice in talks between King Carol I and Prince Schönburg, the Austro-Hungarian consul in Bucharest. The King tried on both occasions to dismiss the importance of the radical nationalism of Iorga and the president of the League, which disquieted the Prince, by qualifying them as "totally crazy." (Bodea and Vergatti 2012, p. 97, 103). Eventually, in May, 1909, after ignoring several warnings, Iorga was prohibited to enter Austrian territories considering he posed a danger to state security (Bodea and Vergatti 2012, 129). The impact of his nationalist ideas across the borders grew at an alarming pace, with his picture being printed on thousands of postcards in July, 1909, in Czernowitz (Cernăuți), Bukovina's capital city (Țurlea 2008, 181). By 1913 a secret note inside Vienna's Interior Ministry considered that almost the entire Romanian press within the Old Kingdom was "in the service of the League," with Iorga being praised as the most influential and charismatic political agitator (Bodea and Vergatti 2012, 236-7). The year the First World War broke out, the League finally decided a suggestive and overdue rebranding, changing its name to the *League for the Political Unity of all Romanians*. By then, as Hitchins noted (2013, 241), not too many Transylvanian Romanians had political unity with the Old Kingdom in their mind, except for Iorga and the League.

The start of summer courses at Vălenii de Munte, a small town in the Carpathians, close to the Transylvanian border, in 1908, had a clear political ambition. Here Iorga established his main residence, founded a publishing house and organized a one-month length summer school from 1908 to 1940 every year, except for the wartime period. Up to the First World War, this "cultural citadel" hosted a school of nationalist propaganda each July, with lectures and speeches meant to bolster national sentiments and pride over history, traditions, language etc. Hundreds, then thousands of students, rural teachers and priests were pouring across the borders to the frustration of the imperial authorities next door. Romanian secret police agents reported that by closely following what happened each summer at Vălenii de Munte they could find out more about "the next phases of the nationalist movement" (Țurlea 2016, 50). By 1912, a journalist from Brașov, in Hungarian-ruled Transylvania, label the summer school "the University of the Whole Nation" and "the Mecca of Romanianness" (cited in Țurlea 2016, 100). No wonder the same year, as a sign of royal openness to the nationalist cause, Carol, the eldest son of Ferdinand, the Crown Prince,

visited the summer school. This was a spectacular leap forward for a King which remained, despite all, on the side of the Central Powers, but who probably wanted to attract public support for the Monarchy (Țurlea 2008, 147-52).

Everyday nationalist politics

The political parties were not pleased to see the increasing popularity of this initiative, which could have endangered not only Romania's foreign affairs, but also their own position on the political scene (Țurlea 2016, 57-8). Iorga's nationalism was thus politically dangerous not only because it reclaimed new political boundaries, but also because he embodied a more national and democratic (read popular) politics, in contrast to the old, traditional political forces. Iorga acted from the bottom up, as an independently elected member of parliament who was above parties. Suffice to say that this action increased Iorga's political capital even more, which sped up the formation of his Nationalist Democratic Party in April, 1910. The newly established party was led through a joint presidency with A. C. Cuza. This was the first openly antisemitic political party. We should note that Iorga did not establish a peasant party, although he glorified peasantry, but a nationalist party, which should say a lot per se in terms of political goals. In a letter of 1911 to co-president A. C. Cuza, regarding their partisan affairs, Iorga put it bluntly: he felt an urge to act and get involved in politics because "to theorize my whole life is not in my nature" (Iorga 1984, 416). Iorga remained a member of parliament for the rest of his life, with only short pauses. This also touches on another distinction between cultural and political nationalism put forward by John Hutchinson: while the historians and the artists are the agents dedicated to national revivalism, journalists and legislators are those formulating political demands in the name of the nation. Iorga wanted and succeeded to be both.

Legitimizing Greater Romania

To all this political activity, Iorga added, of course, an intense historiographical activity. Some exegetes even appreciate that his best syntheses were written during the pre-war period, and that his scientific reputation as a Medievalist and a Byzantinist beyond the Romanian borders was formed at this time. While being interested in the professionalization of history at a theoretical level, Iorga infused his writing with romantic elements and put the nation at the center of his endeavours. What he succeeded to write was "a national history with a transcultural perspective" (Gazi 2010, 206). In addition, his encyclopedic spirit and a vast network of contacts in European academic circles (Mallart 2021) sets him apart from most national historians. Nevertheless, he

remains the most important provider of legitimacy for Romanian nationalism in terms of historical continuity. His historical writing would serve against competing narratives advanced by revisionist neighbors especially in the interwar period (Turda 2011, 352), but also during national communism.

