

Ukrainian Nationalism and Competing Memories of World War II: The Azov Movement's Projected Narrative.

Bertrand de Franqueville
PhD student in Political Science, University of Ottawa.
bertrand.defranqueville@uottawa.ca

Paper Presented at the 2021 ASN World Convention, 5-8 May 2021.
Do not cite without the permission of the author.

T.W.: Analytical descriptions of symbolic, physical and verbal violence against certain groups are present in this text.

Abstract

This article takes as its starting point the three memorial narratives described by Yoav Galai (2019): Firstly, the Stockholm narrative, which places the memory of the Holocaust and the struggle against its denial at the center. Secondly, the Prague narrative, which equates the crimes of the USSR and Nazi Germany. Finally, the Moscow narrative, which claims a monopoly on anti-fascism. These three narratives allow to look further into their application in the Ukrainian context and the way these issues are handled in the face of their "dark side", and the need to "come to terms with the Past" (Yurchuk, 2017); especially concerning the crimes of USSR within the Moscow narrative, and those of the OUN/UPA within the Prague narrative. Through this, I aim to relate the memorial clash to the growing involvement of the far right in the Ukrainian political field by focusing on the Azov movement. I question the way in which this movement seizes these memorial challenges of the Second World War as a tool of political affirmation. I begin by presenting the conflict between these three narratives of the Second World War since the fall of USSR in a Ukraine divided between the vestiges of the past and the will to build the foundations of a new nation. It was during this period that the Prague narrative, which until then had been strongly promoted by the far right, became increasingly important. However, the Moscow narrative persisted and helped to compete with this memory of autonomization. On the other hand, the European narrative of Stockholm remained a hardly recognized point of tension. The Maidan revolution and the following outbreak of war in the Donbass had the effect of crystallizing these memorial tensions by welding the positions of each camp. The far right experienced a revival, benefiting from a stronger affirmation of nationalist discourse. Among its constituent groups, the Azov movement stood out. Unlike the more liberal/democratic political spaces, which often have a more compliant (flexible or moderate) stance towards these memorial issues, the Azov movement performs in a clear-cut manner an integral, and radical, claim to the Prague memorial narrative. A narrative that is fully in line with the ideological continuity of their nationalist commitment.

Key words

Nationalism; Narratives; Far Right; Azov; Ukraine.

In his article about the transnational mythscape of World War II, Yoav Galai (2019) presents three narratives: Stockholm's narrative, which places the memory of the Holocaust and the struggle against its denial at the center; Prague's narrative, which aspires to the recognition of the atrocities carried out by the USSR and equates Soviet crimes with those of the Nazis; and Moscow's narrative of the "Great Patriotic War," claiming a monopoly on anti-fascism. However, these different narratives generate the voluntary omission of facts that do not fit the valued myth, i.e., the national participation in collaboration with Nazism for the first, minimization of local responsibility for the crimes of the Holocaust for the second, and patriotic holism that neglects the targeted nature of the violence while hardly acknowledging its own crimes for the third.

This "constellation" of memories proposed by Galai is particularly interesting when analyzing the World War II memorial mobilizations in Ukraine. Indeed, the country finds itself on the edge of these three competing mystified narratives. Volodymyr Kravchenko (2015) explains the resulting tension since the end of the USSR and the search for an autonomized national memory. He highlights two narratives in particular. On the one hand, the narrative of the "Great Patriotic War" in which "the USSR was Hitler's only real enemy" (Ackerman and de Lara 2018, 213), eclipsing the specific extermination of Jews to favor a standardized reading of victims as Soviet citizens. On the other hand, the Ukrainian narrative, « similar to the Polish one in that it portrays Ukraine as a victim of both Hitler and Stalin, but with a heroic discourse connected to the OUN underground and the Ukrainian insurgency (UPA) » (Kravchenko, 2015, p.462). This narrative aims to establish its autonomy from the Soviet memory and thus raises the question of the rehabilitation of nationalist figures of the interwar period and of the Second World War as national heroes such as Stepan Bandera and, more broadly, the members of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (OUN/UPA), who were nationalist figures who collaborated with the German Nazi regime while fighting against the USSR. A recognition that then implies minimizing or even ignoring their nationalist

ideological affiliation and their contribution to both the collaboration and the abuses against the Polish and Jewish populations (Himka 2013; Kravchenko 2015; Kasianov 2015; Yurchuk 2017; Gobert 2018). This struggle between these Russian and Ukrainian narratives thus tends to put aside the Stockholm narrative, which is hardly mobilized. Although increasingly taken into account, it remains relatively marginalized and the subject of intense tension (Himka 2008; Shevel 2016). What Yuliya Yurchuk (2017) frames as a division between “reclaiming the past” in a post-colonial perspective where Ukraine “seeks to reclaim its history and identity” and the need to “come to terms with the Past” leading to the questioning of the involvement of national heroes in human rights violations. A need that becomes even more pressing “as a nation which has declared a commitment to European values and made European integration its strategic goal” (p. 112). The autonomous anti-imperialist discourse, in particular the anti-Russian one invested by the Prague narrative, was not then the prerogative of the radical right nationalists in Ukraine. Rather, it was a factor of its marginalization in the 1990s and early 2000s (Umland and Shekhovtsov 2013) as the question of memorial narratives became one of the major issues of national construction in the newly independent Ukraine. However, their plurality and the varied positioning both between successive governments until 2013-2014 (Kasianov 2015; Yurchuk 2017) and between the different geographical regions of the country seem to complicate the assertion of a single identity (Shevel 2016). The outbreak of the Maidan Revolution and the separatist uprisings in the east helped to reinforce the divisions, while at the same time welding those memory “blocs” in a more significant way. As Georgiy Kasianov (2015) points out, separatist and Russian propaganda describes the Ukrainian army as “fascist,” a direct allusion to the Soviet myth of the Great Patriotic War. On the Ukrainian side, Oxana Shevel (2016) shows that once more divided on the issue of rehabilitating the memory of Stepan Bandera, the OUN, and the UPA, the center of the country now tends to position itself in a more favorable perspective. This would contribute to underlining a potential greater receptivity to the Prague narrative, which has so far been promoted more by the western part of Ukraine. At the same time, we have seen an increasing return of the far right to the forefront, headed by Svoboda, Right Sector and the Azov movement

(Umland 2019; 2020)¹. This may have contributed to a crystallization of commemorative mobilizations in the country while the context offered them an opportunity to have a greater voice in the political field. It is then about the latter movement that we will discuss here, and more specifically about their investment in the mobilization of national narratives as a strategic means of political distinction. We will thus ask to what extent the Azov movement seizes these memorial challenges of the Second World War as a tool of political affirmation.

We argue that if the Prague narrative is not - or no longer - the prerogative of the Ukrainian far right, the Azov movement maintains its use but in its most rigid and assertive way to distinguish itself from the rest of the political field, by claiming and appropriating the entire ideological and militaristic legacy of the OUN/UPA while ignoring the shadowy parts of the discourse without any concern for them. The Prague narrative is therefore an integral and integrative part of Azovian nationalism within their third way perspective.

In order to explore this question further, we will proceed in two steps. First, we will return to the significance of the clash between the three national memorial narratives in Ukraine, trying to adequately illustrate their complexity and the stakes they represent in the country today. This understanding of the memorial clash is indeed necessary to better understand, in a second step, the investment of Azov in these debates. An involvement by performing an even more radical aspect of this narrative that fully corresponds to their commitments as it remains radically different from the meaning proposed by the center of the Ukrainian political field².

