

Negotiating the Double-Minority Dilemma in Cyprus and Northern Ireland

Samantha Twietmeyer, Queen's University

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Abstract

Despite striking similarities between Northern Ireland and Cyprus, both in terms of their nationalist and territorial conflicts and in terms of the pattern of attempts made to resolve these tensions, the turn of the 21st century saw the success of the Good Friday Agreement in Northern Ireland and the failure of the Annan Plan in Cyprus. This paper presents the Double Minority Dilemma (DMD) framework for examining the success and failure of complex settlement negotiations. The DMD thesis posits that each community's security dilemma is defined by their perception of their geopolitical environment. Drawing inductively from a comparison of the Northern Ireland and Cyprus cases, the paper outlines a framework for understanding the impact of third-party relationships from the perspective of domestic elites by framing these external parties in terms of their distance to the Double Minority Dilemma. It then illustrates the application of this framework by commenting on the European Union's interaction with the DMD in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

Introduction

At first glance, the islands of Ireland and Cyprus may appear to be quite different, located as they are at opposite ends of the continent of Europe. The political territory of Northern Ireland has stood out in contemporary conflict resolution as a unique story of success, with its peoples negotiating a multi-party constitutional agreement to end their protracted violent conflict. In contrast, Cyprus stands equally as infamous in its *failure* to find such an agreement to end the stalemate that divides the island. Yet these territories share a broad set of similarities, from their British colonial history, to the rise of violent inter-communal conflict in the mid-20th century, to their complex negotiation processes at the turn of the 21st century. At their root, Cyprus and Northern Ireland are ethno-national conflicts with political tensions centered around questions of territory and national survival. Most importantly, however, these communal and territorial divisions are representative of a phenomenon called the Double-Minority Dilemma. Using this dilemma as a framework clarifies how negotiations to resolve longstanding issues on the two islands are complicated by differing perceptions of power asymmetry in each conflict and highlights how the conflicts have been significantly compounded by geopolitical relations. After

demonstrating the application of the theory of the double-minority dilemma in the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus, this paper will examine the process by which the European Union helped parties in Northern Ireland overcome this barrier while hindering progress in Cyprus, and the implications of this dilemma for third-party involvement in the two island conflicts today.

The theory of the Double Minority Dilemma (DMD) situates its core argument in the international nature of ethnic conflict. Where many analyses of nationalist and ethnic conflicts frequently view these conditions as domestic in nature, the DMD proposes that neither the conflicts themselves, nor the processes of negotiation and settlement, can be fully understood outside of their geopolitical conditions. This allows for flexibility in examining the role of third-parties in conflict resolution processes as it removes questions of intervention or non-intervention from the space of analysis.

The Double Minority Dilemma (DMD)

In a double minority scenario, both parties to the conflict perceive themselves to be the minority under threat. In some cases, the minority-majority balance within a political unit is upset by geopolitics and differing perceptions of the conflict space held by the conflict parties. On the one hand, the ethnic minority, (or minorities), within the political territory perceives itself to be the group whose existence is legitimately under threat by domination by the majority ethnic group. On the other hand, by virtue of a geopolitical presence, most likely the presence of the minority's homeland state, the majority ethnic group perceives itself to be the minority whose existence is legitimately under threat. In this condition, the relationship of the homeland state or other third-party is understood to be geopolitical, and not simply geographical, because there are important historical relations beyond physical proximity that underpin these relationships.

The terminology of the "double minority" has previously been used in describing inter-group tensions. Most prominently, Harold Jackson's study of the "Two Irelands" and Schaller and Abeysinghe's work on Sri Lanka.¹ But this terminology has been overlooked in favour of the more common study of asymmetry. "Double asymmetries" has been used to refer to a similar asymmetric balance of power situation which results from parties viewing their relative regional power as weak. In 1978, Herbert Kelman described the "parallelism" of asymmetries in Israel and Palestine.² Here, both the Palestinians and Israelis describe the conflict as asymmetrical and both perceive this imbalance to exist to their disadvantage. Israel's control of the land under dispute suggests the asymmetry exists to the disadvantage of the Palestinians. Conversely, when

¹ Harold Jackson, *The Two Irelands: The Problem of the Double Minority - a Dual Study of Inter-Group Tensions* (London: Minority Rights Group, 1972). Mark Schaller and A. M. N. D. Abeysinghe, "Geographical Frame of Reference and Dangerous Intergroup Attitudes: A Double-Minority Study in Sri Lanka," *Political Psychology* 27, no. 4 (2006).

² Herbert C. Kelman, "Israelis and Palestinians: Psychological Prerequisites for Mutual Acceptance," *International Security* 3, no. 1 (1978).

including the Arab states in geographical proximity, the asymmetry exists to Israel's disadvantage.³ Kelman further tied the perception of asymmetry to a great existential risk in acceptance of the other, thus beginning to highlight the important role of perceived threat in this asymmetry. Rouhana and Fisk expanded upon this discussion by examining the importance of perceptions in defining power and threat in the Israel and Palestine context.⁴ This expansion is key to understanding power asymmetries as a product of elite perceptions more than as a reflection of some defined reality.⁵

So, being that this literature exists, why elect to use the alternate terminology of the double minority?

The Double Minority Dilemma specifically emphasizes the ethno-national frames of reference of the parties to the conflict, bridging nationalism studies with conflict resolution literature on the security dilemma. First of all, the terminology emphasizes the importance of the 'minority' in comprehending and evaluating the perceived asymmetries. The use of the term 'minority' encompasses an understanding of wider structural and political inequalities which contribute to, and are informed by, the boundary-making of communal groups.⁶ As explored in Andreas Wimmer's study of boundary-making, the emphasis of ethnic minority differences and divisions over social divisions is produced by the institutional context.⁷ More specifically, per Rogers Brubaker's contention on transborder nationalisms, the claims of a "national minority" are a "political stance, not an ethnographic fact."⁸ In presenting the identification of homeland states or other national ties to regional or otherwise geopolitically relevant actors as an effective mode of ethno-national determination and survival, the double-minority presents itself as an institutional context defining actor behaviour.

Second, the inclusion of the terminology of the security dilemma is key to understanding the stalemate of the perceived positions of the groups involved in the DMD. In international relations, the security dilemma defines the condition whereby the actions of one group to increase their security necessarily decreases the security of other groups in the system.⁹ In the

³ "Creating the Conditions for Israeli-Palestinian Negotiations," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 26, no. 1 (1982), p. 43. Kelman's work is expanded into the Northern Ireland context by Robert Mulvihill and Marc Howard Ross. Robert Mulvihill and Marc Howard Ross, "Theories of Conflict Management and Peacemaking in Northern Ireland" (paper presented at the North American Conference on Conflict Resolution and Peacemaking, Montreal, 1989). Also see: Marc Howard Ross, *The Management of Conflict: Interpretations and Interests in Comparative Perspective* (Ann Arbor: Yale University Press, 1993); Also see: "Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts," *Political Psychology* 16, no. 3 (1995).

⁴ Nadim N. Rouhana and Susan T. Fiske, "Perception of Power, Threat, and Conflict Intensity in Asymmetric Intergroup Conflict," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 39, no. 1 (1995).

⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976).

⁶ Frederick Barth, *Ethnic Groups and Boundaries: The Social Organization of Culture Difference* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1969); Donald Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985).

⁷ Andreas Wimmer, *Ethnic Boundary Making* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

⁸ Rogers Brubaker, *Nationalism Reframed: Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5.