Turning back to nationalist politics, Iorga's popularity reached its climax during the war but then decreased. It is important to note that he is not to be found in any liberal form of politics. After a short experience as president of the Chamber of Deputies, between December, 1919 and March, 1920, he continued his political activity, but was to remain a marginal figure on the enlarged political scene. As an influential public intellectual, he often expressed distrust of parliamentary democracy and sympathy towards authoritarian solutions. He admired providentialism such as Mussolini (Țăranu 2015, 2016). Due to his cultural authority, King Carol II appointed him Prime Minister, to form a government "beyond parties," which lasted only a short while, between April, 1931 and June, 1932, due to the lack of political support and the economic difficulties of the Great Depression. Even during Carol II's royal dictatorship (February 1938 – September 1940), which left the traditional institutions void of power, Iorga still remained a senator (even President of the Senate for five days) and a member of the Council of the Crown, as cabinet member without portfolio. He opposed the violence and mysticism of the "new nationalism" of the radical right and supported the monarchy as a vector of political stability and traditional authority.

One of the reasons for his isolated political position, of one man show, was the fact that he failed to merge his own party (after the separation from the virulent antisemitism of A. C. Cuza) with the Romanian National Party in Transylvania. The main incompatibility was the fact that the historian could not reconcile his nationalism with the regionalist demands coming from Transylvania. In comparison, in Hutchinson's terms (2013), cultural nationalists would have tended to support decentralization as a way to balance state and community, favouring the latter. Iorga was, on the contrary, pleading for a strong centralized state. Political unity was now a completed national project, even beyond hopes, and Iorga turned to strategies to legitimize the new Romanian and European *statu quo*. The objective remained political, while the means were of all sorts.

Complicated nationalist legacy after WWI

Iorga's nationalism had a huge impact on the younger generation of pre-war Romania because of his reputation and of the many ways in which he activated. There is still an ongoing debate

concerning the character of this legacy, benign or malignant, or better said the proportion of each. Some scholars see a direct continuity between Iorga's populism and the Iron Guard, while others considered the postwar political and ideological context to have brought about a significant split from early 20th nationalism (Oldson 1992, 137-38, 161, Ioanid 1992, 487, Heinen 1999 [1986], 80-90, Adam 2018, 215).

Nevertheless, it would be hard to deny the impact he had on the key ideologues of the radical right. In August 1930, Nae Ionescu, a charismatic university professor and journalist who at that time supported the King and wanted to legitimize the new reign, called the new generation of disillusioned young people who opposed the establishment "Iorga's historic class" (Ionescu 1990, 193). By 1933, Nae Ionescu had turned into an influential ideologue of the Iron Guard's national regeneration project. Likewise, Nichifor Crainic, the other prominent ideologue of the 1930s, promoter of a Christian Orthodox type of palingenetic nationalism (Turda 2008, 449-50), recounted in his memoirs that his generation of young nationalists had been "dominated by Iorga's providential spirit", by his "prophetism," exhausted once Greater Romania had emerged (Crainic 1991, 148). At some point in the second half on the interwar period, a prominent Romanian journalist calculated that nearly 36 per cent of those holding a seat in parliament, either liberals or national peasants, had started their political career in Iorga's party (Şeicaru cited in Țurlea 2008, 180). Outside parliament, on the extreme right, the "new" nationalists of the Legionary Movement were gaining popular support with a platform that radicalized everything that pre-war nationalism had stated. Yet the new era of mass politics and the experience of the Great War added some heavy tones to this ultranationalist palingenetic project: religious utopia, mysticism, and the cult of violence. Iorga's clash with his "bastard sons," whom he opposed, ended in the assassination of the former by the latter in November, 1940. This epitomized in a way the end of the nineteenth century nationalism dying at the hands of radical ultranationalist politics.

2. What kind of Iorga for post-Communist Romania?

The research question in this section is: how can the success of the cultural nationalism paradigm in Iorga's case be explained? Can the preference to explain Iorga's nationalist activity culturally and not politically be correlated with some other tendency? The pre-1989 literature is not the subject of this section, because chronologically speaking, Hutchinson's seminal work was published in 1987 and had no time to produce effects. However, the communist period will be a

first starting point to explain the current state of the scholarship dedicated to Iorga. The ideological censorship and the national-communist exacerbation which operated for four decades left deep traces in the research approaches to this subject. The post-Ceaușescu political context will be briefly discussed to point out what hindered a more dispassionate and critical approach of Iorga to emerge.