Because of its efficiency in understanding the issues, we will continue to use Galai's frameworks by maintaining the names of these narratives by three cities: Stockholm, Prague and Moscow. Besides the relevance of these names by their

¹ By Azov movement we mean the combination of a political party, an armed force and various groups operating in their fold. Azov is the result of the aggregation of nationalist activists (gathered since the Maidan or from pre-existing organizations) forming an armed group after the outbreak of war in 2014. Led by Andriy Biletsky, the Azov battalion (then regiment) are quickly integrated into the National Guard under the control of the Interior Ministry. Led by Andriy Biletsky, the Azov battalion (then regiment) are quickly integrated into the National Guard under the control of the Interior Ministry. At the same time, a political mobilization (directed by the Civil Corps) was organized. Finally, a political party was created on October 14, 2016: The National Corps, whose leader is Andriy Biletsky. Other groups also gravitate around this sphere like the National Druzhyna created on January 28, 2018 or Centuria created in August 2020.

² In the Bourdieusian meaning. See *Propos sur le champ politique* (2000).

reference to significant conferences for the formulation of these memorial issues, they allow us to keep a rather effective geographical representation of their meaning while allowing us to broaden our focus in the development of our analysis. We will also mobilize the existing literature surrounding the question as well as the data collected in the activist literature available on the internet and those collected during two research fields carried out in 2016 and 2017.

A memory in tension: Competing narratives and the difficult affirmation of a Ukraine on the edge between three myths

As briefly explained in the introduction, Ukraine is on the edge of the three memorial narratives of Prague, Moscow and Stockholm. Kravchenko (2015) and Yurchuk (2017) emphasize two main competing narratives in identity issues and post-independence political confrontations: The Prague one on the one hand and the Moscow one on the other. They divide the issue between the independent aspirations against Russia and the ongoing influence of its Soviet vestiges. A clash that brings forward the question of the Stockholm narrative, which highlights the tensions involved in the construction of a national myth that implies dealing with the past.

Breaking out of the Russian yoke: A contested assertion of the Prague narrative

With the independence of Ukraine and the fall of the USSR, the question of leaving the Soviet legacy arose. A doctrine of national rebirth emerged, with a desire to Ukrainize legislation, institutions and identity. This was part of a compromise between old and new elites (Yurchuk 2017, p. 113) that allowed a way out of the Soviet narrative in a reunification perspective (p.114). This aspiration continued from Leonid Kravchuk (1991-1994) to Victor Yushchenko (2005-2010) and then Petro Poroshenko (2014-2019) (Kravchenko 2015). Soviet history is thus presented as a foreign occupation and Ukraine as a victim of imperialism. But this narrative goes back beyond Soviet history. As Himka (2008) explains, "Self identification as victim in

Eastern Europe is older than the Holocaust. The Polish and Ukrainian victimization narratives go back to the 1830s and 1840s, the Hungarian one to 1920" (p. 363). However, it is only during the Gorbachev era and then during the independent Ukraine that they particularly stand out. Three memorial tools in particular contribute to the construction of a narrative that is autonomous from the Moscow one: the Cossack heritage, the Holodomor and the rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA, namely led by Stepan Bandera.

Firstly, the Cossack imagery is strongly present in Ukrainian mythology, until it is found in the national anthem of the country: "And show that we are brethren of the Cossack nation". As Maxime Deschanet (2014) then points out, "the Zaporogues Cossacks will effectively crystallize the discontent of a population under foreign domination." (p.31). They are the figure of people fighting against external oppression. The Hetmanat, a sort of State which they sought to set up, became an ideal of protector of the peasantry, of freedom and independence. The Cossack myth thus remained influential and was found particularly during the Maidan revolution where the organization of the square was directly inspired by it, even to the point of being compared to the *sitch* of the Zaporogues Cossacks (Goujon and Shukan 2015). Units were referred as *sotnia* ("centuria", in reference to a Cossack unit of one hundred fighters), and the fighters as *sotnyky* (Idem; Kasianov, 2015).

Then, it is the reference to the Holodomor memory that is at the heart of the Ukrainian narrative. "The Holodomor of 1932-33 occupies the most important position in the Ukrainian national martyrology; in official memorial policy, its importance was elevated under presidents Leonid Kuchma" explains Kravchenko (2015, p.459). This famine organized by USSR that led to millions of deaths constitutes the common trauma on which the Ukrainian memory is built as a victim of Soviet totalitarianism. This competes with the myth of the Great Patriotic War, which tends to make the abuses and crimes of the USSR invisible (Idem).

Finally, the question of the rehabilitation of the OUN and the UPA has also become a major issue, if not the main issue, in a tension characterized by two clashing historiographical trends: an invective tendency on the one hand, and a tendency that

heroizes on the other (Gomza 2015, 196). Indeed, these organizations are gradually represented as resistance forces to Soviet oppression before and during World War II. However, they were also under the influence of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy to such a degree that upon the German invasion in the summer of 1941, they collaborated (Himka 2013). Their members participated in abuses against the Jewish and Polish populations and in important massacres in a logic of ethnic cleansing (Gomza 2015; Yurchuk 2017; Gobert 2018). When Soviet control was restored, armed resistance continued, and the movement was not defeated until the 1950s (Himka 2013). However, the OUN had undergone some metamorphosis by the summer of 1943 through an ideological orientation more inclined toward the market economy, rejecting aggression against minorities, seeking to contribute to national and cultural tolerance, abandoning the idea of a single union, and espousing ideals related to liberal democracies (Gomza 2015, p.201). A contextual "turn" that contemporary UPA promoters can rely on. Thus, the memory of the collaboration tends to be overlooked today and it is a positive image of the UPA as anti-Russian, anti-communist and dedicated to the independence of Ukraine that prevails (Himka 2008).

It is therefore these three historical points that strongly feed a discourse of independence and autonomy from Russia that gradually takes the form of the Prague narrative. This is particularly apparent under Yushchenko's presidency, which initiated a policy of ethno-symbolism that pointed out the pain (Holodomor) and heroism (OUN/UPA) of the reborn Ukrainian nation (Kasianov 2015). In 2007 a campaign was undertaken to make the famine the greatest human catastrophe of the twentieth century and to call for the extermination of the symbols of the Soviet past. Yushchenko also awarded the title of Hero of Ukraine to Stepan Bandera, which was a choice strongly criticized inside and outside the country (Idem). In the wake of Maidan, and in a context of war, the so-called "decommunization" laws of 2015 provided a second example of this desire to break free from the Russian yoke and confirm a more prominent orientation towards the Prague narrative. These laws condemn the totalitarian crimes of Nazism and the USSR; order the removal of statues and street names established during that era; call for the opening of Soviet archives to the public; and rehabilitate the memory of those who fought for Ukrainian

independence (Gobert 2018). Moreover, the "Great Patriotic War" has become the "Second World War". According to Andreas Umland, there is also a tendency to a "partial banderisation of historical commemorations, and of the official discourse" (quoted by Gobert, *Idem*).

But while the memory of Stepan Bandera is still highly controversial in Ukraine, the radical right is fully invested in preserving and reclaiming this legacy, namely that of the paramilitary Banderist branch of the Insurgent Army (UPA). It is these specific forms of nationalism that are found in the emerging parties of the late 1980s and early 1990s. Among others, appeared the Ukrainian National Assembly and its National Self-Defense Unit (Umland and Shekhovtsov 2013), which described itself as the nationalist saviors aiming to stop the excesses of democracy through a clear hierarchy (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2018). There was also the Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists, which was directly in the line of the OUN. Finally, one finds the Social-National Party of Ukraine (SNPU) and its paramilitary group People's Guard Detachment, which later became Patriots of Ukraine. They promoted a revolutionary ultranationalism, a violent overthrow of power in the country, and an anti-Russian bent (Umland and Shekhovtsov 2013). Despite their presence in the Ukrainian political landscape, the radical right remained marginal during the late 1990s and early 2000s. While their participation in memorial conflicts was apparent, notably through the defense of monuments to the memory of Bandera and the attack on those to the memory of the Soviet past (Kasianov 2015), their political weight remained low. The fall of the USSR and the emergence of a liberal national narrative aspiring to wipe out the past contributed to their failure to hold the monopoly of the struggle for the autonomy of Ukrainian memory from the Russian one. They were challenged by liberal groups more open to democratic ideas (Umland and Shekhovtsov 2013; Likhatchev 2016) and around which memorial mobilization served as a space for political confrontation (Yurchuk 2017). This allows us to consider again a more diffuse Prague narrative that does not enable us to assert a distinctive feature of the nationalist radical right.

