

**\*\*\*DRAFT\*\*\***

**Paper Presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021**

**Do No Cite Without the Permission of the Author**

**Article title:** Ethnic Quotas and Power Distribution in Limited-Access Orders of the Northwest Caucasus, 1920-2020

**Author:** Azamat Tatarov, Kabardino-Balkarian State U, Russia

**Email:** [traveller9090@mail.ru](mailto:traveller9090@mail.ru)

**Abstract.** Throughout most of the Soviet era and post-Soviet decades political management and the formation of government bodies in the North Caucasus have been drawing on the features of the nationalities policy aimed at the integration of ethnic groups. This paper explores the construction of plural societies (consociations) in the Northwest Caucasus – Adygea, Karachay-Cherkessia and Kabardino-Balkaria – through the prism of historical institutionalism and the analytical framework of limited-access orders. Delving into the historical context dating back to the 1920s, the author explores the formation of principles, formal and informal rules, which become proven attitudes and are used by ex-nomenklatura political leaders in some post-Soviet ethnic republics. In addition to defining ethnic quotas as, to a certain extent, inherited Soviet practices which are reproduced both in a fragile and basic social orders, the article examines cases of deviation from the conventional proportions of ethnic representation in government bodies causing drastic challenges to the unity of divided societies. It is argued that political ethnic quotas are an important tool in preserving social and territorial integration in multiethnic regions in the context of a democratic deficit in the 21st century Russia.

**Key words:** Northwest Caucasus, ethnic quotas, governance, nationalities policy, fragile and basic limited-access orders.

## **Introduction**

Being among sustainable post-Soviet political institutions in the North Caucasus, ethnic quotas are a set of informal practices that configures the distribution of positions between ethnic political actors in government bodies and retains functionality in the face of political changes. At least in the Brezhnev era, the current administrative boundaries of ethnic regions were formed, as well as practices were established guaranteeing the regional elites an inflow of investments and rents in exchange for loyalty to the Center in Moscow and, to a certain extent: corporate transactions (Corporalist Deal) (Bunce, 1983), elite bargains and semi-formal/informal agreements between the Center and ethnic political actors,

mechanisms of political settlements. Analysis of the phenomenon of post-Soviet ethnic quotas (Astvatsaturova, Adiev, 2013; Magomedrasulova, 2016; Panov, 2016), the structure of elites (Salgiriev, 2015), transformation of elites (Tetuev, 2016), the relationship between ethnic mobilization and political discourse (Zhemukhov, 2012; Borov, 2014; Silaev, 2020) demonstrates to what extent configurations of ethnic representation in public offices are inherited from the Soviet era and how deeply they are embedded in elite recruitment strategies in the North Caucasus.

This study<sup>1</sup> is aimed at identifying the institutional framework and mechanisms for the reproduction of informal institutions, in this case, ethnic quotas, and at explaining how this reproduction determines the processes in the political and social spaces. Why in some regions (Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia) a conditionally proportional model of representation has developed between titular groups<sup>2</sup> and ethnic Russians, while in Adygea the titular minority has achieved access to a key position since 1949 and a conditional parity of representation ( $\approx$  50-50) in the early 1990s? What are the reasons for the preservation of informal, normatively loose ethnic quotas, against the background of the fact that at the end of the Soviet and early post-Soviet eras, ethnic mobilizations formed a public demand for institutions of ethnic representation based on democratic development? How is the ethnic quota institutions reproduced in the changing institutional framework and affect political settlements and political stability in plural societies?

The selected cases, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, are characterized by a long experience of participation in Soviet and Russian projects of ethno-federalism since the early 1920s. After the collapse of the USSR, the political elites faced the challenges of ethnic mobilization and the competition of three mobilization discourse – 1) the *Adyghe* (Adygeans, Kabardians, Circassians), 2) Karachays and Balkars, closely related in language and culture,

---

<sup>1</sup> The paper was created as part of a project supported by Oxford Russia Fellowship 2020–2021. See official website: <https://ssl-research.org/en/orf/>

<sup>2</sup> Titular groups is a name for indigenous ethnic groups developed within the framework of Soviet nationality policy.

and 3) ethnic Russians. Not only differ they nominally (number, urbanization, language) but also in the possibilities of self-organization and mobilization. On the one hand, the strengthening of the unity of the ruling classes against the background of the weakening of ethnic mobilizations is accounted for as the achievement of modern stability and power distribution balance. On the other hand, political stability is associated with the fact that in the 21st century the federal Center regained high state capacities, lost rapidly at the turn of the 1980-1990s, and reduced the autonomy of regional leaders.

The presence of several ethnic communities makes it possible to represent the Northwest Caucasus ethnic regions as consociational models (Lijphart, 1977) – multi-unit objects, managed via compromise and ensuring political participation for segments (for example, ethnic ones) that are influenced by political processes. Lijphart defines four basic principles of his theory: the grand coalition and representation (for example, ethnic representation), segment autonomy (in our case, of ethnic communities), proportional representation (as a result of democratically supported elections), and the veto of minorities (for instance, in education).

The main losses of the classic consociational theory are that it provides high-quality explanatory possibilities only at limited time stages, during the period of conflict resolution in multi-constituent societies (Haddad, 2009; Walsh, 2015), and does not guarantee long-term stability perspective (Caluwaerts, Reuchamps, 2014; El Machnouk, 2017; Nagle, 2017). The prospects for democratic consociational institutions in the post-Soviet space, not to mention the Soviet one, are ambiguous with the “effect of democracy” not providing social transformations which democratic institutions rely on (Tilly, 2007).

The selected cases are defined as consociational models without necessarily being linked to the four basic principles outlined by Lijphart. However, during the early post-Soviet years, the actions of the elites in the republics of the Northwest Caucasus quite organically fit into the framework of Lijphart’s approach against the background of maintaining territorial integrity. More recent political realities

alienate these cases from the democratic foundations of the classic consociational theory: representation, based on informal observance of demographic proportions; a decrease in the level of publicity of political struggle and in the role of ethnic organizations in the formation of counter-elites; erosion of the veto and electoral engineering; and the abolition of two-chamber parliament in both regions by the mid-2000s.

In addition to the four basic democratic elements mentioned, consociational theory emphasizes the importance of elite compromise. And this fits into the context that political settlements and stability depend both on public democratic demonstrations of “fair” political representation, as well as on elite bargains and rents that generate incentives for elites to compete for resources using nonviolent mechanisms (North et al., 2009). Rent-seeking behavior and ethnicity of political actors are associated with regional elites seeking to achieve a balance of political settlements.