The literature on Iorga is paradoxical: surprisingly vast and yet extremely poor in critical studies. The best example of this is the fact that there are only two biographies (Theodorescu 1968, Nagy-Talavera 1996), some biographical essays (Valota Cavallotti 1977, Râpeanu 1994, 2001, 2002) and only a few monographs or studies dedicated to his political activity (Pearson 1988, Țurlea 1991, 2001, 2008, 2016, Oprețescu 2000, Chioveanu 2010). Studies on his nationalist thinking are also few and not coincidentally published by foreign researchers (Oldson, 1973, 1991, Vanhaelemeersch 2006) or by Romanians living abroad (Ioanid 1992, Volovici 1991). Overall, in Romanian historiography there are many texts that keep Iorga out of the necessary critical re-evaluations (Schmitt 2017 [2016], 24, Daskalov 2015, 278), unlike similar studies published abroad. In part, this situation is owed to the communist period, with ramifications to this day. If until the Communist takeover in Romania, between 1944-1948, Iorga's memory was tolerated and accepted as an example of a martyr of the legionnaires' violence, which were rather symbolic ideological enemies of communism, after 1948 many of his works were removed from shelves. It was not until the late 1950s, after the withdrawal of Soviet troops, that his works started being recovered. Beginning with the increasingly visible distancing of the Romanian communists from the official line of Moscow, during the 1960s, the need for internal legitimacy made Iorga return to academic debate and, since 1965, even to bookstores. This restitution was then made by the dictator Nicolae Ceaușescu under the sign of autochthonous nationalism, meant to exacerbate the potential of the great personalities of the Romanian culture both internally and externally. Other communist leaders such as Slobodan Milošević and Enver Hodža did the same (Tismăneanu 1999, 91). This restitution even reached a cult of the historian's personality, as an exercise for the future cult of the political leader (Iacob 2014). Iorga's editing and exegesis followed the carefully controlled line of the communist regime's demands, following themes much instrumentalised by the dictator against the Soviet Union: the struggle for national sovereignty, the rights of smaller powers in international affairs.

However, the distancing from the apologetic discourse did not occur in the first decade of the post-communist regime, on the contrary. Most of the authors of texts about Iorga of those years were exponents of a 'radical continuity' with the old regime (the term was coined by Shafir 1994, 350-5). Nationalism seemed, again, as Radu Ioanid observed, the only post-December ideology that the political elites appealed to (Ioanid 1994, 173). In fact, the debate seemed once again to oppose a European-oriented critical discourse to an “illiberal and anti-minority populism of the nationalists” (Turda 2011, 198). The post-Ceaușescu era was dominated for over two and a half decades by a direct successor to the former Communist Party, being the only such case among the Warsaw Pact countries (Gallagher 2015, 171): The National Salvation Front (FSN), the present day Social Democratic Party (PSD)⁶. To hinder opposition from liberal parties, the FSN/PDSR relied on a variety of partners, mostly small ultra-nationalist and neo-communist satellite parties. Only two were important: the far right antisemitic Greater Romania Party (PRM) and the strongly xenophobic and anti-Hungarian Party of Romanian National Unity (PUNR), based in Transylvania (Gallagher 1996). Each party had at least one important editor and/or scholar of Iorga.

Holocaust deniers, Iorga's admirers

One of the most influential in this camp was the historian Gheorghe Buzatu, coming from the ranks of the extreme nationalist PRM. He was an editor of volumes on Iorga since the Communist era and a proponent of the term “iorgology” as a field of inquiry for dedicated scholars of the subject (Buzatu 2015, 2). Initially a member of the FSN/PDSR, then of the PUNR, there was also the historian Petre Țurlea, who is to this day the single most productive scholar of Iorga, author of extensively documented monographies. Both Buzatu and Țurlea were elected members of parliament and held chauvinist and antisemitic views. Deniers of the Romanian part in the Holocaust, both historians and politicians are noted for their fierce antisemitic and anti-Hungarian rhetoric, as well as their attempts to rehabilitate Ion Antonescu, Romania's leader during the Second World War (for Buzatu see Shafir 2014, for Țurlea see Ioanid 1994, 175). Buzatu was mostly concerned with Antonescu, but in the works he edited he often attempted to legitimize the military dictatorship invoking the dubious belief that Iorga would have approved the former's wartime decisions (Buzatu 2015, 214).

⁶ After 1993 renamed as the Party of Romanian Social Democracy (PDSR), and from 2001 onwards as the PSD.

While underlining that Iorga's initiatives had both a cultural and a political goal, Țurlea's reading can provide a case study in historical omissions: one can hardly find in his works any mention of Iorga's antisemitism or anything less than heroic nationalist writing (Țurlea 2008, 2016). Țurlea's stated purpose was to defend the Romanian territorial integrity against external or internal danger, a rather recurring theme in the Romanian nationalist discourse (Turda 2001, 197). He pointed to the enemy from within, the "aggressive" Hungarian minority in Harghita and Covasna, as well as "the cosmopolitan elitists" supposedly backed from abroad, who engaged in critical assessments of the national panteon, mainly historian Lucian Boia (Țurlea 2008, 536). Iorga's legacy was once more instrumentalised to serve clear political goals.