However, the Maidan revolution contributed to an increased visibility of these movements, at the forefront of which were Svoboda and Right Sector (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014). If they were a minority, they nevertheless remained highly active and "disproportionately visible" (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2018, p. 615). Not only could this be related to a greater willingness to mobilize a violent repertoire that their paramilitary liabilities and insurgent character allowed them to emphasize, but also to their ability to mobilize a significant network and activist resources (Idem). Volodymyr Ishchenko (2020b) explains in this regard that "the radical nationalists possessed a unique combination of resources, allowing them to strategically exploit the opportunity for radicalization and to facilitate diffusion of violent tactics widely among Maidan protesters." (p.207). According to him, they had much more important networks, organizational structures, and increased socialization and experience with violence (see also Ishchenko 2018). Their participation to the Maidan provided an opportunity to mobilize their anti-Russian repertoire by supporting a movement that opened up the possibility of moving away from Moscow's influence (Shekhovtsov and Umland 2014). Nevertheless, there is a reappropriation of traditional nationalist references without being associated with - or in direct affiliation with - radical right activism. Slogans such as "Glory to Ukraine! Glory to the heroes!" or references to "Ukrainian Cossackdom" mainly represented symbols of resistance and freedom. Yuliya Yurchuk (2015) explains that "in general, Stepan Bandera and the OUN-UPA largely lost their negative meaning of many Kyiv protesters during the Euromaidan" (p. 125). These historical references oriented around the Prague narrative may have contributed to the dissemination of a myth once more monopolized by the far right. However, they may have potentially increased their legitimacy.

Their involvement against the separatist uprisings then constituted a second opportunity because of their ability to respond quickly and adapt to a changing context (Gomza and Zajackowski 2019). The involvement of radical right-wing movements in the conflict allowed them to highlight their role as defenders of the nation by distinguishing themselves from the regular armed forces. But they failed to convert it into electoral capital (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2018; Likhatchev 2016). Finally, Umland (2020) explains that the "official political rhetoric, mass media

discourse, cultural policies and memory affairs have become more militant and nationalistic. As a result, far-right ideas, leaders and organizations that were previously marginalized have become tolerated, if not liked, by society. " (p.264). A dilution of the Prague narrative that may have participated in a banalization of the Ukrainian radical right's discourse with a concomitant radicalization of the discrediting of anti-fascism - and, by association, a certain fringe of the left - associated with Russia by the Moscow narrative (Shekhovtsov 2015).

The Moscow narrative: an outdated but persistent myth

If the Prague narrative began to gain strength in the aftermath of Ukrainian independence, one can nevertheless observe the persistence of the Moscow narrative within the country. Indeed, this narrative, which promotes the history of the Great Patriotic War, contributed to claim the monopoly of the anti-fascist struggle in order to justify the Soviet ideology by providing proof of the superiority of its system. No criticism was then allowed (Yurchuk 2017, p. 108). Yet, this myth contained several shadowy parts brought to the forefront by the Prague narrative: the state terror, the Holodomor and the nationalist independence struggle. This helped to counter accusations of Ukrainian collaboration to Holocaust (Himka 2008). But the gradual implementation of a form of Prague narrative remains contested. First, for its decried reevaluation of the OUN/UPA. But above all because of the prominence of the Moscow narrative, from which Ukraine has not totally disengaged itself. Yanukovich's presidency was thus characterized by a certain distance from the narrative described above, with a greater defense of Russian speakers and a fight against nationalism. While the purpose was more to discredit Yushchenko, Yanukovich nonetheless asserted that he did not consider the Holodomor as genocide and promised that the titles of Heroes of Ukraine granted to Bandera and Shukhevych would be withdrawn (Kasianov 2015). This was also intended to ease tensions with Russia. But apart from its "genocidal" character, the memorial mobilization of the Holodomor was nonetheless unchanged (Idem). Memory issues thus became a part of the country's electoral contests. For example, with Yushchenko, a pro-Ukrainian, who was active in

the West and in the center of the country when Yanukovich tried to discredit his opponent by labeling him a nationalist (Yurchuk 2015, p. 118). Oxana Shevel (2016) also notes that there was too much division among Ukrainian political elites who saw personal advantage in exploiting locally apparent identity antagonisms. Moreover, according to the author, Russia's influence remains significant in seeking to keep this memorial war going. The denunciation of the Orange Revolution as "nationalistic" and "fascist" attests to this (Yurchuk 2015). And this may have played into the separatists' perception of a "fascist" Ukraine with a direct allusion to the Great Patriotic War and the reuse of Putin's rhetoric (Kasianov 2015).

However, a persistent influence of the Moscow narrative in the Ukrainian camp is also noticeable, as explained by Volodymyr Kravchenko (2015), and can be mobilized in the struggle against separatist and Russian forces. Indeed, he says that "Both warring sides on the Donbas borrow heavily from the Soviet propaganda arsenal, habitually compare their opponents to fascists, and describe the victories of their soldiers using labels such as the 'Battle of Stalingrad' or 'Defence of the Brest Fortress'" (p. 464) and part of the Ukrainian population continues to show an ambivalent stance towards Soviet mythology. Even more, using the terms of anti-fascism against Russia demonstrates its lack of monopoly on the Soviet narrative, as it is reinterpreted and appropriated locally. Besides, from a perspective of semantic contestation, another definition of antifascism was possible. Indeed, part of the Ukrainian left joined the separatist side but "were not able to re-frame 'antifascist' rhetoric into a more adequate and progressive form, while their reiteration of the 'fascist junta' term - an overkill in the system of post-Soviet cultural references - played into the Russian nationalist/Soviet patriotic narrative" (Ishchenko 2020c, 820). However, another fringe of the left, which could describe their activism as anti-fascist (to a certain extent and) in a more western understanding, has enrolled in an anti-imperialist commitment against Russia. It could then contribute to a decline of the Moscow narrative without becoming involved in the Prague one. This would even offer a possible echo to the Stockholm narrative through its critical historiographical ambition. Even more, as Ishchenko (2020c) underlines vis-à-vis Maidan, "the new left

hoped to articulate gender equality, minority rights and other libertarian principles under the popular frame of 'European values' and in contrast to the Russian government's conservative turn" (p.226). Moreover, explicitly anti-Russian positions of anarchist groups can be observed (see in particular Wishart 2019). Recently, while Russia was strengthening its arsenal on the border of Ukraine, Dmitry Mrachnik (2021) reminded in the anarchist journal *Nihilist* the need to engage in an opposition to Russian imperialist actions.

However, such an interpretation of the Ukrainian left remains limited. Especially in view of its relative weakness, pre-existing to the Maidan but which was accentuated during the revolution and the outbreak of war with two factions, one of which joined the separatists. A division that reinforced the association of the left to Moscow's anti-fascist narrative and increased its discredit. Finally, its polarization through the issue of Maidan and the conflict contributed to a further alignment of both spaces with nationalist positions (Ishchenko 2020a; 2020c). The memorial divisions have been maintained and finally question the place of the Stockholm narrative in these confrontations.