⁹ Robert Jervis, "Cooperation under the Security Dilemma," *World Politics* 30, no. 2 (1978).

context of a double minority scenario, this is made true by the perception of minority status held by both parties. Party A, assuming it is the minority and under threat from the majority, Party B, seeks some form of assurance for its ethno-national survival. Party A might perceive this action as simply balancing, and perhaps not even balancing exactly, but simply pursuing some decrease in the gap of power between Party A and Party B. But in the context of the double minority, Party B already perceives itself to be the minority under threat. Therefore, any form of action by Party A to increase their relational power is a direct threat. In the terminology of bargaining theories “fixed pie” scenario, in Party A’s attempt to increase their share of the pie, Party B is losing their portion of the pie. Therefore, in fully comprehending the interaction of the political conceptualizations of minority identity and security dilemmas, the “double minority dilemma” terminology provides a more nuanced framework for studying the particular form of ethno-national conflict which we see in Northern Ireland and Cyprus.

The DMD in Northern Ireland and Cyprus

To see the DMD in context, I will begin by situating the Northern Ireland case. The post-WWII numerical majority in Northern Ireland is the Protestant population and the numerical minority is the Catholic population. Though the difference in these demographics shrinks over the years from 65% Protestant and 35% Catholic to as little as 55% and 45% by the 21st century, the populations remain in the same majority-minority positions throughout.¹⁰ The Catholic population perceives the Protestant dominance and the geographical presence of their minority population within the political boundaries of the United Kingdom to be a threat to their security. In this context, there are several explanations for the Catholic population to both rely upon and to be perceived to rely upon the support of the Republic of Ireland. Primarily, this support is pre-existing in that the conflict in Northern Ireland stems directly from the wider revolutionary Irish nationalism that produced the 1916 rising and subsequently resulted in Irish independence with the Government of Ireland Act of 1920 and the formal partition of the island.¹¹ The partition agreement left supporters of Irish nationalism and independence within the boundaries of the United Kingdom, thus the ethno-national political community is termed the “Nationalists” rather than defined by the religious signifier of “Catholic”. This previous conflict was ethno-nationally defined and thus those political identities and ties necessarily remain, if somewhat loosely, following independence. Where these nationalist ties merge with a militant support for unity with the Republic of Ireland, the Republican identity is born. Moreover, the partition itself is

¹⁰ These percentages represent only the self-identifying population of Catholic and Protestant denominations, and exclude population numbers of groups identifying as ‘other’ or ‘none.’ Census Statistics on the population and demographics of Northern Ireland from 1926 onward are available online at <https://www.nisra.gov.uk/statistics/census>

¹¹ Jonathan Tonge, *Northern Ireland: Conflict and Change* (Hertfordshire: Prentice Hall Europe, 1998); John McGarry and Brendan O’Leary, *Explaining Northern Ireland* (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers Ltd., 1995).

widely perceived as illegitimate and non-existent by Northern Ireland's Nationalist communities.¹²

The wider perception that the Nationalists, lacking adequate political representation within Northern Ireland as well as access to positions of economic or social power, frequently turn to their homeland state of the Republic of Ireland for a variety of financial and even military supports are more divergent in terms of evidence and levels of validity over time. Indeed, for a lengthy duration of the conflict, the Nationalists were ostensibly abandoned by both the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom in terms of active response to their demands or interests. From the 1960s, the Republic of Ireland was engaging in political self-determination and economic development and were more than willing to step aside, ignore, or outright condemn the conflict in the North. On Britain's part, despite claiming the small territory as part of the United Kingdom, the early offices for Northern Ireland were a distant thought in the business of running the country. Under the auspices of the "Home Office" until 1972, Northern Ireland affairs were dealt with alongside issues as wide and varied as infant and childcare, slaughterhouses, and railway accidents. Despite the origins of the conflict being directed at the United Kingdom's colonial authority, the wider perception of threat for Nationalists was focused upon the Protestant majority and their political ideology of Unionism rather than British control. As the conflict in Northern Ireland grew through the 1970s and 1980s, the United Kingdom stepped in to attempt to enforce peace, however, in the eyes of the Nationalists, this act only increased the strength of the Protestants and developed an even more unfair balance increasing the threat to their community's existence.

Meanwhile, the Protestant population of Northern Ireland fought hard to retain political control of the small territory in which they were the majority residents when the Republic of Ireland achieved its independence in 1921. Out of fear of their national survival should they come under the authority of the new Catholic-dominated Irish State, the Protestants demanded their right to self-determination in the territory of Ulster. This base security threat which underpinned the partition of Ireland and creation of Northern Ireland continues to exist even today. It was this fear which fed into the concerns of Protestants whenever the Republic of Ireland was perceived to give support to the Catholic minority of Northern Ireland. Any support from the Republic of Ireland for the Catholic minority is seen as an existential threat to both Protestants and the political community of Unionism. Moreover, the Unionist community seeks to remain within the Union with Great Britain to retain authority over its minority rights and protections. In this context, the early years of British apathy towards the Northern Irish territory only increased this sense of insecurity within the Unionist population.

Some of the earlier stages of this dilemma are laid out in Harold Jackson's 1972 study of Northern Ireland. As both the Nationalists and Unionists perceive their security situation in terms

¹² Frank Gallagher, *The Indivisible Island; the History of the Partition of Ireland* (London: Gollancz, 1957).

of the regional dominance of the other party and their minority status, there is a double minority dilemma at the heart of the conflict in Northern Ireland. This dilemma exists within the perceptions of the domestic communities of the conflict, but it cannot exist without the presence and actions of the two homeland states. Thus the DMD suggests that the conflict in Ireland cannot be considered solely a 'domestic' or 'civil' conflict. This produces important implications for the role of third-parties and the process of internationalization which occurs from the 1970s onwards in Northern Ireland.

Before elaborating upon those processes, the condition of the Double Minority Dilemma in Cyprus will be examined.

In Cyprus, the double-minority dilemma functions similarly to Northern Ireland, though the demographic difference is significantly more divided between the strong numerical majority of Greek Cypriots and a numerical minority of Turkish Cypriots. Despite some population growth in Turkish Cypriots over the years, and disregarding for now the dilemmas around the Turkish Settler population in the North of Cyprus, the division has remained approximately 80% Greek Cypriot and 20% Turkish Cypriot for half a century.¹³ At the time of Cyprus' independence from the British colonial power in 1960, the Turkish Cypriot minority was granted political power-sharing in the constitution so as to protect their continued national minority existence on the Greek Cypriot-dominated island of Cyprus. This would in itself be enough to anger the Greek Cypriots who, with such a dominant majority, felt unfairly forced into sharing power.¹⁴ The wider imposition of these less-than agreeable terms by external parties underpins a lingering suspicion of international intervenors which impacts negotiations to this day.¹⁵ But the constitution produced more than simply a political-power arrangement that was less than satisfactory to the Greek Cypriots. The constitution effectively made the Greek Cypriots a minority through granting authority to the homeland states of Greece and Turkey, along with the United Kingdom, to act as guarantors of the power-sharing agreement.