Conversely, when Iorga was not used to legitimize the anti-Hungarian or antisemitic views of Romanian politicians or historians in the years 1990-2000 (Gallagher 1992, 587), his legacy was used in the opposite direction, for the rehabilitation of the interwar radical right. For instance, Iorga's so-called "organic rationalism" was used as a key concept by an editor to legitimize an edited collection of texts by Nae Ionescu (Smântânescu in Ionescu 1990).

The classical cultural approach: obfuscating antisemitism

The first work that explicitly mentions an understanding of Iorga's nationalism as cultural appeared in 1992 in Portland, Oregon. It was written by the American historian Nicholas M. Nagy-Talavera (1929-2000), who was born in Hungary into a Jewish family. It is also the only biography available in English and the second and last such endeavour after that of Barbu Theodorescu (1968), which makes it widely cited by all those interested in Iorga, but also Romanian nationalism, in general (a recent example is Iordachi 2019). While being an extremely solid and far-reaching research that offers a synthesis on the whole life and activity of Iorga, the historical prose is extremely biased. The author dedicated the book to his wish that "in the twenty-first century his [Iorga's] cultural nationalism will be interpreted correctly" (Nagy-Talavera 1996). The cultural paradigm is thus set and sometimes guides the reader page after page. While the author acknowledged how "the preservation of national identity and the nation's welfare" was Iorga's "Supreme Law" (p. 447), he used this commitment as an excuse for his subject's many arguable views: his recurrent ethno-exclusivism and antisemitism, his post-war anti-establishment rhetoric and support for authoritarian solutions, and the admiration toward Fascist Italy. His very sympathetic account of Iorga's cultural nationalism is often

contradictory: sometimes he places the cultural nationalist above the historian (p. 451), therefore putting (nationalist) politics above science, while at other times Nagy-Talavera admits that, even so, Iorga “was not a real politician” (p. 454), but, first, a historian. At the end of this “monumental and admirably disorganized book,” as Iordachi put it (2000, 173), Nagy-Talavera pleaded for Iorga’s nationalism to be analyzed as one of good faith and humanity, in contrast to the “suicidal nationalism” of the extreme right. One of the least convincing arguments offered in this respect regarded Iorga’s alleged abandon of pre-war antisemitism. Nagy-Talavera stated that Iorga was a “determined” antisemite who however rejected anti-Jewish violence and that, in any case, he was so forty years before the Holocaust (p. 84). The author strikingly ignores to account for Iorga’s incitement to hatred of 1938-1940, when Romanian anti-Jewish legislation was already in force. Although Iorga was denouncing both nazism and the Romanian fascist Iron Guard, Iorga relapsed into antisemitism and brought once more his contribution to an already extremely radicalized political climate. The author’s insistence on the cultural nationalism paradigm, while understating his subject’s explicit antisemitism and his political (nationalist) aims, seems to indicate that his ultimate effort was to not allow room for an interpretation which could tie Iorga’s nationalism to the interwar ideology of the Iron Guard. Another sympathetic attempt to explain Iorga’s involvement in nationalist politics was put forward in a study by Chioveanu (2010). Part of the first generation of young post-communist historians who otherwise critically approached Romanian fascism, Chioveanu offered some arguable statements to justify Iorga’s illiberal politics.

There is an irony when downplaying Iorga’s antisemitism by downplaying his political goals. This was best illustrated by one of his contemporaries, Barbu Theodorescu, the author of the other available biography, published during Communism, in 1968. A very knowledgeable scholar of Iorga, who acted as his secretary and key bibliographer, Theodorescu wrote in 1938: “As a historian and nationalist, N. Iorga was an antisemite. To antisemitism from his concept would signify the destruction of his entire political science” (cited in Volovici 1991, 181-82). While this can be seen as an overstatement, the tendency to obfuscate the subject and discuss instead about Iorga’s patriotism is still present in academic debates (Scurtu cited in a press release from the Romanian Academy 2000). After all, pre-modernist historian Andrei Pippidi (Iorga 1999, 7), a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy and

Iorga's grandson, was requesting a "defensive criticism" of the historian's political biography, mocking precisely references to antisemitism and fascist sympathies.