The institutional approach of D. North and his colleagues (2009) is of interest from the point of view of defining and analyzing the dynamics of the development of social orders, including the North Caucasus (Starodubrovskaja, Kazenin, 2016). The conceptualization of limited-access orders is based on the considerations on the prevalence of personal ties over impersonal relationships among the elites. Rents are understood as resources that are limitedly available to citizens and organizations to serve as economic incentives for cooperation within the ruling coalitions. Defining fragile basic and mature limited-access orders is linked to variations of the ability of the state to use rents to reduce the use of violence in society, to form a complex institutional organization and to support non-competitive and control competitive organizations. The transition of limited-access order from a fragile state to a basic one determines the institutional framework, due to which political actors establish those “rules of the game” that reduce the use of violence in the struggle of elites for resources (North et al., 2009).

We often perceive a totalitarian state as an organization that has superpowers to control society. But during the development of the totalitarian system in the USSR in the 1920-1950s, modernization and state penetration met with drastic resistance from traditional institutions and opposition groups and their leaders, and the WWII led to economic disorder and ethnic deportations in the Northwest Caucasus (Balkars and Karachays in 1943-1957). Not only overcoming the war devastations, but also the growth of knowledge of the Russian language by non-Russian nationalities, increased the Center's real capacity to establish loyal regional elites, long-term rules that ensure the stability of control over the regions. Therefore, we attribute the 1920s-1950s to the period of fragile limited-access order, while the 1960-1980s – to the basic one.

The collapse of the USSR led to the destabilization of the state in the Northwest Caucasus. The fragile order (1990s – early 2000s) took place in the conditions of ethnic mobilizations and the existence of centers of violence autonomous from the state. The transition to the basic order in Russia and its regions is determined by the process of recentralization (Gel'man, 2010) in the early 2000s and displacement/co-optation of competitive organizations. This can be clearly seen in the fate of ethnic organizations in the Northwest Caucasus in the 21st century, when the most significant of them lost their ability to influence autonomous legitimization and were incorporated into the changed institutional framework.

In the Northwest Caucasus, two main types of interregional identity are found – Adyghe (Kabardians, Circassians and Adyghe) and Karachay-Balkarian. On the eve and after the collapse of the USSR, tendencies of interethnic solidarity (the *Adyghe*) and high risks of regional dispersion began to appear against the background of ethnic mobilizations (Karachays, Balkars and, to a lesser extent, Russians). The relatively slow decline in the number of Russians and the preservation of their noticeable share in the population in comparison with the Northeast Caucasus put forward the consociational models of multi-ethnic

(Karachay-Cherkessia)<sup>3</sup>, trio-ethnic (Kabardino-Balkaria) and duo-ethnic (Adygea) ethnic quotas.

*Key research questions:*

How is the reproduction of informal ethnic quotas taking place in regional government bodies in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria in the context of changes in the political institutional framework?

How is the functioning of ethnic quotas differentiated in the context of fragile and basic limited-access orders in different regions of the Northwest Caucasus?

### **Transformation of the territorial and ethnic composition of the Northwest Caucasus**

What are the first obstacles on the way of the explorer of the past and present of the North Caucasus? Among the first of these are obviously the features of the “fracture zone” (p. 8, 242) with which James Scott (2009) endowed this region and its multiple geographic, language and culture divisions (*Map 1 and 2*). Staying away from state penetration for centuries, the North Caucasus, full of inaccessible mountain labyrinths of gorges and passes, was conquered and made the object of Russian conquest in the second half of the 19th century, i.e. relatively shortly before the beginning of the Soviet nationalities policy. The latter initially determined the institutional framework for the involvement of ethnic groups in a new social space, forming three consociations in the Northwest Caucasus (Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia). The Soviet “registration” identified two main fragmented clusters of ethnic groups: Adygeans, Circassians and Kabardians were closely related subgroups of the once united ethnic group of *Circassians* (the self-name – *Adyghe*), which dominated the Northwest Caucasus until the conquest of the Russian Empire in the late 18th and first half of the 19th century. No less closely related Balkars and Karachais belong to the group of

---

<sup>3</sup> In Karachay-Cherkessia, in addition to the three main strategic groups (Karachais, Circassians and Russians), there are also two titular minorities, Abazins and Nogais.

Turkic languages, and this is one of their main differences from their closest neighbors.

All three regions, Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia, were formed with the status of Autonomous District, or *Autonomous Oblast (AO)*, and became republics after the collapse of the USSR, but they had different paths of development of status and territorial changes in the 1920-1960s. Throughout the Soviet period, the Adygean AO was an enclave within larger administrative units, mainly the Krasnodar Krai, and acquired its modern territorial shape in 1962. The Kabardino-Balkarian AO received an increase in status in 1936, becoming the Kabardino-Balkarian Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (KBASSR) and turned the Kabardian ASSR during the period of deportation of the Balkars (1944-1957) . More confused is the history of the Karachay-Cherkess AO, which existed from 1922 to 1926, then divided into the Karachay and Cherkess AO, and finally reunited after the return of Karachays to the homeland in 1957 to become, as before, a part of Stavropol Krai.

Map 1. The North Caucasus: administrative division





Map 2. The Northwest Caucasus: ethnic composition



### **In pursuit of ethnic quotas configurations, 1920-1980s**

Since 1917, for the *Circassians*, like other North Caucasian peoples, the fate of a new vector of political development was being decided. Two projects, *Mountainous Republic of the Northern Caucasus* (1917-1919) and *Mountain Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic* (1921-1924), so close in their geographic and demographic boundaries, offered completely different perspectives. The first republic opened up opportunities for the development of consociational democracy in the form of a parliamentary republic, the essence of which, according to Lijphart (1977), was existence of a multi-component society through the development of sets of democratic institutions and the consideration of ethnicity in the procedure for elections and appointments. With the coming to power of the Bolsheviks, the project was rapidly delegitimized, but the Soviet experiment also did not provide effective consolidation in the conflict-ridden region after the Civil War (1918-1920), generating a request to create a cluster of autonomies in the North Caucasus.