The heavy question of the Stockholm narrative

In the face of these two competing narratives presented above, the Stockholm narrative and the question of Holocaust seems to have been marginalized by the memorial mobilizations in Ukraine although it is also a central issue. The more European memory of the Holocaust is indeed less taken into account by the other two narratives and a pluralist approach seems hardly manageable (Shevel 2016). On the one hand, the Moscow narrative, insists more on a triumphant discourse of World War II (Himka 2008; Kravchenko 2015; Galai 2019) and Soviet sacrifice. It then dismisses the specificity of the Jewish Holocaust because "it was seen to highlight the experience of a particular ethnicity, which clashed with Soviet practice" (Galai, 2019, p.4). On the other hand, the Prague narrative does not specifically reject the Stockholm one, but positions it in equal terms with Soviet crimes (p.8). And the Ukrainian vision struggles to acknowledge the responsibility of the OUN-UPA in these

massacres. Ishchenko (2018) reminds us, however, that the "admiration of OUN and UPA among the general public does not necessarily mean xenophobic attitudes towards Poles or Jews, it is usually based on ignorance and denialism about their mass murders and collaborationism with the Nazis." Yurchuk (2017) thus points out a certain difficulty in "coming to terms with the past", which emphasizes a critical view on the difficult aspects of the past" (p. 108). This therefore invites one to confront the memorial hindrances of the polarized and polarizing narratives of the OUN-UPA (Gomza 2015).

During World War II, Ukraine was also the site of the massacre of Jews, and particularly in what has been called "The Holocaust by Bullets" (Ackerman and de Lara 2018). 1.55 million Ukrainian Jews were exterminated between 1941 and 1944 (Idem). Between 30,000 and 40,000 Ukrainians are believed to have taken part in these murders (Dieter Pohl, cited by Himka 2013). But the recognition of this massacre is made difficult in a Ukrainian memory marked by the two opposing narratives. Himka (2013) highlights a struggle between traditionalists who refused to undermine the purity of the nation and their opponents who wished to get the memory of the Shoah recognized and taught, especially to fight anti-Semitism and Holocaust denial.

This is particularly visible in the memorial policies that have been established, especially at the site of Babi Yar where 33,771 Jews were killed on September 29 and 30, 1941. A first monument erected in 1976 only honored the Soviet victims (idem; Gobert 2018). Following independence, the recognition of Jewish victims was established but in the midst of other groups affected by the massacre. These memorial attempts were therefore confronted with Ukrainian opposition to the singularity of Jewish memory, arguing that non-Jewish Ukrainians had also been killed (Himka 2013). A cross commemorating the victims of the OUN was also established but vandalized on numerous occasions. Several other memorial places for Jewish victims have also been attacked throughout Ukraine, including in Galicia where the OUN and UPA are commemorated as heroes (Idem). In addition, the Institute of National

Memory created in 2006 has sought ensure that the memory of the Holodomor is recognized while sidelining the memory of the Jews of Ukraine.

Thus, "the Shoah is still considered in Eastern Europe as one mass murder among others and as imposed from outside" (Droit 2007, 120). The legacy of Ukraine's responsibility for the Holocaust presents a major tool of international discrediting, heavily mobilized by Russia as it performs its anti-fascist narrative. The labeling of collaboration has intensified and taken on an even greater significance in this period of war. But Ukraine is also under the influence of Europe marked by the Stockholm narrative (Himka 2013; Shevel 2016). A European influence and an aspiration for its values that pushes to deal with the past but whose process is strained as the conflict in the Donbass continues and nationalist sentiment grows stronger (Yurchuk 2017, p.126).

Finally, Ukraine faces different competing memorial narratives. The issue of a national narrative autonomized from the Russian one is not new nor represents a monopoly of the far right. However, this narrative is challenged by both the prevalence of the anti-fascist narrative of Moscow and the necessary interrogation of the Stockholm one, which represent major challenges in the construction of the country's identity. The Ukrainian nationalist far right continues to be involved in these memorial debates, and the successive events of the Maidan and the war in the Donbass have contributed to a greater echo in their universe of meaning, and even a banalization of their commitment. However, competing readings of the Prague narrative are not part of their political questioning. Their involvement is characterized by their will to continue to institute a nationalist narrative that recovers and assumes the complex political and military heritage of this memory while fighting against other myths. This seems to be particularly the case of the Azov movement, whose Prague narrative tends to be an integral part of their mobilization.

Azov's strict affirmation of the Prague narrative: A continuity in the distinction

More than a new phenomenon inherited from the conflicting debates since Ukraine's independence, the affirmation of the Prague autonomous narrative is fully in line with the universe of meaning claimed and supported by Ukrainian nationalists. This, without the questioning of the other two narratives. This is how the Azov movement tends to fully perform a discourse that they proudly claim to be the heir. First by insisting on its historical affiliation with Ukrainian national mythology (particularly the one of Bandera) where they claim to be the bridge between the past, the present and the future. And second, by a contemporary affirmation and a staging of this OUN-UPA legacy, both ideological and martial. The Prague narrative thus fully represents a third way dynamic that feeds their discourse to the point of finding its geographical representation in their geopolitical ambition.

A claimed historical affiliation

In his article "Elusive Proteus: A study in the ideological morphology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists", Ivan Gomza (2015) explains the three main characteristics of the ideology of the OUN-UPA. First, an ambition for a national rebirth, claiming a cultural heritage that would have been distorted by their contemporaries, who were the sign of a political decline. The warrior image of the Cossacks is glorified as a symbol of independence and protection of the Nation (p.199). Second, the claim of a third way between two national models against which they are opposed: The Soviet communism on the one hand and the Western liberal democracy on the other hand. The former would be in total contradiction with nationalist values, while the latter would both oppose Ukrainian independence and jeopardize national cohesion through its electoral competition (p.200)³. Third, the

³ Indeed, Gomza (2015) explains that «Soviet communism, an officially materialistic, anti-religious, internationalist, and class-warfare doctrine, was antonymous to fundamental nationalist values of spiritual idealism, religiosity, and belief in national community transcending the class differences (...). Liberal democracy (...) was associated with the Second Polish Republic, an anti-Ukrainian edifice erected upon the ruins of the Western Ukrainian People's Republic. Moreover, liberal democracy was a value-system of the Western Europeans

use of violence was seen as "an instrument of imposing and sustaining a new order" and, more broadly, as a way of confronting Jewish and Polish populations that might endanger this project (p. 201). A guideline that Bandera seemed to have retained despite the OUN's convergence with more liberal Western values after 1943. Indeed, he highly criticized this liberalization, perceived as a submission to Western values, although he recognized its benefits in terms of recruitment and cooperation. These are three characteristics that can be found in Azov in a contemporary version, as we shall see later.

This Banderist legacy is claimed and celebrated by Azov and their memory is kept alive, as we can see in several ways on the National Corps website. Several memorial actions are carried out, among which the celebration, every 1st of January, of the anniversary of Bandera. This gives the opportunity to different commemorative activities such as film projections (NC-B7, 2017)⁴, visits to his places of life and memory (NC-B8, 2017), or processions (NC-B11, 2018; NC-B2, 2020). During these events, Bandera's memory is glorified as a symbol of struggle for liberation (NC-B1, 2021) and defense of national interests (NC-B9, 2017). According to them, he would represent the embodiment of ideological purity that would not give in to please the West, as they consider liberal democracies unreliable against Moscow (Petro Klimchuk, NC-B5, 2018). More violent actions are also celebrated, such as the sponsored assassinations of Soviet and Polish personalities in the 1930s (NC-B10, 2018). Other OUN-UPA leaders also have their anniversaries celebrated, such as Stepan Lenkavsky (NC-OU1, 2020), Mikhail Zayats (NC-OU2, 2020), and Roman Kravchuk (NC-OU3, 2020), whose produced narratives emphasize their commitment and repression against the Poles, Germans and Soviets. Their funerals are also commemorated, like the one of Hryts Khmilenko (NC-OU5). We also see triumphalist

who forged a Versailles Europe with no place for an independent Ukraine. (...). Secondly, the OUN members professed a profound mistrust in electoral politics and political parties. They lamented the deleterious effects of democratic rule on social structure and national cohesion." (p. 200).