A twenty-first century turn: towards a new approach

Paraphrasing Irina Livezeanu's titlu concerning the poverty of post-communist contemporary history in Romania (2003), I would state that there was much poverty in post-communist Iorga's scholarship, especially in the first decade, but only if one looked for critical surveys. Alternatively, hagiographic approaches flourished. In a sense this is still the case, in terms of specialized articles, but there seems to be a promising change of perspective. Both Western and Romanian scholars started to critically revisit Iorga's complex legacy and challenge the extreme nationalist discourses of the post-1989 period. I would only point out to a very geographically diverse gallery of scholars interested in 19th and 20th centuries nationalism and ultranationalism, who brought fresh eyes to the scholarship on Iorga, away from the heroic style that seemed to set apart so far surveys of Iorga. Romanian scholars Marius Turda (2011), Bogdan C. Iacob (2014), Robert Adam (2018), Constantin Iordachi (2019), Ana Bărbulescu (2020), Bulgarians Diana Mishkova and Roumen Daskalov (2015), Greek Effi Gazi (2010), Italians Stefano Santoro (2014) and Giuseppe Motta (2019), Spanish Lucila Mallart (2019), Australian Roland Clark (2019). A special mention, while contrary to the approach presented in this text, deserves Anca Mândru (2009) who applied Hutchinson's cultural nationalism theory to Iorga's interwar activity within the Cultural League in a Master's thesis. Their reading of Iorga seem to move the debate forward into twenty-first century, where a different framework could emerge and where, as Volovici put it, "we should get ourselves used to critically discuss anything and anyone again" (1997).

Conclusions

The case of Nicolae Iorga demonstrates how cultural and political nationalism are complementary and sometimes dovetail. In order to be able to distinguish between the two types we should follow the primary goal of the agents of nationalism – a moral community or a strong territorial state - as Hutchinson suggested (2013). However, Iorga's case study is not an easy case to assign to one of the two categories. And this is because Iorga made so much use of cultural means. Things became even more complicated when we are dealing with a polymath. Interestingly enough, in Peter Burke's 500 short biographical index Iorga is the only name described to have also been a politician (Burke, 2020, 267), while in the text we can find only two other polymaths

involved in politics, Alexis de Tocqueville and Thomas Macaulay⁷. While the company of great minds does justice to Iorga's work overall, to place his nationalism in a cultural context and disrobe him of his (nationalist) politics, good or bad, and of political agency would certainly deform his political biography. Through a political reading of key moments in Iorga's early public life of the pre-1914 period, I wished to a different perspective on Iorga's nationalism. In this, I was inspired by John Breuilly's interpretation of nationalism as a form of politics seeking to exercise power, trying to see if this can help at an individual level, in tracing the political story behind probably the most influential agent of nationalism of pre-war Romania. While for some authors to think of nationalism in political terms, as a pursuit of power for the agents themselves and for their nation-state, seems "more extreme" than to think in terms of cultural nationalism (Szedlacsek 2014, 233), I believe it to be the only authentic way to understand the profile of historians acting as nation-builders. All of Iorga's academic works and revivalist efforts were subordinated to his nationalist politics. And nationalism and politics were, of course, the one and same thing for Iorga. As he confessed to a close contact, G. T. Kirileanu, in 1915: "If I were to write as a historian, I would write differently; but, as a politician, I have to follow possibilities, and the future historian will see why I had to write like that..."⁸. Romanians are so used to the classical discourse on Iorga as an encyclopaedic intellectual that they have a hard time to accept that Iorga never limited himself to culture, all the contrary.

References

- Adam, Robert. 2018. *Două veacuri de populism românesc*. București: Humanitas.
- Alexandrescu, Sorin. 2008. "Modernism și antimodernism. Din nou. cazul românesc." In *Modernism și antimodernism. Noi perspective interdisciplinare*, edited by Sorin Antohi, 103-159. București: Cuvântul/Editura Muzeului Literaturii Române.
- Bărbulescu, Ana. 2020. "Nicolae Iorga and the Jews." *Holocaust. Studii și cercetări* 13: 219-245.
- Bodea, Cornelia, and Ștefan Vergatti. 2012. *Nicolae Iorga în arhivele vieneze și ale Siguranței regale (1903-1914)*. București: Mica Valahie.
- Boia, Lucian. *Istorie și mit în conștiința românească*. București: Editura Humanitas.
- Breuilly, John. 1993. *Nationalism and the State*. Manchester (UK): Manchester University Press.

⁷ Iorga was one of the two Romanians referenced in the book, along with a famous sociologist and psychologist, Zevedei Barbu, who is almost unknown in Romania. His biography only recently started to be discovered by Romanian scholars. See Stan (2015), Maci and Finkenthal (2015).

⁸ Iorga as recounted in one of his close contacts's daily notes (Kirileanu 2013, 111). My translation.