Turning to the approach of D. North and his colleagues (2009) for reviewing the Soviet political dynamics of the 1920-1980s, one can distinguish two stages in the institutional development of consociations: the period of fragile (1920-1950s)

and basic (1960s – late 1980s) limited-access orders. 1920-1940s were marked by modernization and social upheavals in the North Caucasus, breakdown of traditional institutions and development of new civil “rules of the game.” During this period, the state could control only a small number of organizations and temporarily put up with competitive phenomena. In particular, in the 1920s the early Soviet Kabardian elite, headed by B. Kalmykov, had to reckon with the Sharia movement and one of its leaders N. Katkhanov. The Soviet education system coexisted with a network of Muslim schools. Violent repression and the spread of a totalitarian regime ensured the strengthening of the state’s monopoly on violence and its control over the formation of organizations. The transition to the basic model in the autonomies passed through the trials of the Great Patriotic War 1941-1945 and the deportation of neighboring Karachays and Balkars, and ended after the restoration of the economy and the rehabilitation of victims of repression in 1950 – mid. 1960s.

The withdrawal of Kabarda from the *GASSR* already in 1921 demonstrated objective difficulties of the project of the Soviet mountain federation as well as certain aspirations of the Kabardian elite, which at the same time avoided contradictions with the Center’s interests. On the one hand, the X Congress of the Russian Communist Party (b) in 1921 marked the launch of *korenizatsiya* policy, which consisted in a systematic increase in the share of representatives of the North Caucasian ethnic groups in the party and state apparatus. On the other hand, during this period the Kabardian political leaders were interested in the emergence of Kabardian autonomy against the background of the growth of the national movement (Dzamikhov, Kazharov, 2019, p. 41, 44). However, the issues of rehabilitation of the losses of the *Circassians* (*Adyghe*) in the Caucasian War of the 19th century and the satisfaction of their territorial claims were far from being resolved. The Center definitely sought for the administrative segmentation of the Adyghe people and for deepening the differentiation of a single identity (Cuciev, 2007, p. 68), which resulted in the unification of Kabarda and Balkaria into a single AO (1922) and the creation of the Circassian AO, Adygean AO and

Shapsugsky District. Thus, in the 1920s four “different” nationalities appear: Kabardians, Circassians, Adygeans and Shapsugs.

Early Soviet nationalities policy and modernization 1920-1930s is often perceived in the framework of the concept of positive action (Martin, 2001), according to which the USSR made huge investments in the development of ethnic institutions before World War II, taking into account the interests of national minorities via positive discrimination of the majority, ethnic Russians. In the 1920s this policy was aimed at overt korenizatsiya, training of communist ethnic cadres in various spheres, including political one. In 1933-1939, there was a change of discourse and positive discrimination turned to “silent.” The issues of korenizatsiya have left the public sphere of discussion. The wording in the classification of nationalities has changed. In particular, a more delicate term “culturally backward nationalities in the past” has appeared (Martin, 2001, p. 372–374). Ethnic representation has grown into a more informal set of institutions, rituals in which “the actors are the audience” (Scott, 1990, p. 59).

The departure from the indigenous policy and the turn towards unification led to an influx of the Russian-speaking population and a decrease in the titular population in the autonomies, the transition of the North Caucasian languages to the Cyrillic alphabet, an uncompromising anti-Islamic campaign and the fight against some old vestiges.

Another controversial process was forced collectivization. It should be emphasized that regardless of the economic outcomes and consequences of collectivization, the latter certainly provided more ambitious goals for the state: the appropriation of resources and political control over the countryside which had not previously been adapted for this level of state intervention (Scott, 1998, p. 203).

The methods of violence and coercion caused a wave of armed uprisings in the North Caucasus, which spread in Kabardian, Balkarian and Karachai villages in the 1928-1930s (Ajshaev, 2009, p. 7ff; Mambetov, Mambetov, 1999, p. 171, 173). Participants in peasant uprisings were against violent collectivization and government interference in religion and customs. An acute discontent of the

peasants in the early 1930s increased activity of criminal and political banditism (Chekists of Kabardino-Balkaria, 1987).

The period of the Great Patriotic War became a difficult test for the consociations of the Northwest Caucasus which ended up in the war zone and the Nazi occupation of 1942-1943. In the Center, irritation about the “North Caucasian issue” increased, as a result of which the conscription of the North Caucasian highlanders into the army has been limited (Bezugol'nyj, Bugaj, Krinko, 2012), and the assessment of banditry in the autonomies has been taken into account when preparing repressions and criticism of regional elites. At the same time, the law has not developed a distinction between political and criminal banditry.

After the deportation of the Balkars, KBASSR was transformed into the Kabardian ASSR, and the first secretary Z. Kumekhov (a Kabardian) was removed from office. The assessment of the work of Kumekhov's team was made in a political report on the situation among the Kabardians, prepared for Moscow by his successor and ethnic Russian N. Mazin (1944-1949). Mazin tried to prove the failure of the “Kumekhov’s policy,” recalling that a significant part of the communists did not evacuate and remained in the zone of Nazi occupation. Also, the report’s author accused the Kabardian people of “unworthy” behavior during the occupation and came down with criticism of the 115th national cavalry division and the evacuation, which allegedly led to the fact that “all collective farm cattle were left to the invaders,” i.e. the Nazi German forces (Russian State Archive of Social and Political History Fund 17, Inventory 88, Case 286, pp. 16-22).

Such ethnic-centered accusations were not unprecedented and reflected the political discourse prevailing in the mid-1940s: the transition from a positive assessment of the organizational measures of regional elites at the beginning of the war to harsh criticism after the battle for the Caucasus. Now, the facts that representatives of the indigenous nationalities were massively mobilized into the Red Army, took an active part in the defense of the Caucasus and providing the front with strategically important products were ignored.

During the Great Patriotic War, the Center's trust in the representatives of the *Adyghe* elite significantly decreased in the Adygean and Cherkess AO. Only after the I. Stalin's death and the return of the deported peoples the titular nationalities receive broader opportunities for political participation. If in the Stalinist era, forced modernization and mass repressions postponed the issue of flexible ethnic representation in the field of government, then since the late 1950s in some regions, certain patterns of informal quotas began to emerge, guaranteeing access for representatives of the titular population to key positions. In addition, the approach to the basic model of the natural state after the Stalinist era allowed the Center to take advantage of some of the fruits of the previous decades of modernization, in particular, the improved knowledge of the Russian language among indigenous peoples, the formation of formal social lifts that could be a profitable alternative to kinship and ethnic ties.

The WWII showed that modernization in the autonomies in the 1920s-1930s was unfinished. The titular nationalities were still poorly involved in industry and constituted a very small part of the urban population. Obtaining education, development of personnel, resettlement to the city required an increase in good command of the Russian language. But the latter was introduced as compulsory in national schools in 1938-1939. In 1940, only 25-30% of indigenous North Caucasians conscripted for military service were fluent in Russian (Bezugol'nyj, Bugaj, Krinko, 2012: 119-120).