⁴ We want to specify here that it is activist literature. To this end, we seek to highlight the perception, meaning and staging of the group by itself. The universe of meaning that they seek to make visible. In order to simplify and distinguish the resources, we adopt a particular numbering system for the activist sources analyzed, which makes it easier to find the references in the bibliography.

speeches of certain battles, such as the battle of Zhovka led by the UPA battalion "Galaida I"(NC-OU6, 2020). Other various practices are also carried out to maintain this memory, such as the rehabilitation of UPA fighters' graves (NC-OU11, 2020) or the UPA march. This march is celebrated annually on October 14 as a replacement for the USSR's inherited Defender of the Fatherland Day (NC-B12, 2017; NC-OU8 and 9, 2020). A set of discourses and practices promoted that are fully in line with the Prague narrative as a narrative of a struggle for autonomy from Europe and Russia. Even more, where the current official post-Maidan position tends to ignore or minimize the abuses of the OUN, the radical right does not embrace these issues and glorifies these organizations as a source of inspiration (Mierzejewski-Voznyak 2018).

But more than the claim of this memorial legacy, Azov seeks to be more directly integrated and asserted as the symbolic link between this past, the present and the future of the country. A continuity that is first found in the organizational and ideological transmission through organizations that take up the political and paramilitary model of the OUN-UPA and its integral revolutionary nationalism (Ishchenko 2020b, 209; Mokrushyna 2020, 195). Andreas Umland (2019) explains that Biletsky⁵ openly claimed this legacy: "We have not moved away from what we are. Everything that is behind 'Azov's' soul comes from our right-wing ideology, from the heritage of the Patriot of Ukraine." (p.121). Azov also tries to be part of a symbolic continuity. Thereby, it may not be a coincidence that (birth) anniversaries are also commemorated, which can be part of this rhetoric of continuity of a commitment that never ceases (as well as the omnipresent flame in the events). Therefore, during these commemorative actions, it is not only references to the past that are presented, but also to the present. The gatherings are an opportunity to call on people to be inspired by this struggle from which they claim to be heirs (NC-B3, 2020) and which echo the political issues of the group. Therefore, the past is mobilized to refer to a present in which the enemy has not changed (NC-B11, 2018; NC-B4, 2021).

⁵ Azov's leader, he had first been involved in other organizations such as Stepan Bandera's Trident and then Patriots of Ukraine (Mokrushyna 2020, p.197).

From this perspective, it is also - and perhaps mostly - the military legacy that is asserted. This martial emphasis can be seen, for example, in the claim of Cossack heritage, seen as symbols of purity fighting for Ukraine's independence. In the National Corps presentation video, the narrator explains: "By the Scythians, Sarmatians, druzhinniki of Rus, Zaporozhian cossaks, an ancient military tradition has passed to me. I have to stand on guard of our civilization protecting our land from the wild east. " (NC-POL3, 2016). This same spirit can be seen in murals painted on the walls observed in the activist places visited: some show their will of affiliation to a whole past warrior genealogy when others symbolize a future-oriented perspective. Moreover, when I asked an activist of the movement which historical figure inspired him, he explained me: "In fact, it is the most popular men among our historical leaders, like those of the Cossack period or the time of the "landlords" of Kyiv or any European political leader of ancient Greece or ancient Rome or the Middle Ages who led the Europeans and the wars in difficult times"⁶. Through inspiration, references or even commemorations, Azov is directly involved in this military mythical heritage that contributes to shape their modes of action, claim and affirmation of a certain national narrative.

Practice of a legacy and militarization of the civilian sphere

This radical (para)militarist inheritance that Azov claims - that a more liberal vision of the Prague narrative incorporates less - is not only found in a symbolic way but is also expressed in practice through both the use and the staging of violence. Before their involvement in Azov, several activists we met mentioned a certain socialization to violent practices, via, for example, training in the use of weapons or in combat sports. Practices that were promoted by existing nationalist groups, such as Patriots of Ukraine where VO2 explained to me that "everyone learned to use weapons or techniques like how to walk... And things like that."⁷. Several violent

⁶ Interview with VO2, 2016.

⁷ Interview with VO2, 2016.

actions were also pursued, such as the practice of “safaris”⁸. Ishchenko (2020c) explains that “the far right were preparing for radical confrontation with the government for years before Maidan” (p. 825). This experience was applied during Maidan, not only against the government but also against left-wing activists participating in the revolution (Ishchenko 2020b; 2020c)⁹.

Thereafter, violence in its military and political dimensions continues to be mobilized and legitimized through a strong valorization of the warrior *ethos*. To this end, through the National Corps and certain other militant structures that gravitate in its sphere, the movement contributes to offer a structure of reconversion of military capital into activist capital that perpetuates the fighting ideal in the civilian environment. A reconversion that contributes to a transmission to new generations of skills and knowledge that tend to be militarized. For example, combat sports, learning to use weapons, and history courses that mobilize national myths fully invest this martial meaning sphere while being also considered as a space of socialization of the young generations. This militaristic tradition of the radical right is then maintained in activist mobilizations. Symbolically, the force is staged with demonstrations that take on a particular aesthetic: uniform outfits (black, camouflaged or in the colors of the party), flags, smoke bombs, torches, uses of symbols mixing an anchorage in a particular national narrative and references to the radical right (evocation of Cossacks, runes, black sun, Celtic cross) are basic elements of the demonstrations of the last few years (see for example NC-B11, 2018; NC-B2 and 3, 2020; NC-OU4 and 9, 2020 or NC-B4, 2021). On January 28, 2018, the National Druzhyna, an activist structure founded by former Azov members and still gravitating within this movement’s sphere, organized a march with strong military overtones. Portrayed as a “civic formation for the protection of public order,” some 600 people marched in line, masked and dressed in black or camouflaged clothing to publicly profess their involvement (Fedeczko and Kupfer 2018). In early August 2020, Oleksiy Kuzmenko (2020) also reported on his Twitter account the creation of Centuria, a new organization linked to Azov, promising that “everything anti-Ukrainian will be

⁸ Interview with O1, 2017.

⁹ This may indicate a will for a memorial monopolization of the event, contributing to the current visibility of Azov.

annihilated." A video is added showing many masked men dressed in black and arranged in ranks.