- Burke, Peter. 2020. *The Polymath*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press.
- Buzatu, Gheorghe. 2015. *Efigia celebrității*, In N. Iorga. *Istoria românilor*, X2 - *Omagiul succesorilor*, edited by Gheorghe Buzatu and Victor Spinei, 2nd edition. București: Editura Enciclopedică.
- Chioveanu, Mihai. 2010. "Istoricii și politica în România interbelică." In *România interbelică. Istorie și istoriografie*, edited by Ovidiu Pecican: 141-161. Cluj-Napoca: Limes.
- Clark, Roland. 2019. "From Elite Pamphleteers to Social Movement Protagonists: Antisemitic Activism in 1920s." *Studies on National Movements* 4 (May): <https://snm.nise.eu/index.php/studies/article/view/47>.
- Crainic, Nichifor. 1991. *Zile albe, zile negre. Memorii*, I. București: Casa editorială Gândirea.
- Daskalov, Roumen. 2015. "Feud over the Middle Ages: Bulgarian-Romanian Historiographical Debates." In *Entangled Histories of the Balkans. Volume Three: Shared Pasts, Disputed Legacies*, edited by Roumen Daskalov and Alexander Vezenkov: 274-354. Leiden: Brill.
- Hutchinson, John. *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism: The Gaelic Revival and the Creation of the Irish Nation State*. London: Allen&Unwin, London, 1987.
- Hutchinson, John. 1994. *Modern Nationalism*. London: Fontana Press.
- Hutchinson, John. 2013. "Cultural Nationalism," in John Breuilly (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, edited by John Breuilly: 75-96. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Gallagher, Tom. 1992. "Vatra Românească and resurgent nationalism in Romania," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15:4, 570-598. DOI: 10.1080/01419870.1992.9993764
- Gallagher, Tom. 1996. "A feeble embrace: Romania's engagement with democracy, 1989–94," *Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics*, 12:2, 145-172, DOI: 10.1080/13523279608415307.
- Gallagher, Thomas G. 2015. "Unsocial Democrats: The PSD's Negative Role in Romania's Democracy." In *Post-Communist Romania at Twenty-Five*, edited by Lavinia Stan and Diance Vancea: 171-191. Lanham/Boulder/New York/London: Lexington Books.
- Gazi, Effi. 2010. "Theorising and Practising 'Scientific' History in South-Eastern Europe (Nineteenth Century): Spyridon Lambros and Nicolae Iorga," in Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (eds.), *Nationalising the Past. Historians as Nation Builders in Modern Europe*, 192-208. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Heinen, Armin. 1999 [1986]. *Legiunea "Arhanghelului Mihail". Mișcare socială și organizație politică*. București: Humanitas.
- Iacob, Bogdan C. 2014. "Nicolae Iorga as New Man. Functions of a Teacher Cult." *Studii și Materiale de Istorie Contemporană*, XIII: 178-192.
- Ioanid, Radu. 1992. "Nicolae Iorga and Fascism", *Journal of Contemporary History* 27: 467-492.
- Ioanid, Radu. 1994. "Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Romania." In *Anti-Semitism and the Treatment of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Eastern Europe*, edited by Randolph L. Braham. Boulder/New York: Columbia University Press/The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies Graduate Center/City University of New York and Social Science Monographs.
- Iordachi, Constantin. 2019. *Liberalism, constitutional nationalism, and minorities : the making of Romanian citizenship, c. 1750–1918*. Leiden/Boston: Brill.
- Ionescu, Nae. 1990. Roza vânturilor 1926-1933. Foreword by Dan Smântânescu. Edited by Mircea Eliade. București: Cultura Națională." (anastatic reprint)
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1899. *Opinions sincères. La vie intellectuelle des Roumains en 1899*. Bucarest: Imprimerie de L'Indépendance Roumaine.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1900. *Opinions pernicieuses d'un mauvais patriote. Articles de critique et d'histoire, publiés dans l' 'Indépendance roumaine'*.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1903. *Cuvinte adevărate*. București: Institutul Minerva.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1908a. *Cultură politică și politică națională*. Vălenii-de-Munte: Tipografia Neamul Românesc.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1908b. *A cui e Dunărea?* Vălenii-de-Munte: Tipografia Neamul Românesc.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1916. *O luptă literară. Articole din Sămănătorul*, II (iulie 1905-aprilie 1906). Vălenii-de-Munte: Neamul Românesc.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1933. "Două concepții istorice (Cuvântare de intrare în Academia Română, 17 mai 1911)," in *Generalități cu privire la studiile istorice. Lecții de deschidere și cuvântări*. 2nd edition. București: [n.p.].
- Iorga, Nicolae. [1937]. *Iudaica*. București: "Bucovina" I. E. Torouțiu.
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1940. *Desvoltarea imperialismului contemporan. Lecții la Universitatea din București*. București: Tipografia ziarului "Universul."
- Iorga, Nicolae. 1984. *Correspondență* vol. I, edited by Ecaterina Vaum. București: Minerva.