The guarantor arrangements assured Turkish Cypriots that, despite their lack of numerical power, they would be protected from Greek Cypriot national dominance by the guarantor presence of Turkey. Being a significant minority, and noting the inclusion of Greece as similar support for the Greek Cypriots, this does not necessarily seem to be a great imposition on the

¹³ These percentages represent only the self-identifying population of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot denominations, and exclude population numbers of groups identifying as 'other' or 'none.' Census Statistics on Cyprus are more difficult to confirm, particularly as concerns the territory of Northern Cyprus where the Turkish "settler" population creates confusion around self-identified Turkish Cypriots and the settlers from Turkey who are part of a nationalising agenda by the neighbouring state. See Neophytos Loizides, "Settlers, Mobilization, and Displacement in Cyprus: Antinomies of Ethnic Conflict and Immigration Politics," in *Settlers in Contested Lands : Territorial Disputes and Ethnic Conflicts* (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 2015).

¹⁴ Arend Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1977).

¹⁵ Makarios Drousiotis, *The Cyprus Crisis and the Cold War: Ussr Duplicity Versus Us Realpolitik (1974–1977)* (Nicosia: Alfadi Books, 2016); Claire Palley, *An International Relations Debacle: The Un Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2005).

Greek Cypriot community's security. But the Greek Cypriots saw the constitution as including not only of political veto-power for Turkish Cypriots but also the threat of the interventionist power of Turkey. These two elements combined to produce a direct threat to their national existence.¹⁶ Though they had acquired a similar source of national support in the inclusion of Greece as a guarantor, the Greek Cypriots felt that their right to exist was challenged by the over-representative authority of the Turkish Cypriots through the significant power of Turkey. As with Northern Ireland after 1920, some of the double-minority tension in the Cyprus case stems from historical arrangements which pre-exist the institutional circumstances of the 1960 constitution. It is important to note that prior to becoming a British colony, the island of Cyprus had been under the control of the Ottoman empire and thus the Greek Cypriots were historically uneasy about Turkish authority having previously been a minority under Ottoman control.

In response to this perceived threat, the Greek Cypriots challenged the imbalances produced by the constitution by introducing legislation to remove some of the Turkish Cypriot authority thus further provoking the security dilemma of the island. Following an attempted Greece-backed coup to gain full control of the island for Greek Cypriots, Turkey utilized its guarantor power to intervene on behalf of the Turkish Cypriot minority which it declared was under threat. The Turkish Cypriots saw this as support for their minority position, while the Greek Cypriots viewed this as an act of invasion, thus positioning themselves as the minority under threat. In the context of the DMD, the Greek Cypriot position prevents any real acceptance of a 'fair' agreement with the Turkish Cypriots outside of handing complete authority of the island to the Greek Cypriot government. The fixed pie in this scenario operates with the security of the Greek Cypriot numerical dominance on the island in tandem with the threat that the Turkish ethno-national identity on the island presents for the future of a nationally "Greek" island of Cyprus.

It is important to note that numerical demographics do not necessarily pre-determine that the Protestant or Greek Cypriot populations would be the *dominant* community within the territorial unit. The power-relationship which frames the DMS may also be defined by political ownership. For example, a minority may be perceived to be more powerful due to their presence in institutions of power. This is often true in cases of ethnic domination or control, where an ethnic minority has grasped the political authority of a state.¹⁷ As with demographics, this power-balance can be presented as greater or lesser by elite framing and broader perceptions. If third-parties are seen to be in support of a minority domination, this can increase the perceived imbalance of power. Conversely, minorities in positions of control are under constant vigilance to maintain this authority and can deem the presence of a third-party supporter or 'homeland state' of an ethnic group under their control as tipping the balance of power towards the ethnic

¹⁶ Makarios Drousiotis, *The First Partition of Cyprus 1963-1964* (Nicosia: Alfadi Publications, 2008); Stanley Kiriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968).

¹⁷ Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism Versus Control," *World Politics* 31, no. 3 (1979).

group. Indeed, we can find several historical and contemporary cases including Burundi (-2000), Iraq (-2003), Liberia (-1980), South Africa (-1994), and Syria (-present) which have experienced a numerical minority holding the majority of coercive political power within a state. This set of circumstances could theoretically exist in an altered form of the Double-Minority Dilemma (DMD), where the internal and external security concerns operate for the dominant minority. Apartheid South Africa is the most likely candidate for applying the DMD in this manner - where the White minority held political dominance of a state surrounded by Black majority states regionally. However, in this situation the majority under political domination would not be experiencing the external facets of the double-minority dilemma in the same fashion. It is important to recognize that in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus, the numerical majority within the political units holds dominance over the political institutions and their minority condition is produced through regional arrangements rather than the numerical relationship within the state or territory.

Third Parties and Internationalizing the DMD

The introduction of third-parties into these contexts is entirely perceived through the lens of the DMD. The DMD therefore serves as a strategic framing device for third-party intervention. The elite leadership of the parties to the conflict immediately take account of the third-party's credibility and capability and ascertain to which side of the security dilemma that power is being applied.¹⁸ Additionally, in using the strategic framing of the Double Minority Dilemma, elites may choose to reinforce a certain perception of how this third-party's power is being applied which may or may not represent reality.¹⁹ Understanding the difficulty of predicting how a third-party will interact with the DMD, how does the DMD framework help to understand how Northern Ireland managed a successful resolution within this divisive context while Cyprus did not? By the 1990s in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus, a wider array of international parties were involved in both conflicts beyond the ethnic homeland states. In Northern Ireland, the parties to the negotiations included both Nationalist and Unionist parties as well as the Republic of Ireland, the United Kingdom, and even the United States and other foreign actors. In Cyprus, high levels of internationalization involved the interventions of the United Nations and European Union, along with the UK, US, Russia, and several other states. The DMD thesis suggests that the inclusion of

¹⁸ The theory of intervenor credibility and capability (also power and interest in different schools) is strongly evidenced in the existing literature I. William Zartman and Saadia Touval, "International Mediation: Conflict Resolution and Power Politics," *Journal of Social Issues* 41, no. 2 (1985); Jeffrey Z. Rubin, "The Timing of Ripeness and Hte Ripeness of Timing," in *Timing the De-Escalation of International Conflicts*, ed. Louis Kriesberg and Stuart J. Thorson (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1991); Lindsay Reid, "Finding a Peace That Lasts: Mediator Leverage and the Durable Resolution of Civil Wars," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 61, no. 7 (2017).

¹⁹ Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics*; Jennie L. Schulze, *Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia* (Pittsbergh: University of Pittsbergh Press, 2018).

these actors could have, and perhaps should have, reproduced the security dilemma at the heart of the conflict. Indeed, this is shown to be true of early efforts to bring in these actors to earlier processes in the conflict such as the backlash against Anglo-Irish Agreement in the 1980s or the failed American-sponsored mediation efforts in Cyprus throughout the 1970s and 1980s.²⁰ But while in Cyprus the high levels of internationalization contributed to a wider security dilemma stalemate for many years, the DMD appeared to have been overcome through the Northern Ireland Agreement.

The internationalization of conflict plays a key role in determining the presence and effect of third-party intervention in peace negotiations. In *all* circumstances of third-party intervention there is a process of internationalization occurring. But the opposite relationship does not hold true. Although internationalization generally means an increasing number of third-parties are becoming involved, a process of internationalization does not mean there is intervention occurring. The DMD exemplifies this condition. Taking as its premise the notion that the conflicts do not exist outside of their geopolitical relationships, it is a difficult conjecture to make that states like the Republic of Ireland or Turkey are 'intervening' in the conflict when they sit at the negotiation table.