Certain configurations of ethnic quotas and the balance of professionalism and loyalty made it possible to form regional elites, which ensured a stable position in the regions of residence of the Circassians in the 1950s-1970s. The symbolic rapprochement between the Center and the autonomies of the Northwest Caucasus was emphasized in 1957 during the celebration of the "400th anniversary of the voluntary accession" of the *Adyghe* to Russia, held in Adygea, Kabardino-Balkaria and Karachay-Cherkessia. These events were accompanied by honorary awards both to the foremost workers for their successes in economic and cultural development, and to the regions themselves. The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet

of the USSR awarded the Karachay-Cherkess, Adygean AO and the Kabardino-Balkarian ASSR (for the second time after 1930) with the Order of Lenin.

In the era of the first secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian regional committee of the CPSU T.K. Malbakhov (1956-1985), a political balance was formed to ensure interethnic solidarity – while Kabardians, as the most numerous ethnic group, held the post of first secretary, representatives of the Balkars, returned from deportation, were appointed chairmen of the Presidium of the Supreme Council of KBASSR (Ch. Uyanayev (1959-1967) and M. Gettuev (1967-1979)), and the Russians were appointed as the second secretaries of the regional committee (G. Khubaev (1957-1968) and N. Krupin (1968-1977)).

In other autonomies, dissimilar scenarios have developed. In Adygea, the Adygeans were not allowed to the post of the first secretary of the regional committee of the CPSU (b) / CPSU since 1935. But after the Great Patriotic War, the indigenous political leaders in the region receive an unprecedented credit of trust and opportunities that were absent in other autonomies. Since 1949, the first secretaries of the regional committee have invariably been representatives of the Adygean minority (just over 20% of the population of the autonomy, see Table 1).

During the existence of the Circassian AO in 1928-1957, Circassians (A. Argunov and Sh. Tengizov) held the post of the first secretary of the Regional Committee for less than a year in 1937-1938. After the deported Karachays were allowed to return to their home region and the Karachay-Cherkess Autonomous Okrug was restored in 1957, the key position of the first secretary was occupied by ethnic Russians, but at the same time a stable regime cycle did not develop, as in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria – since 1957 to 1988, five people were replaced at the top government position. Despite the insignificant number of Circassians in the region (less than 10%, see Table 1), their representatives occupied prominent positions in management in the post-war era, in particular W. Temirov was the second secretary of the Karachay-Cherkess regional party committee in 1965-1991.

**Table 1. Dynamics of the number of the main ethnic groups in Kabardino-Balkaria, Karachay-Cherkessia and Adygea in the 1950-2000s. (Based on population censuses)**

<b>Kabardino-Balkaria</b>	<b>1959</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2010</b>
Kabardians	190.284 (45,3%)	264.675 (45,0%)	303.604 (45,5%)	363.494 (48,2%)	498.702 (55,3%)	490.453 (57,0%)
Balkars	34.088 (8,1%)	51.356 (8,7%)	59.710 (9,0%)	70.793 (9,4%)	104.951 (11,6%)	108.577 (12,6%)
Russians	162.586 (38,7%)	218.595 (37,2%)	234.137 (35,1%)	240.750 (31,9%)	226.620 (25,1%)	193.155 (22,5%)
<b>Karachay-Cherkessia</b>	<b>1959</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2010</b>
Karachays	67.830 (24,4%)	97.104 (28,2%)	109.196 (29,7%)	129.449 (31,2%)	169.198 (38,5%)	194.324 (40,7%)
Circassians	24.145 (8,7%)	31.190 (9,0%)	34.430 (9,4%)	40.241 (9,7%)	49.591 (11,3%)	56.466 (11,8%)
Russians	141.843 (51,0%)	162.442 (47,1%)	165.451 (45,1%)	175.931 (42,4%)	147.878 (33,6%)	150.025 (31,4%)
<b>Adygea</b>	<b>1959</b>	<b>1970</b>	<b>1979</b>	<b>1989</b>	<b>2002</b>	<b>2010</b>
Adygeans	65.908 (23,2%)	81.478 (21,1%)	86.388 (21,4%)	95.439 (22,1%)	108.115 (24,2%)	107.048 (24,3%)
Russians	200.492 (70,4%)	276.537 (71,7%)	285.626 (70,6%)	293.640 (68,0%)	288.280 (64,5%)	270.714 (61,5%)

*Compiled from: <http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnkbr.html>; <http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnkchr.html>; <http://www.ethno-kavkaz.narod.ru/rnadyghea.html>*

The Brezhnev era was remembered for the further strengthening of infrastructure, which, against the background of the influx of representatives of the titular ethnic groups into the cities, brought the North Caucasian autonomies closer to the status of industrial-agrarian polities. At the same time, two significant obstacles emerged to hinder further Soviet modernization and the policy of national consolidation.

There was a clear intent of the Center to ensure the creation of a unified Soviet nation and “developed socialism,” to give the Russian language the legally supported status of the main official language (Constitution of 1977). However, a contradiction has developed between the strategies of integration, on the one hand, and the growing importance of belonging to the titular nationality, the reproduction

of semi-formal practices of informal ethnic competition in the structures of power and spiritual production, on the other (Cucieiev 2007, p. 80.). First secretaries of the Adygean regional committee of the CPSU, N. Berzegov (1960-1983), and the Kabardino-Balkarian regional committee of the CPSU, T. Malbakhov (1956-1985) enjoyed political stability. But aftermath the perturbations in the political system of the USSR, which began in the late 1980s, exposed the high mobilization capabilities of the North Caucasian ethnic groups.

Besides the official categories of the population of ethnic regions in the late Soviet era (bureaucracy, intelligentsia, proletariat, peasants, hired workers, etc.) there were underground entrepreneurs (*tsekhoviki*) a fairly large layer of people who had income from small-scale and family production, irregular earnings (taxi, *shabashka*); This category of the population is designated by G. Derlugian (2004) as “sub-proletarians” and is recognized by him as quite characteristic of the North Caucasian autonomies. It is not the very presence of this part of the population that is important (according to Derlugian, from 15% to 50% of the population (Derlugian, 2004, p. 325), depending on the time period and availability of “official” employment), but its high mobilization capabilities and distrust of the state. Ethnic networks of trust based on reciprocity (mutual free exchange of services and benefits) and social capital (trust and connections within familiar institutions, for example, ethnic, religious, personal ties, etc.) marginalized subproletarians and their constantly growing replenishment against the background of attractive opportunities for the growth of informal income.