- Iorga, Nicolae. 1999. *Generalități cu privire la studiile istorice*, fourth edition, introduction and notes, and comm. by Andrei Pippidi. Iași: Polirom.
- Kirileanu, G. T. 2013. *Martor la istoria României (1872-1960): jurnal și epistolar*. Vol. 2: 1915-1918. Ed. Constantin Bostan. București: RAO.
- Leerssen, J. 2006. "Nationalism and the cultivation of culture." *Nations and Nationalism*, 12: 559-578. <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1469-8129.2006.00253.x>
- Livezeanu, Irina. 2003. *The Poverty of Post-Communist Contemporary History in Romania*. Washington, DC: The National Council for Eurasian and East European Research.
- Maci, Daniela and Michael Finkenthal (eds.). 2015. *Zevedei Barbu. Psiholog, sociolog și filosof român și englez*. București: Tracus Arte.
- Mallart, Lucila. 2019. "Researching the Medieval Past between Catalonia and Romania. Josep Puig i Cadafalch, Nicolae Iorga, and the Transnational Writing of National History (1921-1935)," *Nations and Nationalism* 27: 148– 161. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12659>.
- Mândru, Anca. 2009. "Cultural Nationalism alongside Official State-Building: the Romanian Cultural League in the Interwar Period." MA thesis, Central European University.
- Motta, Giuseppe. 2019. "Nationalism and Anti-Semitism in an Independent Romania." *Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies* 8 (2): Doi: 14-26. 10.2478/ajis-2019-0012
- Nagy-Talavera, Nicholas M. 1996. *Nicolae Iorga: a biography*. Iași: The Center for Romanian Studies, The Romanian Cultural Foundation.
- Niessen, James P. 1995. "Romanian Nationalism: An Ideology of Integration and Mobilization." In *Eastern European Nationalism in the Twentieth Century*, edited by Peter F. Sugar: 273-304. Washington, DC : American University Press.
- Oldson, William O. 1973. *The Historical and Nationalistic Thought of Nicolae Iorga*. Boulder (CO)/New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press.
- Oldson, William O. 1991. *A Providential Anti-Semitism: Nationalism and Polity in Nineteenth Century Romania*. Philadelphia: The American Philosophical Society.
- Oprîțescu, Mihail. 2000. *Partidul Naționalist Democrat condus de Nicolae Iorga (1910-1938)*. București: [Neva].
- Ornea, Zigu. 1971. *Sămănătorismul*. 2nd revised edition. București: Minerva.
- Ortiz, Ramiro. 1927. *Italia modernă*. București: Editura Ancora.

Pearson, Maurice. 1988. Nicolae Iorga as Historian and Politician.” In *Historians as Nation-Builders: Central and South-East Europe*, edited by Dennis Deletant and Harry Hanak: 157-173. Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University of London/The Macmillan Press.

Pop, Ioan-Aurel. 2014 [2002]. *Istoria, adevărul și miturile (Note de lectură)*. 2nd edition. București: Editura Enciclopedică.

Râpeanu, Valeriu. 1972 [1934]. “Studiu introductiv.” N. Iorga, *O viață de om așa cum a fost*, edited by V. Râpeanu. București: Minerva.

Romanian Academy. 2000. Press release. https://acad.ro/com/pag_com3011.htm

Santoro, Stefano. 2014. *Dall'Impero asburgico alla Grande Romania. Il nazionalismo romeno di Transilvania fra Ottocento e Novecento*. Milano: FrancoAngeli.

Schmitt, Oliver Jens. 2017. *Corneliu Zelea Codreanu: ascensiunea și căderea “Căpitanului.”* București: Humanitas.

Seton-Watson, R. W. (Robert William). (1922). *The historian as a political force in Central Europe: An inaugural lecture delivered on 2 November 1922*. [London]: School of Slavonic studies in the University of London, King's College.

Shafir, Michael. 1994. “Anti-Semitism in the Postcommunist Era.” In *The Tragedy of Romanian Jewry*, edited by Randolph L. Braham: 333-86. Boulder/New York: The Rosenthal Institute for Holocaust Studies Graduate Center/The City University of New York and Social Science Monographs/Columbia University Press.

Shafir, Michael. 2014. “Unacademic academics: Holocaust deniers and trivializers in post-Communist Romania.” *Nationalities Papers*, 42 (6): 942-964, DOI: 10.1080/00905992.2014.939619

Smântânescu, Dan. 1933. *Mișcarea sămănătoristă. Studiu istoric-literar*. [S.l.]: “Bucovina.”