The traditional theory of conflict internationalization suggests that civil conflicts may begin domestically but can become international, or at least regional, conflicts through various conflict-related processes and spill-overs. Taras and Ganguly suggest that internationalization can occur either purposefully or non-purposefully.²¹ Purposeful internationalization occurs when a conflict invites the inclusion of external actors in the domestic sphere. This may happen directly through the invitation of an external mediator, though this pattern is not quite as frequent as one might presume. More often, groups in conflict will entice the wider involvement of other states in order to shore up their bargaining position, as is commonly the case in a DMD scenario. Non-purposeful internationalization, widely studied in conflict studies literature, traditionally refers to conflict spillover, usually through migration and refugee flows, humanitarian need, or economic crises.²² The mechanism of drawing interest from the regional and international sphere is the creation of instability. High levels of international instability draw the attention of large international organizations such as the United Nations, but spill-overs might be quite regional, even bi-lateral at times, and therefore result in slightly lower levels of internationalization. This

²⁰ Arthur Aughey, *Under Siege : Ulster Unionism and the Anglo-Irish Agreement* (Belfast: Blackstaff Press, 1989); P.J. McLoughlin, "'The First Major Step in the Peace Process'? Exploring the Impact of the Anglo-Irish Agreement on Irish Republican Thinking," *Irish Political Studies* 29, no. 1 (2014); Ronald J. Fisher, "Cyprus: The Failure of Mediation and the Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse," *Journal Of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (2001).

²¹ Raymond C. Taras and Rajat Ganguly, *Understanding Ethnic Conflict: The International Dimension* (New York: Addison-Wesley Educational Publishers, Inc., 1998).

²² Anthony Oberschall, *Conflict and Peace Building in Divided Societies: Responses to Ethnic Violence* (Abingdon: Routledge, 2007).

is certainly evident in the level of involvement of intervening parties in Cyprus, such as the United Nations, versus the lack of involvement in Northern Ireland. Despite efforts from various Nationalist and Catholic groups, external involvement was highly restricted until the 1990s. And even then, the European Union, which is a relatively significant player in both conflicts, was not “at the table” in the Good Friday Agreement process. The conflict in Northern Ireland was not deemed to be as regionally destabilizing as a potential civil war in Cyprus which sits at the tense border between Turkey and Cyprus and is also located in the eastern Mediterranean and housing NATO military bases.²³ There is an argument to be made that in the face of increasing transnational relationships globally, and the context Brexit, there is slightly more international interest in the conditions of the Northern Ireland as potentially having wider regional effects, if only economic.²⁴

Simply understanding internationalization as a reaction to spill-over is misleading and ignores the unbounded nature of civil conflict. Ethno-national conflict does not necessarily occur within a vacuum of sovereign territorial borders. Third-parties such as colonial states, kin-states, trading partners, and regional organizations, will often involve themselves due to historical ties which carry a predetermined commitment to maintaining peace and security within the state in question.²⁵ This is particularly true of cases of protracted conflict in ethnically divided societies with ethno-national and territorial conflicts.²⁶ Though protracted conflicts may be more likely to produce unintentional spill-over and internationalization due to their long-duration, the nature of international involvement from the outset of a protracted conflict in an ethnically divided society is more nuanced. States with historical or national ties may in fact even be parties to the conflict narrative themselves, making their participation in the conflict negotiations essential for any successful peace settlement. This is certainly the case for both Northern Ireland and Cyprus where the kin-states are required to be involved in the peace processes for both security and socio-historical reasons. Moreover, this is the assumption of the double minority dilemma.

²³ Ayhan Aktar, Niyazi Kizilyürek, and Umut Özkirimli, eds., *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). There is an additional factor here involving the United Kingdom’s security council seat at the UN which would necessarily defeat any attempt from the UN to intervene in Northern Ireland while also lending support to intervention in Cyprus – both of which would shore up British interests.

²⁴ Steven E. Lobell and Philip Mauceri, "Ethnic Conflict and International Politics Explaining Diffusion and Escalation," (2004).

²⁵ Mwita Chacha and Szymon Stojek, "Colonial Ties and Civil Conflict Intervention: Clarifying the Causal Mechanisms," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* (2016); Michael G. Findley and Tze Kwang Teo, "Rethinking Third-Party Interventions into Civil Wars: An Actor-Centric Approach," *The Journal of Politics* 68, no. 4 (2006); Bogdan Aurescu, "The Borders of Sovereignty: Whose Responsibility Is It to Protect National Minorities?," in *Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of the Kin-State*, ed. Walter Kemp, Vesselin Popovski, and Ramesh Thakur (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011); Walter Kemp, Vesselin Popovski, and Ramesh Thakur, eds., *Blood and Borders: The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of the Kin-State* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2011).

²⁶ David A. Lake and Donald Rothchild, *The International Spread of Ethnic Conflict: Fear, Diffusion, and Escalation* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1998); Jacob D. Kathman, "Civil War Diffusion and Regional Motivations for Intervention," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 55, no. 6 (2011); Karlo Basta, John McGarry, and Richard Simeon, eds., *Territorial Pluralism: Managing Difference in Multinational States* (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2015).

The role of the Double-Minority Dilemma in the cases of both Northern Ireland and Cyprus means that these conflicts are not, and have never been, domestic or 'civil' conflicts. Additionally, due to the numerical minority's perceived inferior power and the proximity of their homeland state, they will either seek outside help from this state or at least be perceived to receive that support. In response to this perceived support being a threat the numerical majority is also likely to seek outside help. This escalation produces the potential of a trend toward greater internationalization which is pursued from within, rather than created by non-intentional spill-over or third-party driven intervention. To better understand the process of internationalization in Northern Ireland and Cyprus, therefore, we must conceive of internationalization as a process whereby the communities widen their own perception of the legitimate and credible parties within in the conflict.

Internationalization may simply compound the existing DMD, continuing to varyingly adjust each party's share of the pie and maintaining the security dilemma at the heart of the double minority scenario. Alternatively, positive and peace producing internationalization in the context of the DMD can be seen to be 'expanding the pie' in terms of the security dilemma stalemate for the two communities. While some of this can be derived from the intentions of the third-party actors themselves, the perception of third-parties and their relationship to the conflict becomes key. In this way, strategic framing by community elites becomes important in determining the impact of the third-party effect on the DMD.²⁷

The cases of Cyprus and Northern Ireland demonstrate that internationalization has been used strategically by all parties to attempt to even the odds, or shore up power, in a conflict where establishing a legitimate authority and claim to territory is the perceived ultimate resolution. The DMD, therefore, presents a condition wherein internationalization is most frequently used to foment or continue conflict, rather than to resolve conflict. However, moderates in both cases have struggled to use the dynamics of the DMD to justify some forms of internationalization which may in fact allow for negotiations to successfully occur and the conflict to be resolved.

Internationalization and the DMD in Northern Ireland

Several authors have written on the importance of the internationalization of the conflict in Northern Ireland in progressing from toward the multi-party negotiations and the Agreement.²⁸ For supporters of the peace-producing nature of internationalization, the addition

²⁷ Schulze, *Strategic Frames: Europe, Russia, and Minority Inclusion in Estonia and Latvia*.