But if strength is made visible, it also continues to be expressed in action. In an article for *Open Democracy*, Denys Gorbach (2018) presents the radical right as "political entrepreneurs who are trying to capitalize on their expertise in violence.". In early 2018, the author lists several incidents of physical violence against antifascist (19 January, Kiev) and left-wing groups (28 January, Lviv), cultural activities questioning discrimination (11 February, Mariupol), LGBTQ+ mobilizations (Kharkiv, 13 February) or feminist actions in general (8 March). A similar observation is made by Ishschenko (2018) who explains that these social-political groups represent easy targets because of their difficulty in physically defending themselves, their stigmatization by an anti-communist and conservative audience and their representation as foreign agents supported by the West. While these mobilizations are sometimes hardly attributed to a specific nationalist organization, Mokrushyna (2020) explains that "National Corps declared that just as they did not let Putin turn Ukrainians into slaves, they will not allow LGBT to disregard the traditions of Ukrainian society and Ukrainian family, and to transgress Ukrainian moral principles." (p. 205). One could add to this an anti-refugee speech, which can be found in many ways in the militant book *Reconquista* (2016). We can also identify sometimes barely hidden threats against opponents (see for example NC-POL1, 2020). Anti-Semitism, traditionally attributed to radical nationalists and which was part of the Banderist violence, is however less emphasized. This could be part of a certain awareness of the communicational stakes surrounding the influence of the Stockholm narrative. The content of Azovian anti-Semitism is thus hard to assess, especially since some activists justify the use of symbols associated with Nazi Germany as a "troll" practice rather than an explicit desire for ethnic cleansing. However, this denies the violent and sensitive dimension of such practices. Also, Gomza and Zajaczkowski (2019) do not exclude the possibility that extreme ideas and "subcultural references" are discussed internally, between trusted individuals who would transmit the "real idea" that the "radical entrepreneurs" would preciously

keep. They would then embrace a similar perspective to the OUN's "dual political agenda" between what is externally accessible and what is developed internally, among insiders (Gomza 2015). According to the director-general of the Ukrainian Jewish Committee, Edward Dolinsky, the far right has shifted their focus from anti-Semitic rhetoric and violence to those they consider "pro-Russian" enemies: leftists and vulnerable minorities. However, in his opinion, "Ukraine's Jews are still on the far right's list of enemies" (Colborne 2019).

This valorization of the warrior *ethos* and of the (apparently) military ethic combined with more "social" actions such as ecological or youth mentoring allows them to put in act a political perspective of the construction of a new society wanted "purified" and hierarchized. Several enemies are then categorized, specifying the rigid borders of the in group and the out group for the formation of a new social order. All of these people are contrasted with the valued model of the traditional heterosexual and patriarchal family (see in particular the National Corps program, NC-POL4, n.d.). In this respect, an analogy is made between the army, the traditional family and the management of the nation in the sense that they represent - in their ideal - ordered and hierarchized structures of the social world, all three headed by the father figure of a charismatic leader (Stanley 2018). These speeches then come to testify the ideal of a reborn society. "The task of the young Patriots' organization and now the mission of Azov is to build a new country based on new principles and rules" VO15 told me¹⁰. A year earlier, when the National Corps had not been yet formed, VO6 explained me:

"We do our business from below. (...) We don't want to run the country. We make some competitions for the youth, we make history courses for the youth, about the history of Ukraine, we make actions related to ecology. This is what we do. It is necessary to conceive the new society. We have to start from the bottom. The most important thing is that those at the top must not sell Ukraine."¹¹

¹⁰ Interview with VO15, 2017.

¹¹ Interview with VO6, 2016.

We then find a palingenic dimension that Gomza (2015) described for the OUN. We note in this regard that before a political agenda (in the electoral sense of the term), Azov prioritizes a social agenda that they set by recovering the full legacy of Banderism in which armed and political commitment are two sides of the same coin.

Affirmation of a third (geo)political way

So, the Prague narrative is fully inscribed as a memorial legacy claimed and supported in its most rigid dimension by Azov. But more than that, this narrative can represent the very expression of its ideology, as a discourse centered around the idea of the third way. Indeed, despite the fact that the discourse of the third way is not unique to this movement and instead represents a typical stance of radical right-wing mobilizations (Gomza 2015; Vysotsky 2020), Azov seems to be fully involved in it, considered as a source of distinction. First, within the specific political stakes of Ukraine and its domestic political field. In the framing of an us versus a them, they develop a multi-polarity oppositional space that reminds us of the double horizontal and vertical dimensions of Brubaker's description of populism corresponding to the external and internal rejection of enemies (2017). In this configuration, Azov would be at the very center: In the horizontal dimension, they reject the external enemies, i. e. both Europe and Russia but also some foreign populations. And in the vertical dimension, they reject the labeled corrupted elites from the top and what they consider to be the very lowest part of their social scale from the bottom. Therefore, in addition to the multiple targets of violence mentioned above, the rhetoric of the double enemy is found repeatedly in the speeches of the volunteers I met, where the criticism of the Russian action is combined with a denunciation of the domestic political activities. VO1 explained me that "Azov is fighting for a new Ukraine, for freedom. The government is not interested in that"¹². VO9 also criticized the oligarchic system, arguing that "Ukraine, for the moment and even after the revolution, remains corrupt. There are oligarchs who have influence. And I think it's

¹² Interview with VO1, 2016.

not a good... We have to fight this system, you know... The system of the oligarchs' ambitions"¹³. A commitment that would then suffer from repression perceived as a hindrance or even persecution. VO15 sums up his opinion as follows: "We have two enemies here, as you must understand. Russia and our government, Ukrainian. That's why some people take part in the National Corps in Kyiv and others are here, trying to prove something, not by thought, not by words, not by considerations, but by their own hands, and weapons of course"¹⁴. It is therefore at the center of a multiple front that some of the volunteers we met put their military and activist commitment to the movement into perspective.

But if the notion of a third "central" alternative is activated in domestic politics, the register of the third way proposes above all an ideological alternative between two models. As VO17 explained me: "We want to make Ukraine strong and independent. We consider collaborations with European countries but not with the European Union, because we want to preserve the independence and sovereignty of our country."¹⁵ Indeed, in the same way that the OUN stood in opposition to communism and liberal democracy, Azov seeks to stand as an alternative to Western and Russian models. On March 16, 2017 Svoboda, Right Sector and the National Corps entered into a strategic alliance agreement (Colin Lebedev 2017, 88). This is part of the renewed project of Intermarium, presented as a European third way. According to the book published by the Azov movement entitled *Intermarium: Geopolitical Alternative for Central and Eastern Europe* (2016), this project aims at a union of the countries of Central and Eastern Europe located between the Adriatic, the Baltic and the Black Sea. It is then a matter of opposition to the cultural, economic and political influence of Western Europe and to the Russian yoke (NC-ITM2, 2016). As Matthew Kott (2017) summarizes:

¹³ Interview with VO9, 2016.

¹⁴ Interview with VO15, 2017.

¹⁵ Interview with VO17, 2017.

“This interpretation takes the ideas of nationalist conservatives further by positing that Intermarium is, essentially, the remaining heartland of the “true Europe”, a bulwark not only against Putinist “neo-Bolshevism” encroaching from Moscow, but also against the neoliberal, multicultural, secular and feminist “neo-Bolshevism” (also known as “cultural Marxism”) emanating from Brussels.”

A geopolitical alternative whose cartography finally takes up the features of the geographical division of the Prague narrative. We would then find, in a certain way, the boundaries proposed by Yoav Galai (2019): an ex-Soviet Central and Eastern Europe privileging the Prague narrative. A space divided between a Western Europe shaped by the Stockholm narrative and a Russia that continues to favor the Moscow narrative. The Prague narrative paves the way for a memorial alternative between the two Western and Russian models. It is thus vigorously defended and claimed in its integrity by Azov, while also fully fitting into their (geo)political perspectives.

Conclusion: A counter-hegemonic battle.

To conclude, where the Prague narrative was the object of memorial tensions for its more liberal/democratic defenders, the Azov movement instead fully claims its legacy by placing itself in the ideological and paramilitary continuity of the OUN-UPA. This strict vision (in the sense of being impermeable to competing narratives and whose grey areas are assumed) of the Prague narrative offers them a tool of distinction that is fully in line with their aim to present a political alternative both within the Ukrainian political field and internationally. It allows them to perform their integral revolutionary nationalism. The militarization of the civil sphere, driven both symbolically and through violent actions, becomes a mirror of their struggle to assert a Ukrainian identity constructed in the perspective of a pure (or purified) and independent nation. The Prague narrative does not constitute a memorial historical innovation for Azov, but rather the continuity of their radical nationalist commitment.