Late 1980s was marked by the beginning of a surge in ethnic mobilization, unprecedented in scale and impact on socio-political processes, and, accordingly, complications of interethnic relations. These changes were not entirely unexpected with intra-ethnic consolidation having been the pursuit of natural ethnic survival (Smith, 1992, p. 451) after years of building “registered” nationalities and state control. Ethnic entrepreneurs acquired the opportunity to participate in political processes. In such conditions, the multiethnic regions of the Northwest Caucasus



turned out to be vulnerable to the threat of disintegration during the transition of the state to a fragile order.

The era of perestroika was reflected in the partial abandonment of the established practices of quotas and the increased pressure of the Center on the regions in the framework of the fight against corruption. In particular, in 1985-1990 the first secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian regional committee of the CPSU was E. Eliseev, sent by the Center from Siberia as part of the strategy of geographic rotation of personnel used by M. Gorbachev. This led to an increased tension and a crisis of the previous agreements within ruling coalition.

### **Between consociational democracy and consociational authoritarianism**

With the collapse of the USSR, the regions of the Northwest Caucasus again faced a dilemma that suggested 1) the construction of autonomous or confederated mono-ethnic orders, or 2) the development of institutions that would ensure the spatial and economic unity of stable ethno-territorial segments. The preservation of the consociations was achieved in varying degrees of difficulty: if in Adygea the status of a separate from administrative control and economically sound republic has entered the path of construction, then Kabardino-Balkaria, and especially Karachay-Cherkessia, faced drastic challenges to territorial unity.

After the collapse of the USSR, political institutionalization in the post-Soviet republics of the North Caucasus shaped, at one stage or another, various models of the formation of elites and threat of violence. One can see that, for example, conformity with the Russian legal system “practically diminishes more or less in the... west-to-east order” (Arutiunov, 2015, p. 25), and in the opposite direction, archaism manifests itself in the formation of the post-Soviet ruling coalitions. In Chechnya and Ingushetia, there was an almost complete renewal of regional elites, while in Dagestan the power was taken over by representatives of new national movements and

businesses. In Karachay-Cherkessia, entrepreneurs from the world of the shadow Soviet economy (*tsekhoviki*) came forward. But in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria, late Soviet elites continue to dominate in the 21st century. (Starodubrovskaja, Kazenin, 2016). The mechanisms and forces that ensure the renewal of elites in the 1990s were largely dependent on regional changes and the struggle of local elites, but, in 2000-2010s, the state strategies and decisions changed to be increasingly decisive.

In the 1990s, the institutionalized split in both republics was based on the dualism of legitimization (Borov, Tumov, 2017, p. 47) between political elites seeking to consolidate their power and unity of Kabarda and Balkaria, and ethnic public organizations (“Adyghe Khase” in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria, the Congress of the Kabardian people, the National Council of the Balkar people in Kabardino-Balkaria, etc.).

The struggle of the state to overcome decentralization and fragility and to control organizations, entered its final phase in 1996-2006 with the adoption of the Federal Law “On Non-Commercial Organizations” and the formation of a legislative framework on registration procedures. This period in Kabardino-Balkaria, to a much greater extent than in Adygea, is associated with the removal of opposition religious organizations from the legal field. Thus, the public influence of the Islamic Center under the control of fundamental Muslims and its monopoly on control over religious education were interrupted in 2000 after the refusal of registration and licensing from the republican Ministry of Justice. In the same year, the leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria gradually co-opted “Adyghe Khase” and approved control at the International Circassian Association, in which Kabardino-Balkarian “Adyghe Khase” traditionally enjoyed influence. However, ethnic leaders did not succeed in attempts to apply to formal procedures and courts. In an interviews, V. Khatazhukov and A. Bogus, who respectively headed “Adyghe Khase” in Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea prior to co-optation, note that official organizations stopped public initiatives and obstructed the authorities and

regional Ministries of Justice against attempts to create independent ethnic organizations.<sup>4</sup>

A salient feature of the strengthening of the base state in Russia is the consolidation of federal control over legitimate violence. If The Ministry of Internal Affairs in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria was headed by natives in the 1990s, then by the end of the 2000s, regional authorities have lost their informal control over law enforcement (Starodubrovskaja, Kazenin, 2016). The federal Center prefers to appoint managers from other regions, which blocks the access of representatives of the titular nationalities regional to the Ministry of Internal Affairs – this procedure is not exclusively related to national regions, but is part of geographic rotation, to some extent, Soviet practices, revived by V. Putin in 2005 (Huskey, 2014, p. 119).

Another channel of influence on the regions was the creation of the Southern Federal District in 2000 and the North Caucasian Federal District in 2010. In addition to the general tasks of implementing federal priorities, the plenipotentiary representatives of the Russian President are able to influence appointments or oversee the formation of regional legislatures in the subordinate federal district.

Other milestones of strengthening of control over regional policies are abolishing direct elections of presidents of the republics in 2004 and renaming of the presidents into heads (*glava*) in 2011-2012.

The possibilities of using ethnic quotas in the distribution of rent were tested in the conditions of experiments to attract businessmen to the leadership of Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea in the mid-2000s – early 2010s.

In 2005-2013, Kabardino-Balkaria was headed by A. Kanokov, who had previously made a name in business and politics at the federal level. The change in the distribution channels of rents (access to subsidies, resources

---

<sup>4</sup> 03/11/2021. Interview with A. Bogus. Former head of "Adyghe Khase" of the Republic of Adygea and vice-president of the International Circassian Association; 11/20/2020. Interview with V. Khatazhukov. Former head of the Kabardian "Adyghe Khase".

from development projects) was carried out taking into account the orientation of the new president to his personal contacts in business, which fit into the federal business development strategy as a platform for stabilizing the North Caucasian regions. However, contrary to the interests of regional players, a “narrow clientelistic approach” (Koehler et al., 2020, p. 101) aggravated Kanokov’s position and the stability of the political settlement in the context of the activation of radical fundamental Muslims after 2005.