²⁸ Adrian Guelke, *Northern Ireland: The International Perspective* (Dublin: Gill & Macmillan, Ltd., 1989); Paul Arthur and Keith Jeffery, *Northern Ireland since 1968*, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1996). The Agreement reached in Multi-Party Negotiations on Friday, April 10th 1998 is variously referred to as "The Agreement" and the "Good Friday Agreement" or GFA.

of international elements to both understanding the conflict and coordinating a peaceful solution is seen to be integral in bringing the parties to the agreement to the table. Jennifer Todd, in particular, notes that key aspects of this process of internationalization were underpinned by the membership of the major kin-states, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, in the European Union (EU) and later the political arrangements of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.²⁹ The impact of the US as a mediator and power-broker has also been highlighted as key to understanding advancements made through the 1990s.³⁰ In contrast, skeptics on the importance of third-party actors, and the EU in particular, argue that, while the important repositioning of Great Britain and Ireland should not be ignored, the wider international influence of the United States and EU is overstated.³¹ The consensus, however, is that these outside parties were not directly harmful to the Agreement or the settlement process which preceded it. This should be surprising considering that for the two decades prior the Republic of Ireland was deemed to be an existential threat to Unionists, the European Union expansion served as a source of great ethno-political contention in Northern Ireland, and Irish America had a track record of supporting Republican terrorism through financial aid to Irish Nationalist groups.³² An observer of the conflict in the 1980 might have laughed at the idea of these three parties being key facets of a successful peace in Northern Ireland.

The DMD offers insight by highlighting the difference between perceptions and realities for understanding the international nature of the conflict. The wider Anglo-Irish dispute has been shown to be one of the historical roots of the conflict, thus the observation that “from the outset, the conflict in Northern Ireland has had an international dimension.”³³ But even if the parties to the conflict were at times hyper-aware of this Irish and British dimension, the same could not be said of the states themselves. What explicit interest was held by the British government maintained one clear position: “The United Kingdom Government again affirm that responsibility

²⁹ Personal communication (2017-06-08). Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, "Path Dependence in Settlement Processes: Explaining Settlement in Northern Ireland," *Political Studies* 55, no. 2 (2007); Jennifer Todd and John Coakley, *From Sunningdale to St Andrews: Negotiating a Settlement in Northern Ireland, 1973-2006* (UPDATE CITATION2018).

³⁰ Adrian Guelke, "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," *International Affairs* 72, no. 3 (1996); Eamonn O’Kane, "From Belfast to Baghdad...? Discourses of Northern Ireland’s ‘Model’ of Conflict Resolution," in *Political Discourse and Conflict Resolution: Debating Peace in Northern Ireland*, ed. Katy Hayward and Catherine O’Donnell (Abingdon: Routledge, Ltd., 2011).

³¹ Paul Dixon, "Rethinking Hte International and Northern Ireland: A Critique," in *A Farewell to Arms? Beyond the Good Friday Agreement*, ed. Michael Cox, Adrian Guelke, and Fiona Stephen (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2006).

³² Feargal Cochrane, "Irish-America, the End of the Ira's Armed Struggle and the Utility of 'Soft Power'," *Journal Of Peace Research* 44, no. 2 (2007); Jeson Ingraham, "The European Union and Relationships within Ireland," *Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN)* (1998).

³³ Joseph Ruane and Jennifer Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 266.

for affairs in Northern Ireland is entirely a matter of domestic jurisdiction.”³⁴ This affirmation essentializes the complication facing any external actor with an interest in the Northern Ireland conflict: Northern Ireland was a domestic conflict within the United Kingdom. This is markedly different to the preamble to the Anglo-Irish Agreement (AIA) of 1985:

“The Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom... Recognising the need for continuing efforts to reconcile and to acknowledge the rights of the two major traditions that exist in Ireland, represented on the one hand by those who wish for no change in the present status of Northern Ireland and on the other hand by those who aspire to a sovereign united Ireland achieved by peaceful means and through agreement...”³⁵

Comparing the declaration in 1969 to the AIA just 16 years later acknowledges a significant shift in how the Northern Ireland conflict was perceived by the two states, most importantly the recognition of the Irish dimension.³⁶ Importantly, it would be several more years before the Unionist community would also come to (begrudgingly) accept the role of the Republic of Ireland in the resolution of the conflict. And even then, not without several guarantees and shifts in the context of the Republic’s relationship with the UK and Northern Ireland.

Beyond this significant change in the narrative of the British government concerning the international nature of the conflict, particularly as concerns the role of the Republic of Ireland, there is good reason to argue that we can legitimately talk about an internationalization of the conflict in Northern Ireland through the increasing involvement of the United States through the 1990s and the increasing support of South Africa in track-two diplomacy after the successful conclusion to the Apartheid regime.³⁷ Additionally, there was a ‘Europeanization’ of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The role of the EU in the internationalization of the DMD will be used here to examine one of the shifts in the perceived security dilemmas of the Republican and Unionist communities which allowed Northern Ireland to move from battlefield to peace table.

The shift in the Anglo-Irish perspective highlighted earlier has been attributed greatly to the British and Irish accessions to EU membership in 1973 and the subsequent economic relationship between the two states. Moreover, an opening to an understanding of devolution

³⁴ "Northern Ireland Text of a Communique and Declaration Issued after a Meeting Held at 10 Downing Street on 19 August 1969," *UK Government* (1969).

³⁵ "Anglo-Irish Agreement between the Government of Ireland and the Government of the United Kingdom 15 November 1985," *UK Government & Irish Government* (1985).

³⁶ Just 8 years later, a second Downing Street Declaration (1993) would go so far as to state: “The British Government agree that it is for the people of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right of self-determination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, North and South, to bring about a united Ireland, if that is their wish.”

³⁷ Adrian Guelke, "The Lure of the Miracle? The South African Connection and the Northern Ireland Peace Process," in *Global Change, Civil Society and the Northern Ireland Peace Process*, ed. Christopher Farrington (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008); "The United States, Irish Americans and the Northern Ireland Peace Process."; O’Kane, "From Belfast to Baghdad...? Discourses of Northern Ireland’s ‘Model’ of Conflict Resolution."

and loose sovereignty can be seen as a European influence. Elizabeth Meehan pushes this further, suggesting that the conflict goes beyond the widely agreed Anglo-Irish transformation and extends to the nationalist and unionist outlooks in Northern Ireland.³⁸ EU membership for Britain and Ireland gave them a position from which they could develop a notion of ‘pooled sovereignty.’ This process began by the membership putting the two countries on equal footing in a way Ireland had not experienced before, improving relations between the two states significantly. The integration process of the European Community also encouraged the two states to engage each other on issues of joint-concern, including Northern Ireland, on a “battle-field” detached from the conflict itself and extended to the international environment.³⁹ Furthermore, as Brigid Laffan notes, the EU governance institutions can be shown to have inspired several aspects of the Agreement itself.⁴⁰ Due to the devolved political institutions of the EU and its associated bodies, this membership also allowed the two states, and indeed the local representatives from within Northern Ireland, become used to the devolved governance and voting procedures that would be enshrined in the Agreement’s power-sharing constitution.

Most importantly, the European venues provided Northern Ireland’s politicians from opposing communities a neutral space within which to engage each other directly, something virtually non-existent in the Unionist-dominated and highly visible Stormont. European involvement offered plenty of Track II opportunities that went largely ignored by the greater public. Track II strategies are most valuable for overcoming the more difficult complications for political negotiators, namely the need to be a strong public figure and to avoid being seen as cooperating or even meeting with ‘the enemy.’⁴¹ Two efforts of the University of Ulster and George Mason University to organize “problem-solving workshops” in Virginia and Strasbourg occurred in 1990, and were attended by representatives of various Northern Ireland parties including the DUP, Alliance Party, and SDLP.⁴² Importantly, the invitation was to meet with the *express purpose* of discussing the European Union and *not* the conflict, the meetings were billed as “Northern Ireland in Europe: 1992”.⁴³ It was a risky business, those who attended may have left even more divided than they arrived, but it was important for overcoming some of the security dilemma concerns that might have been raised through outright cooperation of parties.