However, what might appear to be different is the intensity of its manifestation, which contributes to its distinction from the rest of the political field.

In this regard, Azov seems to be driven by a street strategy rather than an electoral one (Ishchenko 2018; Umland 2020). We could see it through their insurrectionary component, the "bottom-up" commitments or even the attempt - also aesthetic¹⁶- to occupy and deploy the political discourse. A strategy that would then participate above all in a long-term counter-hegemonic cultural battle rather than a sporadic electoralist political fight in a relatively favorable context for such speeches¹⁷.

References:

- Ackerman, Galia, and Philippe de Lara. 2018. "L'Ukraine, l'Europe et la mémoire de la Shoah." *Commentaire* 161 (1): 211–18.
<https://doi.org/10.3917/comm.161.0211>.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. 2000. *Propos Sur Le Champ Politique*. Lyon: Presses universitaires de Lyon.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 2017. "Why Populism?" *Theory and Society* 46 (5): 357–85.
<https://doi.org/10.1007/s11186-017-9301-7>.
- Colborne, Michael. 2019. "Ukraine's Far Right Is Growing Increasingly Violent - Why Aren't Local Jews Concerned?" Haaretz.Com. 2019.
<https://www.haaretz.com/world-news/europe/.premium-ukraine-s-far-right-is-increasingly-violent-why-aren-t-local-jews-concerned-1.6852878>.
- Colin Lebedev, Anna. 2017. "Les Combattants et Les Anciens Combattants Du Donbass : Profil Social, Poids Militaire et Influence Politique." *Études de l'IRSEM*, no. 53.
- Deschanet, Maxime. 2014. "« Et prouverons, frères, que nous sommes de la lignée des Cosaques ». Un mythe pour unir l'Ukraine ?" *Cahiers Sens public* n° 17-18 (1): 27–40. <https://doi.org/10.3917/csp.017.0027>.
- Droit, Emmanuel. 2007. "Le Goulag contre la Shoah: Mémoires officielles et cultures mémorielles dans l'Europe élargie." *Vingtième Siècle. Revue d'histoire* 94 (2): 101–20. <https://doi.org/10.3917/ving.094.0101>.
- Fedeczko, Sofia, and Matthew Kupfer. 2018. "What's Behind Ukraine's Shocking « National Druzhyna » Militia ?" *Hromadske*, 2018.
<https://en.hromadske.ua/posts/whats-behind-ukraines-shocking-national-druzhyna-militia>.
- Galai, Yoav. 2019. "The Transnational Mythscape of the Second World War." *Memory*

¹⁶ In the sense of a deployment of resources with codes and specific symbols allowing to be seen and recognized while transmitting a political message by this direct visibility.

¹⁷ Even more if we consider the metamorphosis dimension of ideology as presented by Gomza (2015).

- Studies*, July, 1–16. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1750698019863151>.
- Gobert, Sébastien. 2018. “En Ukraine, le passé toujours vivant.” *Études* 4249 (5): 19–30.
- Gomza, Ivan. 2015. “Elusive Proteus: A Study in the Ideological Morphology of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists.” *Communist and Post-Communist Studies* 48 (2–3): 195–207. <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.postcomstud.2015.06.005>.
- Gomza, Ivan, and Johann Zajackowski. 2019. “Black Sun Rising: Political Opportunity Structure Perceptions and Institutionalization of the Azov Movement in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine.” *Nationalities Papers* 47 (5): 774–800. <https://doi.org/10.1017/nps.2019.30>.
- Gorbach, Denys. 2018. “Entrepreneurs of Political Violence: The Varied Interests and Strategies of the Far-Right in Ukraine.” *OpenDemocracy*. 2018. <https://www.opendemocracy.net/en/odr/entrepreneurs-of-political-violence-ukraine-far-right/>.
- Goujon, Alexandra, and Ioulia Shukan. 2015. “Sortir de l’anonymat en situation révolutionnaire.” *Politix* n° 112 (4): 33–57.
- Himka, John-Paul. 2008. “Obstacles to the Integration of the Holocaust into Post-Communist East European Historical Narratives.” *Canadian Slavonic Papers* 50 (3–4): 359–72. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00085006.2008.11092588>.
- . 2013. “The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Ukraine.” In *Bringing the Dark Past to Light: The Reception of the Holocaust in Postcommunist Europe*, edited by John-Paul Himka and Joanna Beata Michlic, 626–62. UNP - Nebraska. <https://doi.org/10.2307/j.ctt1ddr8vf>.
- Ishchenko, Volodymyr. 2018. “The Unique Extra-Parliamentary Power of Ukrainian Radical Nationalists Is a Threat to the Political Regime and Minorities.” *The Foreign Policy Centre* (blog). July 18, 2018. <https://fpc.org.uk/the-unique-extra-parliamentary-power-of-ukrainian-radical-nationalists-is-a-threat-to-the-political-regime-and-minorities/>.
- . 2020a. “Contradictions of Post-Soviet Ukraine and Failure of Ukraine’s New Left.” *Lefteast* (blog). January 9, 2020. <https://lefteast.org/contradictions-post-soviet-ukraine-failure-ukraine-new-left/>.
- . 2020b. “Insufficiently Diverse: The Problem of Nonviolent Leverage and Radicalization of Ukraine’s Maidan Uprising, 2013–2014.” *Journal of Eurasian Studies* 11 (2): 201–15. <https://doi.org/10.1177/1879366520928363>.
- . 2020c. “Left Divergence, Right Convergence: Anarchists, Marxists, and Nationalist Polarization in the Ukrainian Conflict, 2013–2014.” *Globalizations* 17 (5): 820–39. <https://doi.org/10.1080/14747731.2020.1722495>.
- Kasianov, Georgiy. 2015. “History, Politics and Memory (Ukraine 1990s–2000s).” In *Memory and Change in Europe : Eastern Perspectives*, edited by Malgorzata Pakier and Joanna Wawrzyniak, Berghahn Books, 193–211. New York.
- Kott, Matthew. 2017. “A Far Right Hijack of Intermarium.” *New Eastern Europe* 2 (May). <https://neweasterneurope.eu/2017/05/26/a-far-right-hijack-of-intermarium/>.
- Kravchenko, Volodymyr. 2015. “Fighting Soviet Myths: The Ukrainian Experience.” *Harvard Ukrainian Studies* 34 (1/4): 447–84.