The arrival of a representative of large business Kh. Sovmen<sup>5</sup> to the post of President of Adygea in 2002-2007 marked a radical personnel transformation that lasted the entire period of his work: the government replaced seven prime ministers, six ministers of agriculture and five ministers of the press. In 2003, the Adygeans replaced the Russians in such key positions as the prime minister and the head of the presidential administration; in choosing candidates, the president took into account his personal connections and business acquaintances. According to some reports, on the eve of the voluntarily resigned prime minister, an ethnic Russian, expressed dissatisfaction with the deprivation of the opportunity to influence appointments in the government<sup>6</sup>. Sovmen was replaced by A. Tkhakushinov, who proclaimed the return of Russians to the posts of head of government, head of the presidential administration and key ministers<sup>7</sup>, which meant a return to the conditional parity model accepted during the times of the first President A. Dzharmov in the early 1990s.

In Karachay-Cherkessia, one can observe the delayed creation of stable configurations of ethnic quotas. While the head of the post-Soviet Karachay-Cherkessia is represented by Karachays, the titular majority of the population, Circassians hold the position of the chairman of the government since 2003, and the Russians lead the People’s Assembly (Parliament) of the republic. However, such an order was formed only after overcoming the 1999 crisis, when the

---

<sup>5</sup> Since the late 1960s, he headed “Polyus”, the largest gold mining enterprise in the USSR/Russia.

<sup>6</sup> 02/15/2021. Anonymous interview. Former member of the Adygea government committee; Khazret Sovmen removes “disgraceful feds”. 21/08/2003, accessible online: <https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/405544> (retrieved: 01/11/2021).

<sup>7</sup> The new head of Adygea says that the key posts in his government will be occupied by Russians. 12/14/2006, accessible online: <https://palm.newsru.com/russia/14dec2006/rusadygeya.html> (retrieved: 02/17/2021).

presidential elections were contested by V. Semenov (a Karachay) and S. Derev (a Circassian) and ended with the support of Kremlin in favor of the former. His successor M. Batdyev (2003-2008) was also a representative of the financial elite, formerly heading the National Bank of Karachay-Cherkessia and having good connections in the federal Center. His reign also saw an increase in violence among the ruling coalition, including the assassination of a deputy of the republic's Parliament. The republic is still ranked by some experts as examples of the fragile limited-access order, in which, unlike Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria, the first post-Soviet elites were not representatives of the party nomenclature, but players of the shadow economy, *tsekhoviki* (Starodubrovskaja, Kazenin, 2016).

Experiments with “presidents coming up from business” in the 2000s and early 2010s. ended with the early resignation of the leaders of Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria and showed how ethnic quota-based governance may not contribute or even hinder the achievement of a robust political settlements. Now we turn to the early formulas of the ex-nomenclatura leaders of Kabardino-Balkaria and Adygea, V. Kokov A. Dzhарimov, who both demonstrated power and influence in their policies.

In Kabardino-Balkaria in the era of V. Kokov, by his own admission, the most important factor of political stability was a well-thought-out ethnically-oriented personnel policy and the balance of ethnic quotas in the republican authorities, and the composition of representatives of Kabardino-Balkaria at the federal level (Kokov, 2001, p. 175). In addition, the president did not hide the prevailing directive: taking into account the nationality of the minister, deputy ministers should represent other ethnic groups (Kokov, 1998, p. 244–254). As A.G. Emuzov<sup>8</sup> recalled, he was given relative freedom in choosing deputies. The main selection criteria was the level of professionalism and business qualities. But the ethnic factor could not be ignored, and after the approval of the candidacies by the Cabinet of

---

<sup>8</sup> In 1992-1997, Minister of Foreign Relations and Nationalities, Minister of Foreign Affairs of Kabardino-Balkaria.

Ministers, a Balkarian and a Russian became deputies (Emuzov, 2015, p. 313, 421–422). Subsequently, a tradition has developed, if not to adhere to ethnic quotas, then to take them into account when appointing someone to important positions<sup>9</sup>.

Kokov was ready to make significant compromises to Balkar political leaders in order to preserve the unity of the ruling coalition<sup>10</sup>. In addition to the personal qualities attributed to the president (like – “the ability to find respect among Balkars”<sup>11</sup> and “to do the necessary handshakes”<sup>12</sup>), strategically and up-to-date verified decisions are observed. In particular, after an unprecedented result in the presidential elections in Kabardino-Balkaria in 1997, when Kokov gained 99.35%, and the minimum support rates in the “Balkar” regions were not lower than 97% (Tumov, 2020, p. 133), in the new government there were twelve Kabardians, four Russians, seven Balkars (30%). The almost threefold excess in the representation of Balkars (against the background of demographic proportions) after such election results testified to the growth of trust in the “rules of the game” in the ruling coalition and the acceleration in overcoming the power deficit in the region.

In parallel to overcoming the power deficit in 1992-1996, the republic received significant investments within the framework of federal decrees, republican and federal targeted development programs aimed at the socio-economic sphere, energy, and recreational resources. The inflow of investment and the distribution of rent allowed the development of additional incentives to reduce violence within the ruling coalition. The republican authorities have shown the organizational potential in ensuring high rates of federal elections during the period of recentralization (support for V. Putin during the presidential elections in 2000 – 74,87%; support for the “United Russia” party in the elections to the State Duma in 2003 – 72,5%) and the achievement of unity of the regional coalition of elites (in

---

<sup>9</sup> 03/23/2021. Interview with B.M. Zumakulov. First Secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian Regional Committee of the CPSU in 1990-1991. Chairman of the Election Commission of Kabardino-Balkaria in 2001-2007.

<sup>10</sup> 01/19/2021. Interview with G. Derlugyan. New York University Abu Dhabi.

<sup>11</sup> 11/8/2020. Interview with M. Rakhaev. Balkar ethnic activist.

<sup>12</sup> 11/22/2020. Anonymous interview. Former ethnic activist and participant in the War of Independence in Abkhazia (1992-1993).

2002, Kokov was re-elected for a third term with a record low for him 87,18% of votes). In general, the electoral processes in Kabardino-Balkaria was under the control of Kokov. In the 2003 parliamentary elections, “closed” party lists were used for the first time, guaranteeing control over the proportions of representation of the three strategic groups in the run-up to and during (Zumakulov, 2005, p. 151).

While V. Kokov faced a more serious challenge from both Kabardian and Balkarian ethnic organizations and their leaders, A. Dzharimov ruled Adygea with low ethnic competition from the non-titular Russian-speaking majority<sup>13</sup> and the latter's lack of "energetic ethnic entrepreneurs."<sup>14</sup> The President used several opportunities to achieve parity by increasing the representation of the titular minority in parliamentary elections and government formation. The president's political course coincided with the demands of ethnic organizations that wanted to create a republic independent from Krasnodar and take into account the interests of Adygheans, who remained the only stronghold of the Adyghe culture after devastation of the Western Circassia during the Caucasian War of the 19th century. Within the ruling coalition, conventions were reached that ensured overrepresentation of Adygheans in parliament: 49% of the deputies were Russians, 45% were Adygheans, 6% were other nationalities (Dzharimov, 1995, p. 92). While the position of the president was assigned to Adygheans, the Presidential Administration and the Cabinet of Ministers were headed by Russians. Over the years, the representation of Adygheans in ministerial positions began to increase (in 1995 – 53%, in 2013 – 62%).