³⁸ Elizabeth Meehan, "From Conflict to Consensus: The Legacy of the Good Friday Agreement, the British-Irish and European Contexts," *University College Dublin Institute for British-Irish Studies* (2009); "The Changing British-Irish Relationship: The Sovereignty Dimension," *Irish Political Studies* 29, no. 1 (2014).

³⁹ Ruane and Todd, *The Dynamics of Conflict in Northern Ireland: Power, Conflict and Emancipation*, 280.

⁴⁰ Brigid Laffan, "Ireland, Britain, Northern Ireland and the European Dimension," (Institute for British-Irish Studies, 2003).

⁴¹ John Burton, *Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in International Relations* (London: Macmillan, 1969); Paul Arthur, "Multiparty Mediation in Northern Ireland," in *Herding Cats: Multiparty Mediation in a Complex World*, ed. Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, and Pamela Aall (Washington, DC: United States Institute for Peace, 1999).

⁴² Personal communication with Professor Stephen Ryan, attendee of the event (2017-06-07).

⁴³ Paul Arthur, "Negotiating the Northern Ireland Problem: Track One or Track Two Diplomacy?," *Government and Opposition* 25, no. 4 (1990).

The transformative environment provided by the European dimension to the peace process is contextually important for the DMD in all three strands of the Agreement. The 'learning' regarding the institutional structures of power-sharing in Northern Ireland is just one aspect. The role of the EU in establishing the Irish dimension through North-South institutions, and establishing the East-West institutions between Britain and Ireland, was more directly acknowledged during the period leading up to the Agreement. For example, Article 3 of the Downing Street Declaration of 1993 states that "the development of Europe will, of itself, require new approaches to serve interests common to both parts of the island of Ireland, and to Ireland and the United Kingdom as partners in the European Union."⁴⁴ Therefore, unlike many major third-party actors in the peace process such as individuals like George Mitchell and Bill Clinton, or the key actions taken by John Major, Bertie Ahern, and Tony Blair, which can be pointed out and debated at length as having a direct positive or negative influence on the peace process, the EU's role in the Northern Ireland peace process "is defined more by institutions than by individuals."⁴⁵ This understanding emphasizes the importance in adjustment of the framework in which the DMD operates to produce settlement rather than attempting to directly influence the DMD itself. The new institutional conditions provided by the EU membership of both the United Kingdom and Ireland allowed for different understandings of the levels of threat posed when actions are taken by the opposing party to the conflict.

This influence was not necessarily always going to be positive. Despite the long historical record of Europe's involvement with Ireland and Britain, there has long been a position of seeing the question of EU influence as a politicized notion. The multiple parties disagreed widely on the role of Europe and European integration. In general, Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) under the leadership of John Hume was the most pro-European. This position was largely due to economic concerns considering the amount of trade between the North and South of Ireland and the European market, however, Unionists remained suspicious of these motives.⁴⁶ John Hume was a prominent member of the European Parliament and Europe had shown itself to be in favour of an Irish dimension to a settlement for Northern Ireland. For Unionists, however, the Irish dimension was a backdoor to Irish re-unification. Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader, Ian Paisley asserted that "the whole aim of the community is to seek to weaken and eventually destroy [Northern Ireland's] links with the rest of the United Kingdom."⁴⁷ While this hyperbole might be disputable, Paisley and other concerned Unionists were not raising unfounded issues. Several scholars were working on similar fatalistic narratives, albeit with less negative perspectives. For example, in 1993, David Donaghue offered the prediction that increasing

⁴⁴ "Joint Declaration on Peace: The Downing Street Declaration," *British and Irish Governments* (1993).

⁴⁵ Katy Hayward and Antje Wiener, "The Influence of the Eu Towards Conflict Transformation on the Island of Ireland," in *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, ed. Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).

⁴⁶ Ingraham, "The European Union and Relationships within Ireland."

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

cooperation between the North and South through the EU would diminish the political relevance of the border over time.⁴⁸

There were also apprehensions by staunch Republicans who were not entirely of one mind concerning Europe. Concerns were raised that the pro-European stance would lead to European unity rather than Irish-unity, thereby abandoning nationalist concerns of communal identity and history and this betrayal would be untenable. These divisions on pro-European positions created an environment in which EU involvement in Northern Ireland risked creating division and reinforcing old cleavages rather than uniting the parties for peace.⁴⁹

By virtue of this political discourse, positioning oneself in regard to Europe and the European Union became in itself a political opinion on the conflict. This sentiment continues strongly today. In discussing the arguments by former leaders and signatories to the Belfast Agreement that the UK-exit would endanger if not completely destroy the Belfast Agreement, one Northern Ireland citizen remarked: “do you not think that their positioning on the impact of the EU on Northern Ireland is just a way to gain political support for a pro-Europe position? They’re all pro-Europe aren’t they?”⁵⁰ This example is just one part of a strong sentiment amongst pro-exit voters that fearmongering around the impact of the European withdrawal upon the Agreement is no more than a political tactic to “scupper Brexit.”

Moreover, during the Brexit negotiations in 2017, the DUP campaigned on a hardline anti-European Union position while Sinn Féin campaigned as strongly pro-Europe. Both campaigns completely removed the more moderate parties from the table, demonstrating a polarization of opinion in Northern Ireland regarding the EU which was likely reinforced by the UK-exit decision. Despite this division of opinion regarding the European Union, however, the majority of both DUP and Sinn Fein representatives of both the Northern Ireland Assembly and Westminster governments initially had largely agreed upon the need for a soft Brexit and no hard border on the island of Ireland. This agreement was representative of the processes of legitimation and positive feedback that have occurred since the Agreement that have made the Common Market not only advantageous, but essential, for Northern Ireland’s security, economy, and even the communal identities.

Internationalization and the EU in Cyprus

⁴⁸ David Donoghue, "Territorial Claims and Ireland in a European Context," in *Northern Ireland: A Crucial Test for a Europe of Peaceful Regions?*, ed. H.O. Skar and B. Lydersen (Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs, 1993), 21. Indeed, this was in essence true of the European Union’s effect on the politicization of the border in Northern Ireland’s politics until the EU was removed from the equation. The emergence of the discourse of Brexit and the fallout we are seeing today illustrate that the EU did not in fact alter the perceptions of the border issue as inherent to ethno-national security in any meaningful way, it simply muted them temporarily.

⁴⁹ Ingraham quotes Jan Erik Grindheim: “we cannot be certain that the introduction of the European dimension, together with the question of self-determination and constitutional nationalism in Northern Ireland, will reduce the conflict between the two communities. Quite the contrary, it might reinforce the old cleavages.”

⁵⁰ Personal communication with Belfast property manager (2017-05-31).