- Kuzmenko, Oleksiy. 2020. "Everything." Twitter. 2020.
<https://twitter.com/kooleksiy/status/1289994308628578304>.
- Likhatchev, Viatcheslav. 2016. "Les Radicaux de Droite Dans Le Conflit Russo-Ukrainien." *Russie.Nei.Visions*, Ifri, , no. 95: 32.
- Mierzejewski-Voznyak, Melanie. 2018. *The Radical Right in Post-Soviet Ukraine*. Edited by Jens Rydgren. Vol. 1. Oxford University Press.
<https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190274559.013.30>.
- Mokrushyna, Halyna. 2020. "Andriy Biletsky's Ukrainian Order: Discourse, Actions and Prospects of Democracy in Ukraine." In *Language of Conflict : Discourses of the Ukrainian Crisis*, edited by Natalia Knoblock. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.
<https://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=2467653&site=ehost-live>.
- Mrachnik, Dmitry. 2021. "Что Могут Сделать Россияне Для Предотвращения Войны? Краткий Гайд Для Революционеров." *Nihilist*, April 9, 2021.
https://www.nihilist.li/2021/04/09/chto-mogut-sdelat-rossiyane-dlya-predotvrashheniya-vojny-kratkij-gajd-dlya-revoljucionerov/?fbclid=IwAR03IE_p-A9c84hak5o-qiXE-vCxC_H4r_LMe0ycpqW36RdsYaKauNEtk.
- Shekhovtsov, Anton. 2015. "The Uneasy Reality of Antifascism in Ukraine." *Anton Shekhovtsov's Blog* (blog). March 14, 2015. <http://anton-shekhovtsov.blogspot.com/2015/03/the-uneasy-reality-of-antifascism-in.html>.
- Shekhovtsov, Anton, and Andreas Umland. 2014. "Ukraine's Radical Right." *Journal of Democracy* 25 (3): 58–63.
- Shevel, Oxana. 2016. "No Way Out ? Post-Soviet Ukraine's Memory Wars in Comparative Perspective." In *Beyond the Euromaidan: Comparative Perspectives on Advancing Reform in Ukraine*, edited by Henry E. Hale and Robert W. Orttung, 21–40. Stanford, California: Stanford University Press.
- Stanley, Jason. 2018. *How Fascism Works: The Politics of Us and Them*. First edition. New York: Random House.
- Umland, Andreas. 2019. "Irregular Militias and Radical Nationalism in Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: The Prehistory and Emergence of the 'Azov' Battalion in 2014." *Terrorism and Political Violence* 31 (1): 105–31.
<https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1555974>.
- . 2020. "The Far Right in Pre- and Post-Euromaidan Ukraine: From Ultra-Nationalist Party Politics to Ethno-Centric Uncivil Society." *Demokratizatsiya* 28 (2): 247–68.
- Umland, Andreas, and Anton Shekhovtsov. 2013. "Ultraright Party Politics in Post-Soviet Ukraine and the Puzzle of the Electoral Marginalism of Ukrainian Ultranationalists in 1994-2009." *Russian Politics & Law* 51 (5): 33–58.
<https://doi.org/10.2753/RUP1061-1940510502>.
- Vysotsky, Stanislav. 2020. *American Antifa: The Tactics, Culture, and Practice of Militant Anti-Fascism*. Fascism and the Far Right. Abingdon, Oxon ; New York, NY: Routledge.
- Wishart, Alexandra. 2019. "The Radical Left in Ukraine since Maidan: The Case of the

National Anarchist Movement.” Master Thesis, University of Glasgow and National University of Kyiv Mohyla Academy.

Yurchuk, Yuliya. 2017. “Reclaiming the Past, Confronting the Past: OUN–UPA Memory Politics and Nation Building in Ukraine (1991–2016).” In *War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus*, edited by Julie Fedor, Markku Kangaspuro, Jussi Lassila, and Tatiana Zhurzhenko, 107–37. Cham: Springer International Publishing. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-66523-8_4.

Activist resources :

NC-B1 : “1 січня — день народження Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2021. Url : <https://nationalcorps.org/1-sichnya-den-narodzhennya-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B2: “До дня народження Степана Бандери націоналісти організують марші по всій Україні”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/do-dnya-narodzhennya-stepana-banderi-nacionalisti-organizovuyut-marshi-po-vsij-ukraini/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B3: “Національний Корпус Івано-Франківщини вшанував пам’ять легендарного провідника ОУН Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/hacionalnij-koppus-ivano-frankivshhini-vshanuvav-pamyat-legendarnogo-providnika-oun-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B4: “У Львові Нацкорпус вшанував пам’ять Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2021. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/u-lvovi-nackorpus-vshanuvav-pamyat-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B5: Klimchuk, Petro. 2018. “Чому Степан Бандера актуальний і сьогодні”, *National Corps*. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/chomu-stepan-bandera-aktualnij-sogodn/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B7: “8 січня відбувся присвячений 108-й річниці від дня народження Степана Андрійовича Бандери кінопоказ”, *National Corps*, 2017. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/8-schnja-vdbuvsja-prisvjachenij-108j-rchnic-vd-dnja-narodzhennja-stepana-andrjovicha-banderi-knopokaz/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B8: “День народження провідника”, *National Corps*, 2017. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/den-narodzhennja-provdnika/> (April 18, 2021)

NC-B9: “Сьогодні день народження Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2017. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/sogodn-den-narodzhennja-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)

- NC-B10 : “1 січня – день народження Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2018. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/1-schnja-den-narodzhennja-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)
- NC-B11 : “В Рівному пройшов смолоскипний марш на честь дня народження Степана Бандери”, *National Corps*, 2018. Url : <https://nationalcorps.org/v-rvnomu-projshov-smoloskipnij-marsh-na-chest-dnja-narodzhennja-stepana-banderi/> (April 18, 2021)
- NC-B12: “У Києві відбувся гучний тридцятитисячний «Марш Слави Героїв»”, *National Corps*, 2017. Url : <https://nationalcorps.org/u-kiv-vdbuvsja-guchnij-tridcjatitjsjachnij-marsh-slavi-gerov/> (April 18, 2021)
- NC-OU1: “116th birth anniversary of the creator of the Decalogue of the Ukrainian Nationalist”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/116th-birth-anniversary-of-the-creator-of-the-decalogue-of-the-ukrainian-nationalist/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU2 : “День в історії: родився Михайл Заяц – личный охраннык Романа Шухевича”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url : <https://nationalcorps.org/den-v-istorii-rodilsya-mihail-zayac-lichnyj-ohrannik-romana-shuhevicha/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU3: “Today marks 110 years since the birth of prominent OUN and UPA figure Roman Kravchuk”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/segodnya-ispolnyaetsya-110-let-so-dnya-rozheniya-vydayushhegosya-deyatelya-oun-i-upa-romana-kravchuka/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU4: “The UPA March 2020 has begun in Kyiv”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/the-upa-march-2020-has-begun-in-kyiv/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU5 : “National Corps honored the memory of the cornet of the UPA army Hryts Khmilenko”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/national-corps-honored-the-memory-of-the-cornet-of-the-upa-army-hryts-khmilenko/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU6 : “The battle between the UPA and the KGB near Zhovkva, Lviv region”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/the-battle-between-the-upa-and-the-kgb-near-zhovkva/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU8 : “В Стрые Нацкорпус організовал марш УПА”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url : <https://nationalcorps.org/v-strye-nackorpus-organizoval-marsh-upa/> (April 19, 2021)

- NC-OU9 : “Марш УПА 2020: Нацкорпус озвучил требования к властям”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/marsh-upa-2020-nackorpus-ozvuchil-trebovaniya-k-vlastyam/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-OU11: “Активисты Нацкорпуса Тернопольщины присоединились к открытию памятного креста на месте захоронения бойца УПА”, *National Corps*, 2020. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/aktivisty-nackorpusa-ternopolshhiny-prisoedinilis-k-otkrytiyu-pamyatnogo-kresta-na-meste-zahoroeniya-bojca-upa/> (April 19, 2021)
- NC-POL1: Sobolevskiy, Vladyslav. 2020. “The anti-Ukrainian hype could turn to a personal tragedy for Kiva”, *National Corps*. Url: <https://nationalcorps.org/the-anti-ukrainian-hype-could-turn-into-a-personal-tragedy-for-kiva/> (April 18, 2021)
- NC-POL3: “ПУХ. докфильм про националистическое движение в Украине. Eng. sub.”, *National Corps*, 2016. Url: <https://ok.ru/video/66053707442987-1> (April 25, 2021)
- NC-POL4: “Program”, *National Corps*. Url: https://nationalcorps.org/programm_nk/ (April 25, 2021).
- NC-ITM2: *Intermarium: Geopolitical Alternative for Central and Eastern Europe*, Kiev, Orientyr, 2016, 159 p.