## **Conclusions**

Reproduction of ethnic quotas in the context of changes and the transition of politics in the Northwest Caucasus from a fragile model to a basic one in the 1950-

---

<sup>13</sup> 6/11/2020. Anonymous interview. Sociologist and expert on Adygea. Employee of the Adyghe State University.

<sup>14</sup> 12/20/2020. Interview with N. Silaev. Expert on the North Caucasus. Leading researcher at the Institute of International Studies, MGIMO.

1960s and 2000-2010s demonstrates the functional ability of this set of institutions to fit into the institutional framework that determines the actions of rent-seeking political actors.

The 1920-1980s played an important role in the formation of political institutions in the Northwest Caucasus: autonomous regions and the status of the titular nationality; institutions, investments and the creation of infrastructure that support interethnic ties and neighboring peoples, access of representatives of titular nationalities to governance in the territories of their historical residence. In general, the above analysis demonstrates that since the second half of the 20th century, especially during the Brezhnev stagnation, the Center's trust level in political leaders in Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria has gradually increased, while in Karachay-Cherkessia it did not enjoy long-term regime cycles and political courses, which in general anticipated the post-Soviet tendencies of political change.

The subordination and co-optation of opposition organizations, the consolidation of violence by reducing the violent potential of other centers, the creation of incentives for cooperation within the ruling coalitions allow the state to establish stable political settlements, and ethnic quotas appear as a proven tactic in the Brezhnev era and after a break in the activities of the presidential office of ex-nomenklatura leaders Adygea and Kabardino-Balkaria. A little later, stability came to Karachay-Cherkessia, where agreements were also adopted on guarantees of access to key positions for representatives of the main structure-forming ethnic groups.

During the appointment of businessmen to the presidency in the republics of the Northwest Caucasus in the early and mid-2000s. led to a dissonance between the configuration of political actors within the ruling coalitions and sharp attempts to redistribute rent. For some time to come, informal and non-public ethnic quotas remain an uncontested practice of guaranteeing the representation of ethnic groups against the background of a deficit of democratic institutions.



## **Interviews**

11/8/2020. Interview with M. Rakhaev. Balkar ethnic activist.

6/11/2020. Anonymous interview. Sociologist and expert on Adyghea. Employee of the Adyghe State University.

11/20/2020. Interview with V. Khatazhukov. Former head of the Kabardian “Adyghe Khase.”

11/22/2020. Anonymous interview. Former ethnic activist and participant in the War of Independence in Abkhazia (1992-1993).

12/20/2020. Interview with N. Silaev. Expert on the North Caucasus. Leading researcher at the Institute of International Studies, MGIMO.

01/19/2021. Interview with G. Derlugian. New York University Abu Dhabi.

02/15/2021. Anonymous interview. Former member of the Adyghea government committee.

03/23/2021. Interview with B.M. Zumakulov. First Secretary of the Kabardino-Balkarian Regional Committee of the CPSU in 1990-1991. Chairman of the Election Commission of Kabardino-Balkaria in 2001-2007.

03/11/2021. Interview with A. Bogus. Former head of “Adyghe Khase” of the Republic of Adyghea and vice-president of the International Circassian Association.

## **Reference list**

1. Ajshaev, O.O. (2009). *Peasant uprisings in Kabardino-Balkaria during the collectivization of agriculture (Krest'janskije vosstanija v Kabardino-Balkarii v period kollektivizacii sel'skogo hozjajstva)*. Nalchik: KBIGI.
2. Arutiunov, S., 2015: Triple Laws and Quasi-states in the Caucasus. In S. Voell & I. Kaliszewska (Eds.), *State and Legal Practice in the Caucasus: Anthropological Perspectives on Law and Politics* (pp. 25–29). Farnham: Ashgate Publishing.
3. Astvacaturova, M.A., Adiev, A.Z. (2017). On the Issue of Theoretical Comprehension of “Informal Ethnic Quotas” among the Political and Administrative Elite (K probleme teoreticheskogo osmyslenija «neformal'nogo

- jetnicheskogo kvotirovanija» v srede politiko-upravljencheskoj jelity). In *Collection of scientific articles of the Institute for Social Research IngGU* (pp. 47–64). Magas: Ingush State University.
4. Bezugol'nyj, A.Ju., Bugaj, N.F., Krinko, E.F. (2012). *Highlanders of the North Caucasus in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945: Problems of History, Historiography and Source Study (Gorcy Severnogo Kavkaza v Velikoj Otechestvennoj vojne 1941–1945 gg.: problemy istorii, istoriografii i istochnikovedenija)*. Moscow: Tsentrpoligraf.
  5. Borov A.Kh. (2014). Politicized Ethnicity: “Circassian Question” – Another Hotbed of Tension in the North Caucasus? (Politizirovannaja jetnichnost': “cherkesskij vopros” – eshhe odin ochag naprjazhennosti na Severnom Kavkaze?). *Social Sciences and Modernity*, 3, 109-118.
  6. Borov, A.Kh., Tumov, A.A. (2017). Elites and Post-Soviet Transformation of Political Regimes in the Republics of the North Caucasus: The “Case” of Kabardino-Balkaria (Jelity i postsovetskaja transformacija politicheskikh rezhimov v respublikah Severnogo Kavkaza: “sluchaj” Kabardino-Balkarii). *History Magazine, Scientific Research*, 4, 40–55.
  7. Bunce, V. (1983). The Political Economy of the Brezhnev Era: The Rise and Fall of Corporatism. *British Journal of Political Science*, 13(2), 129–158.
  8. Caluwaerts, D., Reuchamps, M. (2014). Combining Federalism with Consociationalism: Is Belgian Consociational Federalism Digging its Own Grave? *Ethnopolitics*, 14(3), 277–295.
  9. Cuciev, A.A. (2007). Atlas of the Ethnopolitical History of the Caucasus (1774-2004) (Atlas jetnopoliticheskoj istorii Kavkaza (1774-2004)). Moscow: Europe.
  10. Derlugian, G. (2004). Bourdieu's Secret Admirer in the Caucasus. New York: Verso.
  11. Dzamikhov, K.F., Kazharov, A.G. (2019). On the National Statehood of the Peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria: The History of Formation and Constitution (Early 1920s) (O nacional'noj gosudarstvennosti narodov KBR: istorija stanovlenija i