Where the Northern Ireland case presents a history of active prevention of wider third-party involvement, and a slow but deliberate process of internationalization, Cyprus has featured a much wider inclusion of various international parties from the conflict's inception in the 1950s. Studies of the Cyprus conflict have found various third-parties to be both helpful and problematic over many years. The UN has particularly been highlighted to be at times problematic, exacerbating the issues of the conflict, and at other times helping to advance the goal of achieving a settlement.⁵¹ Addressing more recent events, Claire Palley provides a cutting examination of the role of the UN in the Annan Plan for Cyprus and its missteps in producing a settlement document that could not pass a public referendum.⁵² James Ker-Lindsay, too, argues that the UN's decision to arbitrate the conflict settlement process, thereby removing the community leadership from the final negotiations of the agreement, prevented any successful acceptance of the process as legitimate.⁵³ The dominant narrative which filtered through the pages of media throughout subsequent negotiations including the Annan Plan process from 2001-2004 was one of distrust of the external third-parties. The UK and the US, and by extension the United Nations due to the authority held by the two Security Council states, were seen to be untrustworthy by both the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. In the Greek Cypriot community the presence of foreign monies became the source of an all-out assault on civil society organizations. These arguments frequently focused on the distribution of USAID monies through the UNDP "allegedly to promote the hated Annan plan" and was utilized as part of a larger campaign against the international influence in the Annan Plan itself.⁵⁴ There was no possible agreement with both the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey that could exist without the Greek Cypriots being required to make unfavourable concessions. Concessions which would threaten their national existence in Cyprus. Thus the international support for the Annan Plan, which was described as having been drafted entirely by the international community, was support for Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots.

But the Turkish Cypriots were also battling with an issue of the legitimacy of international third-parties in the process. Michael Moran argues that the real obstacle to Cyprus solution from the Turkish Cypriot perspective was not the intransigence of the communal leader, Rauf Denktash, or the nationalist and geopolitical interests of Turkey, but rather "the UN's (surely rather paradoxical) determination, on the one hand, to seek a new federal government in Cyprus – while, at the same time, treating the present an all-Greek government as if it were perfectly legitimate."⁵⁵ The Turkish Cypriots enter the negotiations in Cyprus under international

⁵¹ Tozun Bahcheli, "Searching for a Cyprus Settlement: Considering Options for Creating a Federation, a Confederation, or Two Independent States," *Publius* 30, no. 1 (2000); Ronald J. Fisher, "Escalation of an Identity-Based Conflict to an Adversarial Impasse*," *Journal Of Peace Research* 38, no. 3 (2001); Michalis Stavrou Michael, *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict: Negotiating History* (Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

⁵² Palley, *An International Relations Debacle*.

⁵³ James Ker-Lindsay, "The Emergence of 'Mediation' in International Peacemaking," *Ethnopolitics* 8, no. 2 (2009).

⁵⁴ Jean Christou, "Unops with Hunts Poisoning Atmosphere," *Cyprus Mail*, Oct 23 2006. Personal Interviews: Ayla Gurel, 13 Aug 2017; Makarios Drousiotis, 8 Aug 2017

⁵⁵ Michael Moran, "Cyprus: A European Anomaly," (Istanbul Kultur University, 2010), 11.

conditions where the UN, and later the EU, recognize the full and legitimate authority of the Greek Cypriot government who had previously been involved in a process of eradicating the Turkish Cypriot national existence. Erol Manisali determines that “the countries of the West regarded the Turks and the Greeks on the island differently and in the relations between Turkey and Greece they continuously supported Greece.”⁵⁶ The involvement of the US and EU in this context is therefore seen to actively pursue a resolution in favour of the Greek Cypriots. This position was further evidenced by the EU accession process and the exclusion of Turkey and Turkish Cypriots.

Both narratives of distrust of these wider external parties were able to be leveraged by the ethnic elites in Cyprus within the framework of the Double Minority Dilemma. It is through the DMD’s creation of the duplication of threat narratives that the Greek and Turkish Cypriots can simultaneously hold and firmly believe the exact opposite intentions of third-parties like the UK, the US, and the UN. However, since the failure of the Annan Plan, the criticism of third-parties in compounding the Cyprus security dilemma and preventing resolution has focused less on the UN interaction with Cyprus, or that of the US and UK, and more upon the role of the European Union. Where the EU provided a shift in the institutional structure of the DMD in Northern Ireland which allowed for elites to frame their security dilemma in terms which were negotiable, the EU’s intervention in Cyprus had very much the opposite effect.

The EU accession process through the 1990s initially presented the possibility of real progress in the Cyprus negotiations by offering a carrot and stick approach to encouraging parties to the negotiation to embrace essential concessions.⁵⁷ At least for many international observers, the EU accession of Cyprus presents itself as an opportunity for a federally united Cyprus to earn its place in the European Union by meeting the requirements of proving itself a stable and democratic polity via a successful settlement agreement. Indeed, prior to 1999, the Cyprus settlement was a precondition for accession. In addition, the potential future accession of Turkey could also be tied into the process. But the EU has a politicized relationship with the communities of Cyprus which complicates its ability to act as a neutral party or to provide the institutional framework that supports negotiated settlement within a DMD. The most important of these is the membership of Greece in the EU and its ability to control the EU’s decision-making vis-à-vis the Cyprus question. Where both Ireland and the UK shared membership in the EU, lending to a venue for stabilizing Anglo-Irish relations, the exclusion of Turkey and the overrepresentation of Greece’s authority in the EU set up the EU as an arena where the DMD would continue to be reinforced.

⁵⁶ Erol Manisali, *Cyprus: Yesterday and Today* (Istanbul: D&R Publications, 2000), 85.

⁵⁷ Olga Demetriou, "Catalysis, Catachresis: The Eu's Impact on the Cyprus Conflict," in *The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Power of Integration and Association*, ed. Thomas Diez, Mathias Albert, and Stephan Stetter (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008); Hubert Faustmann, "The Cyprus Issue after Accession," in *An Island in Europe: The Eu and the Transformation of Cyprus*, ed. James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann, and Fiona Mullen (London: L.B. Tauris & Co. Ltd., 2011).

Indeed, it is arguable that the Greek Cypriots knew this fully when first embarking on their EU accession application. The support of Turkey for the Turkish Cypriot cause, and the ensuing Turkish settlement program in the northern territory of the island created the DMD conditions where Greek Cypriots sought sources of foreign assistance to shore up their position of power. Accession to the European Union would not only increase ties between the Greek Cypriots and Greece, but would also bring the support of some of Europe's most powerful states to the Greek Cypriot position.⁵⁸ The need to establish this membership emerges from the power-imbalance in the region and the DMS which runs deep through the Cyprus conflict.⁵⁹ This act of internationalization, therefore, did not seek to "widen the pie" per se but rather to increase the security of the Greek Cypriot share of the pie. For Greek Cypriots, they were "European" and deserved their place among the society of Europe. In return, Greece has always held a primacy of place in the ideology of Europe, being the seat of democracy in the long history of the continent, and this translated to a natural affinity between the Greek-supported Republic of Cyprus and the European Union.

In the north of the island, however, the perspective vis-à-vis Europe was much more suspicious. A majority of Turkish Cypriots regarded the EU accession bid as a direct threat to their cause, citing both Greek and Greek Cypriot statements which illustrated that the EU bid was an attempt to ensure Greek Cypriot control of the island. Similar to the previously discussed perspective of the EU's potential for encouraging a united Ireland, EU membership was perceived to be a "backdoor" to *enosis*, or "unity" with Greece.⁶⁰ Turkish Cypriot elites used this framing to their advantage. Rauf Denktas declared that EU membership would "do away with the Treaty of Guarantee... and finally provide for the final victory of Hellenism in Cyprus."⁶¹ This perception was reinforced by the decision to allow Turkey's bid for the EU in 1999 which was then framed as part of a strategic effort to get concessions from Turkey on Cyprus. Furthermore, membership in the EU indirectly strengthens the Republic of Cyprus' independence and territorial integrity.⁶² In framing the EU accession process as a threat to the Greek Cypriot national identity, Denktas

⁵⁸ Moran, "Cyprus: A European Anomaly."