Stan, M. (2015). “Zevedei Barbu: an exercise in intellectual biography.” *Studia Politica: Romanian Political Science Review*, XV(3), 515-528. <https://nbn-resolving.org/urn:nbn:de:0168-ssoar-51714-4>.

Stanomir, Ioan. 2000. *Reacțiune și conservatorism: eseu asupra imaginarului politic eminescian*. București: Nemira.

Statutele Ligei pentru unitatea culturală a tuturor românilor. 1893. București: Noua Tipografie “Populară.”

- Theodorescu, Barbu. 1968. *N. Iorga*. București: Editura Tineretului.
- Theodorescu, Barbu. ed. 1972. *Scrisori către Nicolae Iorga, vol. I (1890-1901)*. București: Minerva.
- Theodorescu, Barbu. 1976. *Nicolae Iorga (1871-1940): biobibliografie*. București: Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică/Editura Militară.
- Tismăneanu, Vladimir. 1999. *Fantasmele salvării. Democrație, naționalism și mit în Europa post-comunistă*. Iași: Polirom.
- Turda, Marius. 2001. "Transylvania Revisited: Public Discourse and Historical Representation in Contemporary Romania." In *Nation-Building and Contested Identities: Romanian and Hungarian Case Studies*, edited by Balázs Trencsényi, Dragoș Petrescu, Cristina Petrescu, Constantin Iordachi, and Zoltán Kántor. Budapest/Iași: Regio Books/Polirom.
- Turda, Marius. 2008. "Conservative Palingenesis and Cultural Modernism in Early Twentieth-century Romania." *Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions*, 9 (4): 437–453. DOI: 10.1080/14690760802436068
- Turda, Marius. 2011. "Historical Writing in the Balkans." *The Oxford History of Historical Writing*, Volume 4: 1800-1945, ed. Stuart Macintyre, Juan Maignashca, and Attila Pók. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Țăranu, Georgiana. 2015. "The Mythical Mussolini as Seen by Nicolae Iorga: The Statesman, the Genius, the Man." *Historical Yearbook XI-XII*: 195-208.
- Țăranu, Georgiana. 2016. "Profesorul Nicolae Iorga și 'lecțiile' Italiei lui Mussolini pentru uzul publicului român." In *Istorie și istorici la Universitatea din București: dimensiuni instituționale – proiecte intelectuale*, edited by Florentina Nițu, Florin Müller, and Remus Nica. București: Editura Universității din București: 139-51.
- Țăranu, Georgiana. 2019. "A Historian's Eyes on that 'Admirable Man from Asia Minor': Nicolae Iorga's Understanding of Atatürk and his Regime." In *Türkiye-Romanya İlişkileri: Geçmiş Ve Günümüz Uluslararası Sempozyumu/ International Symposium On Turkey-Romania Relations: Past And Present*, 4-6 October 2017, Constanta, Bildiriler / Papers, vol. II, 1241-1242. Ankara: Atatürk Araştırma Merkezi Yayınları.
- Țurlea, Petre. 1991. *Nicolae Iorga în viața politică a României*. București: Editura Enciclopedică.
- Țurlea, Petre. 2001. *Nicolae Iorga între dictatura regală și dictatura legionară*. București: Enciclopedică.

- Țurlea, Petre. 2008. *Nicolae Iorga la Vălenii de Munte*. București: România Pur și Simplu.
- Țurlea, Petre. 2016. *Nicolae Iorga*. București: Enciclopedică.
- Vanhaelemeersch, Philip. 2006. *A Generation Without Beliefs and the Idea of Experience in Romania (1927-1934)*. Boulder (CO)/New York: East European Monographs/Columbia University Press.
- van Hout, Milou. 2020. "In search of the nation in Fiume: Irredentism, cultural nationalism, borderlands." *Nations and Nationalism*.26: 660–676. <https://doi.org/10.1111/nana.12583>
- Verdery, Katherine. 1995. "National Ideology and National Character in Interwar Romania." In *National Character and National Ideology in Interwar Eastern Europe*, edited by Ivo Banac and Katherine Verdery, 103-133. New Haven: Yale Center for International and Area Studies.
- Volovici, Leon. 1991. *Nationalist Ideology and Antisemitism: the Case of Romanian Intellectuals in the 1930s*. Trans. by Charles Kormos. Pergamon Press: Oxford/New York/Seoul/Tokyo.
- Volovici, Leon. 1997. Interviewed of Mircea Iorgulescu, April 19, 1997. Radio Europa Liberă Moldova. <https://moldova.europalibera.org/a/24408738.html>