- konstituiranija (nachalo 1920-h gg.)). *Bulletin of the Kabardino-Balkarian Institute for Humanitarian Research*, 3(42), 39–58.
12. Dzharimov, A.A. (1995). *Adygea: from autonomy to a republic (Adygeja: ot avtonomii k respublike)*. Moscow: AUTOPAN.
  13. El Machnouk, S. (2017). Electoral System Reform in Lebanon: Dilemmas of a Consociational State. *Ethnopolitics*, 17(1), 1–20.
  14. Emuzov, A.G. (2015). *Through the years and distances (Cherez gody i rasstojanija)*. Nalchik: Tetragraph.
  15. Gel'man, V. (2010). The Dynamics of Sub-National Authoritarianism: Russia in Comparative Perspective. In V. Gel'man, C. Ross (Eds.), *The Politics of Sub-National Authoritarianism in Russia* (pp. 1–18). Farnham: Ashgate.
  16. Gubashiev, A.Zh. (Ed.). (1987). *Chekists of Kabardino-Balkaria (Chekisty Kabardino-Balkarii)*. Nalchik: Elbrus.
  17. Haddad, S. (2009). Lebanon: From Consociationalism to Conciliation. *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics*, 15(3–4), 398–416.
  18. Huskey, E. (2014). Legacies and Departures in the Russian State Executive // In M. Beissinger & S. Kotkin (Eds.), *Historical Legacies of Communism in Russia and Eastern Europe* (pp. 111–127). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  19. Koehler, J., Gunya, A., Shogenov, M., Tumov, A. (2020). Violence and the Dynamics of Political Settlements in Post-Soviet Kabardino-Balkaria. *Perspectives on Terrorism*, 14(2), 93–111.
  20. Kokov, V.M. (1998). *The roads of reform. Economy and power in the conditions of market transformations (Dorogami reform. Jekonomika i vlast' v uslovijah rynochnyh preobrazovanij)*. Moscow: Slavic Dialogue.
  21. Kokov, V.M. (2001). *Climbing to ideals. The Problems of Reforming the State and Social Structure (Voshozhdenie k idealam. Problemy reformirovanija gosudarstvennogo i obshhestvennogo ustrojstva)*. Moscow: Slavic Dialogue.
  22. Lijphart A. (1977). *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration*. New Haven: Yale University Press.

23. Magomedrasulova, R.B. (2013). Informal Institutions in the North Caucasus: Subjects and Resources of Influence on the Political Space (Neformal'nye instituty na Severnom Kavkaze: sub#ekty i resursy vlijanija na politicheskoe prostranstvo). *Theory and Practice of Social Development*, 8, 283–286.
24. Mambetov, G.H., Mambetov, Z.G. (1999). *Social Contradictions in the Kabardino-Balkarian Village in the 20-30s (Social'nye protivorechija v kabardino-balkarskoj derevne v 20–30-e gody)*. Nalchik: Publishing house “KBSC RAS.”
25. Martin, T. (2001). *The Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923-1939*. Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press.
26. Nagle, J. (2017). Beyond Ethnic Entrenchment and Amelioration: An Analysis of Non-Sectarian Social Movements and Lebanon’s Consociationalism. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 41(7), 1370–1389.
27. North, D., Wallis, J., Weingast, B. (2009). *Violence and Social Orders: A Conceptual Framework for Interpreting Recorded Human History*. New York: Cambridge University Press.
28. Panov, P. (2016). In Search of Inter-Ethnic Balance: Ethnic Composition and Informal Power-Sharing in Russian National Republics. *European Politics and Society*, 17(3), 353–372.
29. Salgiriev, A.L. (2015). The Structure of the Political Elite in the Polyethnic Republics of the North Caucasus (Struktura politicheskoy jelity v polijetnichnyh respublikah Severnogo Kavkaza). *RUDN Bulletin, Political Science Series*, 2, 83–88.
30. Scott, J.C. (1990). *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
31. Scott, J.C. (1998). *Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the Human Condition Have Failed*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
32. Scott, J.C. (2009). *The Art of Not Being Governed: An Anarchist History of Upland Southeast Asia*. New Haven & London: Yale University Press.
33. Silaev, N. (2020). Ethnicity as a Tool and Nationalities Policy as Practice: The Case of Stavropol Krai. *Caucasus Survey*, 8(2), 196–213.

34. Smith, A.D. (1992). Chosen Peoples: Why Ethnic Groups Survive. *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 15(3), 436–456.
35. Starodubrovskaja, I., Kazenin, K. (2016). *The North Caucasus and the Modern Model of Democratic Development (Severnyj Kavkaz i sovremennaya model' demokraticeskogo razvitiya)*. Moscow, full text accessible online: <https://polit.ru/article/2016/04/01/caucasus/> (retrieved: 01.26.2020).
36. Tetuev, A.I. (2016). Formation and Development of the New Statehood of the Peoples of Kabardino-Balkaria During the Period of Systemic Transformation of Russian Society (1990-2010) (Stanovlenie i razvitie novoj gosudarstvennosti narodov Kabardino-Balkarii v period sistemnoj transformacii rossijskogo obshhestva (1990-2010 gg.)). *Bulletin of IAE*, 3, 82–89.
37. Tilly Ch. (2007). *Democracy*. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.
38. Tumov, A.A. (2020). *Trends and Problems of Political Development of the Republics of the North Caucasus in the Post-Soviet Period: The Experience of Kabardino-Balkaria (Tendencii i problemy politicheskogo razvitiya respublik Severnogo Kavkaza v postsovetskij period: opyt Kabardino-Balkarii)*. PhD Thesis. Nalchik: Kabardno-Balkarian State University.
39. Walsh, D. (2015). How a Human Needs Theory Understanding of Conflict Enhances the Use of Consociationalism as a Conflict Resolution Mechanism: The Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland. *Ethnopolitics*, 15(3), 285–302.
40. Zhemukhov, S. (2012). The Birth of Modern Circassian Nationalism. *Nationalities Papers*, 40(4), 503–524.
41. Zumakulov, B.M. (2005) *Institute for Elections in Kabardino-Balkaria (Institut vyborov v Kabardino-Balkarii)*. Nalchik: El–Fa.