⁵⁹ Greek Cypriots, and many Turkish Cypriots, also saw the obvious economic benefits of joining the European Union as a way to support development on the island which had been stalled for many years by the ongoing tensions. There were Greek Cypriots who were supportive of inclusion of Turkish Cypriots in the accession process, however the dominant desire to accede to the EU as a unified state under the banner of the "Republic of Cyprus" was inherently exclusionary of Turkish Cypriot participation.

⁶⁰ Hakan Bağcı, "Cyprus: Accession to the European Union - a Turkish View," in *Cyprus and the European Union: New Chances for Solving an Old Conflict?*, ed. Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Hansjörg Brey (München: Südosteuropa-Gesellschaft, 1997).

⁶¹ Rauf Denktas, "Intercommunal Negotiations and the Eu Membership of Cyprus," in *Cyprus and the EU*, ed. UNANC (1995). This is strikingly reminiscent of Northern Ireland's Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) leader, Ian Paisley, who asserted that "the whole aim of the [EU] is to seek to weaken and eventually destroy [Northern Ireland's] links with the rest of the United Kingdom" Paul Arthur, quoted in: Ingraham, "The European Union and Relationships within Ireland."

⁶² Yannis Kranidiotis, "Political Issues," in *Cyprus and the European Union: A Challenge*, ed. John Charalambous, Marion Sarafis, and Eleni Timini (1996).

and others were able to ensure that the EU presence would reinforce the double minority dilemma and encourage support for greater ties between the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus and Turkey.⁶³

The initial recognition of the bid for accession was palatable for Turkish Cypriots only under the conditions that the accession would require some form of Cyprus settlement. Once Turkey's bid for accession was accepted, the social and economic benefits of EU membership could be discussed openly in Turkish Cypriot politics. Because Turkey would be a fellow member, the security-based issue of guarantor rights would be resolved. One of the two leading Turkish Cypriot parties, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), even capitalized on the EU bid, campaigning hard for pro-solution positions on the basis that the resulting EU membership would benefit Turkish Cypriots. Moreover, upon the warning received by Turkey that their bid for membership hinged on a Cypriot settlement, Turkey applied pressure to the abstentionist Denktash to attend direct talks with the Greek Cypriot representatives. However, the stability granted by this coalescence of objectives was thrown into instability by the 2002 EU decision that Cyprus could accede to the EU divided.⁶⁴ This shift was in keeping with Denktas' earlier warnings, that the "unilateral accession of the Republic of Cyprus was equivalent to union with Greece" and while it did not deter continued support for the Annan Plan settlement agreement in the North of Cyprus, the decision greatly impacted the Cypriot position vis-à-vis the need for settlement.⁶⁵

The EU had initially leveraged the potential Cyprus resolution as a pressure point to encourage Turkey to support a successful settlement, suggesting strongly that this would be required in order for Turkey's application for EU membership to be considered. During the Annan Plan process this gamble ostensibly paid off. Greece's efforts to ensure Cyprus' successful accession and the concerted effort by Turkey's government to meet EU demands led both states to moderate their policies, if not towards each other, at least towards the Cypriot negotiations. At this time, Turkey, under the leadership of newly elected Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, was endeavouring to present itself as a candidate for accession. It was actively adjusting its minority rights legislation to match EU standards and requirements and the Erdoğan was particularly vocal about EU accession being a national priority. Faustmann observes that the decision to vote against the Annan Plan by Tassos Papdopoulos may have been responding to this perspective that the international community shared regarding Turkey and Erdoğan's core objectives. He observes that the Republic of Cyprus seemed to have "developed a long-term strategy based on the perception that the closer Turkey came to [EU] membership the more willing it would be to

⁶³ Daria Isachenko, *The Making of Informal States: Statebuilding in Northern Cyprus and Transdnistria*, ed. Oliver P. Richmond, Rethinking Peace and Conflict Studies (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).

⁶⁴ Helen Xanthaki, "The Route to Eu Accession," in *Cyprus and the Eu: The Road to Accession*, ed. Constantin Stefanou (London: Ashgate, 2005).

⁶⁵ Christophoros Christophorou, "Party Change and Development in Cyprus (1995-2005)," *Southern European Society and Politics* 11, no. 3-4 (2006).

make concessions on Cyprus.”⁶⁶ Today hindsight recognizes that this widely accepted interpretation of Turkey’s objectives at that time was fatally flawed in assuming the EU accession could consistently apply this type of pressure.

Conclusion

The double minority dilemma provides a framing device for ethno-national parties to establish and affirm their security position as a minority under threat in very specific geopolitical contexts. In both Northern Ireland and Cyprus, the DMD underpins not only the originating histories of the conflicts but also the institutional arrangements through which continued third-party involvement is perceived. A comparison of the two cases presents an opportunity to observe how the DMD impacts the effect of third-parties in any attempt to internationalize a conflict toward resolution. Due to an array of similarities between the cases, this effect can be explored vis-à-vis the continued involvement of a former colonial power, namely the United Kingdom, the intervention and mediation of a global power-broker, such as the United States, and even the interventions of wider regional and international organizations such as the European Union and United Nations. For the sake of space, this paper has demonstrated the interaction of the European Union with the Double Minority Dilemma in both cases. The comparison of the EU’s role in Northern Ireland with that of Cyprus demonstrates how the EU affects the relationships not only of the ethno-national parties in conflict, but also their geopolitical allies or ‘homelands’ which inform the DMD narrative of the conflict. In Northern Ireland, the effect upon the DMD was to produce conditions whereby the security dilemma became balanced enough to produce concessions and encourage settlement. In Cyprus, the effect of the EU was to further exacerbate elite framing of the DMD such that the third-parties involved continued to be perceived as one-sided in their support for one or the other community and the negotiated settlement failed.

While this comparison was drawn from the historical experience of the processes leading to the Good Friday Agreement and Annan Plan, the implications of the DMD and its relationship to the European Union in both Northern Ireland and Cyprus are more relevant than ever in today’s political climate. The fallout of Brexit and the recent introduction of the Northern Ireland Protocol is under scrutiny for the potential of elites to reinvigorate the framing of the minority under threat by highlighting concerns that the Unionist community will be abandoned by the United Kingdom and left to deal with the threat from the Republic of Ireland on its own. In turn, Nationalist elites have been taking advantage of the political crisis to push for discussion of a unity vote, signaling the need to join with Ireland in order to protect the future existence of the Northern Irish Catholic identity. Across the continent, Cyprus is facing renewed politicization of its Double Minority Dilemma via the increasing European economic connections on the island and discussions around the hydro-carbon economy in Cyprus waters. The question of Cyprus’ place in Europe is further compounded by reoccurring tensions around migration in the region and the use of the island by migrants and refugees to move from Turkey into Europe. As the

⁶⁶ Faustmann, "The Cyprus Issue after Accession."

Republic of Cyprus' ties to Europe on questions like the hydro-carbons issue or regional migrant patterns becomes stronger, so too does the Turkish Cypriot relationship with Turkey. The EU accession has thus contributed to further deepening of the double minority ties and contributes to the ongoing stalemate of the security dilemma in the region.

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